TERRORISTS TALK TRAP TO BUY TIME

It's the same old story. When it is at a disadvantage, the Tiger seeks to
engage its enemy in negotiations, buy time and weapons, sew confusion in the
ranks of the enemy's troops (Sri Lankan, IPKF), and disrupt the morale and
momentum of the armed forces. It is psychological warfare at its most
insidious.

In 1987 the Sri Lankan army was marching on Jaffna, having captured
Vadamaarachchi, and Prabhakaran was put to rout. That victory was aborted by
India's intervention - a folly for which India would pay with the murder by
a grateful Prabhakaran, of the leader who ordered the intervention, Shri
Rajiv Gandhi. 15 years later the long range patrols of the Sri Lankan army
were liquidating LTTE commanders and hunting down Prabhakaran, until the
Ranil-Balasingham-Solheim CFA saved his skin.

We must not allow that history to repeat itself.

Then why not simply say no? Because the trap is a complex one: if we comply
with the international pressure, we undermine our armed forces and the
national interest. If we are seen to reject talks outright, we, rather than
the Tigers appear the intransigents, and isolate ourselves from sources of
support, economic and strategic. The global heat on the Tigers may abate,
and some elements in the international system may even tilt to the LTTE. The
LTTE has agreed to unconditional talks, with an eye to India.

How then should we respond?

We should take our stand along the same line that the international
community has drawn in the sand, in relation to other terrorist forces. I do
not mean Al Qaeda, which, it has been argued, one cannot negotiate with
because it is a trans-national network with no cause but the destruction of
the West. I refer to the international stand on forces deemed terrorist,
which are as, or even far more rooted than the LTTE in their native soil and
have causes widely recognised as more legitimate.

What has been the recent stand of the international community, on the
Palestinians? It insists that any and all Palestinian movements (initially
the PLO, now Hamas) have to recognise the right of the state of Israel to
exist, in order to begin negotiations. It insisted that the PLO replace
Chairman Arafat as leader because he was complicit with or unable to rein
in, terrorism. It insisted on elections in the Palestinian areas. Now, faced
with an elected Hamas government, it insists on the recognition of the state
of Israel and the renunciation of terrorism and violence before any aid is
restored.

Unless the international community wishes to make the case that the LTTE has
a cause of greater legitimacy than the Palestinians, the Sri Lankan
government cannot be faulted for adopting roughly the same, or a similar
bottom line. The reason that I do not say 'an identical' or 'the same'
bottom line, is because the asymmetry of strength between the Israelis and
the Palestinians is markedly greater than that between us and the LTTE, both
militarily and in the diplomatic arena.

Translated, what would the standard international line on terrorism mean in
terms of talking to the Tigers today or tomorrow? The GOSL should insist on
the following as necessary terms for negotiations:

1. The LTTE must recognise the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the democratic Sri Lankan state; its existing borders; and that any
solution, interim or final, to the Tamil question must be within the Sri
Lankan state. Nothing outside it is negotiable.

2. There cannot be two armed forces within a country. No democratic state
can coexist with a hostile suicide-bombing terrorist militia and kamikaze
pirate navy. The LTTE must agree that de-commissioning of its weapons under
international auspices must be part of any settlement. (That was part of
Northern Ireland's Good Friday agreement, though Ireland being England's
first colony, the call for British 'troops out' was far more legitimate a
case than the Tigers have.)

3. The LTTE must agree to internationally supervised elections within a
compressed time frame. The government can negotiate a political settlement
only with democratically elected representatives.

4. The Government cannot negotiate with the LTTE so long as it is led by
Velupillai Prabhakaran who has assassinated many elected Sri Lankan leaders.
It will however, negotiate with any LTTE leader, apart from Prabhakaran, who
has been elected by the people.

If we go in for talks without any of these terms being fulfilled, we must
insist upon prior security guarantees in the form of signed agreements and
military supplies, including weapons systems that will give us a decisive
edge in the event that the LTTE renews its aggression. The Sri Lankan state
and its armed forces must have a tangible incentive for going for talks at
this time; an incentive that can generously compensate for the disadvantages
of so doing.

President Mahinda Rajapakse and his team have the opportunity to make this
case to the international community, including the global media, in Havana
and New York, through vigorous 'outreach diplomacy'. He must pay his
respects at Ground Zero, the site where the Twin Towers of the World Trade
Centre stood, and use the global mood of the 5th anniversary of 9/11, to
state our case strongly before the UN General Assembly as a frontline state
in the global war against terrorism and suicide terrorists. The president
will also have to pledge before that global audience, a solution to the
Tamil ethnic problem, based on autonomy (which does not fall too far short
of the Indian model). Sri Lanka cannot be ruled an exception to the global
consensus on terrorism. On what basis can the international community reject
our case against terrorism, on this 5th anniversary, and in New York of all
places?

We need a Sampur in the international arena. Our diplomats must match the
achievement of our armed forces. It is only then that we can create the
political and diplomatic space for our armed forces to do their job of
saving the country from totalitarian separatist terrorism. It is only by
waging "the battle of ideas" (as Fidel calls it) in the global arena, going
on the offensive, taking the war to the LTTE, that we can sidestep the
political-diplomatic Claymore mines that have been rigged for us with the
Tiger's talks trap. The fifth anniversary of 9/11 and the resultant global
war on terror is the right moment; there is no better one, and the
imperative is urgent.