Politics.be - Amerikaanse troepen bezigheidstherapie

[quote="dejohan"]

Citaat:

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door TomB

Citaat:

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door michr.oscoop

Citaat:

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door TomB

They need to get out. Fast.

Dat er wat water wegloopt uit het emmertje van de WMD verandert niets aan mijn overtuiging dat die oorlog gerechtvaardigd is; het heeft echter wel zo zijn gevolgen voor de credibiliteit van de VS in de Wereld, en dat is een zeer slechte zaak.

En wat over de credibiliteit van de VS regering bij de amerikaanse populatie?

Het groffe onbeschaamde is dat een Bush zo zijn voeten veegt aan de publieke opinie, dat hij zelfs geen "vondst" van MDW (waar het toch om begonnen was, rememember!)organizeert... De Bushadministratie geeft toe dat al voor de oorlog, ze er zelf geen bewijs van hadden...
Een ander punt was de "steun " van Saddam aan Bin Laden. Daar gaven zowel Bush als Blair voor de oorlog toe, er zélf niet in te geloven..
Van volksverlakkerij en hoogmoed gesproken.. De Bushadministratie veegt volledig haar voeten aan haar geloofwaardigheid: Zij zijn de baas, punt uit... Een oorlog beginnen dus op basis van "mogelijkheden, gissingen veronderstellingen en propaganda"... Gewoon een testcase voor de internationale opinie in feite
Wie zegde ook weer dat het geloof sterker is dan de rede?
Hoeveel mensen zouden zich genaaid voelen hierdoor?
Laten we vooral niet vergeten dat Irak jarenlang werd overvlogen en bespioneerd met satelieten en vliegtuigen...

[size=4]President Bush Meets with Prime Minister Blair[/size]

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
January 31, 2003

President's Remarks

President Bush Meets with Prime Minister Blair
Remarks by the President and British Prime Minister Tony Blair
The Cross Hall
4:12 P.M. EST
THE PRESIDENT: It's my honor to welcome Tony Blair back to the White House. We just had a wide-ranging discussion on a lot of issues. I appreciate my friend's commitment to peace and security. I appreciate his vision. I appreciate his willingness to lead. Most importantly, I appreciate his understanding that after September the 11th, 2001, the world changed; that we face a common enemy -- terrorists willing to kill innocent lives; that we now recognize that threats which gather in remote regions of the world must be dealt with before others lose their lives.
Tony Blair is a friend. He's a friend of the American people, he's a friend of mine. I trust his judgment and I appreciate his wisdom.
Welcome.
THE PRIME MINISTER: First of all, can I say how delighted I am to be back in the White House and to see President Bush. And as he's just described to you, we had an excellent discussion, covering all the key issues of the day. And I would like to praise his leadership in the world since September the 11th, particularly, on what I think are the two key issues that face our world today -- which are issues of international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. And I think both of those issues come together because they threaten the peace and the order and the stability of the world. And what is essential is that in every respect, in every way that we can we mobilize international support and the nternational community, in order to make sure that these twin threats that the world faces are dealt with. And I have no doubt at all that we can deal with them. But we should realize those two threats -- terrorism, weapons of mass destruction -- are not different, they're linked.
And dealing with both of them is essential for the future peace and security and prosperity of the world.
Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Fournier. Here's what we're going to do. I will call upon a
reporter. The Prime Minister will call upon a reporter. And we'll do this three different times. Start with you.
Q Thank you, sir. First, quickly to the Prime Minister, did you ask President
Bush to secure a second U.N. resolution and to give the inspectors more time? And, President Bush, the U.N. says -- the U.N. inspectors say Saddam is not complying, you say Saddam is not complying, why wait a matter of weeks? What's -- why hold up on the decision?
THE PRESIDENT: First of all, you violated the two-question rule -- as usual.
He's had a bad habit of this. I'll start. Saddam Hussein is not disarming. He is a danger to the world. He must disarm. And that's why I have constantly said and the Prime Minister has constantly said
this issue will come to a head in a matter of weeks, not months.
THE PRIME MINISTER: The whole point about the present situation is that when President Bush made his speech to the United Nations, when we went down the United Nations route, we passed Resolution 1441. And I think it really repays reading that, because we said very clearly that Saddam had what we said was a final opportunity to disarm, and that he had to cooperate fully in every respect with the U.N. weapons inspectors.
As Dr. Blix said in his report to the Security Council earlier this week, he's
not doing that. And therefore, what is important is that the international
community comes together again and makes it absolutely clear that this is
unacceptable. And the reason why I believe that it will do that is precisely
because in the original Resolution 1441, we made it clear that failure to disarm would lead to serious consequences.
So this is a test for the international community. It's not just a test for the United States or for Britain. It's a test for the international community, too.
And the judgment has to be, at the present time, that Saddam Hussein is not cooperating with the inspectors, and therefore is in breach of the U.N.
resolution. And that's why time is running out.
Andy.
Q A question for the President, if I may. What is the status, in your view, of any second resolution? Is it something that you think it's worth spending time and energy trying to assemble and, if so, why?
THE PRESIDENT: First, let me reiterate what I just said. This is a matter of
weeks, not months. Any attempt to drag the process on for months will be
resisted by the United States. And as I understand the Prime Minister -- I'm loath to put words in his mouth -- but he's also said weeks, not months. Secondly, I want to remind you, I was the guy that went to the United Nations in the first place. I said, why don't we come together as a world to resolve this issue, once and for all. Why doesn't the United Nations stand up as a body and show the world that it has got the capacity to keep the peace.
So, first of all, in answer to one part of your question, this just needs to be
resolved quickly. Should the United Nations decide to pass a second resolution, it would be welcomed if it is yet another signal that we're intent upon disarming Saddam Hussein. But 1441 gives us the authority to move without any second resolution. And Saddam Hussein must understand that if he does not disarm, for the sake of peace, we, along with others, will go disarm Saddam Hussein.
Steve.
Q Thank you, sir. Mr. President, is Secretary Powell going to provide the
undeniable proof of Iraq's guilt that so many critics are calling for?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, all due in modesty, I thought I did a pretty good job myself of making it clear that he's not disarming and why he should disarm.
Secretary Powell will make a strong case about the danger of an armed Saddam Hussein. He will make it clear that Saddam Hussein is fooling the world, or trying to fool the world. He will make it clear that Saddam is a menace to peace in his own neighborhood. He will also talk about al Qaeda links, links that really do portend a danger for America and for Great Britain, anybody else who loves freedom.
As the Prime Minister says, the war on terror is not confined to just a shadowy terrorist network. The war on terror includes people who are willing to train and to equip organizations such as al Qaeda.
See, the strategic view of America changed after September the 11th. We must deal with threats before they hurt the American people again. And as I have said repeatedly, Saddam Hussein would like nothing more than to use a terrorist network to attack and to kill and leave no fingerprints behind. Colin Powell will continue making that case to the American people and the world at the United Nations.
THE PRIME MINISTER: Adam.

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[size=4]Q One question for you both. Do you believe that there is a link between Saddam Hussein, a direct link, and the men who attacked on September the 11th?
THE PRESIDENT: I can't make that claim.
THE PRIME MINISTER: That answers your question. [/size]

...END 4:25 P.M. EST

Return to this article at:
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http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/relea...030131-23.html

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[size=3]Ook na de oorlog gaf de US administratie toe dat er geen bewijzen voor het bestaan van MDW voorhanden waren op het ogenblik dat de US die oorlog begonnen:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp...nguage=printer

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washingtonpost.com
[size=4]Bush Certainty On Iraq Arms Went Beyond Analysts' Views [/size]
[size=3]By Dana Priest and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers
Saturday, June 7, 2003; Page A01
During the weeks last fall before critical votes in Congress and the United Nations on going to war in Iraq, senior administration officials, including President Bush, expressed certainty in public that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, even though U.S. intelligence agencies were reporting they had no direct evidence that such weapons existed.
In an example of the tenor of the administration's statements at the time, the president said in the Rose Garden on Sept. 26 that "the Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons. The Iraqi regime is building the facilities necessary to make more biological and chemical weapons."But a Defense Intelligence Agency report on chemical weapons, widely distributed to administration policymakers around the time of the president's speech, stated there was "no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing or stockpiling chemical weapons or whether Iraq has or will establish its chemical agent production facilities."The disparities between the conviction with which administration officials portrayed the threat posed by Iraq in their public statements and documents, and the more qualified reporting on the issue by intelligence agencies in classified reports, are at the heart of a burgeoning controversy in Congress and within the intelligence community over the U.S. rationale for going to war. The failure of the United States to uncover any proscribed weapons eight weeks after the end of the war is fueling sentiment among some Democrats on Capitol Hill and some intelligence analysts that the administration may have exaggerated the threat posed by Iraq.
The White House yesterday defended the administration's prewar claims. "We continue to have confidence in our statements about Iraq's possession of chemical and biological weapons," spokesman Ari Fleischer said. He added that "the precise location of where Iraq had chemical and biological weapons was never clear, but the fact they had it was never in doubt, based on a reading of the intelligence."
The controversy over the administration's handling of the Iraq intelligence continued, however, as two senior defense intelligence officials discussed the issue behind closed doors with members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The officials, Adm. Lowell Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Stephen Cambone, undersecretary of defense for intelligence, were asked by reporters afterward about the classified Defense Intelligence Agency report on Iraq's chemical weapons.
"What we're saying is that as of 2002 in September, we could not reliably pin down, for somebody who was doing contingency planning, specific facilities, locations or production that was underway at a specific location at that point in time," Jacoby said.
The existence of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) document was reported in this week's U.S. News and World Report. The administration declassified a summary page of the document last night.
The report said that "although we lack any direct information, Iraq probably possesses chemical agent in chemical munitions" and "probably possesses bulk chemical stockpiles, primarily containing precursors, but that also could consist of some mustard agent and VX," a deadly nerve agent.
As the administration built its case for war last fall, some policymakers used caveats in describing Iraq's weapons holdings that mirrored the caution built into the DIA and other intelligence reports. In early September, for example, Bush used words such as "likely" or "suggests" in making the case that Iraq had a covert weapons program. But many of the president's speeches, as well as statements by Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, went without caveats.
Among those concerned by the discrepancy is Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.), the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who routinely asked at committee meetings on Iraq whether officials were certain they would find weapons of mass destruction if the United States toppled the Iraqi government. Warner's committee and the Senate and House intelligence committees are deciding whether to launch an independent investigation of the administration's handling of Iraqi intelligence by their staffs. The CIA is already conducting an internal probe.
Cheney kicked off the administration's campaign to win congressional and U.N. support for military action in a speech on Aug. 26 to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Nashville. "Simply stated," Cheney said, "there's no doubt that [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction."
Before his Rose Garden statement in late September, Bush had used more measured language about Iraq's chemical weapons program, in line with the Defense Intelligence Agency conclusion.
At the United Nations on Sept. 12, when he urged the world body to join the United States in confronting Iraq, Bush said that previous U.N. inspections revealed "that Iraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard and other chemical agents."
But on Sept. 26, as the campaign to win congressional and U.N. Security Council approval for military action intensified, the president told congressional leaders Iraq "possesses" such weapons. On the same day, Rumsfeld told reporters that Iraq has "active development programs for those weapons, and has weaponized chemical and biological weapons."
On Oct. 1, the CIA released a "white paper" on Iraq's weapons programs derived from a broader, classified National Intelligence Estimate that had been sent to the White House and shared with members of Congress in briefings.
Among the "Key Judgments" in the first two pages of the National Intelligence Estimate that were meant to summarize the details that followed were statements in the white paper that "Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons," and "Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin and VX."
However, the more detailed backup material later in the document did not support those assessments. The intelligence paper contained more qualified language, stating, for example, that "gaps in Iraqi accounting and current production capabilities strongly suggest Iraq has the ability to produce chemical warfare agents within its chemical industry." It also said Iraq "has the ability to produce chemical warfare agents" -- a softer formulation than the summary section of the document, which said that Iraq "has begun" producing the agents.
On Oct. 7, Bush echoed without qualification the white paper's "key judgment" conclusion when he said that Iraq "possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons." He went on to say, "Saddam Hussein has chosen to build and keep these weapons despite international sanctions, U.N. demands, and isolation from the civilized world."
Asked about the president's comments on the Iraq intelligence yesterday, Fleischer said: "Intelligence comes in the form of a mosaic. The president's description of the complete picture resulted from an interagency process in which every statement was vetted and approved by each agency."
A senior administration official, who consulted with analysts familiar with the white paper, said the document's judgments "were a bit more categorical" than later statements "but the overall burden of the evidence pointed to that conclusion." He added that the president's statements were "based on the preponderance of the evidence" as he and policymakers saw it.
Throughout the run-up to war, according to senior intelligence officials, intelligence agencies had no direct evidence such as photographs or stolen Iraqi documents to support a firm conclusion about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. They said the case was circumstantial, largely because U.N. weapons inspectors had left Iraq in 1998, shutting off the last bit of direct knowledge available to the United States. Inspectors returned last November and remained in Iraq until March.
Some officials have said privately that, while they could influence the content of intelligence documents, they had no control over what administration policymakers said in interpreting the material.
© 2003 The Washington Post Company[/size]