"Significant questions remain about the ethnic composition and loyalties of some Iraqi
units—specifically, whether they will carry out missions on behalf of national goals instead of a
sectarian agenda. Of Iraq’s 10 planned divisions, those that are even-numbered are made up of
Iraqis who signed up to serve in a specific area, and they have been reluctant to redeploy to other
areas of the country. As a result, elements of the Army have refused to carry out missions.
The Iraqi Army is also confronted by several other significant challenges:
Units lack leadership. They lack the ability to work together and perform at higher levels of
organizationthe brigade and division level. Leadership training and the experience of
leadership are the essential elements to improve performance.
Units lack equipment. They cannot carry out their missions without adequate equipment.
Congress has been generous in funding requests for U.S. troops, but it has resisted fully
funding Iraqi forces. The entire appropriation for Iraqi defense forces for FY 2006 ($3 billion)
is less than the United States currently spends in Iraq every two weeks.
Units lack personnel. Soldiers are on leave one week a month so that they can visit their
families and take them their pay. Soldiers are paid in cash because there is no banking
system. Soldiers are given leave liberally and face no penalties for absence without leave. Unit
readiness rates are low, often at 50 percent or less.
Units lack logistics and support. They lack the ability to sustain their operations, the
capability to transport supplies and troops, and the capacity to provide their own indirect fire
support, close-air support, technical intelligence, and medical evacuation. They will depend
on the United States for logistics and support through at least 2007.
The Iraqi Police
The state of the Iraqi police is substantially worse than that of the Iraqi Army. The Iraqi Police
Service currently numbers roughly 135,000 and is responsible for local policing. It has neither
the training nor legal authority to conduct criminal investigations, nor the firepower to take on
organized crime, insurgents, or militias. The Iraqi National Police numbers roughly 25,000 and
its officers have been trained in counterinsurgency operations, not police work. The Border
Enforcement Department numbers roughly 28,000.
Iraqi police cannot control crime, and they routinely engage in sectarian violence,
including the unnecessary detention, torture, and targeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians. The
police are organized under the Ministry of the Interior, which is confronted by corruption and
militia infiltration and lacks control over police in the provinces.
The United States and the Iraqi government recognize the importance of reform. The
current Minister of the Interior has called for purging militia members and criminals from the
police. But he has little police experience or base of support. There is no clear Iraqi or U.S.
agreement on the character and mission of the police. U.S. authorities do not know with
precision the composition and membership of the various police forces, nor the disposition of
their funds and equipment. There are ample reports of Iraqi police officers participating in
training in order to obtain a weapon, uniform, and ammunition for use in sectarian violence.
Some are on the payroll but don’t show up for work. In the words of a senior American general,
“2006 was supposed to be ‘the year of the police’ but it hasn’t materialized that way.”"
p.12/13
http://www.bakerinstitute.org/Pubs/i...p_findings.pdf