| Micele |
18 april 2010 16:24 |
Allez, nog eens Wikipedia:
http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/F-117_Nighthawk
Ge leest toch dat dit trage bakken zijn.
daarbij vooral:
F-117’s vlogen meer dan 1300 missies en maakten 6905 vlieguren. Tijdens de missies hebben de piloten meer dan 2000 ton aan precisiemunitie afgeworpen waarvan meer dan 80% de doelen uitschakelde. Een van de missies veroorzaakte het bloedbad in de schuilplaats van Amiriyah op 13 februari 1991.
Tijdens operatie Allied Force ging in maart 1999 de 82-0806 verloren. Het toestel werd neergeschoten met een SA-3 'Goa'-raket van de 3de Batterij (250e Raketbrigade) van het voormalige federale Joegoslavische leger.
De eenheid, bestaande uit lanceerinrichtingen met elk vier SA-3 raketten, stond onder bevel van kolonel Dani Zoltan. De eenheid was vaak mobiel en communicatie vond plaats via de telefoon.
Door berichtgeving van sympathisanten in Italië die de aantallen opgestegen toestellen doorgaven, was Zoltan op de hoogte van de komst van de vijand. Ook maakten de Amerikanen de cruciale fout voor zowel de heen als de terugvlucht dezelfde route te volgen!
Door een goede radaropstelling op de route hoefde de radar maar zeer kort ingeschakeld te worden om een goede ‘lock’ op de toestellen te krijgen en kon de batterij de F-117 op 13 km afstand uitschakelen. [1].
De Nighthawk stortte neer in de buurt van de plaats Budjanovici in een veld. De vlieger werd enkele dagen daarna door eigen troepen gered. Vermoedelijk werd een andere Nighthawk beschadigd op een basis in Kroatië aan de grond gezet.
Citaat:
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/hta.../20051121.aspx
How to Take Down an F-117
November 21, 2005: The Serbian battery commander, whose missiles downed an American F-16, and, most impressively, an F-117, in 1999, has retired, as a colonel, and revealed many of the techniques he used to achieve all this. Colonel Dani Zoltan, in 1999, commanded the 3rd battery of the 250th Missile Brigade. He had search and control radars, as well as a TV tracking unit. The battery had four quad launchers for the 21 foot long, 880 pound SA-3 missiles. The SA-3 entered service in 1961 and, while it had undergone some upgrades, was considered a minor threat to NATO aircraft. Zoltan was an example of how an imaginative and energetic leader can make a big difference. While Zoltan's peers and superiors were pretty demoralized with the electronic countermeasures NATO (especially American) aircraft used to support their bombing missions, he believed he could still turn his ancient missiles into lethal weapons. The list of measures he took, and the results he got, should be warning to any who believe that superior technology alone will provide a decisive edge in combat. People still make a big difference. In addition to shooting down two aircraft, Zoltan's battery caused dozens of others to abort their bombing missions to escape his unexpectedly accurate missiles. This is how he did it.
--- Zoltan had about 200 troops under his command. He got to know them well, trained hard and made sure everyone could do what was expected of them. This level of quality leadership was essential, for Zoltan's achievements were a group effort.
--- Zoltan used a lot of effective techniques that American air defense experts expected, but did not expect to encounter because of poor leadership by the enemy. For example, Zoltan knew that his major foe was HARM (anti-radar) missiles and electronic detection systems used by the Americans, as well as smart bombs from aircraft who had spotted him. To get around this, he used landlines for all his communications (no cell phones or radio). This was more of a hassle, often requiring him to use messengers on foot or in cars. But it meant the American intel people overhead were never sure where he was.
--- His radars and missile launchers were moved frequently, meaning that some of his people were always busy looking for new sites to set up in, or setting up or taking down the equipment. His battery traveled over 100,000 kilometers during the 78 day NATO bombing campaign, just to avoid getting hit. They did, and his troops knew all that effort was worth the effort.
--- The Serbs had spies outside the Italian airbase most of the bombers operated from. When the bombers took off, the information on what aircraft they, and how many, quickly made it to Zoltan and the other battery commanders.
--- Zoltan studied all the information he could get on American stealth technology, and the F-117. There was a lot of unclassified data, and speculation, out there. He developed some ideas on how to beat stealth, based on the fact that the technology didn't make the F-117 invisible to radar, just very to get, and keep, a good idea of exactly where the aircraft was. Zoltan figured out how to tweak his radars to get a better lock on stealth type targets. This has not been discussed openly.
--- The Serbs also set up a system of human observers, who would report on sightings of bombers entering Serbia, and track their progress.
--- The spies and observers enabled Zoltan to keep his radars on for a minimal amount of time. This made it difficult for the American SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) to use their HARM missiles (that homed in on radar transmissions.) Zoltan never lost a radar to a HARM missile.
--- Zoltan used the human spotters and brief use of radar, with short range shots at American bombers. The SA-3 was guided from the ground, so you had to use surprise to get an accurate shot in before the target used jamming and evasive maneuvers to make the missile miss. The F-117 he shot down was only 13 kilometers away.
Zoltan got some help from his enemies. The NATO commanders often sent their bombers in along the same routes, and didn't make a big effort to find out if hotshots like Zoltan were down there, and do something about it. Never underestimate your enemy.
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Slimme kerels die Serviërs; en dat met (oude) SA-3 radars (Russische makelij)
Dat kort inschakelen -en snel locken- heeft natuurlijk de bedoeling zelf moeilijk localiseerbaar te blijven voor de vijand uit de lucht.
Citaat:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S-125
The Isayev S-125 Neva/Pechora (Russian: С-125 "Нева"/"Печора", NATO reporting name SA-3 Goa) Soviet surface-to-air missile system was designed to complement the S-25 and S-75. It has a shorter effective range and lower engagement altitude than either of its predecessors and also flies slower, but due to its two-stage design it is more effective against more maneuverable targets.
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Nato tegenhanger: (ook Be (Nato-BSD) en NL in D)
Ik spreek uiteraard met ervaring. ;-) |
