| parcifal |
26 maart 2022 10:41 |
Citaat:
Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Hoofdstraat
(Bericht 9927118)
Dat was altijd het doel, ook de connectie met de Krim. Dan nog de neutraliteit en denazificatie
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LOl, dat was NOOIT het doel. :D
Het doel was de grote steden innemen en de Zwarte en Azov zee afsnijden.
Dat is grotendeels mislukt.
Nu wordt er gekeken hoe de formidabele imago-schade kan beperkt worden.
Mooi draadje :
https://twitter.com/WarintheFuture/s...62797268901889
Citaat:
Russia's Plan A to use light forces – supported by an ‘air campaign lite’ - to seize Kyiv and other key points, capture government leaders and force a political accommodation from Ukraine, had obviously failed within 48 hours.
Russia, its opening gambit foiled, needed a Plan B. And it had to use the forces already assembled around the periphery of Ukraine.
So, the Russian campaign Plan B was a ‘creeping, multi-axis attrition’. It featured more firepower, as well as destruction of smaller cities to set an example for Kyiv. Plan B also appeared to hope that the Russian Air Force eventually turned up.
And it is clear now that the majority of the forces used for Plan B were ground combat centric with a very light logistic footprint. These forces were used on three separate fronts (north, east and south) without obvious overall coordination.
The Russian high command had rolled the dice and rested Plan B on ‘mass on multiple fronts’ being able to win the day in the north, east and south. But once that ‘mass’ runs out of food, fuel and ammunition, it loses military utility. And can become a stationary target.
The Russians continued to take heavy casualties with this plan B. They have given up many lives for small gains in terrain. Rear area security also suffered, with the Russians pushing forward as much combat power as possible.
So Plan B did not work out either. The Russian high command had to go back to drawing board (again) with their campaign design. And because it appears they have not appointed an overall theatre commander, Moscow has to coordinate with commanders in the field
About a week ago we saw the start of Russia’s ‘Plan C’ campaign in Ukraine. It was an even more ad hoc & more brutal plan that their two previous attempts. It featured holding gains, long range firepower on cities, and destroying as much infrastructure as possible.
Rudskoy claims city bombardment aimed to cause “damage to military infrastructure, equipment, personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.” This is code for expending large amounts of cheap artillery & rockets to terrorise Ukrainian civilians & force a political accommodation.
Summing up, Russia has not achieved its key military objectives in the north, east of south. It is desperately trying to capture Mariupol as a consolation ‘victory’.
Therefore, the Russians appear to be evolving their Plan C campaign. What does this look like? First, it accepts that a short war is now not possible. The Ukrainians are in this for the long haul to defend their nation. The Russians appear to be saying the same.
The evolved Plan C may see the Russians choose a single front, focussing reinforcements & other supporting assets there to secure more tactical success, or even a breakthrough. Given attacks on Dnipro, and some advances in Luhansk / Donetsk, this may be in the east.
So we may also see a move of combat forces, artillery and logistics to the east. And in other areas, we may see soldiers ‘digging in’ and constructing trench lines as a sign the Russians don’t intend to continue their advances on these axes in the short term
Worst case, the Russians might use weapons of mass destruction as well. The use of such weapons features in Russian doctrine, but given Biden's comments, Russian leadership will have to carefully think through potential NATO reactions to such use
A final part of this evolved campaign might be in Russian military leadership. Possibly, Putin could purge his senior military leadership to shift blame while also searching for a more effective strategy. And appoint an overall joint commander for Ukraine.
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