Econometrische mijmeringen van een dorpsidioot

[Jean Pierre van Rossem]

Op dit forum is er een spruitkool die in de geest van het postmoderne wetenschappelijk relativisme de grenzeloze pretentie heeft dat mijn theorie over oorlog en economie een zoveelste theorietje in de rij is. Een andere noemt het onomwonden het werk van een dorpsidioot. Hier volgt dan de complete tekst van die dorpsidioot en dan even kijken wie wat weet te zeggen. De interessantste delen bevinden zich in de paragrafen 6, 7 en 8.

De tekst bevindt zich op: http://www.bene.ws/capitalism/

JPVR

[Supe®Staaf]

Om die econometrische formules te snappen, heb ik niet de nodige achtergrond of opleiding, enfin of in één woord: ik ben er te stom voor.
De tekst van §6,7,8 lijkt mij dezelfde als je hier in verschillende threads hebt neergepoot. Het lijkt me allemaal nogal logisch, maar dat kan te wijten zijn aan mijn bril van argwaan t.o.v. de hele Amerikaanse Mac-World 'verkoopsstrategieën'.
Is het wereldschokkend om te vernemen dat machthebbers en groot-kapitaal de touwtjes in handen hebben en alles manipuleren om haar uitbouw te bestendigen? Ik dacht van niet. De vaudeville rond iraq en de vaste wil van de USA (althans de machtsgroepen aldaar die er belang bij hebben) om door te drijven, zijn voor het kleinste kind duidelijk.
Waarom je prestige als een hoofdreden bovenaan zet zie ik niet goed in. Dat is enkel een manipulatietechniek van de publieke opinie. Inspelen op pattriottisme om 't volk warm te maken en met de smile het vuile werk op het slagveld te doen opknappen. Daar draait dat m.i. om.
Dé hoofdmotieven lijken me: de eigen (wapen) economie aanzwengelen, en (goedkoper geproduceerde) olie.

[C uit W]

één woord: ik ben er te stom voor.

dat zijn er 6

Inspelen op pattriottisme om 't volk warm te maken en met de smile het vuile werk op het slagveld te doen opknappen.

Beetje zoals belgie gedaan heeft/ doet met de vlamingen

[C uit W]

@ JP:

By unifying the efforts of the American power elite and the Zionist power elite an old Zionist dream, Jews ruling the world, becomes true

Volgens mij is dat simpelweg anti-semitisme, je kan evengoed zeggen dat de spa het communisme wil invoeren in ons land

[Jean Pierre van Rossem]

Dat heeft niets met anti-semitisme te maken. Trouwens dat is een conclusie die Joffe van de Zeit heeft getrokken. Voorts moet je Zionisme niet verwarren met Judaisme. Het Zionisme is dezelfde elite theorie als de Ubermensch theorie van de nazi's. Voor mij bestaan er geen minderwaardige of meerderwaardige mensen, er bestaan enkel mensen, ongeacht hun gelaatskleur of hun voorkomen.

JPVR

[Darwin]

Als jullie er niets tegen hebben wil ik ook de rest van JP's geestelijk kind hier in hapklare brokken posten.




[size=6]§ 6. Post-war State intervention in postmodern ecomomy (1950-2000)[/size]

After World War II most European economies were seriously destroyed. Several monopolistic enterprises went bankrupt (e.g. the steel giant Stinnes in Germany) and the transformation from war economy to peace economy gave a chance to several small firms to survive. The average business size was at once much lower than before World War II and scale elasticity of the capitalistic economies jumped far above one. The USA, which was never attacked by the enemies on its proper territory, had no need on a reconstruction like in Europe, but increased its exports to the old continent. After the war the old trusts were more and more transformed in corporations, governed by a new class of managers being formed at special business schools.

Being involved in two new wars (Korea and Vietnam) the American government signed contracts with the corporations for delivery of military materials. However, those contracts fluctuated sharply from year to year, and without diversification corporations could run in great trouble (e.g. Lockheed). Splendid example of such diversification is I.T.T., created in 1920, which acquired Avis (automobile location) in 1965, a chain of motels (Sheraton) in 1967, schools for steno-dactyl, publicity companies, etc. Other examples are Gulf & Western, Ling-Temco-Vought, Occidental Petroleum, etc.

This diversification had a bizarre effect on the American economy: at once the monopolistic control over the market diminished, despite the existence of always larger companies. This aspect of American mergers was neglected in the analysis made by Paul M. Sweezy and Paul A. Baran of America’s monopoly capital.[48] Although number of corporations owning more than half of America’s industrial assets decreased year after year, the diversification of their supply increased competition on a more oligopolistic market. One can consider those corporations, with capitals above one billion dollars, as a whole of several sub-enterprises decreasing the business size instead of increasing it. Otherwise it’s difficult to explain while during the period 1945-1973 the scale elasticity of America’s economy could be higher than one.

Generally spoken the period 1945-1974 was one of nearly steady economic growth. Except for the United Kingdom (2.84 %), Luxembourg (2.93 %) and Ireland (3.41 %) all west-European countries realised during the period 1954-1974 an annual growth of 4 % or more, with West-Germany (5.29 %) as European locomotive. But even Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Turkey realised during the same period annual growth percentages of more than 4 %. That was not the case in the USA, where economy was victim of four past-war business cycles between 1945 and 1970. Here annual growth was 3.26% (cf. Table 4).

In Europe national States lost a part of their sovereignty after the creation in 1950 of what became later the European Union. Initially reduced to only six States (West-Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, and called the European Economic Community) the members were, in four stages, enlarged to fifteen States. Great efforts were done to protect agriculture, resulting in manipulated prices for agricultural products. But the fight against monopolies (even State monopolies) and against all too high State subventions for enterprises, made that a part of the former national interventions were replaced by supranational control.

The unification of the money – the introduction of the euro in 2001 – was another great achievement of the E.U. Far reaching were the consequences of the creation of a European Central Bank (E.C.B.) in 1998 as a result of the Maastricht Treaty. At once national States could no longer decide about the applied interest rates – this decisions were now a prerogative of the E.C.B.. That also implied that a part of the national anti-crisis policy (e.g. decreasing the interest rates under recessions, in order to stimulate the investments) was now a supranational date. Other techniques of State intervention, such of devaluation or revaluation of the national currencies, were no longer possible after the creation of the E.C.B. The logic of the situation resulted in the creation of a European Investment Bank (E.I.B), financing long-term capital investments, and of the European Economic and Social Committee, supposed to unify the social policy of the member-States.

All this doesn’t imply that public intervention in European economy became lower. No, the intervention largely increased and decision making was at once seriously slowed by a massive supranational bureaucracy. The fact that the E.U. works without supranational constitution and without supranational army, that it never abolished national kingdoms, with kings and queens chosen by nobody, makes, that in several aspects, the E.U. remains, as compared to the USA, a dragon on feet of clay.

European State intervention resulted in the last half century in what has been called deliberation or consensus economy where governments negotiate as intermediary between trade unions and patronage. This intervention, however, can never abolish the real tension between the capitalist owners of production means (trying to maximize their profits and to minimize their costs, including the gross wages) and the working class (trying to increase the prizes for their labour force). Direct and indirect taxes, combined by social charges, are the main instruments for State intervention in the national economy. Here figures are largely different from State to State.

The American government works with total tax revenues being only 30 % of the gross domestic product (GDP), in Japan and Spain this is even lower: 20 %, in the Scandinavian States (except Sweden) it is more than 40 %, in Belgium, Luxembourg and Sweden even more than half of the GDP.[49]

Until 1974 it seemed that capitalistic governments, applying the Keynesian[50] investment programs in periods of crises, had the business cycles eventually under control. State intervention in economy was greater than ever before and deficit spending in periods of crises seemed to be the ultimate solution for controlling business cycles. Having acquired control over their National Banks, most governments tried (at least until 1998 in the E.U. States) to control the average price level by using changes in interest rates. Moreover, all kind of price commissions, tried to control the inflation rate directly. In more and more capitalistic countries wages were linked to changes in inflation. It was a period of 25 years increasing of real incomes.

However, nobody seemed to have seen the increasing vulnerability of all those capitalistic economies depending for their energy consumption largely upon petroleum from the Middle-East. An obvious indication of this increased vulnerability was ascertained by econometricians building models of capitalistic economies. The general tendency can be resumed as follows: the younger an economic model was, the more it indicated that equilibrium conditions were worsening.

I explain. An econometric model is a set of equations describing such processes as consumption, production, trade, investments, exports, imports, etc. Number of equations can vary between 25 to several hundreds. They are based upon statistical time series covering several years (in most actual models 50 years to 200 quarters). Each model works with endogenous variables being explained in equations and exogenous variables being used in equations, but not explained by other variables. Most models are built for local governments. The set of exogenous variables mostly corresponds with instruments of political decisions such as direct and indirect taxes, social contributions, money wages of government workers, etc. Once a model is built one can calculate the several impact multipliers corresponding with each exogenous variable. It permits to calculate what will be e.g. the effect of decreased income taxes on economic growth, inflation, unemployment, public debt, etc., all being endogenous variables.

After a so-called Baumol transformation of linearised econometric models one can transform the complete econometric model into a matrix equation and study the stabilisation conditions for the whole model. In normal human language that means that for each economy we can calculate how sensitive that economy is to exogenous shocks, or also, how long it will take for an economy to recover from a strong exogenous shock. In technical terms, in the language of econometricians, that implies that the stabilization condition for an econometric model is, that the highest eigenvalue (syn. Characteristic root) corresponding with the matrix of impact multipliers[51] should be in absolute value less than one, be it a real or a complex number. It is not necessary to be a good mathematician to understand the essentials of all this. It simply means that economies with a highest eigenvalue greater than one have difficulties to return to a state of equilibrium after an exogenous shock[52]. The more the highest eigenvalue (called modulus) exceeds one, the more fragile a particular economy will be, and the longer it will take to return to equilibrium after an exogenous shock.





If one calculates the highest characteristic roots for old models of capitalistic, constructed before 1950, they are nearly always lower than one, what implies that at exogenous shocks those economies were able to restore rapidly equilibrium. Later, especially after 1966, most models were working with a highest characteristic root slightly above one. Of all western economies, American economy seems to have the highest characteristic roots. For the oldest model of the USA, built by Jan Tinbergen, and covering the period 1919-1932, one can calculate ex post that for all years the highest eigenvalue of the linearised model is lower than one.[53] For the Klein-Goldberger model[54] of the American economy, covering the period 1929-1952, the highest eigenvalues for some years were below one, for others greater than one, so that it was rather difficult to speak any longer of a balanced economic growth. This was surely no longer the case with the so-called Brookings model of the USA, published in 1965.[55] The situation was even worse at the Wharton model[56], published in 1968 and regularly updated in the 1970s and 1980s. P.H. Howrey was the first econometrician to calculate the highest eigenvalues for the American economy[57]. He did so for 1972 with an updated version of the famous Wharton-model. His conclusion was that the highest eigenvalue for the American economy (as described by the model) was 1.1344 +/- 0.0743i, a complex number. This then implied that when suffering a strong exogenous shock, the American economy should have serious problems to return to a situation of equilibrium (without overproduction). Year after year, instead of returning to equilibrium, the economy will be further away from its equilibrium, for a prolonged period. In other words: the American economy is a pretty vulnerable one, so that ordinary business cycle crises can easily go off the rail to return as structural crises of persistent overproduction. Initially it was believed that the Wharton-model was not a good description of American economy. But each time a new model was built for the American economy, econometricians found unsound highest eigenvalues, thus confirming Howrey's empirical observations[58].

In my lifetime I built several models of the American economy. One of them was the famous and contested Moneytron Model of the American economy[59], built for the period 1960M1-1988M8. It worked with 195 endogenous variables, 144 stochastic equations, 51 identity equations, and 24 to 51 exogenous variables. If this model was so unreliable someone should explain how it allowed me to win at the American stock exchange $ 791,000,000 US (The European Journal). The same model, having been proven pretty useful for stock exchange speculation showed for the year 1989 a highest eigenvalue of 1.1267. Another and older model (called Varusarms), built by Arnaud Fransen and me, in order to study the impacts of US armament on American economy, and covering the period 1967-1981 showed res. 1.2259, 0.9532 + 0.01642i and 0.9532 - 0.01642i as three highest eigenvalues for the year 1974.


[size=3]Excursion - Before 1985 a modulus being in absolute value higher than one, and corresponding with a well-constructed econometric model of a country, was seen as a clear proof that at exogenous shocks, the economy of such country should diverge from its equilibrium, and this the faster the excess over one was. More recent studies in sensitivity analysis subscribe no longer this somewhat simplistic vision. Large econometric models are never a set of linear equations. Since 1985 most linearisations of non-linear models follow the Pagan and Shannon approach to obtain asymptotic distributions for the endogenous parameters from distributions over the exogenous parameters. This approach, however, ignores the possibility of multiple equilibria as was explained by Marcus Berliant and Sami Dakhlia from Washington University in 1997.[60] The use of so-called calibrated models[61] is no solution: macroeconomic models are characterised by non-linearities and dynamics (endogenous variables of period t are functions of other variables of period t and former periods t-j), resulting by a non-zero number of unstable eigenvalues. Linearising a model in the neighbourhood of an appropriate steady-state, to calculate short-run adjustments following exogenous shocks, can lead to different results than would be derived from the correct (non-linear) model.[62] Earlier, in 1996, two American econometricians presented computationally efficient algorithms for estimation of nonlinear dynamic models, working with derivative-based estimations. Reasonably complex models could be solved by this method in a very short time on Sun Sparc20.[63]

A new generation of econometricians, not accepting the use of divergent models with a highest modulus in absolute value greater than one, propose to construct inversely – using the Dynare software and working under Gauss-Matlab conditions – perfect foresight equilibrium models. In order to see of such perfect foresight models have a unique solution, one has to test it on Blanchard and Kahn conditions.[64] However, this conditions are only valid for linear models with coefficients not changing over time. Only after having transformed the original model in a linear approximation, and to work with reduced variables supposed having all the same growth, the Blanchard and Kahn conditions can be applied. Hysteresis[65] can be easily discovered by the existence of eigenvalues equal to one.[66] [/size]


The new theories undoubtedly are right that the linearization of dynamic nonlinear macroeconomic models provokes errors on calculating the matrix of impact multipliers and their corresponding characteristic equation, but never the errors can be that great that a highest modulus of let’s say 1.2 should have been in reality lower than one. It is a fact that the increasing vulnerability of western capitalistic economies is due to two important facts, nl. (i) that monopolistic and oligopolistic competition became the dominant market form so that the auto-regulating effects of free competition disappeared, and (ii) that the production process used more and more energy from crude oil having to be imported in large quantities. So, the empirical ascertainment of highest modulus higher than one and increasing in time, corresponding with macroeconomic models of capitalist economies, confirms this theory.

End 1973 the western economies were confronted with a violent exogenous shock when, at the very moment that in most countries scale elasticity was again close to one, or even smaller, the OPEC decided to quintuple the prices of the barrel crude oil. The consequence was a new and third structural crisis of capitalism. Initially most governments tried to fight it in Keynesian sense, by stimulating private investments. However, the main difference between a business cycle crisis and a structural economic crisis is that under the first condition new investments are labour-creative, whilst under the second condition they are labour-economizing. That means that national governments were pouring oil (!) on the flames. Indeed, under monopolistic market conditions the corporations tried to calculate the increased cost for used mechanical energy into their prices. With wages catching up increased inflation with one time lag, that resulted in an increased overproduction. In the USA overproduction was only 0.17 % in 1974, but at once 1.87 % in 1975, 2.43 % in 1976, 2.97 % in 1977. In Australia overproduction jumped up from 0.00 % in 1974 to 3.73 % in 1975 and 4.62 % in 1976; in Turkey from 0.60 % in 1974 to 16.22 % in 1975; in West-Germany from 1.39 % in 1973 to 5.26 % in 1974; in Great-Britain from 0.47 % in 1973 to 3.95 % in 1975, 9.36 % in 1976 and 11.03 % in 1977; in Italy from 0.39 % in 1974 to 3.03 % in 1976, 5.27 % in 1977 and even 7.10 % in 1980, etc.[67] The scarcity on crude oil on the international market made that all industrial enterprises and all transport-firms, using petroleum, tried to consume less and to increase the rationality of its use. Where it was possible most enterprises tried to use other energy sources such as natural gas, electricity, or natural energy from sun, wind and water. Use of nuclear energy by electricity producers increased rapidly, especially in the USA, France, Germany, Belgium and the United Kingdom.

The USA, having built a large part of its welfare on petroleum, probably made the same error as Great Britain at the begin of the 20th century: having built their welfare upon coal and steam engines the Britons waited much too long to switch to oil and electricity as energy sources. Something similar happened in the U.S.A. where the consumption of petroleum increased between 1973 and 2000 from 34.07 quads to 38.76 quads (= quadrillion BTU), whilst in Europe the petroleum consumption decreased: from 6.57 to 5.45 in Germany (West and East together before 1991), from 5.12 to 3.98 in France, from 4.61 to 3.39 in the United Kingdom, from 4.07 to 3.68 quads in Italy (cf. Table 5). The part of petroleum in the total consumption of primary energy decreased in the States between 1973 and 2000 only from 44.9 to 40.2 %, whilst in Europe it decreased much sharper: from 47 % to 39% in Germany, from 64.9 to 38.2 % in France, from 57.6 to 34.3 % in the United Kingdom, from 70.9 to 46.2 % in Italy, from 63.3 to 53.3 % in Spain, from 48.9 to 43 % in the Netherlands, from 29.1 to 20.7 % in Norway, from 55.9 to 49.1 % in Belgium. In Japan the part of used petroleum in all consumed primary energy went down from 68.4 % in 1973 to 50 % in 2000. In Australia the figure came down from 42.4 % in 1980 to 34.6 % in 2000. In the fast growing Chinese economy the part remained stable, but was always around a low 20 %.





That sticking on oil – despite a petroleum energy balance worsening from year to year – may explain why the American economy seems more vulnerable than e.g. the most European and the Japanese economy (remember the modulus of American econometric models being much higher than one than in most other countries).

The petroleum crisis of 1974-1987/89 induced a sharp increased unemployment in the capitalist world. From 1953 to 1974 unemployment in the States was 5.21 %, from 1974 to 1981 8.80 % (cf. Table 4). In the U.K. the averages were res. 1.74 % and 5.34 %; in West-Germany res. 1.54 % and 3.83 %; in France res. 1.71 and 5.52 %; in Spain res. 1.55 and 9.26 %; in Italy res. 5.60 and 7.90 %; in the Netherlands res. 1.45 % and 4.63 %; in Belgium res. 2.71 % and 6.80 %, etc.

Only three European countries didn’t suffer under a sharply increased unemployment: Norway, Switzerland and Luxembourg. How we can explain that? For Norway the answer is quite easy: of all European countries it consumed the least petroleum energy (less than 30 %) and moreover its economy was more than self-sufficient for oil, since it found a large quantity of oil in the North Sea. For Switzerland and Luxembourg, two typical banking States, the explanation can be found in the mechanism of structural crises, where banks are the only winners. Why?

Let’s study the course of a typical structural crisis. At the first stage monopolist enterprises increase their prices – i.e. sell their commodities further above their exchange value – with wages following not or only with a time lag behind. That provokes overproduction, since the private purchasing power of the consumers is lagging behind. Although human energy is now relatively cheaper than natural and/or mechanical energy, most enterprises will try to sell their commodities on the international markets. To win the battle for the world market monopolists invest – often helped by governments continuing their Keynesian policy – in more productive machines. This capital deepening results in more unemployment and in an even sharper struggle for the world market than before.

The continuously increasing demand for better machines results in increasing interest rates, having the banks as first beneficiates. Those interests raise even more due to the increasing public debt of States continuing their wrong Keynesian policy during structural crises. Between 1975 and 1987 this public debt increased in the USA from 42.8 % of the GDP to 51.6 %, in West-Germany from 25.0 % to 43.6 %, in France from 41.1 % to 46.6 %, in Italy from 57.9 % to 92.7 %, in Spain from 13.4 % to 48.1 %, in Canada from 43.2 % to 69.4 %, in Belgium from 60.7 % to 132.5 %, in the Netherlands from 41.3 % to 76.9 %, etc.[68]

Indeed, when the structural crises became sharper and sharper, most governments tried to balance the failing private consumption by increasing the public consumption in order to stabilize the economic growth. On doing so they created conditions under with the famous interest snow ball started rolling, increasing public debt faster and faster, and making that the interests rates were increasing. It should be noted that banks were the greatest prejudiced under such circumstances. In 1992 I calculated that the Belgian banks won between 1969-1974 an average of 6.30 % of all Belgian profits, whilst for the period 1975-1984 this average was 11.24%.[69] The cash flow of Belgian non-financial enterprises decreased to 1.94 % for the period 1974-1985, whilst it increased to 7.07 % for the Belgian banks.[70] One can conclude that, contrary to the Great Depression of 1929, where several banks went bankrupt, banks were the only winners at the structural crisis of 1974-1987/89. Thus no wonder than two small banking States like Switzerland and Luxembourg didn’t suffer under the same crisis.

Bourgeois economists could never explain why the petroleum crisis – a crisis of persistent overproduction[71] - could result at a given moment in two-digit inflations, despite the fact that aggregated supply was much higher than aggregated demand.

Some figures: in the States inflation was more than 9 % in 1975, 1980 and 1981; in Canada inflation was 15.49 % in 1975, more than 10 % between 1979 and 1981; in Australia inflation was 18.55 % in 1974, more than 10 % between 1979 and 1981; in Turkey inflation rose from 21.92 % in 1973 to 102.21 % in 1980; in Japan (less suffering from the crisis) inflation was 20.60 % in 1974 but rapidly returned to 2 % (1979-1981); in West-Germany inflation was more than 6 % during the three first years of the crisis; in the United Kingdom inflation was 15.05 % in 1974, 26.86 % in 1975 and still 19.22 % in 1980; in France inflation oscillated around 11 % from 1974 to 1981; in Italy inflation was between 11.62 % (1973) to 20.74% (1980); similar situation in Spain where inflation reached 22.83% in 1977; in the Netherlands inflation was 11.20 % in 1975; in Belgium inflation was more than 12 % in 1974 and 1975, etc.[72]

The explanation of persisting inflation despite persisting structural overproduction is quite simple. The high unemployment inspired most governments of capitalistic States to intervene between trade unions and capitalists to obtain a generally accepted wage moderation. That resulted in a further fall of the private purchasing power, increasing the overproduction once more. With national markets being unable to absorb the surplus production competition on the world market (resulting in an high increase of the export quotes as can be seen in Table 4) competition for more productive machines became sharper and sharper, increasing the interest rates. During the first five-six years of the crisis monopolist enterprises calculated even those risen interest costs in their prices, provoking high inflation in nearly the whole capitalistic world.

Bourgeois economists, working with a pure metaphysical marginal utility theory of value of commodities, seemed not to understand the qualitative difference between a market of free competition where commodities are sold nearly at their effective exchange values, and a monopolistic market where commodities can be sold endless higher than their exchange value, expressed in energy-quants. Another complication was that the USA, leader of the western economy, had been involved in more than 50 wars between 1945 and 1975.

This rise of an American military State was commented by Robert L. Heilbroner as follows: “There is no doubt that American capitalism during the 1950s and 1960s felt impelled to police the world. In those decades the United States intervened in Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; clandestinely overthrew at least one government (Guatemala), and probably another (Iran), and contributed to the demise of a third (Chile); actively supported repressive right-wing regimes in Greece and Brazil; entered into a world wide system of secret military arrangements; and ‘showed the flag’ on a total of at least fifty occasions.”[73]

All this was earlier and sharper formulated by the American sociologist Charles Wright Mills in his The power elite.[74] He concluded that the “publics” of the USA were not governed by their democratic government and its president, but by what was called the industrial-military complex. Mills wrote: “The history of modern society may readily be understood as the story of the enlargement and the centralisation of the means of power – in economic, in political, and in military institutions. The rise of the nation-state has involved similar developments in the means of violence and in those of political administration.”[75] He continous: “There is no longer, on the one hand, an economy, and, on the other, a political order, containing a military establishment as unimportant to politics and to moneymaking. There is a political economy numerously linked with military order and decision. This triangle of power is now a structural fact.”[76] Science, technique and education, and at a lower degree religion and family, may be considered as ramifications of the military, economic and political order.[77] Mills concludes: “Institutional trends may be defined as opportunities by those who occupy the command posts. Once such opportunities are recognised, men may avail themselves of them. Certain types of men from each of these areas, more far-sighted than others, have actively promoted the liaison even before it took its truly modern shape. Now more have come to see that their several interests can more easily be realized if they work together, in informal as well in formal ways, and accordingly they have done so.”[78] The structural interaction of the three orders conducts to a partial fusion and a coincidence of interests. So originates the American power elite forming a unity: “This unity reaches its frothier apex in sharing of that prestige which is to be had in the world of celebrity. It achieves a more solid culmination in the fact of interchangeability of positions between the three dominant institutional orders. If it is revealed by considerable traffic of personnel within and between these three, as well as by the rise of specialized go-betweens as in the new style of high-level lobbying.”[79]

This wilful coordination of the social structure – not to be confounded with a conspiracy – so typical for the American power elite allows its actors to take any decision they wish as long as it lets the people reckless to what happens abroad. In cases of less unconcern decisions in war making are possible by manipulating the people, by calling on nationalistic feelings, and by letting believe the people that they are in danger when the power elite shouldn’t act upon the by the power elite self-created facts (e.g. letting them believe that the Iraqis have mass-destruction weapons which will be used against the American people if no war – in the sense of a first strike - is ordered).

The power elite – a typical American fact – has by its structure far reaching consequences on America’s post-1945 economy. The economic order has a unique opportunity to use power for moneymaking. The easiest way is to obtain that the political order places million and billion dollars orders for the military order. In the beginning American corporations could doubt a continuity in those military orders – inspiring them in the 1950s to diversification, resulting in a less monopolistic market with a smaller business size. But since the early 1960s war making was a reliable part of the international policy of the American power elite. At once corporations could be ensured of nearly continuous military orders, making further diversification unnecessary. Not only effective wars, but the so-called Cold War with the Soviet Union, contributed to close links between giant corporations and the American power elite. The highest danger for those corporations was not inflation, even not overproduction, but that peace should break out![80]

It’s not exaggerated to state that the relatively fast fall of the scale elasticity in the USA, started in the early 1960s, was (unintentionally) provoked by the American power elite and its system of fixed orders at the giant multinational corporations, increasing sharply the degree of monopoly once further diversification was no longer necessary. Main victim of the petroleum boycott of the OPEC by October 9, 1973, this multinationalised economy carried the other capitalist economies in a structural crises, even those countries where the scale elasticity was not already insane.

In the USA the structural crisis was nearly over in 1985-1987, definitively faster than in all other countries. For the first time in history a structural crisis could be overcome without general war. Main reasons were (i) that overproduction and unemployment were never so strong as at the Great Depression and (ii) that the petroleum crisis resulted in most countries in a lower input of mechanical energy in the production process. If we consider again eq. 10, nl. r = µ - a.(eH/eNM)]/m² (with a < 0) the rationalisation of used mechanical energy, being the largest part of eNM, made that eH/eNM could be increased so that the scale elasticities of the several capitalist economies could be restored.

However, it took the technological evolution several years, before machines could work with less input of mechanical energy. An other factor in the recovery was undoubtedly the introduction of the first home computers, creating several small firms taking profit from massive innovation (theory of Joseph M. Schumpeter). That finally resulted in an increase of m, also resorting in higher scale elasticities of the several economies. In most capitalist countries the third structural crisis was over in 1989. Recovery should certainly have been faster if mainly socialist governments should have stopped subventions to old and dying industries (such as steel in Europe).

The last decade of the 20th century was again one of serious growth, not so high as in the 1960s, but fast enough to restore all profit rates. Meantime the whole society qualitatively changed in the last half of the century. How that was breeding the so-called postmodern society, with its typical feelings of uncertainty and indeterminacy, with its instable nuclear families having replaced the larger old traditional family, I explained earlier in two other articles.

[TomB]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Jean Pierre van Rossem

Op dit forum is er een spruitkool die in de geest van het postmoderne wetenschappelijk relativisme de grenzeloze pretentie heeft dat mijn theorie over oorlog en economie een zoveelste theorietje in de rij is. Een andere noemt het onomwonden het werk van een dorpsidioot. Hier volgt dan de complete tekst van die dorpsidioot en dan even kijken wie wat weet te zeggen. De interessantste delen bevinden zich in de paragrafen 6, 7 en 8.

De tekst bevindt zich op: http://www.bene.ws/capitalism/

JPVR

Meneer Godgeklaagd heeft zich nog eens beziggehouden met het voorspellen van het eind van de wereld zoals we die kennen als de mensen voor een enkele keer hun hersencellen zouden gebruiken om de verbanden tussen de verschillende machtsblokken in de wereld te gaan analyseren.

De schijding tussen genie en schyzofreen is ongeveer even dik als de lijn tussen het verkopen van een risico-investeringsportfolio en oplichterij van de onwetende. U zal dan ook begrijpen dat u categoriek vanuit het verkeerde startblok vertrekt in deze discussie.

Deze spruitkool zal over het week-end het zandkasteel eens grondig doornemen en op maandag met wat meer detail toelichten. In tegenstelling tot u houdt ik, op de hardwerkende - lees gerust : eerlijke - wijze, een zaak draaiende naast de politieke hobbies.

Als uw doelstelling enkel is om uit te vissen wie nog weet wat te zeggen na uw tekst doornomen te hebben, dan moet u trouwens misschien eens naar objektieven voor uw leven op zoek. Misschien meer iets voor uw eigen ontwikkeling in plaats van een nodeloze zoektocht naar erkenning in een maatschappij die uw reeds meerdere malen herkauwd en uitgespuwd heeft.

[Supe®Staaf]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door C uit W

dat zijn er 6

Wat weer overduidelijk bewijst dat ik geen wiskundige kei ben.
[size=2](Het éne, belangrijke woord leek me zonder toegevoegde context zo cru en liefdeloos tegenover mezelf, dat ik het niet over mijn hart kon verkrijgen)[/size]

[Jean Pierre van Rossem]

Aan Tom B.

Het einde van de wereld voorspellen? Wat is dat nu voor nonsens? Meer doe ik niet dan de voorwaardelijke voorspelling maken (onder voorwaarde dat een paar exogene gegevens zus en zo zijn) dan dat West-Europa in een structurele crisis van persisterende overproductie zal belanden. Dat is dus zeker het einde van de wereld niet. Hopelijk argumenteert u na de lectuur op een meer faire manier.

JPVR

[Jean Pierre van Rossem]

Ik hengel niet om academische erkenning. Zou dat het geval zijn geweest dan publiceerde ik mijn tekst in Econometrica of zoiets. Ik heb ook geen concrete bedoelingen met die tekst: ik wil er niet één of ander doel mee bereiken. Ik wil het enkel ter overweging meegeven aan een aantal mensen die geïnteresseerd zijn in internationale politiek.
Wat de verwijten van Tom B. betreft is het misschien gepast eraan te herinneren dat het Hof in Straatsburg mij heeft vrijgepleit. Voorts heb ik er geen problemen mee schuld te bekennen in de zaak waarin ik veroordeeld ben. Ik heb wel mijn straf uitgezeten, dus wat wil u meer? Is het mijn schuld dat uw "eerlijke zaak" niet beter rendeert? Ik bewonder u dat u op eerlijke manier zaken wil doen, maar dan weet u biezonder goed dat wie het zo probeert, in een land met de krankzinnigste fiscale wetten, het zeker niet makkelijk krijgt. De overreactie van B. verraadt een hoop frustraties en een hoop vooroordelen. Moge hij zich bij de lectuur over die bezwaren heen kunnen zetten. Meer vraag ik niet.

JPVR

[Darwin]

Ik heb paragraafke zes eens vlug gelezen en het lijkt erop dat de ene economie meer afhankelijk is van wat er in de wereld gebeurt dan een andere.

Zelf ben ik een groot voorstander van een zo groot mogelijke autonomie voor zo klein mogelijke sociaal-economisch-cultureel-politieke entiteiten.

Echter, de beweging naar mondialisering is niet te stuiten.

Maar weerom, niets weerhoudt ons in Europa ervan om autonomie op kleinere schaal na te streven.

Als je helemaal zelfbedruipend bent, moet je in theorie niks meer vrezen van buitenaf. Maar je moet wel bereid zijn om voor die autonomie op te komen als het moet. Om te voorkomen dat weer nieuwe golven van parasieten van over heel de wereldbol van de slechtgeorganiseerde en kwetsbare streken naar de goedgeorganiseerde sterke streken trekken, moet de UNO verder ontwikkeld worden.

M.a.w. dit is een zaak die op wereldniveau moet opgelost worden.

In Europa zal in ieder geval om van zelfbedruipendheid te kunnen spreken eerst en vooral het aantal mensen mettertijd drastisch moeten afnemen, zodat we de streken buiten Europa niet meer hoeven leeg te roven zoals nu het geval is, en de mensen buiten Europa ook nog een kans krijgen.

[TomB]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Jean Pierre van Rossem

Ik hengel niet om academische erkenning. Zou dat het geval zijn geweest dan publiceerde ik mijn tekst in Econometrica of zoiets. Ik heb ook geen concrete bedoelingen met die tekst: ik wil er niet één of ander doel mee bereiken. Ik wil het enkel ter overweging meegeven aan een aantal mensen die geïnteresseerd zijn in internationale politiek.
Wat de verwijten van Tom B. betreft is het misschien gepast eraan te herinneren dat het Hof in Straatsburg mij heeft vrijgepleit. Voorts heb ik er geen problemen mee schuld te bekennen in de zaak waarin ik veroordeeld ben. Ik heb wel mijn straf uitgezeten, dus wat wil u meer? Is het mijn schuld dat uw "eerlijke zaak" niet beter rendeert? Ik bewonder u dat u op eerlijke manier zaken wil doen, maar dan weet u biezonder goed dat wie het zo probeert, in een land met de krankzinnigste fiscale wetten, het zeker niet makkelijk krijgt. De overreactie van B. verraadt een hoop frustraties en een hoop vooroordelen. Moge hij zich bij de lectuur over die bezwaren heen kunnen zetten. Meer vraag ik niet.

JPVR

Voor iemand die zijn thread begint met mij een grenzeloos pretentieuze spruitkool te noemen kom je nu toch uit een veel gemodereerdere hoek. Misschien niet meer zo dronken als bij uw eerste schrijven Jean?

Mijn zaak is BTW in de US, dan nog wel precies omwille van de krankzinnige fiscale wetten waarover u het heeft. Ik ben ooit nog gestart in Belgie. Dat prille begin heeft geduurd tot ik een werknemer aannam en tot het besef kwam dat ik er voor drie moest betalen. Het kan mij overigens geen spleet schelen of je nu een oplichter bent of niet. Het lijkt me dat de mensen in West Vlaanderen zo om de tien jaar een keer het geld uit hun zakken laten kloppen, of het nu door u is of door een spraakmakend bedrijf. Wat het rendement van mijn zaak betreft slaat ge natuurlijk maar wat in het rond zonder feiten.

Maak u geen zorgen, ik zal uw hersenspinsel met evenveel eerlijkheid als plezier lezen, het ziet er trouwens op het eerste zicht niet al te slecht geschreven uit.

JPR, als economisch miskend genie kunt ge mij in tussentijd een grote lol doen en uw mening neerpoten over het verleggen van de belastingen van arbeid naar verbruik (zoals Vivant dat voorstelt). Dat hoeft heus geen 20 paginas te beslaan, ik wil er gewoon uw gedacht van weten.

[Ali]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Darwin

Ik heb paragraafke zes eens vlug gelezen en het lijkt erop dat de ene economie meer afhankelijk is van wat er in de wereld gebeurt dan een andere.

Zelf ben ik een groot voorstander van een zo groot mogelijke autonomie voor zo klein mogelijke sociaal-economisch-cultureel-politieke entiteiten.

Echter, de beweging naar mondialisering is niet te stuiten.

Maar weerom, niets weerhoudt ons in Europa ervan om autonomie op kleinere schaal na te streven.

Als je helemaal zelfbedruipend bent, moet je in theorie niks meer vrezen van buitenaf. Maar je moet wel bereid zijn om voor die autonomie op te komen als het moet. Om te voorkomen dat weer nieuwe golven van parasieten van over heel de wereldbol van de slechtgeorganiseerde en kwetsbare streken naar de goedgeorganiseerde sterke streken trekken, moet de UNO verder ontwikkeld worden.

M.a.w. dit is een zaak die op wereldniveau moet opgelost worden.

In Europa zal in ieder geval om van zelfbedruipendheid te kunnen spreken eerst en vooral het aantal mensen mettertijd drastisch moeten afnemen, zodat we de streken buiten Europa niet meer hoeven leeg te roven zoals nu het geval is, en de mensen buiten Europa ook nog een kans krijgen.

de meeste dromen zijn bedrog.

en hoe gaat belgié zich bedruipen ? met de overschotten van jullie varkensmest mischien?

[Darwin]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Ali

de meeste dromen zijn bedrog.

en hoe gaat belgié zich bedruipen ? met de overschotten van jullie varkensmest mischien?

Hier spreekt iemand met veel ervaring blijkbaar.

Die varkensmest kunnen we misschien over jullie kop uitkappen.

Zodoende gaan jullie hier wat sneller lopen, en zijn we hier in Europa weeral met minder mensen, zodat we weeral dichter bij onze autonomie zijn gekomen.

[akanit]

Quote:
één woord: ik ben er te stom voor.

dat zijn er 6



Ik kreeg wel de slappe lach toen ik dit las
Dat is een weerlegging om U tegen te zeggen

Gewoon wiskundig gepakt héhé.
Ik hou wel van die droge humor.

[Supe®Staaf]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door akanit

Gewoon wiskundig gepakt héhé.
Ik hou wel van die droge humor.

Ze hebben mijn achilleshiel ontdekt, de snoodaards.

[Antoon]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Jean Pierre van Rossem

Op dit forum is er een spruitkool die in de geest van het postmoderne wetenschappelijk relativisme de grenzeloze pretentie heeft dat mijn theorie over oorlog en economie een zoveelste theorietje in de rij is. Een andere noemt het onomwonden het werk van een dorpsidioot. Hier volgt dan de complete tekst van die dorpsidioot en dan even kijken wie wat weet te zeggen. De interessantste delen bevinden zich in de paragrafen 6, 7 en 8.

De tekst bevindt zich op: http://www.bene.ws/capitalism/

JPVR

Een forumlid heeft je hierboven een beetje ondiplomatisch gekwalificeerd als dorpsidioot.

Dat algemeen bekend is dat jouw intelligentie beperkt is, en dat de Vlamingen je altijd al hebben beschouwd als een klucht waarmee goed kon worden gelachen, kun je hen niet echt kwalijk nemen.

Want je bent ook niet echt slim, hé? en zeker niet om au sérieux te worden genomen.

Het woord 'dorpsidioot' wordt trouwens regelmatig in de volksmond gebruikt wanneer ze het over JPVR hebben.

Maar dat wist je toch zelf ook. Niet?

[alpina]

In plaats van te zeveren of iemand een dorpsidioot is of niet zouden jullie je beter wat bezighouden met het artikel zelf!!

[Bolter]

Los van alle mijmeringen of economische wetmatigheden : er is voldoende geld aanwezig op wereldniveau om ons allen een menswaardig leven te laten leiden....

Kortom : er is geld genoeg, alleen is het niet goed verdeeld....

Al die cijfers kunnen me dan ook de pot op..

Geld is als water.
Waar er veel is vloeit er makkelijker meer naartoe.
De rest slibt dicht.

[Darwin]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Bolter

Los van alle mijmeringen of economische wetmatigheden : er is voldoende geld aanwezig op wereldniveau om ons allen een menswaardig leven te laten leiden....

Kortom : er is geld genoeg, alleen is het niet goed verdeelt....

Al die cijfers kunnen me dan ook de pot op..

Geld is als water.
Waar er veel is vloeit er makkelijker meer naartoe.
De rest slibt dicht.

Mis Bolter, zie maar de topic "hoeveel mensen kan de aarde aan?".

Met geld koop je geen extra aarde, zelfs niet op krediet.