Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, USA Nominee to be General and Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

The integration of joint capabilities under the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been a success. Our military forces are more interoperable today than they ever have been in our nation's history. This achievement has been remarkable. The next step is to ensure the ability of the military and civilian departments to work closely together. Counterinsurgency warfare requires a total commitment of the government – both military and civilian agencies – and unity of effort is crucial to success.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

One of the most pressing needs is for the creation of interagency doctrine for the prosecution of counterinsurgency and stability operations. The State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs has taken initial steps toward this end. During a conference hosted jointly by State and OSD, I proposed several actions that could help foster greater interagency capacity, and I recently seconded two majors from Fort Leavenworth (awaiting the start of the next School of Advanced Military Studies course) to the State Department to work this issue. Beyond development of doctrine in this area, there is discussion on creating an interagency Center for Complex Operations, which would be an intellectual clearinghouse for ideas and best practices in the many facets of irregular warfare. This appears to be a low-cost, but high-payoff, action that the Committee should consider supporting.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq?

The Commanding General of MNF-I commands forces within Iraq and is the senior military representative to the US Chief of Mission. MNF-I is a Combined Joint Task Force under Operational Control (OPCON) to the Commander of US Central Command (USCENTCOM). MNF-I conducts operations in support of the Government of Iraq, US Mission and other international organizations. The CG exercises Tactical Control (TACON) of non-US Coalition Forces and OPCON of the Multi National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I) and the Multi National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I). This is a strategic level command.

What are the differences between the duties and functions of the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq and the Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq?

The Commanding General of MNC-I is the senior operational level commander in Iraq. He directly commands forces conducting operations to restore order and security in Iraq.

The commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq has a wider responsibility which covers strategic issues and the political/military interface, working with the US Ambassador and Government of Iraq to integrate all aspects of the campaign such as security, governance, economic development, communication, and transition.

What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

I believe that I have a good background for the duties of MNF-I CG, if confirmed. First, I have, of course, served in Iraq for some 2-1/3 years and have a good understanding of the country, its government, and many of its leaders from all factions. Second, I have had a number of joint assignments at relatively high level – as a TDY Special Assistant to CINCSOUTH, as Military Assistant to the SACEUR, as Operations Chief of the UN Force in Haiti, as Executive Assistant to the CJCS, as ACOS OPS of SFOR in Bosnia, and, of course, as the commander of MNSTC-I and the NATO Training Mission in Iraq. Third, I believe I have a reasonably solid academic/intellectual background, having studied, as well as served in, major combat operations, counterinsurgency operations, peacekeeping operations, and peace enforcement operations. Most recently, in my current position, I oversaw the development of the new Army/Marine Corps manual on counterinsurgency and also oversaw changes to other Army doctrinal manuals, our leader development programs, our combat training centers, and a variety of other activities that support the preparation of our leaders and units for deployment to Iraq. Finally, I believe I understand the requirements of strategic-level leadership, which is what, after all, MNF-I is all about.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq?

Yes, and I will complete them before deploying, if confirmed. In particular, I need: to establish initial personal relationships with the members of the JCS I don't know (I have done this with the VCJCS and CJCS and key Joint Staff members already); to get briefings on the interagency's support for the important "non-kinetic" aspects of the new way ahead; to meet again with the Secretary of Defense and President – and certain interagency leaders; and to discuss Iraq with several leaders of the intelligence community with whom I have not yet been able to meet. The most important, frankly, is getting an understanding of the level of interagency support that will be forthcoming. That will obviously be key to the comprehensive approach that is essential in Iraq.

Major Challenges and Priorities

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq?

There are many challenges in Iraq, but I would point out four of particular concern. The top challenge is providing the security necessary to reduce the cycle of violence in Iraq today. This will be a difficult mission and time is not on our side. We must focus on population security, particularly in Baghdad, to give the Iragi government the breathing space it needs to become more effective. The second challenge is continuing the development of capable Iraqi Security Forces, relatively free of ethnic and sectarian bias. The Iragi Army has made much progress, but is uneven, and the police remain a challenge. The third challenge is the integration of the interagency effort to ensure that progress is made along all lines of operation - not just security, but economic, governance, and the rule of law as well. That is related to the fourth challenge, and that is the lack of capacity of the Iragi government. Irag has enormous natural resources and potential wealth. However, to take advantage of its blessings, not only must security be improved, but critical national issues must be resolved by the Iragis, on issues such as national reconciliation, the devolution of power below Baghdad, the distribution of oil wealth, and so on. Only through unity of effort of all - coalition and Iragi, military and civilian - can we bring the full weight of our effort to bear on the difficult situation in Iraq.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Population security is the top priority. We must clear and hold the neighborhoods of Baghdad to break the cycle of violence that is preventing political progress in Iraq. We can only do this by establishing persistent presence – coalition, as well as Iraqi – in Iraqi neighborhoods. I plan to ensure that some of our forces locate in the neighborhoods they protect and that they fight closely linked with their Iraqi counterparts – with the Iraqis in the lead whenever possible – to secure the population.

I will also work to improve the capability of the Iraqi Security Forces by augmenting the size and capabilities of the embedded transition teams that advise these forces. Beyond this, I will enhance the partnership between U.S. units and Iraqi units, which increases the operating capabilities of both forces. The Iraqi units have greater cultural awareness and linguistic capabilities, while U.S. forces bring greater military capabilities to the battlefield. Iraqi and U.S. elements are more effective at population security and preparing for gradual transition when working together.

To improve interagency cooperation, I applaud the recent efforts to embed the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the Brigade Combat Team headquarters for those provinces in which BCTs are the senior HQs, or in the division headquarters in areas where they are the senior HQs in a province. This will provide a synergy that will significantly enhance our ability to conduct stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq.

And I will do all that I can, in partnership with the Ambassador, to ensure that our interagency is doing all possible to help develop capacity in the Iraqi government and to enable it to come to grips with the tough issues it must resolve.

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq?

As the military commander, my broad priorities would support the development of an Iraqi state that is a stable, reasonably representative democracy that respects the rights of all Iraqis and can provide for its own security, with Iraqi security institutions that act professionally and according to the interests of all Iraqi people. My more immediate priorities would address the challenges that Multi-National Force-Iraq faces today – security of the population to enable political progress, enhancement of Iraqi Security Force capabilities to provide the Iraqi government a

monopoly on the use of force, support for effective interagency cooperation to bring the full weight of our national resources to bear on the problem, and assistance to interagency elements as they work to help the Iraqi government build capacity and resolve the tough issues it confronts. Other priorities would include countering the threats posed by Iranian and Syrian meddling in Iraq, and the continued mission of dismantling terrorist networks and killing or capturing those who refuse to accept a unified, stable Iraq.

Lessons Learned

What were the major lessons you learned in your previous lraq tours, both leading a division and leading the effort to establish, train, and equip security forces, that are the most applicable to the duties you are about to assume?

Perhaps the best way to answer this is to attach an article I wrote upon returning from Iraq after my last tour there. In it, I laid out the lessons I learned in the form of 14 observations, noted below; they are still valid, though they obviously require nuanced application depending on the specific situation in each case (which is explained in the article). The article attached explains them in detail.

- 1. "Do not try to do too much with your own hands."
- 2. Act quickly, because every Army of liberation has a half-life.
- 3. Money is ammunition.
- 4. Increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success.
- 5. Analyze "costs and benefits" before each operation.
- 6. Intelligence is the key to success.
- 7. Everyone must do nation-building.
- 8. Help build institutions, not just units.
- 9. Cultural awareness is a force multiplier.

10. Success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations.

- 11. Ultimate success depends on local leaders.
- 12. Remember the strategic corporals and strategic lieutenants.
- 13. There is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders.
- 14. A leader's most important task is to set the right tone.

During your prior combat tours of duty in Iraq, were there any incidents of which you were aware within your command of alleged detainee abuse or abuse of civilians?

There was one specific case of alleged detainee abuse in the 101st Airborne that was brought to my level. It was a few months into our time in Mosul (and prompted us to establish clear standards relatively early on), and did not involve death or serious injury. I took action in that case, which included a general officer letter of reprimand and relief of the senior individual involved and lesser action against others. We very quickly then issued clear instructions to all elements in the 101st Airborne Division Task Force that all detainees would be treated IAW Geneva Convention, ensured refresher education in what that meant, began a process of inspecting all detention facilities in the Division at least weekly, and started a process of having the Red Cross rep in the area and Ninevah Province Council members (including an Imam) visit our facilities on a regular basis, as well.

There was also at least one case of mistreatment of a civilian that I recall – in which a small element improperly confiscated a vehicle from a local citizen who was stopped at a checkpoint, with the element leader then not being forthright about the incident during subsequent inquiries. (The civilian was not physically mistreated.) We formally investigated, took nonjudicial action under UCMJ against those involved, and compensated the citizen.

There were numerous other cases of damage incidental to operations for which we compensated the citizens affected.

As the MSNTC-I Cdr, we did not operate detention facilities; however, some of the Iraqi units we advised did do that, and we had serious challenges in a few of those in the summer of 2005 before I left Iraq. In each case, we documented possible cases of mistreatment, shared the evidence with the Minister of Interior and MNF-I HQs, helped the Minister and respective Iraqi units conduct remedial training, and, in at least one case, withdrew all financial/equipment/advisor support for an element (in that case due to actions by several leaders of the Baghdad Major Crimes unit) until individuals were removed and/or disciplined.

If so, please explain the circumstances and describe the actions that you took in response to these incidents? Answered above.

U.S. Mistakes

What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes the U.S. has made to date in Iraq?

First, there were a number of assumptions and assessments that did not bear out. Prominent among them was the assumption that Iraqis would remain in their barracks and ministry facilities and resume their functions as soon as interim governmental structures were in place. That obviously did not transpire. The assessment of the Iraqi infrastructure did not capture how fragile and abysmally maintained it was (and this challenge, of course, was compounded by looting). Additionally, although most Iraqis did, in fact, greet us as liberators (and that was true even in most Sunni Arab areas), there was an underestimation of the degree of resistance that would develop as, inevitably, a Shi'a majority government began to emerge and the Sunni Arabs, especially, the Saddamists, realized that the days of their dominating Iraq were over. Sunni Arab resistance was also fueled by other actions noted below.

Beyond that, as noted recently by President Bush, there were a number of situations that did not develop as was envisioned:

- There was the feeling that elections would enhance the Iraqi sense of nationalism. Instead, the elections hardened sectarian positions as Iraqis voted largely based on ethnic and sectarian group identity.

- There was an underestimation of the security challenges in Iraq, particularly in 2006 in the wake of the bombing of the mosque in Samara, coupled with an over-estimation of our ability to create new security institutions following the disbandment of the Iraqi security forces – which was not helped by the planning issues described below.

- It repeatedly took us time to recognize changes in the security environment and to react to them. What began as an insurgency has morphed into a conflict that includes insurgent attacks, terrorism, sectarian violence, and violent crime. Our responses have had to continue to evolve in response, but that has not always been easy.

A number of mistakes were made by both political and military leaders during the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom:

- The very slow (if that) execution of the reconciliation component of de-Ba'athification left tens of thousands of former Ba'ath Party members (many of them Sunni Arabs, but also some Shi'a) feeling that they had no future opportunities in, or reason to support, the new Iraq. To be fair to CPA, AMB Bremer intended to execute reconciliation (or exceptions to the de-Ba'athification order) and gave me permission, e.g., to do so on a trial basis in Ninevah Province; however, when we submitted the results of the reconciliation commission conducted for Mosul University and subsequent requests for exception generated by Iraqi processes with judicial oversight, no action was taken on them by the de-Ba'athification Committee in Baghdad. As realization set in among those affected that there was to be no reconciliation, we could feel support for the new Iraq ebbing in Sunni Arab majority areas. - Disbanding the Iraqi army (which was, to be sure, an army that Iraq did not need in the long term as it had vastly more senior officers than were remotely required and was more of a jobs program than a competent military force) without simultaneously announcing a stipend and pension program for those in the Army, the future plan for Iraq's defense forces, and provisions for joining those forces undoubtedly created tens of thousands of former soldiers and officers who were angry, feeling disrespected, and worried about how they would feed their families. (The stipend plan was eventually announced some 5 weeks after the disestablishment was announced, but it did not cover senior officers, who remained, therefore, influential critics of the new Iraq.) This action likely fueled, at least in part, the early growth of the insurgency and anti-coalition feeling.

- We took too long to recognize the growing insurgency and to take steps to counter it, though we did eventually come to grips with it.

- We took too long to develop the concepts and structures needed to build effective Iraqi security forces to assist in providing security to the Iraqi people.

- Misconduct at Abu Gharyb and in other less sensational, but still damaging cases, inflamed the insurgency and damaged the credibility of Coalition forces in Iraq, in the region, and around the world.

- We obviously had inadequate plans, concepts, organizations, resources, and policies for the conduct of Phase IV (stability and reconstruction) operations; consequently, we were slow to move into Phase IV operations.

- We had, for the first 15 months or more in Iraq, an inadequate military structure. With hindsight, it is clear that it took too long to transform V Corps HQs into CJTF-7 HQs, and that even when we had CJTF-7 HQs, it was not capable of looking both up and down (i.e. performing both political-military/strategic functions and serving as the senior operational headquarters for counterinsurgency and stability operations). Moreover, it is clear that we should have built what eventually became MNSTC-I HQs and the TF-34 HQs (which oversees detainee/interrogation operations) much sooner, along with the other organizations that were eventually established (e.g., the Gulf Region Corps of Engineer HQs).

- Although not a problem in the 101st Airborne Division AOR during my time as 101st commander, it is clear that in certain other AORs there were more tasks than troops – especially in Anbar Province for at least the first year and likely in other areas as well.

- Finally, the strategy pursued in the wake of the bombing of the Al Askariya Mosque in Samarra in February 2006 was unable to arrest the spiraling violence and rise of harmful sectarian activities. Repeated operations in Baghdad, in particular, to clear, hold, and build did not prove durable due to lack of sufficient Iraqi and Coalition Forces for the hold phase of the operations.

Which of these mistakes, if any, are still having an impact, with which will you have to deal if confirmed?

We continue to feel the effects of many of the issues stated above. If confirmed, I intend to work with the U.S. Ambassador to gain traction on a number of levels – security for the Iraqi people, establishment of effective local governance and economic development that will create stakeholders in the new Iraq, reconciliation, the continued establishment of effective Iraqi Security Forces, and establishment of rule of law to ensure effective justice to all Iraqis.

<u>Mosul</u>

When you commanded your division in Mosul in 2003 the city appeared to be relatively quiet and stable. That changed considerably in 2004 and later.

Why do you believe that happened?

The situation in Mosul deteriorated significantly about 9 months after the 101st Airborne Division departed from Iraq. There were several reasons for this development. First, the insurgents made a concerted effort to open a new front as it became clear that the Coalition was going to conduct operations to clear Fallujah in the fall of 2004. Second, the Sunni Arab governor of Ninevah Province was assassinated in late June 2004 (the night of the transition of sovereignty, while on the road to Baghdad, south of Ninevah Province). In the fractious political process that followed. many of the Sunni Arabs left the provincial council in protest over the way the replacement governor was selected. This left a Sunni Arab majority province without adequate Sunni Arab representation in the provincial council. Undoubtedly, this led to some of them and their followers no longer supporting the new Irag and some others likely tacitly or actively supporting the insurgents as they sought to put roots down in Ninevah and began a concerted campaign of intimidation of Sunni Arabs who supported the new Iraq. Third, many level-4 Ba'ath Party members lost hope over time that they would ever have a role in the new Iraq due to stalling over reconciliation in Baghdad, despite the special exemption given to the 101st Airborne Division by Ambassador Bremer in the late

summer of 2003 to conduct a special reconciliation process in Ninevah Province and Ambassador Bremer's encouragement to all to use the exception process in the CPA order. Finally, the forces that replaced the 101st Airborne Division – called Task Force Olympia – were only a little over one-third the size of the 101st Airborne (though they started out about half our size), had many fewer helicopters and other enablers, and one of their battalions was subsequently taken frequently to be used as the CJTF-7 reserve. At the time TF Olympia replaced us in late January/early February. I believed its forces would be sufficient to secure Ninevah Province due to the presence of the tens of thousands of Iraqi Security Forces we had recruited, trained, and equipped, and with whom we operated closely on a daily basis. That was borne out by the Iraqis' performance during the uprisings in April 2004 when Mosul was one of the few places in Iraq where Iraqi forces did well. Over time, however, the Iragi forces slowly deteriorated following the Governor's assassination, as the insurgents mounted a brutal campaign of intimidation. Ultimately, that degraded their effectiveness and began a spiral downward that didn't end until during the Fallujah operation in November 2004, during which a concerted attack in Mosul revealed the police to be completely intimidated and ineffective, and overwhelmed many of the Iraqi Army elements, as well. (Regretably, although both BG Ham and I repeatedly requested replacement of the once-aggressive Police Chief in the fall of 2004, the Minister of Interior was never willing to take that action, despite clear signs that the Chief and his family had been severely attacked and intimidated.) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Task Force Olympia's HQs lacked the same robust intelligence structure that the 101st Airborne Division possessed, which proved a serious shortfall in the intelligence-intensive business of counterinsurgency warfare. Where the 101st Airborne had largely been able to generate the precise intelligence that helped us tear out the "roots" of the insurgents almost as fast as they were established. this proved more challenging, particularly over time, for Task Force Olympia.

Role in Development of the New Iraq Strategy

What role, if any, did you play in the development of the new Iraq strategy recently announced by the President?

I met with the Secretary of Defense a couple of days after he took office and before he left for his first trip to Iraq, and we discussed the situation there during that meeting. We subsequently talked after his trip, as well. I also talked to the CJCS several times during this period, noting that a population security emphasis, in Baghdad in particular, was necessary to help the Iraqis gain the time/space for the tough decisions they faced and discussing the general force levels that were likely to be required. As the strategy was refined, I talked on several occasions to LTG Ray Odierno to confirm that his troop-to-task analysis required the force levels that are part of the new strategy, and I relayed my support for those levels to the CJCS and the Secretary. I also supported the additional emphasis on the advisory effort and the additional resources for the reconstruction effort (both in terms of funding and personnel for PRTs and governmental ministry capacity development).

Iraqi Army Reinforcements

The Iraqi Government has agreed to send an additional three Iraqi Army brigades to Baghdad, two of which will apparently be predominately Kurdish.

Do you know why Kurdish units were selected?

Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) and MNC-I made the decision to deploy the two predominantly Kurdish battalions to support the Baghdad Security Plan primarily based upon the low threat levels in their original assigned areas of responsibility, the readiness levels of the units involved during their time as elements of the IGFC, and the desire to involve these relatively well-trained units in the effort to establish security in the capital city.

Do you believe that Kurdish units will be more effective than other units in enhancing security in Baghdad? Why?

I have confidence in the expected performance of these units, though there are likely to be challenges due to language issues (few of their enlisted soldiers speak Arabic) and, possibly, due to operating away from predominantly Kurdish areas for the first time (though some of the battalions did serve in mixed-ethnic areas in the vicinity of Mosul). In considering other factors, there has been little in the way of corruption or other sectarian issues reported in these units. Additionally, because of their combat experience and predominantly Kurdish soldiers, there tends to be a higher level of unit cohesion in these formations. Because of their home locations, there is a lower likelihood these units will have issues with infiltration by anti-governmental entities. Finally, commanders involved in training these units, as well as their Coalition advisors, assess that they are unlikely to be biased when conducting operations in the locations to which they are being assigned.

How do you believe Sunni or Shi'a Arabs will react to Kurdish troops in their neighborhoods?

I believe that in the end all parties will accept the presence of these forces in an effort to secure Baghdad. Initial feedback from a Lieutenant Colonel on the ground with whom I correspond is that one of the first battalions to arrive has been welcomed as it has brought improved security – though it is obviously still very early on in this effort.

MNF-I considered several aspects prior to making the decision to use these Kurdish-based forces. For example, MNF-I studied whether both the Sunni and Shi'a leaders would consider this an attempt by Kurdish entities to expand their influence. While there have been some statements by radical Shi'a leaders and some reservations offered by Sunnis, the assessment is that the people of Baghdad will adopt a waitand-see position. In the end, if security is enhanced, all parties will benefit and likely will be grateful.

How do you believe the Mahdi Army will react to Kurdish troops entering Sadr City?

I believe the reaction in Sadr City to any security forces, not just Kurdish ones (and it is not clear that Kurdish forces will operate in Sadr City), will vary depending upon the perception of the mission, size and composition of forces, duration of operations, and response of key Shi'a leaders.

This is, however, a very dynamic period, and actions taken in Sadr City will have to be carefully considered. While it is possible Muqtada al-Sadr will respond with harsh rhetoric that could escalate into violence, there is also the possibility that political engagement by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will result in a tense, but calm entry of Iraqi forces into Sadr City. As a leader within the Shi'a community, Muqtada al-Sadr must demonstrate the willingness to act constitutionally, responsibly, and within the rule of law, regardless of what kind of Iraqi Security Forces are involved. Having said this, again, any actions involving Sadr City will be very sensitive and will require considerable thought and preparation.

What is your understanding of how Iraqi brigades which are predominantly Sunni or Shi'a will be deployed – i.e., among their own sect or the other?

Iraqi Security Forces will be assigned areas of operations throughout Baghdad without regard to sectarian composition of the units. Brigades of the 6th and 9th Iraqi Divisions, each of which have a mix of Shi'a and Sunni personnel (though predominantly Shi'a in their makeup) will be employed in all nine administrative districts of the city. It is true that some districts in the city are predominantly Shi'a, while others are predominantly Sunni. However, U.S. Army battalions will be partnered with these Iraqi brigades to reinforce the practice that all security forces operate in a professional, disciplined and ethical manner, and in accordance with the rule of law, international humanitarian norms, and recognized international standards for enforcement and protection of human rights.

What are the implications either way?

It is important to ensure no particular sect feels persecuted by the deployment of any Iraqi Security Force in their neighborhood. The partnering of a US battalion with each Iraqi Security Force brigade will ensure that sectarian divisions and mistrust are kept to a minimum.

Command and Control

What do you understand to be the command and control relationships between American and Iraqi forces in the new Baghdad security plan?

This is an exceedingly important issue. Getting the relationship between our forces and the Iraqi security forces right is critical to operating together. At its simplest, US commanders will command and retain operational control of US forces; Iraqi commanders will command Iraqi forces and exercise operational control over them once transitioned from the tactical control of US forces (this has taken place for the 6th Division and in the case of many other Iraqi units in recent months). If confirmed, I intend to ensure that there is very close cooperation between US and Iraqi headquarters to ensure unity of effort, careful coordination of operations, and clear knowledge of what each force is doing. Of necessity, this will include Iraqi and US Special Operations Forces and Police Forces as well. As I understand it, the Baghdad plan is to be an Iraqi Plan, devised by the Iraqis in consultation with, and supported by, MNF-I and MNC-I, and US Forces, under the command of US commanders, will act in support of the Iraqi effort to establish security in Baghdad.

Do you have any concerns?

Yes. MNF-I and MNC-I will need to carefully work out liaison arrangements, co-location of command posts, terms of reference that delineate respective responsibilities for various combat, combat support, and combat service support activities, communications to support all of this, and so forth. Having said this, Coalition Forces have been working with Iraqi security forces for some time and have developed an understanding of the relationships involved, and they will use that experience to inform the actions to be taken in this case.

Confronting the Militias

Based on your knowledge, is the Iraqi Government taking the steps it must to confront and control the militias?

Militias and armed groups are a challenge with which MNF-I and the Iraqi government must contend. One reason the Iraqi government has not confronted militias in a meaningful way is that, regrettably, they fill a security need. Another reason is that some political parties derive their political strength from their militias, which provide both security and allow for the provision of basic services to the people.

Article 9 of the Iraqi Constitution prohibits militias and stipulates that "the Iraqi armed forces and security services will be composed of the components of the Iraqi people with due consideration given to their balance and representation without discrimination or exclusion. They shall be subject to the control of the civilian authority, shall defend Iraq, shall not be used as an instrument to oppress the Iraqi people, shall not interfere in political affairs, and shall have no role in the transfer of authority." In short, the security forces of Iraq must be professional and apolitical, and they must have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

Once Iraqi Security Forces, backed by Coalition forces, gain control of Baghdad and provide security to the people, the need for militias to protect local areas will cease to provide a justification for their existence. The Iraqi government can then work to execute a comprehensive disarmament, disbandment, and reintegration (DDR) program. And recent reports indicate that PM Maliki understands the need to deal with the militias.

What role would you expect to play on this issue, if confirmed?

Iraqi government intermediaries, Coalition leaders, and US Embassy Baghdad personnel are involved in discussions to provide opportunities for militia groups to enter into a DDR process. If confirmed, I would support and be involved in these efforts.

Under what circumstances, if any, would you recommend that American troops enter Sadr City?

American troops enter Sadr City regularly in response to operational needs. These operations are likely to continue. As the Iraqi Security Forces transition into a leading role, I would expect to see a more prominent Iraqi Security Force presence in Sadr City and, as part of that, it is likely American troops will also be present, but principally in a supporting role and to ensure full situational awareness of the actions of the Iraqi forces.

In your judgment, how effective will the addition of more U.S. troops be in securing Baghdad if Prime Minister Maliki continues to allow militias to exist and operate?

PM Maliki has indicated a willingness to deal with militias and this effort will be of central importance in securing Baghdad. Additional US troops will be important in the overall effort by providing the necessary capacity to continue with clearing insurgent forces from contested areas while also partnering with Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police in order to bolster their capability to prevent sectarian violence, whether on the part of militias, terrorists, or insurgent groups.

Counterinsurgency Doctrine

According to the new counterinsurgency manual, "twenty (soldiers or police forces) per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective counterinsurgency operations. Baghdad alone, according to doctrine, requires a force of 120,000-130,000 personnel to meet the minimum requirement. However, when the planned increase in U.S. and Iraqi forces is complete, Baghdad would only have about 80,000 security forces.

Do you believe that 80,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops is sufficient and if so, why? What is your understanding of the status and adequacy of the risk assessment and mitigation plan associated with this deviation from doctrine?

Forces currently in or moving to Baghdad should be sufficient to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations given the anticipated politicalmilitary situation and planned phased operations.

The recommended force ratio is a "rule of thumb," distilled for simplicity's sake from numerous complex cases of counterinsurgency operations. These cases may differ significantly in terms of geography, urbanization, or enemy strength.

The counterinsurgency doctrine clearly states that host nation police and army forces are a key part of the equation, as are special operating forces and other security elements. Baghdad is a city of roughly 6 million people, so a 1:50 ratio of security forces to population would be equal to roughly 120,000 counterinsurgents. Iraqi Army, Police, and Special Operations Forces, together with the U.S. forces currently on the ground or deploying to Baghdad in the months ahead, total approximately 85,000 – though, to be sure, not all of those are of the same levels of effectiveness, and some of the Police undoubtedly are of limited effectiveness. However, we do not necessarily have to secure every part of Baghdad at once – this can

be done in stages – and will have to be done that way given the way the forces are expected to flow into Iraq. Beyond that, tens of thousands of ministry security forces and tens of thousands of civilian (often third country) contracted guard forces protect key sites in Baghdad (including, for example, the US Embassy, MNSTC-I HQs, the Ministry of Oil, etc.) that MNF-I and the Iraqi government would otherwise have to detail soldiers or police to protect. These forces, again, number in the tens of thousands – and although by no means all are of high capability and some are undoubtedly compromised, they do secure hundreds of sites that otherwise would require coalition or Iraqi military or police forces. Thus, with the addition of all five U.S. brigades under orders to reinforce Baghdad and the Iraqi Security Forces either in Baghdad or headed to the city, there should be sufficient military forces available to achieve our objective of securing Baghdad.

Length of Iraqi Insurgency

General Casey has said that 20th Century counterinsurgency efforts typically lasted nine years.

Do you believe the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq could last as long as nine years, or even longer?

I agree with General Casey that the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq will continue for some time, but its duration will depend on a variety of factors that about which it is very difficult to make judgments. What I am clear about, however, is that the Government of Iraq must ultimately win this fight, with Coalition forces in a supporting role. Thus, while it is possible that the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq could, indeed, last 9 years or more, that should not be taken to imply that US forces would be involved in substantial numbers for the duration of that period.

Combat Service Support

With the expected increase of U.S. troop levels in Iraq by over 20,000, do you believe there is sufficient combat service support in place or will that have to be augmented as well?

Generally, Brigade Combat Teams have their own combat service support units to sustain their Soldiers and equipment; however, I am sure that one of the tasks being undertaken by MNC-I in recent weeks has been determination of requirements for any additional combat service support elements above brigade level. This will be an area on which I will focus following arrival in Iraq, if I am confirmed. Should additional so-called enablers be needed, I will request them.

If so, by how much?

MNF-I reports that it has a mature theater base in place and does not anticipate a large requirement for augmentation of combat service support capabilities.

Do you see any problems with the extent of reliance of U.S. forces in Iraq on contractor support?

No. The Army has always benefited from contracted non-military support in one form or another, though that reliance has grown substantially in recent years. Contractors allow the military a great deal of flexibility to meet sustainment and life support requirements; they also help with security in some cases. They must be well-integrated, but over time MNF-I has developed mechanisms to ensure synchronization of contractor support and military activities.

Sustainment

Based on your knowledge of the Army and its state of readiness, how long do you believe the increased troop levels and operations tempo can be sustained?

My personal sense is that the Army is stretched and is straining; however, the Army is making plans to sustain increased troop levels should that be required. Nonetheless, the strain on the Active and Reserve Components is clear. Soldiers in some units are returning to Iraq in a year or less, and that is obviously difficult for them and their families, and it makes preparation of units challenging as well. My own family is well acquainted with this challenge, as my return to Iraq, if confirmed, will be my fourth year-or-longer deployment since 2001. Reset of equipment is also a challenge - though additional funds received recently should help the Army considerably to meet the demand, though it is likely to take some time to ramp up the depots fully. Having said that, as MNF-I commander, it would be beyond my brief to determine the overall health of the Army and Marine Corps - though it would be something about which I would be concerned. It would be my job to determine the troops and resources required to accomplish the mission in Iraq, and to inform the CENTCOM commander and Secretary of Defense of those requirements. It is more appropriate for the Joint Staff and the Services to determine how long we can sustain a surge. I am encouraged, however, by Secretary of Defense Gates' announcement that the end strength of our Army and Marine Corps will be increased. Clearly, the conflict in Iraq has been hard on our ground forces, and I support the Secretary's efforts to ensure we have the forces needed we need for what are frequently very people-intensive operations.

State of Training and Equipping of Iragi Security Forces

What is your understanding of the state of training and equipping of Iraqi Security Forces?

My understanding is that, with some exceptions, the Iraqi Objective Counterinsurgency (COIN) Force and Iragi Objective Civil Security Force (totaling approximately 325,000 personnel) were issued 100% of their pacing items of equipment (i.e. their most important items) and that 100% percent of their personnel were trained. The exceptions are for the remaining portions of the Navy and the Air Force and approximately two thousand support troops, all of which have significantly longer training timelines and specialized training requirements. The Objective COIN Force units do, however, face challenges in sufficient fill of leaders, who take a long time to develop, and in development of higher-level staff skills and intelligence elements, which also take time to develop. The Iragi Government is addressing these shortfalls through a combination of former commissioned and non-commissioned officer recalls and prospective policies to accelerate promotion to corporal and sergeant for recruits with requisite levels of civilian education. The ISF have also experienced attrition due to combat losses and absences over the last eighteen months. To address this attrition, MNSTC-I and the Iragi Government are generating some thirty thousand replacements, eighteen thousand of which will address the attrition that has occurred over the last year and half, and another twelve thousand to bring these units to 110% to address the effects of Iragi leave policies and to provide some personnel flexibility to unit commanders. Over 6,500 of these soldiers have graduated and joined the force and the second cycle of almost 8,000 will graduate shortly.

What concerns do you have about the ability of those units to participate in the implementation of the new Baghdad security plan?

Iraqi units, at all levels, continue to perform well when partnered with Coalition Forces. An immature logistics system, a shortage of mid-grade leadership, and the ultimate loyalty of select units/leaders remain my primary concerns. These concerns are currently being addressed through continued development of the ISF logistical structure, Coalition Force emergency logistical support, partner relationships between Iraqi and Coalition Force units (which are being strengthened), embedding of Transition (Advisor) Teams in Iraqi units down to at least the battalion level, and a variety of actions to foster loyalty and professionalism like a soldier's creed, oaths of office, a Center for Ethics and Leadership, the Iraqi Military Academy, the Staff Colleges, and so on.

Force Protection

The new Baghdad security plan apparently envisions American units being co-located with Iraqi units spread out over approximately 30 mini-bases throughout Baghdad.

In general, how could you, as Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, accommodate and protect those forces and the forces which would have to resupply them on a daily basis?

As explained to me, under the Baghdad Security Plan, Coalition forces will establish Joint Security Stations (JSSs) with the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, and the Iragi National Police. The stations will be strategically positioned throughout the city to accommodate dispersed, joint patrols, and to provide central command and control hubs that ultimately feed back into the Baghdad Security Command. The establishment of JSSs will include enhancing force protection and developing essential sustainment and life support. Many of the JSSs are located at existing Iragi Police Stations, but will require vulnerability assessments prior to occupation by Coalition Forces. Based on these assessments the necessary force protection enhancements will be completed to mitigate the risks of attack. Force protection enhancements will include improvements such as entry control points, external barriers to redirect traffic flows and/or reinforce perimeters, increased protection from indirect fires, and guard posts/towers where required. Additionally, robust Quick Reaction Forces, as well as redundant and secure communications with parent Forward Operating Bases and with coalition patrols operating in the area, will enhance the force protection posture of each JSS.

Sustainment of our forces will be just as critical as their protection. Coalition forces patrolling from JSSs will have adequate levels of food, fuel, water, medical supplies, and ammunition on hand to preserve their combat capability. The JSSs will be resupplied as the forces rotate into and out of the primary Forward Operating Bases, rather than through daily resupply convoys. Essentially, the forces operating out of a JSS will be self-sustaining for their period of operations, with replacements arriving with their own requisite supplies as forces rotate. The basic, enduring life support packages at each JSS might include tents, generators, and environmental control units which will be positioned within the site's perimeter.

What is your understanding of whether the security plan requires the contracting of additional U.S. bases and facilities?

Current planning does not anticipate the requirement to reopen previously transferred FOBs or the creation of new ones. MNF-I is using space on existing FOBs that have the capacity for the first three reinforcing brigade combat teams, with basing requirements for the remaining two currently under development.

Military Transition Teams

Do you believe that the size, structure, number, and operating procedures for U.S. Military and Police Transition Teams embedded with Iraqi security forces need to be changed in any way?

Yes. There is unquestionable linkage between ISF progression and the embedded transition team program. Despite the success achieved by the embedding of transition teams, the current Military Transition Team (MTT) size is insufficient to meet all operational requirements and permit an optimum level of support. The commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq has initiated a plan to enhance MTTs to increase their effectiveness. Based on conditions within each multi-national division (MND) area of responsibility, primarily relating to levels of violence and ISF capacity for independent operations, MTTs are being augmented by assets controlled by the respective MND Commanders. US brigade combat teams are the primary resource providers for these enhancements. Enhanced MTTs have the ability to advise ISF units down to company level.

The current size, structure, and number of Police Transition Teams (PTT) is appropriate for the missions they are assigned. There are three different types of PTTs: station, district, and provincial. The nucleus of all PTTs is a military police squad with additional U.S. Army personnel added at the district and provincial level. Because of the mission and scope of responsibility of an Iragi Police provincial directorate, the typical PTT working at that level is larger and includes additional military and civilian members who possess other specialties and expertise such as operations, personnel, logistics, and maintenance management. The other two key and essential components of all PTTs are interpreters and International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs). Multinational Corps-Iraq is currently providing PTTs at a ratio of one for every three police stations, one for every two police districts, and one for every one provincial police directorate. The current operating procedures have resulted in clear visibility on the effectiveness and capabilities of Iraqi Police, from station through provincial level, and helped improve the Iragi Police ability to conduct basic law and order missions. Upon arrival in Iraq, if confirmed, I will assess this again to see if augmentation is required.

What do you recommend?

Throughout Iraq, the enhancement of the baseline MTTs will continue based on an assessment of the security situation in each MND Area of Responsibility. The estimate provided to me by the MNF-I staff is that it will take 6-12 months to move to enhanced MTTs throughout Iraq. Continuing and expanding the transition team program over time will energize ISF progression and eventually facilitate a change in relationship as the embedded transition teams move more toward the advising role and less toward mentoring or even, to a degree, leading.

The current ratio of PTTs at the station, district, and provincial levels is adequate, but we also need to relocate some PTTs from provinces that have moved to Provincial Iraqi Control to provinces that have not achieved Provincial Iraqi Control. International Police Liaison Officers (IPLO) and interpreters are absolutely essential to successful PTT operations. Multinational Corps – Iraq continues to have difficulty recruiting and fielding new interpreters; additional emphasis and incentives need to be established to retain the qualified interpreters we currently employ. Additionally, if the IPLO program is ended too soon, the lack of this law enforcement expertise and experience would have a significant and adverse impact. A recommendation for making the IPLO program even better is to recruit law enforcement experts from other Middle Eastern nations (such as Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, etc.) into the program.

What is your understanding of how the Army and Marine Corps are ensuring that U.S. troops are properly trained for this duty, to include dissemination of "lessons learned" to incoming teams?

Only gualified officers and NCOs are chosen to fill these critical positions. based upon their grade, skill, and experience match, balanced with dwell time. To facilitate and synchronize this effort, Army, Air Force, and Navy "external" transition team training was consolidated and is now conducted at Fort Riley, Kansas by the 1st Infantry Division. The two-star commander there, his staff, and a brigade combat team now execute the full spectrum of tasks required to man, train, and equip external transition teams. The Marines are running a similar program at 29 Palms, California. Transition Team training is based on 7 core competencies - combat skills, force protection, team support processes, technical and tactical training, advisor skills, counterinsurgency operations, and understanding the culture (which alone encompasses about fifty hours of training to empower the teams' abilities to forge a positive relationship with their Iragi counterpart). The lessons learned process is critical and is integrated before, during, and after a team embeds with an ISF unit. Throughout training, team members are in communication with the team they will replace so they may exchange information, pass back these lessons and learn about their Iragi

unit prior to deployment. Additionally, programs like Fort Riley (60 days), Camp Buehring (Kuwait, 6 days), and the Phoenix Academy (Taji, Iraq, 8 days) undergo continuous review so that the training can remain relevant by adapting the training model as necessary based on input from the field and changing conditions in theater. Once in theater, teams execute a 60day assessment of the training they received in preparation for their assignment as advisors, complete a formal end of tour assessment to codify lessons learned, and an assessment of the transition between their team and the follow on team. The Iraq Assistance Group (IAG) has also compiled transition team lessons learned on the IAG website for all transition teams to utilize. And the Combat Studies Institute and Center for Army Lessons Learned have captured lessons on transition team operations and techniques and published them as well.

The Military Police Brigade fully sources the Police Transition Teams and provides RSOI, implementation, execution and mission oversight of the Police Transition Team Program. The brigade brings a cohesive and organic element to training, resourcing and equipping PTTs which are actually military police squads already trained for law enforcement skills. These MP units are trained at home station to perform this mission. These teams are embedded with International Police Liaison Officers (IPLO) who are trained, hired and managed by the State Department. Host nation police building and training is a doctrinal military police mission. Experiences and lessons learned at Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo all contribute to continued mission development and application. Lessons learned and up-to-date TTPs are disseminated back to the deploying units through direct contact with units on the ground, Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS), Mission Readiness Exercise (MRX), and then Relief-In-Place (RIP) Program during which the MP Brigade conducts a PTT certification. Additionally, lessons learned are disseminated through the Center for Army Lessons Learned Website, Senior Leader forums (many virtual), the Battle Command Training Program COIN Seminars, combat training center mission rehearsal exercises, the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, and doctrine development efforts.

If confirmed, what would you recommend in this regard?

First, it is necessary to retain the core transition team and ensure it continues to receive the best possible training in preparation for its mission of mentoring and advising the ISF unit. This core structure is the expertise upon which additional enhancement is placed. They are the subject matter experts within the transition team. Second, as conditions on the ground permit, I would expedite the enhancement of transition teams to capitalize on their contributions toward ISF development. This must be done in a manner that also balances other operational requirements, which will lessen as the levels of violence become more manageable for the ISF. Furthermore, leaders should direct the widest dissemination of lessons learned by our teams. The team in training as well as any team in theater must be alerted to newly developed tactics, techniques and procedures that are proving successful in application. This is done through the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Combat Studies Institute, and the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance at Fort Leavenworth, among other agencies.

Detainee Treatment Standards

Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006 memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DoD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention?

Yes. The standards outlined in Common Article 3 should be the standard for US and Coalition forces to adhere to in regards to the handling of detainees at all levels. In fact, as I noted in responding to one of the earlier questions, after an early case of detainee mistreatment, I directed that detainees in the 101st Airborne Division area of responsibility would be handled in accordance with the Geneva Convention, as those were the standards our soldiers understood.

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Yes. I believe having one interrogation standard outlined in one document adds clarity. The new FM clearly articulates what is and what is not authorized and effectively identifies methods to ensure accountability.

Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our won detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen or Marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?

Yes.

You oversaw the issuance of a new Army doctrine on counterinsurgency operations. Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply

fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention?

Yes. We can conduct effective interrogation and detention in wartime in a counterinsurgency environment and comply with the requirements outlined in Common Article 3; in fact, we had international human rights organizations participate in the COIN Seminar we hosted to discuss a very early draft of the manual. And that conference, in fact, was co-hosted by Harvard's Carr Center for Human Rights.

Iraq State-Owned Enterprises

What is your understanding of the status of Department of Defense efforts to help restart Iraqi state-owned enterprises to increase employment in Iraq?

When the Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations-Iraq (TF BSO) arrived in Iraq, it expected to find a Soviet-style, aging State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) industrial base that was grossly uncompetitive. First-hand evaluations, however, reveal that some of these factories possess modern-even automated-equipment, and are capable of producing materials and manufactured goods that would be competitive in both Iragi and world markets. Some facilities have deteriorated or suffered from a lack of recapitalization, and require varying amounts of refurbishment. Other SOEs are simply obsolete, either because they produce materials or finished goods for which there is little or no demand, or because they require cost-prohibitive investment prior to restarting operations. SOEs traditionally employ large numbers of Iragis. Their closure still requires that the Gol address manpower costs, principally through retraining programs and job placement assistance. The TF is not advocating U.S. Government investment in Iraqi factories, and is committed to the long term policy of economic privatization.

Beyond this, having helped Iraqi industries reestablish cement plants, small refineries, and asphalt plants, among others, while commanding the 101st Airborne Division, my view is that there are numerous industries that could be reestablished – ideally with Iraqi funds – and could be selfsustaining, as they enjoy a comparative advantage in some factor of production (e.g., Iraq has vast sulfur reserves, reportedly the largest in the world, which would be used to refine high-grade sulfur for industrial purposes and production of fertilizer; Iraq also has large deposits of "sour crude" that are ideal for asphalt production). I strongly support encouraging such initiatives.

If so, what is your view of these efforts?

I strongly support the efforts of this Task Force. TF BSO is assessing Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM) SOEs as well as private factories. MIM is responsible for approximately 56 of the 190 or so SOEs nationwide. These 56 SOEs have approximately 200 factories. Within the 56 MIM SOEs, TF BSO has assessed 25 of these and is working closely with Deputy Prime Minister Salih and the MIM to revitalize the existing Iragi industry base. Where competitive industrial capacity exists, TF BSO and DoD will do everything they can to support the ministries, the factories, and provincial leadership to restart operations, re-employing as many current workers as circumstances permit. Several of the SOEs visited are in relatively good shape and can be restarted with minimal investment in power restoration. Initial efforts identified ten large factories, from Baghdad through Al Anbar Province, where \$6M provided by the Iragi Government can restart operations and reemploy 11,000 workers. The products that these facilities generate will help to meet local and DoD demands, and have the potential to serve broader U.S. and global markets.

Special Inspector General

The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR) conducts comprehensive audits, inspections, and investigations which are valuable to Congress.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to support the audits, inspections, and investigations conducted by the SIGIR?

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) reports provide valuable insight to the Force Commander, the Ambassador, and officials in Washington. I supported the activities of the SIGIR as MNSTC-I Commander and, if confirmed, I will support them as the commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). I should note that I also supported the activities of the GAO during my time in Iraq and following return to the US, and I also invited the Army Audit Agency to audit activities of the 101st Airborne and MNSTC-I on two or three occasions while I was in Iraq.

Mental Health Assessments in Theater

The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made 3 separate assessments over the past several years detailing the immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S. soldiers deployed to Iraq. The most recent study, MHAT III, found that multiple deployers reported experiencing higher levels of acute stress, and that overall levels of combat stressors are increasing. These types of reports lend support to the fact that increasing numbers of troops are returning from duty in Iraq with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), depression, and other mental health issues.

What is your understanding of the key findings of the previous mental health assessments, actions taken by the Army to address key findings, and the effect of such actions?

The MHAT assessments looked at morale, mental health staffing, access to mental health care, stress from multiple deployments and leadership issues. The general findings from the studies showed that multiple deployments and longer deployments were by far the leading factors that increased the incidence of mental health issues. The studies recommended redistribution of mental health staff to provide better coverage and the development of a Suicide Prevention Program within theater.

The MHAT 4 study completed in October 2006 showed that the staffing was better, which improved access to Mental Health care for troops. In August 2006, the MNF-I Surgeon published Behavioral Health Guidelines, which implemented recommendations from the MHAT III Study. These included the establishment of a multi-disciplinary Suicide Prevention Committee, whose purpose is to address theater-specific issues related to military member suicides.

In addition there is a Mental Health web site for Commanders on the MNF-I portal and there are mandatory pre- and post-deployment Mental Health assessments and reassessments (3-6 months post deployment.). MNF-I has also created a working group consisting of G1 personnel, CID agents, Chaplains, Surgeons and Mental Health professionals that meets not less than quarterly to assess the status of Mental Health in the AOR.

If confirmed, would you support continuous mental health assessments of the U.S. forces in Iraq?

Yes.

Do you have any views on how to best address the mental health needs of our troops, in terms of both prevention and treatment?

As explained above, I believe we are doing a considerable amount to support the mental health of the force in Iraq; having said that, we must continue re-examine whether we are doing all that we can in this critical area. Iraq is a war zone and we can diminish but not eliminate mental health problems. MNF-I has the assets and capabilities to provide prevention measures and treatment throughout Iraq, to include teams that periodically perform outreach at main bases and remote sites to identify potential issues. If confirmed, I will monitor this area closely.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.