De Russische propaganda machine
 

Nu we hier toch dagelijks het plezier mogen beleven om overstelpt te worden met berichten van de trollenfabriek, lijkt het mij de geschikte plaats om het thema aan te snijden in het kader van dit artikel

De vragen die zo opkomt bij mij, is hoeveel zou een troll betaald worden om hier te spammen...:lol:

hoe hoog zouden die trollen zitten in de pyramide :lol:

https://english.nv.ua/nation/inside-...-50505923.html

This powerful structure shapes the narrative inside Russia and beyond, crushing dissent and manufacturing public opinion to suit the Kremlin’s agenda. It’s more than just an information tool — it’s a full-fledged industry of lies, equipped with promotion platforms, a robust incentive system, and serious cash flow.

At the top of the pyramid

Russia’s disinformation machine mirrors the hierarchy of a major corporation. At the very top are two deputy chiefs of Putin’s presidential administration: Sergey Kiriyenko and Alexei Gromov.

“Gromov is the curator and tsar of television — he decides everything that goes on there. No other official in the country can call a TV station and tell them what to do,” Russian journalist and Project media co-founder Mikhail Rubin told NV. “Kiriyenko is the other first deputy chief of staff, and the internet falls under his watch.”

According to Rubin, all top editors of Russian TV channels — and not just them — report directly to Gromov. “He holds editorial meetings with the broadcasters almost every week. He gathers an ‘iconostasis’ of federal channel heads and press secretaries from various agencies,” Rubin said.

Read also: Inside the Kremlin’s web of lies, money, and manipulation
These meetings typically take place Thursdays in Gromov’s office on Staraya Square in central Moscow. Though technically informal, they dictate the editorial line for all of Russian television.

The attendees include senior executives from Channel One, VGTRK, NTV, TV Center, REN TV and Channel Five.

To illustrate Gromov’s reach, Rubin recalled a phone call made during a Foreign Ministry briefing — directly to spokesperson Maria Zakharova — ordering her not to comment on Russia’s use of the Oreshnik missile in a strike on Dnipro. “That call came from Gromov. And it shows just how much influence he has,” Rubin added.


Kiriyenko, for his part, oversees a number of internet-related entities critical to the Kremlin’s digital propaganda efforts. These include the so-called autonomous nonprofit organization Dialog — effectively a government-run interagency internet communications center — the Internet Development Institute (IRI), the Agency for Strategic Consulting, the Expert Institute for Social Research (EISI), and the Foundation for Civil Society Development (FORGO).

All of these bodies produce content to push propaganda narratives or spread disinformation.

The middle tier: From Kremlin command to digital manipulation

The network built and overseen by Kiriyenko clearly illustrates how Russia’s propaganda pyramid functions — from its Kremlin apex down to the foot soldiers on the information front lines.

For instance, the Expert Institute for Social Research (EISI) was launched at Kiriyenko’s initiative in 2016. This analytical center was designed to help shape and promote pro-Kremlin ideology. EISI works closely with the Foundation for the Development of Civil Society (FORGO), headed by Konstantin Kostin, a former chief of the Kremlin’s domestic politics directorate. FORGO executes the Kremlin’s strategic messaging goals and coordinates efforts among various state-run and civic organizations.

But there’s another group — “independent” actors including volunteers and current or former soldiers. In the past, they generated “white noise,” occasionally criticizing military leadership. However, after the killing of Yevgeny Prigozhin and others, and the arrest of Igor Strelkov, even those minimal elements of “free speech” vanished from their reports.

Filippov believes these “military correspondents” have no real impact on front-line developments but still contribute to the broader stream of Russian propaganda.

Pro-Kremlin experts, by contrast, are treated more gently. The state doesn’t threaten them — it supports them. Investigative outlet Project looked into how much they earn for pushing Putin’s narratives. For example, Leonid Davidov, a prominent political consultant and creator of the Telegram channel Davidov.Index — which boasts 1.9 million subscribers — received $1.5 million from EISI over the past two years.

Somewhere near the “military correspondents” in the propaganda food chain are fake media platforms launched by Russians and collaborators in occupied areas of Ukraine.



Big and small money: How Russia rewards its propaganda elite
The Kremlin doesn’t shy away from spending — especially when it comes to paying its VIP propagandists.

For example, the salary of VGTRK’s war correspondent Yevgeny Poddubny, who regularly reports on combat operations in Ukraine, rose nearly 25% over the past year, according to Mikhail Rubin. Poddubny now earns an average of 974,000 rubles per month (about $11,700), up from 782,000 rubles ($9,400). His colleague Nikolai Dolgachyov saw an even steeper raise of 65%, bringing his monthly pay to 688,000 rubles ($8,300), up from just over 400,000 rubles ($4,800) the year before.

And the payouts don’t stop with the “military journalists.” Channel One’s Anton Vernitsky, who frequently covers Putin’s activities, now takes home 600,000–650,000 rubles a month (up to $7,800). In January, he was making 400,000 rubles ($4,800).

Staff at the Kremlin’s leading international propaganda and disinformation outlet, Russia Today, also saw boosts. Yevgeny Shipilov, head of the network’s Russian-language service, earned 950,000 rubles per month ($11,400) as of January, Rubin reported. Not long after, his pay climbed to at least 1.1 million rubles ($13,200).

But, as Rubin points out, there’s a catch — the majority of Russian journalists engaged in propaganda work do so for relatively modest pay. This is especially true for those in print and online media, or working for regional outlets.

“People shouldn’t think they’re all raking in luxury Kremlin stipends. Not at all. And that’s the scary part,” Rubin said. “A huge number of people write lies for what are basically regular salaries. By Russian standards, it’s average money. But by Western European standards, it’s laughable.”

In major national newspapers, even a special correspondent might earn no more than $1,500 a month. For regular staffers, it’s closer to $1,000. Regional salaries are even lower.

There’s also a financial stream far harder to trace: the so-called black cash box — unreported contributions from Kremlin-aligned state company executives and businessmen. This money is distributed informally to fund pet projects, initiatives, and the personal needs of Putin’s inner circle.

Russian investigative journalist Alexei Kovalev says a slice of this shadow funding is funneled into the media sector through Kristina Potupchik, a Kremlin contractor responsible for social media and messaging platforms. She now publishes glossy magazines and runs a foundation that claims to support “nonprofit social projects online.”

Soft power: The subtler side of the Kremlin’s propaganda empire
Propaganda doesn’t always scream — sometimes, it whispers. According to Russian investigative journalist Mikhail Maglov, Kremlin messaging isn’t limited to blunt-force tactics; often, it takes subtler forms that “gently lead the audience toward certain ideas.”

A prime example is the Internet Development Institute (IRI), a Kremlin-funded counterpart to USAID — but with far more insidious methods. Instead of hammering ideology home, it operates through soft power, embedding influence in everyday media. That’s why Svetlana Reiter, a journalist and expert on propaganda, calls IRI “an incredibly effective machine of influence.”

IRI is headed by Alexei Goreslavsky, a former top executive at media holding Rambler&Co. Since 2017, Goreslavsky had overseen internet policy in the Kremlin and directly managed IRI before officially becoming its general director in 2021. Under his leadership, the institute transformed into a government body with a multibillion-ruble budget focused on awarding grants for online military-patriotic education and — as Reiter puts it — “pushing the regime’s agenda.”

And the payouts don’t stop with the “military journalists.” Channel One’s Anton Vernitsky, who frequently covers Putin’s activities, now takes home 600,000–650,000 rubles a month (up to $7,800). In January, he was making 400,000 rubles ($4,800).

Staff at the Kremlin’s leading international propaganda and disinformation outlet, Russia Today, also saw boosts. Yevgeny Shipilov, head of the network’s Russian-language service, earned 950,000 rubles per month ($11,400) as of January, Rubin reported. Not long after, his pay climbed to at least 1.1 million rubles ($13,200).

But, as Rubin points out, there’s a catch — the majority of Russian journalists engaged in propaganda work do so for relatively modest pay. This is especially true for those in print and online media, or working for regional outlets.

“People shouldn’t think they’re all raking in luxury Kremlin stipends. Not at all. And that’s the scary part,” Rubin said. “A huge number of people write lies for what are basically regular salaries. By Russian standards, it’s average money. But by Western European standards, it’s laughable.”

In major national newspapers, even a special correspondent might earn no more than $1,500 a month. For regular staffers, it’s closer to $1,000. Regional salaries are even lower.

There’s also a financial stream far harder to trace: the so-called black cash box — unreported contributions from Kremlin-aligned state company executives and businessmen. This money is distributed informally to fund pet projects, initiatives, and the personal needs of Putin’s inner circle.

Russian investigative journalist Alexei Kovalev says a slice of this shadow funding is funneled into the media sector through Kristina Potupchik, a Kremlin contractor responsible for social media and messaging platforms. She now publishes glossy magazines and runs a foundation that claims to support “nonprofit social projects online.”

Soft power: The subtler side of the Kremlin’s propaganda empire
Propaganda doesn’t always scream — sometimes, it whispers. According to Russian investigative journalist Mikhail Maglov, Kremlin messaging isn’t limited to blunt-force tactics; often, it takes subtler forms that “gently lead the audience toward certain ideas.”

A prime example is the Internet Development Institute (IRI), a Kremlin-funded counterpart to USAID — but with far more insidious methods. Instead of hammering ideology home, it operates through soft power, embedding influence in everyday media. That’s why Svetlana Reiter, a journalist and expert on propaganda, calls IRI “an incredibly effective machine of influence.”

IRI is headed by Alexei Goreslavsky, a former top executive at media holding Rambler&Co. Since 2017, Goreslavsky had overseen internet policy in the Kremlin and directly managed IRI before officially becoming its general director in 2021. Under his leadership, the institute transformed into a government body with a multibillion-ruble budget focused on awarding grants for online military-patriotic education and — as Reiter puts it — “pushing the regime’s agenda.”