Bart Van Stappen
13 augustus 2005, 01:55
__________________________________________________ ____________________
Hanson Agonistes
by Gene Callahan
01 Among pundits currently urging Americans to embrace an eternal
state of war, I find Victor Davis Hanson one of the most
disturbing. Hanson is obviously far more intelligent than shills
like John Podhoretz or Charles Krauthammer, and on the surface he
seems more reasonable. But closer analysis of his writing exposes
that "reasonableness" as a mere patina over the same martial
infatuation possessing his less able comrades. His recent column [1]
defending the atomic bombing of Hiroshima reveals the Mr. Hyde
lurking within our Dr. Jekyll.
02 Hanson begins by declaring, "For 60 years the United States has
agonized over its unleashing of the world's first nuclear weapon
on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945." Say what? I've been around for
46 of those years, and I recall very little "agonizing." Sure,
every once in a while some spoilsport would question the decision,
only to be denounced as an "America hater."
03 So what justified unleashing the A-bomb on the world and melting a
large city along with its unfortunate inhabitants? Hanson says:
"Truman's supporters [argued] that, in fact, a blockade and
negotiations had not forced the Japanese generals to surrender
unconditionally. In their view, a million American casualties and
countless Japanese dead were adverted by not storming the Japanese
mainland over the next year in the planned two-pronged assault on
the mainland, dubbed Operation Coronet and Olympic."
04 Hanson leaves unanswered the question of why the US would only
accept an unconditional surrender. Just war theory, which is an
application of the broader moral theory of aggression, says that
such a course is unacceptable. One may not initiate aggression,
and one is justified in responding to aggression only to the
extent needed to stop it. The view adopted does not suggest that
it renders automatic all choices in war or other conflicts. For
example, there is always uncertainty about just what level of
response is needed to halt some specific act of aggression.
Furthermore, in cases where the enemy is actively fighting, there
may arise "lifeboat" situations, in which one is confronted with a
few stark choices, all of which will contribute directly to the
death of non-combatants. But these do not arise once the enemy has
laid down arms and is talking.
05 Hanson would claim that the US had to demand unconditional
surrender in order to prevent the possibility that a revived Japan
might undertake aggression again in the future. (One wonders how
near he believes that future must be - can one wipe every member
of an enemy nation to ensure safety from it forever?) But
realistic worries on that front can be worked out in peace
negotiations. Having caught a burglar in one's home, one is not
entitled to then slice off his hands, on the chance that,
otherwise, he might rob again. If he is willing to surrender, the
remedies to implement become a matter for intellectual, not
violent, dispute.
06 That does not mean both sides in the discussion have the same
voice. Japan was willing to discuss its terms of surrender, and
was not demanding that of the US. The US could have made clear
that any attempt by the enemy to improve its military situation
would be met with renewed force, without having to agree to
similar conditions, given that its opponent was near collapse.
Thus, America could have built up its arsenal while negotiating,
and, if Japan would not agree to terms acceptable to the US, could
have resumed the war in an even more favorable position. Of
course, maintaining US forces around Japan would have been costly,
but Hanson isn't so brazen as to defend the atomic option because
it saved money.
07 In terms of the particulars of the time, the main bone of
contention was apparently whether or not the Japanese emperor
would be allowed to remain on his throne. However, after Japan did
surrender unconditionally, he was permitted to do so anyway.
Oops-a-daisy! What's more, there is a growing realization that
Japan's ability to continue fighting was about nil. As a veteran
of the Pacific war recently wrote [2]: "The truth is, I now believe,
that in August of 1945, the Japanese Imperial Army could not have
defended its homeland against a well-trained troop of Eagle
Scouts."
08 In any case, if all roads to one's goal lead through Hell, perhaps
one should mull over giving up the goal? But, in Hanson's pagan
ethic, crushing one's enemies comes first, and morality is only a
tool in choosing among the various means of doing so.
09 But let us say we grant Hanson his premise that achieving Japan's
unconditional surrender was the overriding moral imperative for
the US in 1945. He admits, "Hiroshima was the most awful option
imaginable," but makes a leap of faith and asserts, "the other
scenarios would have probably turned out even worse." Perhaps, but
couldn't one begin with less awful options and escalate only if
they didn't succeed? For instance, what about continuing to
blockade the country while announcing a deadline after which
measures would escalate? Hanson argues that the US could not
afford to drop a "demonstration bomb" since it only had two, but
the time given for a blockade to succeed could have been spent
building a third one with which to give that warning.
10 Hanson next moves on to the "we'd done worse" argument:
"Hiroshima, then, was not the worst single-day loss of life in
military history. The Tokyo fire raid on the night of March 9/10,
five months earlier, was far worse, incinerating somewhere around
150,000 civilians, and burning out over 15 acres of the downtown.
Indeed, "Little Boy," the initial nuclear device that was dropped
60 years ago, was understood as the continuance of that policy of
unrestricted bombing - its morality already decided by the ongoing
attacks on the German and Japanese cities begun at least three
years earlier."
11 To be fair, Hanson makes a good point: If unrestricted bombing is
moral, then there is no fundamental basis for qualms at going
nuclear. But it is fatuous to declare that the morality of
unrestricted bombing already had been decided simply because it
had been employed. If a serial killer switches from a sword to a
gun as his weapon of choice, what sort of defense is it to claim
that the morality of serial killing was "already decided" when he
was using the sword?
12 Hanson continues: "Americans of the time hardly thought the
Japanese populace to be entirely innocent." Here we have morality
by opinion poll embracing a grim collectivism. Because some
Japanese civilians were more or less involved in the war effort,
all of them, even infants, were fair game to be slaughtered. Note
that this sort of thinking is exactly how Osama bin Laden
justifies striking civilian targets in the US, Britain, or Spain.
We must grant that the conduct of modern warfare blurs the line
between combatants and non-combatants - on which side of it are
the workers in a bomb factory? But as blurry as we might make it,
an infant in Hiroshima or a new immigrant delivering a sandwich to
the World Trade Center are obviously non-combatants.
13 Hanson notes: "The Imperial Japanese army routinely butchered
civilians abroad - some 10-15 million Chinese were eventually to
perish - throughout the Pacific from the Philippines to Korea and
Manchuria." So we can, too! (And would those Philippines be the
same ones where the US army killed 250,000 people when they tried
to assert their independence?)
14 Hanson plays the saddened realist accepting minimizing suffering,
saying: "The truth, as we are reminded so often in this present
conflict, is that usually in war there are no good alternatives,
and leaders must select between a very bad and even worse choice."
Quite so - but that is why we should end wars sooner rather than
later, and avoid demanding things like unconditional surrender.
15 Once analyzed, none of these "moral arguments" are very
convincing. The reason that such a smart fellow makes such weak
moral arguments is that they are red herrings. The truth is that
he and his cohorts just really love war, and love does not stop to
ask "Why?" Michael Ledeen can only urge that wars arrive "faster,
please." Hanson criticizes both sides of conflicts for not getting
down to fighting sooner. But they know they have to talk the good
talk, to cloak their raw aggression in some ethical finery, or
else the public will turn from their views in disgust. In the end,
they are children in adult bodies, who never lost their
fascination with moving little plastic soldiers and tanks around
their bedrooms.
August 11, 2005
Gene Callahan, the author of Economics for Real People, is an
adjunct scholar of the Ludwig von Mises Institute and a
contributing columnist to LewRockwell.com.
Copyright © 2005 Gene Callahan
--
[1] <http://www.nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson200508050714.asp>
[2] <http://www.antiwar.com/ocregister/saved-by-the-bomb.html>
__________________________________________________ ____________________
("Hanson Agonistes by Gene Callahan"
<http://www.lewrockwell.com/callahan/callahan146.html>)
De VS maakten zich in het gebied schuldig aan uitdagende oorlogsstokerij en
het plegen daden van oorlog tegen Japan, een land waarmee ze niet in oorlog
heetten te zijn. De bedoeling was door de blokkade -- een daad van oorlog --
Japan ertoe te verleiden zich tegen de oorlogszuchtige VS te verweren,
waardoor, gezien ook het bondgenootschap tussen Japan en Duitsland, meteen
de VS -- eindelijk -- in WO-II zou kunnen treden. De Japanse aanval op Pearl
Harbor was door de VS zorgvuldig ontworpen en beraamd. Dag en uur van deze
"verrassingsaanval" waren door FDR en zijn oorlogszuchtige medewerkers
gekend. Voor de Amerikaanse vlootcommandant-ter-plekke (Haïti), die door hun
eigen overheid in het ongewisse werden gelaten, was het wél een volslagen
verrassing, maar *niet* voor het Witte Huis.
Admiraal James O. Richardson, Opperbevelhebber van de Amerikaanse Vloot (the
Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet), werd op 8 oktober 1940 in het
befaamde "Oval Office" ontboden. Hij kreeg er door de president zelf het
Machiavellistische plan uiteengezet. Admiraal Richardson weigerde zijn
medewerking daaraan -- aan het weerloos laten afslachten van duizenden van
zijn manschappen -- en werd daarom afgezet -- en vervangen door in allerijl
bevorderde vertrouwelingen van de president, die echter van de plannen in
het ongewisse werden gelaten.
Wie belangstelling mocht hebben voor het hoe, wat en waarom van Pearl
Harbor, en wie wanneer wat waarvan wist, doet u er goed aan kennis te nemen
van het boek:
-----
Robert B. Stinnett, /Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl
Harbor/, New York (NY): Free Press, 2000, 260pp., ISBN 0684853396,
$26.00.
-----
Het boek is niet echt een 'prettig' lezen, maar wel zo verhelderend -- en,
tja, ontluisterend.
Wie het boek zelf te dik zij; zo ook wie alvast een voorproefje wil, kan
terecht bij de samenvatting van de uiteenzetting die Stinnett hield voor het
The Independent Institute <http://www.independent.org/> in Oakland, CA.
Deze uiteenzetting werd ook opgenomen en in de VS "nationwide" uitgezonden
op 4 juli 2000.
De samenvatting als hierboven bedoeld, is na te lezen op:
Robert B. Stinnett, 7 december 2000:
"December 7, 1941 . . . a Day of Deceit"
<http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig/stinnett1.html>
Voor een bespreking van Stinnetts boek, kan men bijvoorbeeld terecht op:
Dr.hist. H. Arthur Scott Trask, 9 december 2000:
"The Conspiracies of Empire" <http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig/trask1.html>
President Franklin D. Roosevelt offerde wetens en willens duizenden
Amerikaanse staatsburgers op om toch maar ten allen prijze in de oorlog te
kunnen treden. Hij lokte de aanval op Pearl Harbor niet enkel wetens en
willens uit, maar bereikte er ook zijn doel mee: ondanks tegenstand van 80%
van de Amerikaanse burgers tóch in de oorlog treden. "It was a pretty cheap
price to pay for unifying the country." (sic, Lt. Commander Joseph J.
Rochefort, commander of Station HYPO at Pearl Harbor)
Dat zijn de allicht harde, maar niettemin inmiddels afdoende bewezen feiten.
Als u nog ooit hoort over Pearl Harbor en de "held" FDR, bedenk, weet dan
dat het gaat om leugen en bedrog. Om niet minder dan ja hoogverraad,
gepleegd door Amerikaans president Franklin D. Roosevelt en zijn staf van
vertrouwelingen. Om, ten koste van zovele mensenlevens ook, tegen de
Amerikaanse Grondwet, tegen de wil van de Amerikaanse bevolking, tegen het
Amerikaanse Huis van Afgevaardigden en tegen de Senaat, en met voorliegen en
bedriegen van al deze, te allen prijze de VS mee te sleuren in de totale
oorlog, die daarmee tot de tweede wereldoorlog werd.
Sommigen stellen vandaag overeenkomsten tussen de aanval van "9/11" (11
september) en die op Pearl Harbor. Zou het?
Deze maand, zovele maanden nadat de onderwerping van Irak voltooid verklaard
is, sneuvelen er in Irak van het Amerikaanse bezettingsleger nog steeds
enkel al aan soldaten of Marines, gemiddeld vier tot vijf -- per dag.
Allicht zullen sommigen om wat ik hierboven schrijf en aanhaal, (ook) mij
van "blinde Amerikahaat" willen betichten. Zelfs al zijn de (bewezen) feiten
ze onwelgevallig; ze dwalen.
Vooral ook patriotten hebben tot belangrijke opdracht hun regering te
wantrouwen. Ze weten waarom.
Groet,
Bart.
--
Het eerste slachtoffer van oorlog is de waarheid. -- H.L. Mencken
(1880-1956)
Hanson Agonistes
by Gene Callahan
01 Among pundits currently urging Americans to embrace an eternal
state of war, I find Victor Davis Hanson one of the most
disturbing. Hanson is obviously far more intelligent than shills
like John Podhoretz or Charles Krauthammer, and on the surface he
seems more reasonable. But closer analysis of his writing exposes
that "reasonableness" as a mere patina over the same martial
infatuation possessing his less able comrades. His recent column [1]
defending the atomic bombing of Hiroshima reveals the Mr. Hyde
lurking within our Dr. Jekyll.
02 Hanson begins by declaring, "For 60 years the United States has
agonized over its unleashing of the world's first nuclear weapon
on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945." Say what? I've been around for
46 of those years, and I recall very little "agonizing." Sure,
every once in a while some spoilsport would question the decision,
only to be denounced as an "America hater."
03 So what justified unleashing the A-bomb on the world and melting a
large city along with its unfortunate inhabitants? Hanson says:
"Truman's supporters [argued] that, in fact, a blockade and
negotiations had not forced the Japanese generals to surrender
unconditionally. In their view, a million American casualties and
countless Japanese dead were adverted by not storming the Japanese
mainland over the next year in the planned two-pronged assault on
the mainland, dubbed Operation Coronet and Olympic."
04 Hanson leaves unanswered the question of why the US would only
accept an unconditional surrender. Just war theory, which is an
application of the broader moral theory of aggression, says that
such a course is unacceptable. One may not initiate aggression,
and one is justified in responding to aggression only to the
extent needed to stop it. The view adopted does not suggest that
it renders automatic all choices in war or other conflicts. For
example, there is always uncertainty about just what level of
response is needed to halt some specific act of aggression.
Furthermore, in cases where the enemy is actively fighting, there
may arise "lifeboat" situations, in which one is confronted with a
few stark choices, all of which will contribute directly to the
death of non-combatants. But these do not arise once the enemy has
laid down arms and is talking.
05 Hanson would claim that the US had to demand unconditional
surrender in order to prevent the possibility that a revived Japan
might undertake aggression again in the future. (One wonders how
near he believes that future must be - can one wipe every member
of an enemy nation to ensure safety from it forever?) But
realistic worries on that front can be worked out in peace
negotiations. Having caught a burglar in one's home, one is not
entitled to then slice off his hands, on the chance that,
otherwise, he might rob again. If he is willing to surrender, the
remedies to implement become a matter for intellectual, not
violent, dispute.
06 That does not mean both sides in the discussion have the same
voice. Japan was willing to discuss its terms of surrender, and
was not demanding that of the US. The US could have made clear
that any attempt by the enemy to improve its military situation
would be met with renewed force, without having to agree to
similar conditions, given that its opponent was near collapse.
Thus, America could have built up its arsenal while negotiating,
and, if Japan would not agree to terms acceptable to the US, could
have resumed the war in an even more favorable position. Of
course, maintaining US forces around Japan would have been costly,
but Hanson isn't so brazen as to defend the atomic option because
it saved money.
07 In terms of the particulars of the time, the main bone of
contention was apparently whether or not the Japanese emperor
would be allowed to remain on his throne. However, after Japan did
surrender unconditionally, he was permitted to do so anyway.
Oops-a-daisy! What's more, there is a growing realization that
Japan's ability to continue fighting was about nil. As a veteran
of the Pacific war recently wrote [2]: "The truth is, I now believe,
that in August of 1945, the Japanese Imperial Army could not have
defended its homeland against a well-trained troop of Eagle
Scouts."
08 In any case, if all roads to one's goal lead through Hell, perhaps
one should mull over giving up the goal? But, in Hanson's pagan
ethic, crushing one's enemies comes first, and morality is only a
tool in choosing among the various means of doing so.
09 But let us say we grant Hanson his premise that achieving Japan's
unconditional surrender was the overriding moral imperative for
the US in 1945. He admits, "Hiroshima was the most awful option
imaginable," but makes a leap of faith and asserts, "the other
scenarios would have probably turned out even worse." Perhaps, but
couldn't one begin with less awful options and escalate only if
they didn't succeed? For instance, what about continuing to
blockade the country while announcing a deadline after which
measures would escalate? Hanson argues that the US could not
afford to drop a "demonstration bomb" since it only had two, but
the time given for a blockade to succeed could have been spent
building a third one with which to give that warning.
10 Hanson next moves on to the "we'd done worse" argument:
"Hiroshima, then, was not the worst single-day loss of life in
military history. The Tokyo fire raid on the night of March 9/10,
five months earlier, was far worse, incinerating somewhere around
150,000 civilians, and burning out over 15 acres of the downtown.
Indeed, "Little Boy," the initial nuclear device that was dropped
60 years ago, was understood as the continuance of that policy of
unrestricted bombing - its morality already decided by the ongoing
attacks on the German and Japanese cities begun at least three
years earlier."
11 To be fair, Hanson makes a good point: If unrestricted bombing is
moral, then there is no fundamental basis for qualms at going
nuclear. But it is fatuous to declare that the morality of
unrestricted bombing already had been decided simply because it
had been employed. If a serial killer switches from a sword to a
gun as his weapon of choice, what sort of defense is it to claim
that the morality of serial killing was "already decided" when he
was using the sword?
12 Hanson continues: "Americans of the time hardly thought the
Japanese populace to be entirely innocent." Here we have morality
by opinion poll embracing a grim collectivism. Because some
Japanese civilians were more or less involved in the war effort,
all of them, even infants, were fair game to be slaughtered. Note
that this sort of thinking is exactly how Osama bin Laden
justifies striking civilian targets in the US, Britain, or Spain.
We must grant that the conduct of modern warfare blurs the line
between combatants and non-combatants - on which side of it are
the workers in a bomb factory? But as blurry as we might make it,
an infant in Hiroshima or a new immigrant delivering a sandwich to
the World Trade Center are obviously non-combatants.
13 Hanson notes: "The Imperial Japanese army routinely butchered
civilians abroad - some 10-15 million Chinese were eventually to
perish - throughout the Pacific from the Philippines to Korea and
Manchuria." So we can, too! (And would those Philippines be the
same ones where the US army killed 250,000 people when they tried
to assert their independence?)
14 Hanson plays the saddened realist accepting minimizing suffering,
saying: "The truth, as we are reminded so often in this present
conflict, is that usually in war there are no good alternatives,
and leaders must select between a very bad and even worse choice."
Quite so - but that is why we should end wars sooner rather than
later, and avoid demanding things like unconditional surrender.
15 Once analyzed, none of these "moral arguments" are very
convincing. The reason that such a smart fellow makes such weak
moral arguments is that they are red herrings. The truth is that
he and his cohorts just really love war, and love does not stop to
ask "Why?" Michael Ledeen can only urge that wars arrive "faster,
please." Hanson criticizes both sides of conflicts for not getting
down to fighting sooner. But they know they have to talk the good
talk, to cloak their raw aggression in some ethical finery, or
else the public will turn from their views in disgust. In the end,
they are children in adult bodies, who never lost their
fascination with moving little plastic soldiers and tanks around
their bedrooms.
August 11, 2005
Gene Callahan, the author of Economics for Real People, is an
adjunct scholar of the Ludwig von Mises Institute and a
contributing columnist to LewRockwell.com.
Copyright © 2005 Gene Callahan
--
[1] <http://www.nationalreview.com/hanson/hanson200508050714.asp>
[2] <http://www.antiwar.com/ocregister/saved-by-the-bomb.html>
__________________________________________________ ____________________
("Hanson Agonistes by Gene Callahan"
<http://www.lewrockwell.com/callahan/callahan146.html>)
De VS maakten zich in het gebied schuldig aan uitdagende oorlogsstokerij en
het plegen daden van oorlog tegen Japan, een land waarmee ze niet in oorlog
heetten te zijn. De bedoeling was door de blokkade -- een daad van oorlog --
Japan ertoe te verleiden zich tegen de oorlogszuchtige VS te verweren,
waardoor, gezien ook het bondgenootschap tussen Japan en Duitsland, meteen
de VS -- eindelijk -- in WO-II zou kunnen treden. De Japanse aanval op Pearl
Harbor was door de VS zorgvuldig ontworpen en beraamd. Dag en uur van deze
"verrassingsaanval" waren door FDR en zijn oorlogszuchtige medewerkers
gekend. Voor de Amerikaanse vlootcommandant-ter-plekke (Haïti), die door hun
eigen overheid in het ongewisse werden gelaten, was het wél een volslagen
verrassing, maar *niet* voor het Witte Huis.
Admiraal James O. Richardson, Opperbevelhebber van de Amerikaanse Vloot (the
Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet), werd op 8 oktober 1940 in het
befaamde "Oval Office" ontboden. Hij kreeg er door de president zelf het
Machiavellistische plan uiteengezet. Admiraal Richardson weigerde zijn
medewerking daaraan -- aan het weerloos laten afslachten van duizenden van
zijn manschappen -- en werd daarom afgezet -- en vervangen door in allerijl
bevorderde vertrouwelingen van de president, die echter van de plannen in
het ongewisse werden gelaten.
Wie belangstelling mocht hebben voor het hoe, wat en waarom van Pearl
Harbor, en wie wanneer wat waarvan wist, doet u er goed aan kennis te nemen
van het boek:
-----
Robert B. Stinnett, /Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl
Harbor/, New York (NY): Free Press, 2000, 260pp., ISBN 0684853396,
$26.00.
-----
Het boek is niet echt een 'prettig' lezen, maar wel zo verhelderend -- en,
tja, ontluisterend.
Wie het boek zelf te dik zij; zo ook wie alvast een voorproefje wil, kan
terecht bij de samenvatting van de uiteenzetting die Stinnett hield voor het
The Independent Institute <http://www.independent.org/> in Oakland, CA.
Deze uiteenzetting werd ook opgenomen en in de VS "nationwide" uitgezonden
op 4 juli 2000.
De samenvatting als hierboven bedoeld, is na te lezen op:
Robert B. Stinnett, 7 december 2000:
"December 7, 1941 . . . a Day of Deceit"
<http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig/stinnett1.html>
Voor een bespreking van Stinnetts boek, kan men bijvoorbeeld terecht op:
Dr.hist. H. Arthur Scott Trask, 9 december 2000:
"The Conspiracies of Empire" <http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig/trask1.html>
President Franklin D. Roosevelt offerde wetens en willens duizenden
Amerikaanse staatsburgers op om toch maar ten allen prijze in de oorlog te
kunnen treden. Hij lokte de aanval op Pearl Harbor niet enkel wetens en
willens uit, maar bereikte er ook zijn doel mee: ondanks tegenstand van 80%
van de Amerikaanse burgers tóch in de oorlog treden. "It was a pretty cheap
price to pay for unifying the country." (sic, Lt. Commander Joseph J.
Rochefort, commander of Station HYPO at Pearl Harbor)
Dat zijn de allicht harde, maar niettemin inmiddels afdoende bewezen feiten.
Als u nog ooit hoort over Pearl Harbor en de "held" FDR, bedenk, weet dan
dat het gaat om leugen en bedrog. Om niet minder dan ja hoogverraad,
gepleegd door Amerikaans president Franklin D. Roosevelt en zijn staf van
vertrouwelingen. Om, ten koste van zovele mensenlevens ook, tegen de
Amerikaanse Grondwet, tegen de wil van de Amerikaanse bevolking, tegen het
Amerikaanse Huis van Afgevaardigden en tegen de Senaat, en met voorliegen en
bedriegen van al deze, te allen prijze de VS mee te sleuren in de totale
oorlog, die daarmee tot de tweede wereldoorlog werd.
Sommigen stellen vandaag overeenkomsten tussen de aanval van "9/11" (11
september) en die op Pearl Harbor. Zou het?
Deze maand, zovele maanden nadat de onderwerping van Irak voltooid verklaard
is, sneuvelen er in Irak van het Amerikaanse bezettingsleger nog steeds
enkel al aan soldaten of Marines, gemiddeld vier tot vijf -- per dag.
Allicht zullen sommigen om wat ik hierboven schrijf en aanhaal, (ook) mij
van "blinde Amerikahaat" willen betichten. Zelfs al zijn de (bewezen) feiten
ze onwelgevallig; ze dwalen.
Vooral ook patriotten hebben tot belangrijke opdracht hun regering te
wantrouwen. Ze weten waarom.
Groet,
Bart.
--
Het eerste slachtoffer van oorlog is de waarheid. -- H.L. Mencken
(1880-1956)