| /\|cazar |
20 september 2005 17:45 |
Citaat:
Doemdenkers die denken dat de olie piekt (knipoog) voorspellen net niet het einde van de wereld. De genoemde heerschappen zijn er echter zeer gerust in. Zij zijn er van overtuigd dat de prijs voor een vat ruwe olie niet meer dan 200 dollar zal kosten (na correctie voor inflatie) in 2010
|
Euh ?
Ik zie niet in wat er aan doemdenken vervat zit in het erkennen van de eindigheid van de fossiele brandstoffen, meer bepaald ruwe aardolie.
Het is best mogelijk dat de jaarlijkse productie van ruwe aardolie vanaf dit jaar zelfs daalt, tgo een stijgende vraag.
Dan heb je zeker je 200 us dollar per vat ( ik wed zelfs op 95 dollar per vat tegen eind volgend jaar ).
Kan onze economie dat aan ? Neen !
Gevolg ?
MadMax in Bokrijk.
Ik vind dit in grote lijnen een vrij zinnige analyse ... Iedereen moet zelf maar beslissen wat hij met de info aanvangt.
Citaat:
This is not a post rehashing the fact that nitrogen fertilizers derived from natural gas have been used to significantly increase crop yields since the industrial revolution. That's all true (tragically so), of course, but that's not what I'd like to point out.
I've seen, on these boards and elsewhere, a rather curious argument from history that attempts to show that Peak Oil will be a "non-event." Specifically, the argument goes that because there were not massive die-offs and social disintegrations during previous energy-source depletions throughout history, oil peaking will be similarly manageable. For instance, when firewood "peaked" and was eventually entirely depleted in England, people were worried, but they found ways to cope with the problem that did not result in serious discomfort. Or, when whale oil became scarce in the middle nineteenth century, people adapted quickly. They found new ways to light their lamps. Economies did not collapse. People did not die off. There was no mass tragedy of the proportions that Peak Oilers believe will occur. Therefore, proponents of this argument ask, why should we believe that Peak Oil won't be handled in the same facile way of which people have generally shown themselves capable throughout history?
Good question. I intend to show that this argument is based on a number of flawed assumptions that make it untenable. Properly analyzed, oil is not the equivalent of other usually recognized energy sources throughout history. This is because historical analysis of this type should proceed functionally, not categorically. Oil should not be taken to be equivalent to firewood, coal, or whale oil even though they are all in the category of energy source. Functionally, they are very different. When comparing our current situation to historical eras and events, the proper thing to compare oil to is food. Functionally, oil is much closer to historic usage of food than to any other energy source.
To see why, we need to look at how oil functions for mankind today. Oil does a number of things for us, some of the most important including:
1) Powering our most common means of transportation
2) Powering machines that do the majority of the work of agriculture and essential industry.
3) Powering and supporting the aparatus and infrastructure that brings food to the markets that require it.
4) Powering the machines that we use to build our important physical structures such as roads, bridges, houses, governments and commercial buildings, public works buildings, hospitals, etc.
5) Producing electricity, which is in turn commonly used to heat or cool homes, refrigerate food, and light communities.
In the past, other energy sources have, at best, been used as functionally equivalent to point 5. Points 1 through 4 were all accomplished, in their historical analogs, by food. Considered point by point, here is how this works out:
1) Pre industrial earth's most common means of transportation was animal-power. People walked, rode horses or camels, used oxen or mules to haul goods, etc. Animals require food and water; food is the principal energy source used for transportation on pre-industrial earth.
2) Again, most of the work of agriculture or industry on pre-industrial earth was done by animals. Mules, horses, lamas, and people all kept farms running by their own physical exertions, which were powered by food.
3) Goods were hauled from their places of production most typically by wagons hauled by horses or mules. Again, these animals are powered by food.
4) Construction was most commonly carried out by people, though animals were also employed in the process. Again, people and animals require food for energy.
5) Heating and lighting was most commonly accomplished by burning a flagrable substance, such as wood, coal, or whale oil. In this sense, and this sense alone, is oil functionally similar to pre-industrial sources of energy. But even in this case, it is not precisely comparable, because those flagrable sources of energy were produced and brought to those who required them by animals, who used food to power their efforts.
Now, food has another function that oil does not precisely have--namely, food is necessary to the sustainment of life. Theoretically, we could sustain life, and produce food, without oil, though the analyses that show that we will not be able to produce nearly enough seem very sound to me. But in the grand picture under consideration, this point is of little importance. When one considers the intimate role that oil plays in the production and distribution of food, one realizes that the analogy holds. How many people in the industrialized world would know how to produce their own food? Functionally, there is no difference between someone who doesn't know how to produce food, and someone who does but cannot. Oil and the energy it produces allows a great many people to work in a non-agricultural occupation, and still eat. The vast energy that oil contains has freed up unprecedented portions of the population for the production of non-essential goods. In this way, then, supplies of food as a sustainer of life in the developed world will be substantially reduced in a post-peak world. Food production will, at least initially, decline as oil does.
This analysis seems solid. When employing historical analysis, therefore, we should compare an oil shortage to a food shortage. But even here, historical analysis that proceeds by comparison is flawed, because it has very rarely been the case in history that food production has crashed such that it could not be restarted. This would clearly be the case with Peak Oil--once it peaks (by definition), we will never again produce as much. This is suspected to have happened only a few times throughout history, but when it has, it's been utterly devastating. The demise of the Inca, the collapse of Egypt at the end of the Early Kingdom, and the demise of the Scythians, are all attributable to this kind of irreversible food shortage.
Expanding the scope of our inquiry to famines in general, we can see that all signals point towards this apocalyptic picture of the future. For, even in instances where food production was not entirely interrupted, or where the populace in question was able to restart it quickly, the results were nothing short of horrific. The decline of Western Europe during the fourteenth century is a prime example (though there are many others) of what we ought to expect on the downslope toward entirely inadequate petroleum production. The suffering of this century was caused in great part by systemic and frequent interruptions in food supply to the people of northern and western Europe. Wars, climate change, and disease conspired to lower crop yields. While food was mostly never completely unavailable, shortages led to yet more disease, peasant revolts, economic hardship, and prolonged internecine and international conflict. Populations declined all over europe. The art of the period is grim and preoccupied by death. There was a widespread rejection of the learning that took place in the 13th century and a concomittant seeking of refuge in fundamentalist forms of religion. Anti-semitism was widespread as many people sought scapegoats for their troubles. In general, there was a devolution to the social and technological level of the dark ages nearly 700 years prior.
Again, this is the picture that emerges again and again throughout history as famines have gripped societies. Each particular famine has its own flavor (or lack thereof, perhaps), but the overall patterns are the same. They dictate that people are in for very hard times, and that many will die.
|
[edit]
[size=1] Edit:[/size] [size=1]After edit by /\|cazar on 20-09-2005 at 18:47
Reason:
--------------------------------
Citaat:
Doemdenkers die denken dat de olie piekt (knipoog) voorspellen net niet het einde van de wereld. De genoemde heerschappen zijn er echter zeer gerust in. Zij zijn er van overtuigd dat de prijs voor een vat ruwe olie niet meer dan 200 dollar zal kosten (na correctie voor inflatie) in 2010
|
Euh ?
Ik zie niet in wat er aan doemdenken vervat zit in het erkennen van de eindigheid van de fossiele brandstoffen, meer bepaald ruwe aardolie.
Het is best mogelijk dat de jaarlijkse productie van ruwe aardolie vanaf dit jaar zelfs daalt, tgo een stijgende vraag.
Dan heb je zeker je 200 us dollar per vat ( ik wed zelfs op 95 dollar per vat tegen eind volgend jaar ).
Kan onze economie dat aan ? Neen !
Gevolg ?
MadMax in Bokrijk.
Ik vind dit in grote lijnen een vrij zinnige analyse ... Iedereen moet zelf maar beslissen wat hij met de info aanvangt.
Citaat:
This is not a post rehashing the fact that nitrogen fertilizers derived from natural gas have been used to significantly increase crop yields since the industrial revolution. That's all true (tragically so), of course, but that's not what I'd like to point out.
I've seen, on these boards and elsewhere, a rather curious argument from history that attempts to show that Peak Oil will be a "non-event." Specifically, the argument goes that because there were not massive die-offs and social disintegrations during previous energy-source depletions throughout history, oil peaking will be similarly manageable. For instance, when firewood "peaked" and was eventually entirely depleted in England, people were worried, but they found ways to cope with the problem that did not result in serious discomfort. Or, when whale oil became scarce in the middle nineteenth century, people adapted quickly. They found new ways to light their lamps. Economies did not collapse. People did not die off. There was no mass tragedy of the proportions that Peak Oilers believe will occur. Therefore, proponents of this argument ask, why should we believe that Peak Oil won't be handled in the same facile way of which people have generally shown themselves capable throughout history?
Good question. I intend to show that this argument is based on a number of flawed assumptions that make it untenable. Properly analyzed, oil is not the equivalent of other usually recognized energy sources throughout history. This is because historical analysis of this type should proceed functionally, not categorically. Oil should not be taken to be equivalent to firewood, coal, or whale oil even though they are all in the category of energy source. Functionally, they are very different. When comparing our current situation to historical eras and events, the proper thing to compare oil to is food. Functionally, oil is much closer to historic usage of food than to any other energy source.
To see why, we need to look at how oil functions for mankind today. Oil does a number of things for us, some of the most important including:
1) Powering our most common means of transportation
2) Powering machines that do the majority of the work of agriculture and essential industry.
3) Powering and supporting the aparatus and infrastructure that brings food to the markets that require it.
4) Powering the machines that we use to build our important physical structures such as roads, bridges, houses, governments and commercial buildings, public works buildings, hospitals, etc.
5) Producing electricity, which is in turn commonly used to heat or cool homes, refrigerate food, and light communities.
In the past, other energy sources have, at best, been used as functionally equivalent to point 5. Points 1 through 4 were all accomplished, in their historical analogs, by food. Considered point by point, here is how this works out:
1) Pre industrial earth's most common means of transportation was animal-power. People walked, rode horses or camels, used oxen or mules to haul goods, etc. Animals require food and water; food is the principal energy source used for transportation on pre-industrial earth.
2) Again, most of the work of agriculture or industry on pre-industrial earth was done by animals. Mules, horses, lamas, and people all kept farms running by their own physical exertions, which were powered by food.
3) Goods were hauled from their places of production most typically by wagons hauled by horses or mules. Again, these animals are powered by food.
4) Construction was most commonly carried out by people, though animals were also employed in the process. Again, people and animals require food for energy.
5) Heating and lighting was most commonly accomplished by burning a flagrable substance, such as wood, coal, or whale oil. In this sense, and this sense alone, is oil functionally similar to pre-industrial sources of energy. But even in this case, it is not precisely comparable, because those flagrable sources of energy were produced and brought to those who required them by animals, who used food to power their efforts.
Now, food has another function that oil does not precisely have--namely, food is necessary to the sustainment of life. Theoretically, we could sustain life, and produce food, without oil, though the analyses that show that we will not be able to produce nearly enough seem very sound to me. But in the grand picture under consideration, this point is of little importance. When one considers the intimate role that oil plays in the production and distribution of food, one realizes that the analogy holds. How many people in the industrialized world would know how to produce their own food? Functionally, there is no difference between someone who doesn't know how to produce food, and someone who does but cannot. Oil and the energy it produces allows a great many people to work in a non-agricultural occupation, and still eat. The vast energy that oil contains has freed up unprecedented portions of the population for the production of non-essential goods. In this way, then, supplies of food as a sustainer of life in the developed world will be substantially reduced in a post-peak world. Food production will, at least initially, decline as oil does.
This analysis seems solid. When employing historical analysis, therefore, we should compare an oil shortage to a food shortage. But even here, historical analysis that proceeds by comparison is flawed, because it has very rarely been the case in history that food production has crashed such that it could not be restarted. This would clearly be the case with Peak Oil--once it peaks (by definition), we will never again produce as much. This is suspected to have happened only a few times throughout history, but when it has, it's been utterly devastating. The demise of the Inca, the collapse of Egypt at the end of the Early Kingdom, and the demise of the Scythians, are all attributable to this kind of irreversible food shortage.
Expanding the scope of our inquiry to famines in general, we can see that all signals point towards this apocalyptic picture of the future. For, even in instances where food production was not entirely interrupted, or where the populace in question was able to restart it quickly, the results were nothing short of horrific. The decline of Western Europe during the fourteenth century is a prime example (though there are many others) of what we ought to expect on the downslope toward entirely inadequate petroleum production. The suffering of this century was caused in great part by systemic and frequent interruptions in food supply to the people of northern and western Europe. Wars, climate change, and disease conspired to lower crop yields. While food was mostly never completely unavailable, shortages led to yet more disease, peasant revolts, economic hardship, and prolonged internecine and international conflict. Populations declined all over europe. The art of the period is grim and preoccupied by death. There was a widespread rejection of the learning that took place in the 13th century and a concomittant seeking of refuge in fundamentalist forms of religion. Anti-semitism was widespread as many people sought scapegoats for their troubles. In general, there was a devolution to the social and technological level of the dark ages nearly 700 years prior.
Again, this is the picture that emerges again and again throughout history as famines have gripped societies. Each particular famine has its own flavor (or lack thereof, perhaps), but the overall patterns are the same. They dictate that people are in for very hard times, and that many will die.
|
[/size] |
[size=1] Edit:[/size] [size=1]After edit by /\|cazar on 20-09-2005 at 18:47
Reason:
--------------------------------
Citaat:
Doemdenkers die denken dat de olie piekt (knipoog) voorspellen net niet het einde van de wereld. De genoemde heerschappen zijn er echter zeer gerust in. Zij zijn er van overtuigd dat de prijs voor een vat ruwe olie niet meer dan 200 dollar zal kosten (na correctie voor inflatie) in 2010
|
Euh ?
Ik zie niet in wat er aan doemdenken vervat zit in het erkennen van de eindigheid van de fossiele brandstoffen, meer bepaald ruwe aardolie.
Het is best mogelijk dat de jaarlijkse productie van ruwe aardolie vanaf dit jaar zelfs daalt, tgo een stijgende vraag.
Dan heb je zeker je 200 us dollar per vat ( ik wed zelfs op 95 dollar per vat tegen eind volgend jaar ).
Kan onze economie dat aan ? Neen !
Gevolg ?
MadMax in Bokrijk.
Ik vind dit in grote lijnen een vrij zinnige analyse ... Iedereen moet zelf maar beslissen wat hij met de info aanvangt.
Citaat:
This is not a post rehashing the fact that nitrogen fertilizers derived from natural gas have been used to significantly increase crop yields since the industrial revolution. That's all true (tragically so), of course, but that's not what I'd like to point out.
I've seen, on these boards and elsewhere, a rather curious argument from history that attempts to show that Peak Oil will be a "non-event." Specifically, the argument goes that because there were not massive die-offs and social disintegrations during previous energy-source depletions throughout history, oil peaking will be similarly manageable. For instance, when firewood "peaked" and was eventually entirely depleted in England, people were worried, but they found ways to cope with the problem that did not result in serious discomfort. Or, when whale oil became scarce in the middle nineteenth century, people adapted quickly. They found new ways to light their lamps. Economies did not collapse. People did not die off. There was no mass tragedy of the proportions that Peak Oilers believe will occur. Therefore, proponents of this argument ask, why should we believe that Peak Oil won't be handled in the same facile way of which people have generally shown themselves capable throughout history?
Good question. I intend to show that this argument is based on a number of flawed assumptions that make it untenable. Properly analyzed, oil is not the equivalent of other usually recognized energy sources throughout history. This is because historical analysis of this type should proceed functionally, not categorically. Oil should not be taken to be equivalent to firewood, coal, or whale oil even though they are all in the category of energy source. Functionally, they are very different. When comparing our current situation to historical eras and events, the proper thing to compare oil to is food. Functionally, oil is much closer to historic usage of food than to any other energy source.
To see why, we need to look at how oil functions for mankind today. Oil does a number of things for us, some of the most important including:
1) Powering our most common means of transportation
2) Powering machines that do the majority of the work of agriculture and essential industry.
3) Powering and supporting the aparatus and infrastructure that brings food to the markets that require it.
4) Powering the machines that we use to build our important physical structures such as roads, bridges, houses, governments and commercial buildings, public works buildings, hospitals, etc.
5) Producing electricity, which is in turn commonly used to heat or cool homes, refrigerate food, and light communities.
In the past, other energy sources have, at best, been used as functionally equivalent to point 5. Points 1 through 4 were all accomplished, in their historical analogs, by food. Considered point by point, here is how this works out:
1) Pre industrial earth's most common means of transportation was animal-power. People walked, rode horses or camels, used oxen or mules to haul goods, etc. Animals require food and water; food is the principal energy source used for transportation on pre-industrial earth.
2) Again, most of the work of agriculture or industry on pre-industrial earth was done by animals. Mules, horses, lamas, and people all kept farms running by their own physical exertions, which were powered by food.
3) Goods were hauled from their places of production most typically by wagons hauled by horses or mules. Again, these animals are powered by food.
4) Construction was most commonly carried out by people, though animals were also employed in the process. Again, people and animals require food for energy.
5) Heating and lighting was most commonly accomplished by burning a flagrable substance, such as wood, coal, or whale oil. In this sense, and this sense alone, is oil functionally similar to pre-industrial sources of energy. But even in this case, it is not precisely comparable, because those flagrable sources of energy were produced and brought to those who required them by animals, who used food to power their efforts.
Now, food has another function that oil does not precisely have--namely, food is necessary to the sustainment of life. Theoretically, we could sustain life, and produce food, without oil, though the analyses that show that we will not be able to produce nearly enough seem very sound to me. But in the grand picture under consideration, this point is of little importance. When one considers the intimate role that oil plays in the production and distribution of food, one realizes that the analogy holds. How many people in the industrialized world would know how to produce their own food? Functionally, there is no difference between someone who doesn't know how to produce food, and someone who does but cannot. Oil and the energy it produces allows a great many people to work in a non-agricultural occupation, and still eat. The vast energy that oil contains has freed up unprecedented portions of the population for the production of non-essential goods. In this way, then, supplies of food as a sustainer of life in the developed world will be substantially reduced in a post-peak world. Food production will, at least initially, decline as oil does.
This analysis seems solid. When employing historical analysis, therefore, we should compare an oil shortage to a food shortage. But even here, historical analysis that proceeds by comparison is flawed, because it has very rarely been the case in history that food production has crashed such that it could not be restarted. This would clearly be the case with Peak Oil--once it peaks (by definition), we will never again produce as much. This is suspected to have happened only a few times throughout history, but when it has, it's been utterly devastating. The demise of the Inca, the collapse of Egypt at the end of the Early Kingdom, and the demise of the Scythians, are all attributable to this kind of irreversible food shortage.
Expanding the scope of our inquiry to famines in general, we can see that all signals point towards this apocalyptic picture of the future. For, even in instances where food production was not entirely interrupted, or where the populace in question was able to restart it quickly, the results were nothing short of horrific. The decline of Western Europe during the fourteenth century is a prime example (though there are many others) of what we ought to expect on the downslope toward entirely inadequate petroleum production. The suffering of this century was caused in great part by systemic and frequent interruptions in food supply to the people of northern and western Europe. Wars, climate change, and disease conspired to lower crop yields. While food was mostly never completely unavailable, shortages led to yet more disease, peasant revolts, economic hardship, and prolonged internecine and international conflict. Populations declined all over europe. The art of the period is grim and preoccupied by death. There was a widespread rejection of the learning that took place in the 13th century and a concomittant seeking of refuge in fundamentalist forms of religion. Anti-semitism was widespread as many people sought scapegoats for their troubles. In general, there was a devolution to the social and technological level of the dark ages nearly 700 years prior.
Again, this is the picture that emerges again and again throughout history as famines have gripped societies. Each particular famine has its own flavor (or lack thereof, perhaps), but the overall patterns are the same. They dictate that people are in for very hard times, and that many will die.
|
[/size] |
[size=1]Before any edits, post was:
--------------------------------
Citaat:
Doemdenkers die denken dat de olie piekt (knipoog) voorspellen net niet het einde van de wereld. De genoemde heerschappen zijn er echter zeer gerust in. Zij zijn er van overtuigd dat de prijs voor een vat ruwe olie niet meer dan 200 dollar zal kosten (na correctie voor inflatie) in 2010
|
Euh ?
Ik zie niet in wat er aan doemdenken vervat zit in het erkennen van de eindigheid van de fossiele brandstoffen, meer bepaald ruwe aardolie.
Het is best mogelijk dat de jaarlijkse productie van ruwe aardolie vanaf dit jaar zelfs daalt, tgo een stijgende vraag.
Dan heb je zeker je 200 us dollar per vat ( ik wed zelfs op 95 dollar per vat tegen eind volgend jaar ).
Kan onze economie dat aan ? Neen !
Gevolg ?
MadMax in Bokrijk.[/size] |
[/edit] |
