The Al Fallujah Cease-Fire and the Three-Way Game

[lyot]

THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
22 April 2004

The Al Fallujah Cease-Fire and the Three-Way Game

Summary

U.S. forces have reached a written cease-fire agreement with
Sunni guerrillas operating in Al Fallujah. More than ending -- or
at least suspending -- the battles in Al Fallujah, the cease-fire
has turned the political situation in Iraq on its head, with the
United States now positioned strategically between the majority
Shia and the Sunni insurgents.

Analysis

The United States and the Sunni guerrillas in Iraq agreed to an
extended cease-fire in Al Fallujah on April 19. Most media
treated the news as important. It was, in fact, extraordinary.
The fact that either force -- U.S. or Iraqi -- would have
considered negotiating with the other represents an astounding
evolution on both sides. For the first time in the guerrilla war,
the United States and the guerrillas went down what a Marine
general referred to as a "political track." That a political
track has emerged between these two adversaries represents a
stunning evolution. Even if it goes no further -- and even if the
cease-fire in Al Fallujah collapses -- it represents a massive
shift in policy on both sides.

To be precise, the document that was signed April 19 was between
U.S. military forces and civilian leaders in the city. That
distinction having been made, it is clear that the civilian
leaders were authorized by the guerrillas to negotiate a cease-
fire. The proof of that can be found in the fact that the leaders
are still alive and were not executed by the guerrillas for
betraying the purity of their cause. It is also clear that the
Americans believe these leaders speak for the guerrillas in some
definitive way; otherwise, there would have been no point to the
negotiations. Thus the distinction between civilian and guerrilla
in Al Fallujah is not entirely meaningful.

The willingness of the United States to negotiate with the
guerrillas is the most significant evolution. If we recall the
U.S. view of the guerrilla movement in May and June 2003, the
official position was that there was no guerrilla movement, that
there were only the uncoordinated remnants of the old regime,
bandits and renegades. The idea of negotiating anything with this
group was inconceivable for both ideological and practical
reasons. A group as uncoordinated as Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld portrayed them could not negotiate -- or be negotiated
with -- under any circumstances. We believed then that the Sunni
guerrillas were an organized movement preplanned by the Iraqis,
and we believe now -- obviously -- that their organization has
improved over time. It has certainly become an army that can be
addressed as a cohesive entity and negotiated with.

More important is the fact that both sides felt constrained -- at
least in this limited circumstance -- to negotiate. In that
sense, each side was defeated by the other. The United States
conceded that it could not unilaterally impose its will on Al
Fallujah. There are political and military reasons for this.
Politically, the collateral damage of house-to-house fighting
would have had significant political consequences for Iraq, the
alliance and the United States. The guerrillas could not have
been defeated without a significant number of civilian
casualties. Militarily, the United States has no desire to engage
in urban combat. Casualties among U.S. troops would have been
high, and the forces doing the fighting would have been
exhausted. At a time of substantial troop shortages, the level of
effort needed to pacify Al Fallujah would have represented a
substantial burden. The guerrillas had posed a politico-military
problem that could not readily be solved unilaterally.

It was also a defeat for the guerrillas. Their political position
has been unalterable opposition to the United States, and an
uncompromising struggle to defeat the Americans. They have
presented themselves not only as ready to die, but also as
representing an Iraq that was ready to die with them. At the very
least, it is clear that the citizens of Al Fallujah were ready
neither to die nor to endure the siege the United States was
prepared to impose. At most, the guerrillas themselves, trapped
inside Al Fallujah, chose to negotiate an exit, even if it meant
surrendering heavy weapons -- including machine guns -- and even
if it meant that they could no longer use Al Fallujah as a
battleground. Whether it was the civilians or the guerrillas that
drove for settlement, someone settled -- and the settlement
included the guerrillas.

The behavior of the guerrillas indicates to us that their numbers
and resources are not as deep as it might appear. The guerrillas
are not cowards. Cowards don't take on U.S. Marines. Forcing the
United States into house-to-house fighting would have been
logical -- unless the guerrillas in Al Fallujah represented a
substantial proportion of the guerrilla fighting force and had to
be retained. If that were the case, it would indicate that the
guerrillas are afraid of battles of annihilation that they cannot
recover from. Obviously, there is strong anti-American feeling in
Iraq, but the difference between throwing a rock or a grenade and
carrying out the effective, coordinated warfare of the
professional guerrilla is training. Enthusiasm does not create
soldiers. Training takes time and secure bases. It is likely that
the guerrillas have neither, so -- with substantial forces
trapped in Al Fallujah -- they had to negotiate their way out.

In short, both sides have hit a wall of reality. The American
belief that there was no guerrilla force -- or that the
guerrillas had been crushed in December 2003 -- is simply not
true. If the United States wants to crush the guerrillas, U.S.
troops will have to go into Al Fallujah and other towns and fight
house to house. On the other hand, the guerrilla wish for a
rising wave of unrest to break the American will simply has not
come true. The forces around Al Fallujah were substantial, were
not deterred by political moves and could come in and wipe them
out. That was not an acceptable prospect.

Al Fallujah demonstrates three things: First, it demonstrates
that under certain circumstances, a political agreement --
however limited -- can be negotiated between the United States
and the guerrillas. Second, it demonstrates that the United
States is aware of the limits of its power and is now open, for
the first time, to some sort of political resolution -- even if
it means dealing with the guerrillas. Third, it demonstrates that
the guerrillas are aware of the limits of their power, and are
implicitly prepared for some solution short of complete,
immediate victory. The question is where this all goes.

To begin with, it could go nowhere. First, the cease-fire could
be a guerrilla trap. As U.S. forces begin the joint patrols with
Iraqi police that were agreed to, the guerrillas could hit them,
ending the cease-fire. Second, the cease-fire could break down
because of a lack of coordination among the guerrillas, dissident
groups, or a U.S. decision to use the cease-fire as a cover for
penetrating the city and resuming operations. Third, the cease-
fire could work in Al Fallujah but not be applied anywhere else.
The whole thing could be a flash in the pan. On the other hand,
if the Al Fallujah cease-fire holds, a precedent is set that
could expand.

In 1973, after the cease-fire in the Arab-Israeli war, Israeli
and Egyptian troops held positions too close to each other for
comfort. A disengagement was necessary. In what was then an
extraordinary event, Israeli and Egyptian military leaders met at
a point in the road called Kilometer 101. In face-to-face
negotiations, days after guns fell silent in a brutal war, the
combatants -- not the politicians -- mediated by the United
States, reached a limited technical agreement for disengaging
forces in that particular instance, and only in that instance. In
our view, the Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt were
framed at Kilometer 101. If disengagement could be negotiated,
the logic held that other things could be negotiated as well.

There were powerful political forces driving toward a settlement
as well, and the military imperative was simply the cutting edge.
But there are also powerful political forces in Iraq. The United
States clearly does not want an interminable civil war in Iraq.
The jihadists -- the foreign Islamist militants -- obviously do
want that. But the view of the Sunni guerrillas might be
different. They have other enemies besides the Americans -- they
have the Shia. The Sunnis have as little desire to be dominated
by the Shia as the Shia have to be dominated by the Sunnis. In
that aversion, there is political opportunity. Unlike the foreign
jihadists, the native Sunni guerrillas are not ideologically
opposed to negotiating with the Shia -- or the Americans.

The Role of the Shia

The United States has banked heavily on the cooperation of the
Shia. It reached agreement with the Shia to allow them a Shiite-
dominated government. After the December 2003 suppression of the
Sunni guerrillas, Washington cooled a bit on the deal. Grand
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani demanded elections, which he knew the
Shia would win. Washington insisted on a prefabricated government
that limited Shiite power and would frame the new constitution,
leading to elections. Al-Sistani suspected that the new
constitution would be written so as to deny the Shia what the
United States had promised.

Al-Sistani first demanded elections. The United States refused to
budge. He then called huge demonstrations. The United States
refused to budge. Then Muqtada al-Sadr -- who is either al-
Sistani's mortal enemy, his tool or both -- rose up in the south.
Al-Sistani was showing the United States that -- without him and
the Shia -- the U.S. position in Iraq would become untenable. He
made an exceptionally good case. The United States approached al-
Sistani urgently to intercede, but -- outstanding negotiator that
he is -- al-Sistani refused to budge for several days, during
which it appeared that all of Iraq was exploding. Then, he
quietly interceded and al-Sadr -- trapped with relatively limited
forces, isolated from the Shiite main body and facing the United
States -- began to look for a way out. Al-Sistani appeared to
have proven his point to the United States: Without the Shia, the
United States cannot remain in Iraq. Without al-Sistani, the Shia
will become unmanageable.

From al-Sistani's point of view, there was a three-player game in
Iraq -- fragments notwithstanding -- and the Shia were the swing
players, with the Sunnis and Americans at each other's throats.
In any three-player game, the swing player is in the strongest
position. Al-Sistani, able to swing between the Americans and the
Sunnis, was the most powerful figure in Iraq. So long as the
Americans and Sunnis remained locked in that position, al-Sistani
would win.

The Sunnis did not want to see a Shiite-dominated Iraq. So long
as al-Sistani was talking to the Americans and they were not, the
choice was between a long, difficult, uncertain war and
capitulation. The Sunnis had to change the terms of the game.
What they signaled to al-Sistani was that if he continued to
negotiate with the United States and not throw in with the
guerrillas, they would have no choice but to open a line of
communication with the Americans as well. Al Fallujah proved not
only that they would -- but more importantly -- that they could.

From the U.S. point of view, the hostility between Sunnis and
Shia is the bedrock of the occupation. They cannot permit the two
players to unite against them. Nor can they allow the Shia to
become too powerful or for the Americans to become their
prisoners. While al-Sistani was coolly playing his hand, it
became clear to the Americans that they needed additional
options. Otherwise, the only two outcomes they faced here were a
Sunni-Shiite alliance against them or becoming the prisoner of
the Shia.

By opening negotiations with the Sunnis, the Americans sent a
stunning message to the Shia: The idea of negotiation with the
Sunnis is not out of the question. In fact, by completing the
cease-fire agreement before agreement was reached over al-Sadr's
forces in An Najaf, the United States pointed out that it was, at
the moment, easier to deal with the Sunnis than with the Shia.
This increased pressure on al-Sistani, who saw for the first time
a small indicator that his position was not as unassailably
powerful as he thought.

The New Swing Player

The Al Fallujah cease-fire has started -- emphasis on "started" -
- a process whereby the United States moves to become the swing
player, balancing between Sunnis and Shia. Having reached out to
the Sunnis to isolate the Americans and make them more
forthcoming, the Shia now face the possibility of "arrangements"
-- not agreements, not treaties, not a settlement -- between U.S.
and Sunni forces that put realities in place, out of which
broader understandings might gradually emerge.

In the end, the United States has limited interest in Iraq, but
the Iraqis -- Sunnis and Shia alike -- are not going anywhere.
They are going to have to deal with each other, although they do
not trust each other -- and with good reason. Neither trusts the
United States, but the United States will eventually leave. In
the meantime, the United States could be exceedingly useful in
cementing Sunni or Shiite power over each other. Neither side
wants to wind up dominated by the other. Neither wants the
Americans to stay in Iraq permanently, but the United States does
not want to stay permanently either. A few years hardly makes a
major difference in an area where history is measured in
millennia.

The simple assumption is that most Iraqis want the Americans out.
That is a true statement, but not a sufficient one. A truer
statement is this: Most Iraqis want the Americans out, but are
extremely interested in what happens after they leave. Given
that, the proper statement is: Most Iraqis want the Americans
out, but are prepared to use the Americans toward their ends
while they are there, and want them to leave in a manner that
will maximize their own interests in a postwar Iraqi world.

That is the lever that the Americans have, and that they seem to
have been playing in the past year. It is a long step down from
the days when the Department of Defense skirmished with the State
Department about which of them would govern postwar Iraq, on the
assumption that those were the only choices. Unpleasant political
choices will have to be made in Iraq, but the United States now
has a standpoint from which to manipulate the situation and
remain in Iraq while it exerts pressure in the region. In the end
-- grand ambitions notwithstanding -- that is what the United
States came for in the first place.

(c) 2004 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.

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Met andere woorden, het ziet er naar uit dat de grote rol die Al Sadr en het Mahdi leger hier door sommigen werd toegekend slechts facade was, indien je deze analyse een beetje volgt.. Mijns inziens is dat waarschijnlijk ook een correcte inschatting..Al Sadr heb ik nooit anders dan een speelbal beschouwd, maar wel een gevaarlijke..