Lekkende kernreactoren in Doel en Tihange - moet er nog vodka zijn

[Sfax]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Jantje

http://www.hln.be/hln/nl/6756/Kernen...paign=20120820


Leuk nieuws voor onze broekschijters die beweren dat we zonder stroom gaan vallen als we geen kerncentrales hebben.
Die centrales blijken nu tikkende tijdbommen te zijn volgens FANC-directeur-generaal Willy De Roovere en denk dat die man toch voldoende kennis en ondersteuning ter beschikking heeft om juiste uitspraken rond kernenergie en de nodige centrales te kunnen doen.

Die kerel heeft wellicht genoeg kennis ter zake, dat klopt.
Begrijpend lezen daarentegen is duidelijk niet voor iedereen weggelegd. Hij zegt immers nerges wat jij poneert.

[maddox]

C2C.
U maakt van "mogelijke scheurtjes" ,zoals in het door U aangehaalde artikel, al direct lekkende kernreactoren, zoals de titel van dit topic aangeeft. Dus in hoeverre bent U eerlijk tegenover uwzelf?

De informatie die via de media verspreid wordt en waar U zo graag Tjernobyllekes van maakt is tegensprekend en waarschijnlijk al eens door een meloengroene censuurcommissie getrokken.

Wathelet heeft al verkondigd dat de electriciteitsprijs gaat stijgen als de kerncentrales "vroegtijdig" moeten sluiten. Dat was ook een leuk krantenbericht.

Vandemijnkloten gaat daar tegenin door te beweren dat de electriciteitsprijs niet hoeft te stijgen.

De enige manier om de electriciteitsprijs niet te laten stijgen, is om een combinatie toe te passen van BTW verlaging en het stoppen van het subsidieren van te jonge , onstuurbare technologiën.

Want uiteindelijk, Franse kernstroom kost zelfs minder dan Belgische. Daar ze niet kampen met die nucleaire taks.

[maddox]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Sfax

Die kerel heeft wellicht genoeg kennis ter zake, dat klopt.
Begrijpend lezen daarentegen is duidelijk niet voor iedereen weggelegd. Hij zegt immers nerges wat jij poneert.

Integendeel, het desbetreffende artikel geeft duidelijk aan dat de aangehaalde personen nu toch beweren de gepubliceerde uitspraken niet gedaan te hebben, en dat men eerst de volledige testen gaat afwachten.

Maar da's pas in de laatste alinea. De rest van't artikel is zodanig opgesteld dat C2C weeral een Fukushima ziet ontstaan, maar dan zonder dubbele natuurramp.

[fonne]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door C2C

Vande Lanotte hekelt de communicatie van het FANC.

http://deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws/po..._elektriciteit

Aj, nu moeten jullie een socialist gelijk geven!

voor een keer wel. Het doet pijn, maar JVDL heeft gelijk: de communicatie van De Roovere is van een onaanvaardbaar niveau. Maar dat hebben we hier al eerder gezegd, dus eigenlijk geeft JVDL ons gelijk. Nèh, dat voelt al heel wat beter

[C2C]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door maddox

C2C.
U maakt van "mogelijke scheurtjes" ,zoals in het door U aangehaalde artikel, al direct lekkende kernreactoren, zoals de titel van dit topic aangeeft. Dus in hoeverre bent U eerlijk tegenover uwzelf?

Maddox, ik had al gezegd dat ik in deze propaganda en demagogie verkies - net zoals al wat u schrijft op hetzelfde neerkomt.

Het feit is dat er voor de miljoenste keer weer iets met kernenergie niet pluis is. Dat, en de vele catastrofes die we met die energievorm hebben meegemaakt, laat mensen toe die technologie te verwerpen.

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door maddox

De informatie die via de media verspreid wordt en waar U zo graag Tjernobyllekes van maakt is tegensprekend en waarschijnlijk al eens door een meloengroene censuurcommissie getrokken.

Wanneer de baas van een agentschap voor kernenergie-veiligheid zo'n zware uitspraken doet -- en er dan expliciet bijzegt dat hij voorzichtig spreekt -- dan kan een begrijpend lezer weer eens afleiden dat er vuiligheid aan de reactor hangt.

Zoals in Fukushima. Wie de video's heeft gezien van de reactie van de TEPCO-staff op de ramp, en daarna de officiële er-is-niks-aan-de-hand boodschappen ziet, leert voor de honderste keer dat die hele sector rot is van de leugens.

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door maddox

Wathelet heeft al verkondigd dat de electriciteitsprijs gaat stijgen als de kerncentrales "vroegtijdig" moeten sluiten. Dat was ook een leuk krantenbericht.

Wathelet is een politicus, die kan mijn naar veel te belegen kaas stinkende voeten kussen.

Ik luister naar de wetenschappers van de FANC en desnoods zelfs naar de FARC, maar niet naar politici, neoliberalen en kapitalisten.

En de FANC zegt dat bij de blijvende sluiting van Doel 3, de electriciteit die we moeten aankopen zeer duur zal zijn.

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door maddox

Vandemijnkloten gaat daar tegenin door te beweren dat de electriciteitsprijs niet hoeft te stijgen.

Ik luister dus niet naar politici.

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door maddox

De enige manier om de electriciteitsprijs niet te laten stijgen, is om een combinatie toe te passen van BTW verlaging en het stoppen van het subsidieren van te jonge , onstuurbare technologiën.

Inderdaad, de triljardensubsidies voor de fossiele brandstof-sector en voor de sector van de kernenergie moeten dringend afgeschaft worden.

Die kunnen we dan meteen investeren in veel goedkopere, veilige, duurzame en toekomstgerichte energievormen, in plaats van die rommel te blijven gebruiken.

En bovendien kunnen we uw en mijn hachje behoeden voor de vernietiging van het leven op deze planeet. Wat toch ook mooi meegenomen is.

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door maddox

Want uiteindelijk, Franse kernstroom kost zelfs minder dan Belgische. Daar ze niet kampen met die nucleaire taks.

Wij kijken niet naar ouwbakken technologieën uit een ander tijdperk. Wij kijken naar de toekomst.

Schaf gewoon eens de triljardensubsidies voor al die rommel af en kijk wat er gebeurt. Je zal verschieten.

Maar je durft niet, want je kickt op lobbies, op klimaatverandering, op oliebaronnen en op terreur. Die zaken hangen samen, zie je?

[maddox]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door C2C

Maddox, ik had al gezegd dat ik in deze propaganda en demagogie verkies - net zoals al wat u schrijft op hetzelfde neerkomt.

Helaas gelooft U uw eigen leugens.

Het feit is dat er voor de miljoenste keer weer iets met kernenergie niet pluis is. Dat, en de vele catastrofes die we met die energievorm hebben meegemaakt, laat mensen toe die technologie te verwerpen.

Vele catastrophes? Geef eens een lijst.

Wanneer de baas van een agentschap voor kernenergie-veiligheid zo'n zware uitspraken doet -- en er dan expliciet bijzegt dat hij voorzichtig spreekt -- dan kan een begrijpend lezer weer eens afleiden dat er vuiligheid aan de reactor hangt.

Terwijl diezelfde baas en assistenten die in de media aangehaald zijn, later weer in alle toonaarden ontkennen paniekuitspraken gedaan te hebben.
Wathelet is een politicus, die kan mijn naar veel te belegen kaas stinkende voeten kussen.

Ik luister naar de wetenschappers van de FANC en desnoods zelfs naar de FARC, maar niet naar politici, neoliberalen en kapitalisten.

Nope, U luistert naar de media.

En de FANC zegt dat bij de blijvende sluiting van Doel 3, de electriciteit die we moeten aankopen zeer duur zal zijn.

Daar twijfelen we niet aan, en als het niet de sluiting van Doel 3 is, dan zal er wel iets anders zijn dat electriciteit een stuk duurder gaat maken. U luistert niet naar politici. Maar betalen zal U

Inderdaad, de triljardensubsidies voor de fossiele brandstof-sector en voor de sector van de kernenergie moeten dringend afgeschaft worden. Die kunnen we dan meteen investeren in veel goedkopere, veilige, duurzame en toekomstgerichte energievormen, in plaats van die rommel te blijven gebruiken.

Iedere energiebron gelijk voor de wet.

En bovendien kunnen we uw en mijn hachje behoeden voor de vernietiging van het leven op deze planeet. Wat toch ook mooi meegenomen is.

Grootheidswaanzin. Met onze aantallen schijten en zeiken we ons naar de verdoemenis als soort.

Wij kijken niet naar ouwbakken technologieën uit een ander tijdperk. Wij kijken naar de toekomst.

Ik stel voor dat U eens hier kijkt.

Schaf gewoon eens de triljardensubsidies voor al die rommel af en kijk wat er gebeurt. Je zal verschieten.

Maar je durft niet, want je kickt op lobbies, op klimaatverandering, op oliebaronnen en op terreur. Die zaken hangen samen, zie je?

Ik kick op nieuw gereedschap, ik kick op geslaagde projecten en nog zo'n paar dingen. En klimaatverandering, weeral grootheidswaanzin van U om de mens daar zo'n grote rol in te geven. En dan nog, we kloten alleen onszelf hoor.
Terreur en olie hangt wel samen.

[Fallen Angel]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door fonne

Ik denk dat dat vooral aantoont dat gij uw formulekes uit uw boekske nog nooit eens hebt toegepast op een concreet probleem om na te gaan of de krachten groot genoeg zijn om een scheur te doen groeien. Neem uw rekenlat eens ter hand.

Typisch antwoord van de leek.

PS: Als ik voorspel dat een bepaald gebouw gaat instorten dan mag jij er altijd onder gaan staan. Even "die formulekes uit de boekskes" in de praktijk brengen.

[Fallen Angel]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Mambo

explosie lassen. Dat heb ik niet geleerd in de zondagse las les.
Wow...dat is cool.

Ik ben maar een amateurke zie ik. Tig, mig, autogeen, solderen, brasseren en een beetje plastic en veel verder ben ik niet geraakt.

Explosielassen wordt enkel toegepast om twee platen van verschillend metaal aan elkaar te lassen. Ik kan mij niet direct praktische toepassingen daarvoor voorstellen. Ik weet alleen dat het bestaat.

PS: thermietlassen bestaat ook nog

[Tavek]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Fallen Angel

Typisch antwoord van de leek.

PS: Als ik voorspel dat een bepaald gebouw gaat instorten dan mag jij er altijd onder gaan staan. Even "die formulekes uit de boekskes" in de praktijk brengen.

Formules uit een boekske zijn elegant en simpel, en vaak gewoon correct mits de juiste aannames.

[fonne]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Fallen Angel

Typisch antwoord van de leek.

PS: Als ik voorspel dat een bepaald gebouw gaat instorten dan mag jij er altijd onder gaan staan. Even "die formulekes uit de boekskes" in de praktijk brengen.

Ik ben groot genoeg om zelf te zien dat het op invallen staat hoor. Op jou ga ik in ieder geval niet vertrouwen.

Spijtig genoeg voor jou worden al die reactorvaten perfect volgens de boekskes (van ACME vooral) ontworpen en vertrouwen we erop dat ze dan voldoende veilig zijn. Maar vermits jij denkt het zelfs beter te weten dan de boekskes van ACME ga ik maar ver uit de buurt blijven van een reactorvat waar gij bij betrokken zou zijn geweest.

[brother paul]

conclusie die centrales lekken nog niet 1 druppel, tenzij tihange haar kuip dat 3 liter per dag lekt in een dubbele wand. We wonen hier stillekesaan in een archeologisch museum

[C2C]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door maddox

Vele catastrophes? Geef eens een lijst.

U vraagt, wij draaien:

1.

Nuclear power plant accidents and incidents
with multiple fatalities and/or more than US$100 million in property damage, 1952-2011[5][14][15] Date Location Description Deaths Cost
(in millions
2006 $US) INES
level[16]
January 3, 1961 Idaho Falls, Idaho, United States Explosion at SL-1 prototype at the National Reactor Testing Station. All 3 operators were killed when a control rod was removed too far. 3 22 4
October 5, 1966 Frenchtown Charter Township, Michigan, United States Partial core meltdown of the Fermi 1 Reactor at the Enrico Fermi Nuclear Generating Station. No radiation leakage into the environment. 0
January 21, 1969 Lucens reactor, Vaud, Switzerland On January 21, 1969, it suffered a loss-of-coolant accident, leading to a partial core meltdown and massive radioactive contamination of the cavern, which was then sealed. 0 4
1975 Sosnovyi Bor, Leningrad Oblast, Russia There was reportedly a partial nuclear meltdown in Leningrad nuclear power plant reactor unit 1.
December 7, 1975 Greifswald, East Germany Electrical error causes fire in the main trough that destroys control lines and five main coolant pumps 0 443 3
January 5, 1976 Jaslovské Bohunice, Czechoslovakia Malfunction during fuel replacement. Fuel rod ejected from reactor into the reactor hall by coolant (CO2).[17] 2 4
February 22, 1977 Jaslovské Bohunice, Czechoslovakia Severe corrosion of reactor and release of radioactivity into the plant area, necessitating total decommission 0 1,700 4
March 28, 1979 Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, United States Loss of coolant and partial core meltdown due to operator errors. There is a small release of radioactive gases. See also Three Mile Island accident health effects. 0 2,400 5
September 15, 1984 Athens, Alabama, United States Safety violations, operator error, and design problems force a six year outage at Browns Ferry Unit 2. 0 110
March 9, 1985 Athens, Alabama, United States Instrumentation systems malfunction during startup, which led to suspension of operations at all three Browns Ferry Units 0 1,830
April 11, 1986 Plymouth, Massachusetts, United States Recurring equipment problems force emergency shutdown of Boston Edison’s Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant 0 1,001
April 26, 1986 Chernobyl, Ukrainian SSR Overheating, steam explosion, fire, and meltdown, necessitating the evacuation of 300,000 people from Chernobyl and dispersing radioactive material across Europe (see Chernobyl disaster effects) 56 direct; 4,000 cancer[18] 6,700 7
May 4, 1986 Hamm-Uentrop, Germany Experimental THTR-300 reactor releases small amounts of fission products (0.1 GBq Co-60, Cs-137, Pa-233) to surrounding area 0 267
March 31, 1987 Delta, Pennsylvania, United States Peach Bottom units 2 and 3 shutdown due to cooling malfunctions and unexplained equipment problems 0 400
December 19, 1987 Lycoming, New York, United States Malfunctions force Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation to shut down Nine Mile Point Unit 1 0 150
March 17, 1989 Lusby, Maryland, United States Inspections at Calvert Cliff Units 1 and 2 reveal cracks at pressurized heater sleeves, forcing extended shutdowns 0 120
March 1992 Sosnovyi Bor, Leningrad Oblast, Russia An accident at the Sosnovy Bor nuclear plant leaked radioactive gases and iodine into the air through a ruptured fuel channel.
February 20, 1996 Waterford, Connecticut, United States Leaking valve forces shutdown Millstone Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2, multiple equipment failures found 0 254
September 2, 1996 Crystal River, Florida, United States Balance-of-plant equipment malfunction forces shutdown and extensive repairs at Crystal River Unit 3 0 384
September 30, 1999 Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan Tokaimura nuclear accident killed two workers, and exposed one more to radiation levels above permissible limits. 2 54 4
February 16, 2002 Oak Harbor, Ohio, United States Severe corrosion of control rod forces 24-month outage of Davis-Besse reactor 0 143 3
August 9, 2004 Fukui Prefecture, Japan Steam explosion at Mihama Nuclear Power Plant kills 5 workers and injures 6 more 5 9 1
March 11, 2011 Fukushima, Japan A tsunami flooded and damaged the 5 active reactor plants drowning two workers. Loss of backup electrical power led to overheating, meltdowns, and evacuations.[19] One man died suddenly while carrying equipment during the clean-up. 3[20] 7[21]
Nuclear reactor attacks

Nuclear reactors become preferred targets during military conflict and, over the past three decades, have been repeatedly attacked during military air strikes, occupations, invasions and campaigns:[22]

Between 18 December 1977 and 13 June 1979 ETA carried out several attacks on Lemoniz Nuclear Power Plant in Spain while it was still under construction.
In September 1980, Iran bombed the Al Tuwaitha nuclear complex in Iraq.
In June 1981, an Israeli air strike completely destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear research facility.
On 8 January 1982, Umkhonto we Sizwe attacked Koeberg nuclear power plant in South Africa while it was still under construction.
Between 1984 and 1987, Iraq bombed Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant six times.
In Iraq in 1991, the U.S. bombed three nuclear reactors and an enrichment pilot facility.
In 1991, Iraq launched Scud missiles at Israel’s Dimona nuclear power plant.
In September 2003, Israel bombed a Syrian reactor under construction.[22]

Radiation and other accidents

Serious radiation and other accidents include:

1950s

February 13, 1950 : a Convair B-36B crashed in northern British Columbia after jettisoning a Mark IV atomic bomb. This was the first such nuclear weapon loss in history.
December 12, 1952: AECL Chalk River Laboratories, Chalk River, Ontario, Canada. Partial meltdown, about 10,000 Curies released. [10][11]
September 1957: a plutonium fire occurred at the Rocky Flats Plant, which resulted in the contamination of Building 71 and the release of plutonium into the atmosphere, causing US $818,600 in damage.
September 1957: Mayak nuclear waste storage tank explosion at Chelyabinsk. Two hundred plus fatalities, believed to be a conservative estimate; 270,000 people were exposed to dangerous radiation levels. Over thirty small communities had been removed from Soviet maps between 1958 and 1991.[23] (INES level 6).[16]
October 1957: Windscale fire, UK. Fire ignites plutonium piles and contaminates surrounding dairy farms.[5][24] An estimated 33 cancer deaths.[5][24]
March 1959: Santa Susana Field Laboratory, Los Angeles, California. Fire in a fuel processing facility.
July 1959: Santa Susana Field Laboratory, Los Angeles, California. Partial meltdown.

1960s

24 January 1961: the 1961 Goldsboro B-52 crash occurred near Goldsboro, North Carolina. A B-52 Stratofortress carrying two Mark 39 nuclear bombs broke up in mid-air, dropping its nuclear payload in the process.[25][26]
July 1961: soviet submarine K-19 accident. Eight fatalities and more than 30 people were over-exposed to radiation.[8]
March, 21 -August 1962: radiation accident in Mexico City, four fatalities.
1964, 1969: Santa Susana Field Laboratory, Los Angeles, California. Partial meltdowns.
1965 Philippine Sea A-4 crash, where a Skyhawk attack aircraft with a nuclear weapon fell into the sea.[27] The pilot, the aircraft, and the B43 nuclear bomb were never recovered.[28] It was not until the 1980s that the Pentagon revealed the loss of the one-megaton bomb.[29]
January 17, 1966: the 1966 Palomares B-52 crash occurred when a B-52G bomber of the USAF collided with a KC-135 tanker during mid-air refuelling off the coast of Spain. The KC-135 was completely destroyed when its fuel load ignited, killing all four crew members. The B-52G broke apart, killing three of the seven crew members aboard.[30] Of the four Mk28 type hydrogen bombs the B-52G carried,[31] three were found on land near Almer�*a, Spain. The non-nuclear explosives in two of the weapons detonated upon impact with the ground, resulting in the contamination of a 2-square-kilometer (490-acre) (0.78 square mile) area by radioactive plutonium. The fourth, which fell into the Mediterranean Sea, was recovered intact after a 2½-month-long search.[32]
January 21, 1968: the 1968 Thule Air Base B-52 crash involved a United States Air Force (USAF) B-52 bomber. The aircraft was carrying four hydrogen bombs when a cabin fire forced the crew to abandon the aircraft. Six crew members ejected safely, but one who did not have an ejection seat was killed while trying to bail out. The bomber crashed onto sea ice in Greenland, causing the nuclear payload to rupture and disperse, which resulted in widespread radioactive contamination.
May 1968: soviet submarine K-27 reactor near meltdown. 9 people died, 83 people were injured.[9]
January 1969: Lucens reactor in Switzerland undergoes partial core meltdown leading to massive radioactive contamination of a cavern.

1970s

July 1978: Anatoli Bugorski was working on U-70, the largest Soviet particle accelerator, when he accidentally exposed his head directly to the proton beam. He survived, despite suffering some long-term damage.
July 1979: Church Rock Uranium Mill Spill in New Mexico, USA, when United Nuclear Corporation's uranium mill tailings disposal pond breached its dam. Over 1,000 tons of radioactive mill waste and millions of gallons of mine effluent flowed into the Puerco River, and contaminants traveled downstream.[33]

1980s

March 1984: radiation accident in Morocco, eight fatalities.[11] 　
August 1985: soviet submarine K-431 accident. Ten fatalities and 49 other people suffered radiation injuries.[6]
October 1986: soviet submarine K-219 reactor almost had a meltdown. Sergei Preminin died after he manually lowered the control rods, and stopped the explosion. The submarine sank three days later.
September 1987: Goiania accident. Four fatalities, and following radiological screening of more than 100,000 people, it was ascertained that 249 people received serious radiation contamination.[12][34] In the cleanup operation, topsoil had to be removed from several sites, and several houses were demolished. All the objects from within those houses were removed and examined. Time magazine has identified the accident as one of the world's "worst nuclear disasters" and the International Atomic Energy Agency called it "one of the world's worst radiological incidents".[35][36]

1990s

December 1990: radiotherapy accident in Zaragoza. Eleven fatalities and 27 other patients were injured.[8]
April 1993: accident at the Tomsk-7 Reprocessing Complex, when a tank exploded while being cleaned with nitric acid. The explosion released a cloud of radioactive gas. (INES level 4).[16]
August — December 1996: radiotherapy accident in Costa Rica. Thirteen fatalities and 114 other patients received an overdose of radiation.[10]
September 1999: criticality accident at Tokai nuclear fuel plant (Japan)

2000s

January-February 2000: Samut Prakan radiation accident: three deaths and ten injuries resulted in Samut Prakarn when a radiation-therapy unit was dismantled.[13]
April 2010: Mayapuri radiological accident, India, one fatality.[13]

2010s

March 2011: Fukushima I nuclear accidents, Japan and the radioactive discharge at the Fukushima Daiichi Power Station[37]

Accident types

For a list of many of the most important accidents see the International Atomic Energy Agency site.[38]
Loss of coolant accident
Main article: Loss of coolant
See also: Nuclear meltdown and Design basis accident
Criticality accidents

A criticality accident (also sometimes referred to as an "excursion" or "power excursion") occurs when a nuclear chain reaction is accidentally allowed to occur in fissile material, such as enriched uranium or plutonium. The Chernobyl accident is an example of a criticality accident. This accident destroyed a reactor at the plant and left a large geographic area uninhabitable. In a smaller scale accident at Sarov a technician working with highly enriched uranium was irradiated while preparing an experiment involving a sphere of fissile material. The Sarov accident is interesting because the system remained critical for many days before it could be stopped, though safely located in a shielded experimental hall.[39] This is an example of a limited scope accident where only a few people can be harmed, while no release of radioactivity into the environment occurred. A criticality accident with limited off site release of both radiation (gamma and neutron) and a very small release of radioactivity occurred at Tokaimura in 1999 during the production of enriched uranium fuel.[40] Two workers died, a third was permanently injured, and 350 citizens were exposed to radiation.
Decay heat

Decay heat accidents are where the heat generated by the radioactive decay causes harm. In a large nuclear reactor, a loss of coolant accident can damage the core: for example, at Three Mile Island a recently shutdown (SCRAMed) PWR reactor was left for a length of time without cooling water. As a result the nuclear fuel was damaged, and the core partially melted. The removal of the decay heat is a significant reactor safety concern, especially shortly after shutdown. Failure to remove decay heat may cause the reactor core temperature to rise to dangerous levels and has caused nuclear accidents. The heat removal is usually achieved through several redundant and diverse systems, and the heat is often dissipated to an 'ultimate heat sink' which has a large capacity and requires no active power, though this method is typically used after decay heat has reduced to a very small value. However, the main cause of release of radioactivity in the Three Mile Island accident was a pilot-operated relief valve on the primary loop which stuck in the open position. This caused the overflow tank into which it drained to rupture and release large amounts of radioactive cooling water into the containment building.

In 2011, an earthquake and tsunami caused a loss of power to two plants in Fukushima, Japan, crippling the reactor as decay heat caused 90% of the fuel rods in the core of the Daiichi Unit 3 reactor to become uncovered.[41] As of May 30, 2011, the removal of decay heat is still a cause for concern.
Transport

Transport accidents can cause a release of radioactivity resulting in contamination or shielding to be damaged resulting in direct irradiation. In Cochabamba a defective gamma radiography set was transported in a passenger bus as cargo. The gamma source was outside the shielding, and it irradiated some bus passengers.

In the United Kingdom, it was revealed in a court case that in March 2002 a radiotherapy source was transported from Leeds to Sellafield with defective shielding. The shielding had a gap on the underside. It is thought that no human has been seriously harmed by the escaping radiation.[42]
Equipment failure

Equipment failure is one possible type of accident, recently at Białystok in Poland the electronics associated with a particle accelerator used for the treatment of cancer suffered a malfunction.[43] This then led to the overexposure of at least one patient. While the initial failure was the simple failure of a semiconductor diode, it set in motion a series of events which led to a radiation injury.

A related cause of accidents is failure of control software, as in the cases involving the Therac-25 medical radiotherapy equipment: the elimination of a hardware safety interlock in a new design model exposed a previously undetected bug in the control software, which could lead to patients receiving massive overdoses under a specific set of conditions.
Human error
A sketch used by doctors to determine the amount of radiation to which each person had been exposed during the Slotin excursion

Many of the major nuclear accidents have been directly attributable to operator or human error. This was obviously the case in the analysis of both the Chernobyl and TMI-2 accidents. At Chernobyl, a test procedure was being conducted prior to the accident. The leaders of the test permitted operators to disable and ignore key protection circuits and warnings that would have normally shut the reactor down. At TMI-2, operators permitted thousands of gallons of water to escape from the reactor plant before observing that the coolant pumps were behaving abnormally. The coolant pumps were thus turned off to protect the pumps, which in turn led to the destruction of the reactor itself as cooling was completely lost within the core.

A detailed investigation into SL-1 determined that one operator (perhaps inadvertently) manually pulled the 84-pound (38 kg) central control rod out about 26 inches rather than the maintenance procedure's intention of about 4 inches.[44]

An assessment conducted by the Commissariat �* l’Énergie Atomique (CEA) in France concluded that no amount of technical innovation can eliminate the risk of human-induced errors associated with the operation of nuclear power plants. Two types of mistakes were deemed most serious: errors committed during field operations, such as maintenance and testing, that can cause an accident; and human errors made during small accidents that cascade to complete failure.[5]

In 1946 Canadian Manhattan Project physicist Louis Slotin performed a risky experiment known as "tickling the dragon's tail"[45] which involved two hemispheres of neutron-reflective beryllium being brought together around a plutonium core to bring it to criticality. Against operating procedures, the hemispheres were separated only by a screwdriver. The screwdriver slipped and set off a chain reaction criticality accident filling the room with harmful radiation and a flash of blue light (caused by excited, ionized air particles returning to their unexcited states). Slotin reflexively separated the hemispheres in reaction to the heat flash and blue light, preventing further irradiation of several co-workers present in the room. However Slotin absorbed a lethal dose of the radiation and died nine days afterwards. The infamous plutonium mass used in the experiment was referred to as the demon core.
Lost source

Lost source accidents,[46][47] also referred to as an orphan source are incidents in which a radioactive source is lost, stolen or abandoned. The source then might cause harm to humans. For example, in 1996 sources were left behind by the Soviet army in Lilo, Georgia.[48] Another case occurred at Yanango where a radiography source was lost, also at Samut Prakarn a phosphorus teletherapy source was lost[49] and at Gilan in Iran a radiography source harmed a welder.[50] The best known example of this type of event is the Goiânia accident which occurred in Brazil.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has provided guides for scrap metal collectors on what a sealed source might look like.[51][52] The scrap metal industry is the one where lost sources are most likely to be found.[53]
Trafficking in radioactive and nuclear materials

Information reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) shows "a persistent problem with the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials, thefts, losses and other unauthorized activities".[18]

From 1993 to 2006, the IAEA confirmed 1080 illicit trafficking incidents reported by participating countries. Of the 1080 confirmed incidents, 275 incidents involved unauthorized possession and related criminal activity, 332 incidents involved theft or loss of nuclear or other radioactive materials, 398 incidents involved other unauthorized activities, and in 75 incidents the reported information was not sufficient to determine the category of incident. Several hundred additional incidents have been reported in various open sources, but are not yet confirmed.[18][54]

2.
1950s

December 12, 1952 — INES Level 5[citation needed] - Chalk River, Ontario, Canada - Reactor core damaged
A reactor shutoff rod failure, combined with several operator errors, led to a major power excursion of more than double the reactor's rated output at AECL's NRX reactor. The operators purged the reactor's heavy water moderator, and the reaction stopped in under 30 seconds. A cover gas system failure led to hydrogen explosions, which severely damaged the reactor core. The fission products from approximately 30 kg of uranium were released through the reactor stack. Irradiated light-water coolant leaked from the damaged coolant circuit into the reactor building; some 4,000 cubic meters were pumped via pipeline to a disposal area to avoid contamination of the Ottawa River. Subsequent monitoring of surrounding water sources revealed no contamination. No immediate fatalities or injuries resulted from the incident; a 1982 followup study of exposed workers showed no long-term health effects. Future U.S. President Jimmy Carter, then a Lieutenant in the US Navy, was among the cleanup crew.[1]
September 29, 1957 — INES Level 6 - Kyshtym disaster - Mayak, Russia (then a part of the Soviet Union)
The Kyshtym disaster was a radiation contamination incident that occurred on 29 September 1957 at Mayak, a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Russia (then a part of the Soviet Union). It measured as a Level 6 disaster on the International Nuclear Event Scale, making it the third most serious nuclear accident ever recorded (after the Chernobyl disaster, and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, both Level 7 on the INES scale). The cooling system in one of the tanks containing about 70–80 tons of liquid radioactive waste failed and was not repaired. The temperature in it started to rise, resulting in evaporation and a chemical explosion of the dried waste, consisting mainly of ammonium nitrate and acetates (see ammonium nitrate bomb). The explosion, estimated to have a force of about 70–100 tons of TNT threw the concrete lid, weighing 160 tons, into the air.[2] There were no immediate casualties as a result of the explosion, which released an estimated 2 to 50 MCi (74 to 1850 PBq) of radioactivity.[3][4][5] In the next 10 to 11 hours, the radioactive cloud moved towards the northeast, reaching 300–350 kilometers from the accident. The fallout of the cloud resulted in a long-term contamination of an area of more than 800 square kilometers, primarily with caesium-137 and strontium-90.[3] This area is usually referred to as the East-Ural Radioactive Trace (EURT).[6]
May 24, 1958 — INES Level needed - Chalk River, Ontario, Canada - Fuel damaged
Due to inadequate cooling a damaged uranium fuel rod caught fire and was torn in two as it was being removed from the core at the NRU reactor. The fire was extinguished, but not before radioactive combustion products contaminated the interior of the reactor building and, to a lesser degree, an area surrounding the laboratory site. Over 600 people were employed in the clean-up.[7][8]
October 25, 1958 - INES Level needed - Vinča, Serbia (then Yugoslavia) - Criticality excursion, irradiation of personnel
During a subcritical counting experiment a power buildup went undetected at the Vinca Nuclear Institute's zero-power natural uranium heavy water moderated research reactor.[9] Saturation of radiation detection chambers gave the researchers false readings and the level of moderator in the reactor tank was raised triggering a criticality excursion which a researcher detected from the smell of ozone.[10] Six scientists received radiation doses of 2—4 Sv (200—400 rems) [11] (p. 96). An experimental bone marrow transplant treatment was performed on all of them in France and five survived, despite the ultimate rejection of the marrow in all cases. A single woman among them later had a child without apparent complications. This was one of the first nuclear incidents investigated by then newly formed IAEA.[12]

July 26, 1959 — INES Level needed - Santa Susana Field Laboratory, California, United States - Partial meltdown
A partial core meltdown may have taken place when the Sodium Reactor Experiment (SRE) experienced a power excursion that caused severe overheating of the reactor core, resulting in the melting of one-third of the nuclear fuel and significant releases of radioactive gases.[13]

1960s

April 3, 1960 - INES Level needed – Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, United States

A core melt accident occurred at the Westinghouse Waltz Mill test reactor. From what information remains of the event, one fuel element melted, resulting in the disposition of 2 million gallons of contaminated water generated during the accident. At least a portion of the water was retained on site in lagoons, a condition which eventually led to detectable Sr-90 in ground water plus contaminated soil. The site is currently undergoing cleanup.

July 24, 1964 - INES Level needed - Charlestown, Rhode Island, United States - Criticality Accident

An error by a worker at a United Nuclear Corporation fuel facility led to an accidental criticality. Robert Peabody, believing he was using a diluted uranium solution, accidentally put concentrated solution into an agitation tank containing sodium carbonate. Peabody was exposed to 10,000rad (100Gy) of radiation and died two days later. Ninety minutes after the criticality, a plant manager and another administrator returned to the building and were exposed to 100rad (1Gy), but suffered no ill effects.[14][15]

October 5, 1966 — INES Level needed - Monroe, Michigan, United States - Partial meltdown

A sodium cooling system malfunction caused a partial meltdown at the Enrico Fermi demonstration nuclear breeder reactor (Enrico Fermi-1 fast breeder reactor). The accident was attributed to a zirconium fragment that obstructed a flow-guide in the sodium cooling system. Two of the 105 fuel assemblies melted during the incident, but no contamination was recorded outside the containment vessel.[16]

Winter 1966-1967 (date unknown) – INES Level needed – location unknown – loss of coolant accident
The Soviet icebreaker Lenin, the USSR’s first nuclear-powered surface ship, suffered a major accident (possibly a meltdown — exactly what happened remains a matter of controversy in the West) in one of its three reactors. To find the leak the crew broke through the concrete and steel radiation shield with sledgehammers, causing irreparable damage. It was rumored that around 30 of the crew were killed. The ship was abandoned for a year to allow radiation levels to drop before the three reactors were removed, to be dumped into the Tsivolko Fjord on the Kara Sea, along with 60% of the fuel elements packed in a separate container. The reactors were replaced with two new ones, and the ship re-entered service in 1970, serving until 1989.

May 1967 — INES Level needed - Dumfries and Galloway, Scotland, United Kingdom - Partial meltdown

Graphite debris partially blocked a fuel channel causing a fuel element to melt and catch fire at the Chapelcross nuclear power station. Contamination was confined to the reactor core. The core was repaired and restarted in 1969, operating until the plant's shutdown in 2004.[17][18]

January 21, 1969 — INES Level: None - Lucens, Canton of Vaud, Switzerland - Explosion

A total loss of coolant led to a power excursion and explosion of an experimental nuclear reactor in a large cave at Lucens. The underground location of this reactor acted like a containment building and prevented any outside contamination. The cavern was heavily contaminated and was sealed. No injuries or fatalities resulted.[19][20]
De-fuelling and partial dismantling occurred from 1969 to 1973. In 1988, the lowest caverns were filled with concrete, and a regulatory permit was issued in December 1990. Currently, the archives of the Canton of Vaud are located in the caverns.[21]

1970s

December 7, 1975 – INES Level 3 - Greifswald, Germany (then East Germany) - Partly damaged

Operators disabled three of six cooling pumps' electrical supply circuits to test emergency shutoffs. Instead of the expected automatic shutdown, a fourth pump failed causing excessive heating which damaged ten fuel rods. The accident was attributed to sticky relay contacts and generally poor construction in the Soviet-built reactor.[22]

February 22, 1977 – INES Level 4 - Jaslovské Bohunice, Slovakia (then Czechoslovakia) - Fuel damaged

Operators neglected to remove moisture-absorbing materials from a fuel rod assembly before loading it into the KS 150 reactor at power plant A-1. The accident resulted in damaged fuel integrity, extensive corrosion damage of fuel cladding and release of radioactivity into the plant area. The affected reactor was decommissioned following this accident.[23]

March 28, 1979 – INES Level 5[citation needed] - Middletown, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, United States - Partial meltdown

Equipment failures and worker mistakes contributed to a loss of coolant and a partial core meltdown at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station 15 km (9.3 mi) southeast of Harrisburg. While the reactor was extensively damaged, on-site radiation exposure was under 100 millirems (less than annual exposure due to natural sources). Area residents received a smaller exposure of 1 millirem (10 µSv), or about 1/3 the dose from eating a banana per day for one year. There were no fatalities. Follow-up radiological studies predict between zero and one long-term cancer fatality.[24][25][26]

See also: Three Mile Island accident

1980s

March 13, 1980 - INES Level 4 - Orléans, France - Nuclear materials leak

A brief power excursion in Reactor A2 led to a rupture of fuel bundles and a minor release (8 x 1010 Bq) of nuclear materials at the Saint-Laurent Nuclear Power Plant. The reactor was repaired and continued operation until its decommissioning in 1992.[27]

March, 1981 — INES Level 2 - Tsuruga, Japan - Radioactive materials released into Sea of Japan + Overexposure of workers

More than 100 workers were exposed to doses of up to 155 millirem per day radiation during repairs of the Tsuruga Nuclear Power Plant, violating the Japan Atomic Power Company's limit of 100 millirems (1 mSv) per day.[28]

September 23, 1983 — INES Level 4 - Buenos Aires, Argentina - Accidental criticality

An operator error during a fuel plate reconfiguration in an experimental test reactor led to an excursion of 3×1017 fissions at the RA-2 facility. The operator absorbed 2000 rad (20 Gy) of gamma and 1700 rad (17 Gy) of neutron radiation which killed him two days later. Another 17 people outside of the reactor room absorbed doses ranging from 35 rad (0.35 Gy) to less than 1 rad (0.01 Gy).[29] pg103[30]

April 26, 1986 — INES Level 7 - Prypiat, Ukraine (then USSR) - Power excursion, explosion, complete meltdown

An inadequate reactor safety system[31] led to an uncontrolled power excursion, causing a severe steam explosion, meltdown and release of radioactive material at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant located approximately 100 kilometers north-northwest of Kiev. Approximately fifty fatalities (mostly cleanup personnel) resulted from the accident and the immediate aftermath. An additional nine fatal cases of thyroid cancer in children in the Chernobyl area have been attributed to the accident. The explosion and combustion of the graphite reactor core spread radioactive material over much of Europe. 100,000 people were evacuated from the areas immediately surrounding Chernobyl in addition to 300,000 from the areas of heavy fallout in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. An "Exclusion Zone" was created surrounding the site encompassing approximately 1,000 mi² (3,000 km²) and deemed off-limits for human habitation for an indefinite period. Several studies by governments, UN agencies and environmental groups have estimated the consequences and eventual number of casualties. Their findings are subject to controversy.

See also: Chernobyl disaster

May 4, 1986 – INES Level 3-5 (need ref) - Hamm-Uentrop, Germany (then West Germany) - Fuel damaged

A spherical fuel pebble became lodged in the pipe used to deliver fuel elements to the reactor at an experimental 300-megawatt THTR-300 HTGR. Attempts by an operator to dislodge the fuel pebble damaged its cladding, releasing radiation detectable up to two kilometers from the reactor.[32]

1990s

April 6, 1993 — INES Level 4 - Tomsk, Russia - Explosion

A pressure buildup led to an explosive mechanical failure in a 34 cubic meter stainless steel reaction vessel buried in a concrete bunker under building 201 of the radiochemical works at the Tomsk-7 Siberian Chemical Enterprise plutonium reprocessing facility. The vessel contained a mixture of concentrated nitric acid, uranium (8757 kg), plutonium (449 g) along with a mixture of radioactive and organic waste from a prior extraction cycle. The explosion dislodged the concrete lid of the bunker and blew a large hole in the roof of the building, releasing approximately 6 GBq of Pu 239 and 30 TBq of various other radionuclides into the environment. The contamination plume extended 28 km NE of building 201, 20 km beyond the facility property. The small village of Georgievka (pop. 200) was at the end of the fallout plume, but no fatalities, illnesses or injuries were reported. The accident exposed 160 on-site workers and almost two thousand cleanup workers to total doses of up to 50 mSv (the threshold limit for radiation workers is 100 mSv per 5 years).[33][34][35]

June, 1999 — INES Level 2[36] - Ishikawa Prefecture, Japan - Control rod malfunction

Operators attempting to insert one control rod during an inspection neglected procedure and instead withdrew three causing a 15 minute uncontrolled sustained reaction at the number 1 reactor of Shika Nuclear Power Plant. The Hokuriku Electric Power Company who owned the reactor did not report this incident and falsified records, covering it up until March, 2007.[37]

September 30, 1999 — INES Level 4 - Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan - Accidental criticality

Inadequately trained part-time workers prepared a uranyl nitrate solution containing about 16.6 kg of uranium, which exceeded the critical mass, into a precipitation tank at a uranium reprocessing facility in Tokai-mura northeast of Tokyo, Japan. The tank was not designed to dissolve this type of solution and was not configured to prevent eventual criticality. Three workers were exposed to (neutron) radiation doses in excess of allowable limits. Two of these workers died. 116 other workers received lesser doses of 1 mSv or greater though not in excess of the allowable limit.[38][39][40][41]

See also: Tokaimura nuclear accident

2000s

April 10, 2003 — INES Level 3 - Paks, Hungary - Fuel damaged

Partially spent fuel rods undergoing cleaning in a tank of heavy water ruptured and spilled fuel pellets at Paks Nuclear Power Plant. It is suspected that inadequate cooling of the rods during the cleaning process combined with a sudden influx of cold water thermally shocked fuel rods causing them to split. Boric acid was added to the tank to prevent the loose fuel pellets from achieving criticality. Ammonia and hydrazine were also added to absorb iodine-131.[42]

April 19, 2005 — INES Level 3 - Sellafield, England, United Kingdom - Nuclear material leak

20 metric tons of uranium and 160 kilograms of plutonium dissolved in 83,000 litres of nitric acid leaked over several months from a cracked pipe into a stainless steel sump chamber at the Thorp nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. The partially processed spent fuel was drained into holding tanks outside the plant.[43][44]

November 2005 — INES Level needed - Braidwood, Illinois, United States - Nuclear material leak

Tritium contamination of groundwater was discovered at Exelon's Braidwood station. Groundwater off site remains within safe drinking standards though the NRC is requiring the plant to correct any problems related to the release.[45]

March 6, 2006 — INES Level 2[46] - Erwin, Tennessee, United States - Nuclear material leak

Thirty-five litres of a highly enriched uranium solution leaked during transfer into a lab at Nuclear Fuel Services Erwin Plant. The incident caused a seven-month shutdown. A required public hearing on the licensing of the plant was not held due to the absence of public notification.[47][48][49][50]

2010s
See also: Timeline of the Fukushima nuclear accidents

March 11–20, 2011 - INES Level 7[51][52](previously rating is 5[53]) as of April 12 (A final rating is expected after the situation has been completely resolved).
Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, Japan - partial meltdowns in multiple reactors [54]

Main article: Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster

After the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami of March 11, the emergency power supply of the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant failed. This was followed by deliberate releases of radioactive gas from reactors 1 and 2 to relieve pressure. On March 12, triggered by falling water levels, a hydrogen explosion occurred at reactor 1, resulting in the collapse of the concrete outer structure.[55][56][57][58][59] Although the reactor containment itself was confirmed to be intact,[60][61][62] the hourly radiation from the plant reached 1,015 microsievert (0.1015 rem) - an amount equivalent to that allowable for ordinary people in one year."[63][64] Residents of the Fukushima area were advised to stay inside, close doors and windows, turn off air conditioning, and to cover their mouths with masks, towels or handkerchiefs as well as not to drink tap water.[65] By the evening of March 12, the exclusion zone had been extended to 20 kilometres (12 mi) around the plant[66] and 70,000 to 80,000 people had been evacuated from homes in northern Japan.[67] A second, nearly identical hydrogen explosion occurred in the reactor building for Unit 3 on March 14, with similar effects.[68] A third explosion in the “pressure suppression room” of Unit 2[69] initially was said not to have breached the reactor’s inner steel containment vessel,[70] but later reports indicated that the explosion damaged the steel containment structure of Unit 2 and much larger releases of radiation were expected than previously.[69]
Disposed rods of reactor Unit 4 were stored outside the reactor in a separate pool which ran dry, yielding fire and risk of serious contamination.[71]
Staff was brought down from 800 Fukushima, who have been named the "Fukushima 50" by the press.[71] Events are still developing.

March 11–13, 2011 - INES Level 3,[72] Fukushima II Nuclear Power Plant, Japan - Overheating, possible radioactivity emergency.

After the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami of March 11, the cooling systems for three reactors (numbers 1, 2 and 4) of the Fukushima-Daini nuclear power plant were compromised due to damage from the tsunami.[73] Nuclear Engineering International reported that all four units were successfully automatically shut down, but emergency diesel generators at the site were Damaged by the 9.0 magnitude earthquake[74] People were evacuated around 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) from the plant. An evacuation order was issued, because of possible radioactive contamination.[75][76] October 2011, events are still developing.

3.
1940s

June 23, 1942 – Leipzig, Germany (then Nazi Germany) – Steam explosion and reactor fire*
Shortly after the Leipzig L-IV atomic pile — worked on by Werner Heisenberg and Robert Doepel — demonstrated Germany's first signs of neutron propagation, the device was checked for a possible heavy water leak. During the inspection, air leaked in, igniting the uranium powder inside. The burning uranium boiled the water jacket, generating enough steam pressure to blow the reactor apart. Burning uranium powder scattered throughout the lab causing a larger fire at the facility.[1][2]

A sketch of Louis Slotin's criticality accident used to determine exposure of those in the room at the time.

August 21, 1945 – Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA – Accidental criticality
Harry K. Daghlian, Jr. dropped a tungsten carbide brick onto a plutonium core, inadvertently creating a critical mass at the Los Alamos Omega site. He quickly removed the brick, but was fatally irradiated, dying September 15.[3]
May 21, 1946 – Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA – Accidental criticality
While demonstrating his technique to visiting scientists at Los Alamos, Canadian physicist Louis Slotin manually assembled a critical mass of plutonium. A momentary slip of a screwdriver caused a prompt critical reaction. Slotin died on May 30 from massive radiation poisoning, with an estimated dose of 1,000 rads (rad), or 10 grays (Gy). Seven observers, who received doses as high as 166 rads, survived, yet three died within a few decades from conditions believed to be radiation-related.[4]

In the above incidents, both Daghlian (August 21, 1945 case) and Slotin (May 21, 1946 case), were working with the same bomb core which became known as the "demon core".
1950s

February 13, 1950 – British Columbia, Canada – 1950 British Columbia B-36 crash—non-nuclear detonation of a simulated atomic bomb
A USAF B-36 bomber, AF Ser. No. 44-92075, was flying a simulated combat mission from Eielson Air Force Base, near Fairbanks, Alaska, to Carswell Air Force Base in Fort Worth, Texas, carrying one weapon containing a dummy warhead. The warhead contained uranium instead of plutonium. After six hours of flight, the bomber experienced mechanical problems and was forced to shut down three of its six engines at an altitude of 12,000 feet (3,700 m). Fearing that severe weather and icing would jeopardize a safe emergency landing, the weapon was jettisoned over the Pacific Ocean from a height of 8,000 ft (2,400 m). The weapon's high explosives detonated upon impact. All of the sixteen crew members and one passenger were able to parachute from the plane and twelve were subsequently rescued from Princess Royal Island. The Pentagon's summary report does not mention if the weapon was later recovered.[5]
April 11, 1950 – Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA – Loss and recovery of nuclear materials
Three minutes after departure from Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque a USAF B-29 bomber carrying a nuclear weapon, four spare detonators, and a crew of thirteen crashed into a mountain near Manzano Base. The crash resulted in a fire which the New York Times reported as being visible from 15 miles (24 km). The bomb's casing was completely demolished and its high explosives ignited upon contact with the plane's burning fuel. However, according to the Department of Defense, the four spare detonators and all nuclear components were recovered. A nuclear detonation was not possible because, while on board, the weapon's core was not in the weapon for safety reasons. All thirteen crew members died.[5]
July 13, 1950 – Lebanon, Ohio, USA – Non-nuclear detonation of an atomic bomb
USAF B-50 aircraft on a training mission from Biggs Air Force Base with a nuclear weapon flew into the ground resulting in a high explosive detonation, but no nuclear explosion.[6]
November 10, 1950 – Rivière-du-Loup, Québec, Canada – Non-nuclear detonation of an atomic bomb
Returning one of several U.S. Mark 4 nuclear bombs secretly deployed in Canada, a USAF B-50 had engine trouble and jettisoned the weapon at 10,500 feet (3,200 m). The crew set the bomb to self-destruct at 2,500 ft (760 m) and dropped over the St. Lawrence River. The explosion shook area residents and scattered nearly 100 pounds (45 kg) of uranium (U-238) used in the weapon's tamper. The plutonium core ("pit") was not in the bomb at the time.[7]

The Castle Bravo fallout pattern.

March 1, 1954 – Bikini Atoll, Republic of the Marshall Islands (then Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands) – Nuclear test accident
During the Castle Bravo test of the first deployable hydrogen bomb, a miscalculation resulted in the explosion being over twice as large as predicted, with a total explosive force of 15 megatons of TNT (63 PJ). Of the total yield, 10 Mt (42 PJ) were from fission of the natural uranium tamper, but those fission reactions were quite dirty, producing a large amount of fallout. Combined with the much larger than expected yield and an unanticipated wind shift radioactive fallout was spread eastward onto the inhabited Rongelap and Rongerik Atolls. These islands were not evacuated before the explosion due to the financial cost involved, but many of the Marshall Islands natives have since suffered from radiation burns and radioactive dusting and also similar fates as the Japanese fishermen and their children and grandchildren have suffered from birth defects and have received little if any compensation from the federal government[citation needed]. A Japanese fishing boat, Daigo Fukuryu Maru/Lucky Dragon, also came into contact with the fallout, which caused many of the crew to take ill with one fatality. The test resulted in an international uproar and reignited Japanese concerns about radiation, especially with regard to the possible contamination of fish. Personal accounts of the Rongelap people can be seen in the documentary Children of Armageddon.
November 29, 1955 – Idaho, USA – Partial meltdown
Operator error led to a partial core meltdown in the experimental EBR-I breeder reactor, resulting in temporarily elevated radioactivity levels in the reactor building and necessitating significant repair.[8][9]
March 10, 1956 – Over the Mediterranean Sea – Nuclear weapons lost
A USAF B-47 Stratojet, AF Ser. No. 52-534, on a non-stop mission from MacDill Air Force Base to an overseas base descended into a cloud formation at 14,000 feet over the Mediterranean in preparation for an in-air refuelling and vanished while carrying two nuclear weapon cores. The plane was lost while flying through dense clouds, and the cores and other wreckage were never located.[10][11][12]
July 27, 1956 – Lakenheath in Suffolk, UK – Nuclear weapons damaged
A USAF B-47 crashed into a storage igloo spreading burning fuel over three Mark 6 nuclear bombs at RAF Lakenheath. A bomb disposal expert stated it was a miracle exposed detonators on one bomb did not fire, which presumably would have released nuclear material into the environment.[13]
May 22, 1957 – Kirtland AFB in New Mexico, USA – Non-nuclear detonation of an atomic weapon
A B-36 ferrying a nuclear weapon from Biggs AFB to Kirtland AFB dropped a nuclear weapon on approach to Kirtland AFB. The weapon impacted the ground 4.5 miles south of the Kirtland control tower and 0.3 miles west of the Sandia Base reservation. The weapon was completely destroyed by the detonation of its high explosive material, creating a crater 12 feet deep and 25 feet in diameter. Radioactive contamination at the crater lip amounted to 0.5 milliroentgen.[12]
July 28, 1957 – Atlantic Ocean – Two weapons jettisoned and not recovered
A USAF C-124 aircraft from Dover Air Force Base, Delaware was carrying three nuclear bombs over the Atlantic Ocean when it experienced a loss of power. The crew jettisoned two nuclear bombs to protect their safety, which were never recovered.[6]
September 11, 1957 – Rocky Flats Plant, Golden, Colorado, USA – Fire, release of nuclear materials
A fire began in a materials handling glove box and spread through the ventilation system into the stack filters at the Rocky Flats weapons mill 27 kilometres (17 mi) from Denver, Colorado. Plutonium and other contaminants were released, but the exact amount of which contaminants is unknown; estimates range from 25 mg to 250 kg.[14][15][16][17]
29 September 1957 – Kyshtym, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Russia (then USSR) – Explosion, release of nuclear materials
See Kyshtym disaster. A cooling system failure at the Mayak nuclear processing plant resulted in a major explosion and release of radioactive materials. Hundreds of people died and hundreds of thousands were evacuated.[18]
October 8–12, 1957 – Sellafield, Cumbria, UK – Reactor core fire
See Windscale fire. Technicians mistakenly overheated Windscale Pile No. 1 during an annealing process to release Wigner energy from graphite portions of the reactor. Poorly placed temperature sensors indicated the reactor was cooling rather than heating. The excess heat led to the failure of a nuclear cartridge, which in turn allowed uranium and irradiated graphite to react with air. The resulting fire burned for days, damaging a significant portion of the reactor core. About 150 burning fuel cells could not be lifted from the core, but operators succeeded in creating a firebreak by removing nearby fuel cells. An effort to cool the graphite core with water eventually quenched the fire. The reactor had released radioactive gases into the surrounding countryside, primarily in the form of iodine-131 (131I). Milk distribution was banned in a 200-square-mile (520 km2) area around the reactor for several weeks. A 1987 report by the National Radiological Protection Board predicted the accident would cause as many as 33 long-term cancer deaths, although the Medical Research Council Committee concluded that "it is in the highest degree unlikely that any harm has been done to the health of anybody, whether a worker in the Windscale plant or a member of the general public." The reactor that burned was one of two air-cooled graphite-moderated natural uranium reactors at the site used for production of plutonium.[19][20][21]

October 11, 1957 – Homestead Air Force Base, Florida – Nuclear bomb burned after B-47 aircraft accident[22]
B-47 aircraft crashed during take-off after a wheel exploded; one nuclear bomb burned in the resulting fire.
January 31, 1958 – Morocco – Nuclear bomb damaged in crash[22]
During a simulated takeoff a wheel casting failure caused the tail of a USAF B-47 carrying an armed nuclear weapon to hit the runway, rupturing a fuel tank and sparking a fire. Some contamination was detected immediately following the accident.[23][24]
February 5, 1958 – Savannah, Georgia, USA – Nuclear bomb lost
See 1958 Tybee Island mid-air collision. A USAF B-47 bomber jettisoned a Mark 15 Mod 0 nuclear bomb over the Atlantic Ocean after a midair collision with a USAF F-86 Sabre during a simulated combat mission from Homestead Air Force Base, Florida. The F-86's pilot ejected and parachuted to safety. The USAF claimed the B-47 tried landing at Hunter Air Force Base, Georgia three times before the bomb was jettisoned at 7,200 ft (2,200 m) near Tybee Island, Georgia. The B-47 pilot successfully landed in one attempt only after he first jettisoned the bomb. A 3-square-mile (7.8 km2) area near Wassaw Sound was searched for 9 weeks before the search was called off. The bomb was searched for in 2001 and not found. A group of investigators in 2004 claim to have found an underwater object which they think is the bomb.[25]
March 11, 1958 – Mars Bluff, South Carolina, USA – Non-nuclear detonation of a nuclear bomb
A USAF B-47 bomber flying from Hunter Air Force Base in Savannah, Georgia accidentally released an atomic bomb.[26] A home was destroyed and several people injured but the bomb's plutonium core did not explode.[27]
June 16, 1958 – Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA – Accidental criticality
A supercritical portion of highly enriched uranyl nitrate was allowed to collect in the drum causing a prompt neutron criticality in the C-1 wing of building 9212 at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Y-12 complex. It is estimated that the reaction produced 1.3 * 10^{18} fissions. Eight employees were in close proximity to the drum during the accident, receiving neutron doses ranging from 30 to 477 rems. No fatalities were reported.[28]
December 30, 1958 – Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA – Accidental criticality
During chemical purification a critical mass of a plutonium solution was accidentally assembled at Los Alamos National Laboratory. A chemical operator named Cecil Kelley died of acute radiation sickness. The March, 1961 Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine printed a special supplement medically analyzing this accident. Hand-manipulations of critical assemblies were abandoned as a matter of policy in U.S. federal facilities after this accident.[28]
July, 1959 – Simi Valley, California, USA – Explosion
The Sodium Reactor Experiment was a pioneering nuclear power plant built by Atomics International at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory, nearby Simi Valley, California. The reactor operated from 1957 to 1964. In July 1959, the reactor suffered a serious incident in which the reactor core was damaged causing the controlled release of radioactive gas to the atmosphere.[29]
November 20, 1959 – Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA – Explosion
A chemical explosion occurred during decontamination of processing machinery in the radiochemical processing plant at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee . (Report ORNL-2989, Oak Ridge National Laboratory). The accident resulted in the release of about 15 grams (0.53 oz) of 239Pu.

1960s

June 7, 1960 – New Egypt, New Jersey, USA – Nuclear warhead damaged by fire
A helium tank exploded and ruptured the fuel tanks of a USAF BOMARC-A surface-to-air missile at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey. The fire destroyed the missile, and contaminated the area directly below and adjacent to the missile.[24][30]
October 13, 1960 – Barents Sea, Arctic Ocean – Release of nuclear materials
A leak developed in the steam generators and in a pipe leading to the compensator reception on the ill-fated K-8 while the Soviet Northern Fleet November-class submarine was on exercise. While the crew rigged an improvised cooling system, radioactive gases leaked into the vessel and three of the crew suffered visible radiation injuries according to radiological experts in Moscow. Some crew members had been exposed to doses of up to 1.8–2 Sv (180–200 rem).[31]

SL-1 reactor being removed from the National Reactor Testing Station.

January 3, 1961 – National Reactor Testing Station, Idaho, USA – Accidental criticality, steam explosion, 3 fatalities, release of fission products
During a maintenance shutdown, the SL-1 experimental nuclear reactor underwent a prompt critical reaction causing core materials to explosively vaporize. Water hammer estimated at 10,000 pounds per square inch (69,000 kPa) struck the top of the reactor vessel propelling the entire reactor vessel upwards over 9 feet (2.7 m) in the air. One operator who had been standing on top of the vessel was killed when a shield plug impaled him and lodged in the ceiling. Two other military personnel were also killed from the trauma of the explosion, one of which had removed the central control rod too far. The plant had to be dismantled and the contamination was buried permanently nearby. Most of the release of radioactive materials was concentrated within the reactor building.

For more details on this topic, see SL-1.

January 24, 1961 – Goldsboro B-52 crash – Physical destruction of a nuclear bomb, loss of nuclear materials
A USAF B-52 bomber caught fire and exploded in midair due to a major leak in a wing fuel cell 12 miles (19 km) north of Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina. Five crewmen parachuted to safety, but three died—two in the aircraft and one on landing. The incident released the bomber's two Mark 39 hydrogen bombs. Three of the four arming devices on one of the bombs activated, causing it to carry out many of the steps needed to arm itself, such as the charging of the firing capacitors and, critically, the deployment of a 100-foot (30 m) diameter retardation parachute. The parachute allowed the bomb to hit the ground with little damage. The fourth arming device — the pilot's safe/arm switch — was not activated preventing detonation. The second bomb plunged into a muddy field at around 700 mph (300 m/s) and disintegrated. Its tail was discovered about 20 feet (6 m) down and much of the bomb recovered, including the tritium bottle and the plutonium. However, excavation was abandoned due to uncontrollable ground water flooding. Most of the thermonuclear stage, containing uranium, was left in situ. It is estimated to lie around 55 feet (17 m) below ground. The Air Force purchased the land and fenced it off to prevent its disturbance, and it is tested regularly for contamination, although none has so far been found.[32]

March 14, 1961 – 1961 Yuba City B-52 crash
USAF B-52 bomber experienced a decompression event that required it to fly below 10,000 feet. Resulting increased fuel consumption led to fuel exhaustion; the aircraft crashed with two nuclear bombs, which did not trigger a nuclear explosion.

July 4, 1961 – coast of Norway – Near meltdown
The Soviet Hotel-class submarine K-19 suffered a failure in its cooling system. Reactor core temperatures reached 800 °C (1,500 °F), nearly enough to melt the fuel rods, although the crew was able to regain temperature control by using emergency procedures. The incident contaminated parts of the ship, some of the onboard ballistic missiles and the crew, resulting in several fatalities. The movie K-19: The Widowmaker, starring Harrison Ford and Liam Neeson, offers a controversially fictionalized story of these events.

May 1, 1962 – Sahara desert, French Algeria – Accidental venting of underground nuclear test
The second French underground nuclear test, codenamed Béryl, took place in a shaft under mount Taourirt, near In Ecker, 150 km (100 mi) north of Tamanrasset, Algerian Sahara. Due to improper sealing of the shaft, a spectacular flame burst through the concrete cap and radioactive gases and dust were vented into the atmosphere. The plume climbed up to 2600 m (8500 ft) high and radiation was detected hundreds of km away. About a hundred soldiers and officials, including two ministers, were irradiated. The number of contaminated Algerians is unknown.

April 10, 1963 – Loss of nuclear reactor
Submarine USS Thresher sinks about 190 nmi (220 mi; 350 km) east of Cape Cod, Massachusetts due to improper welds allowing in seawater which forced a shutdown of the reactor. Poor design of its emergency ballast system prevented the ship from surfacing and the disabled ship ultimately descended to crush depth and imploded.

January 13, 1964 – Salisbury, Pennsylvania and Frostburg, Maryland, USA – Accidental loss and recovery of thermonuclear bombs
A USAF B-52 on airborne alert duty encountered a severe winter storm and extreme turbulence, ultimately disintegrating in mid-air over South Central Pennsylvania.[33] Only the two pilots survived. One crew member failed to bail out and the rest succumbed to injuries or exposure to the harsh winter weather. A search for the missing weapons was initiated, and recovery was effected from portions of the wreckage at a farm northwest of Frostburg, MD.

April 21, 1964 – Indian Ocean – Launch failure of a RTG powered satellite
A U.S. Transit-5BN-3 nuclear-powered navigational satellite failed to reach orbital velocity and began falling back down at 150,000 feet (46 km) above the Indian Ocean.[34] The satellite's SNAP-9a generator contained 17 kCi (630 TBq)[35] of 238Pu (2.1 pounds), which at least partially burned upon reentry.[36][37][38][39] Increased levels of 238Pu were first documented in the stratosphere four months later. Indeed NASA (in the 1995 Cassini FEIS)[35] indicated that the SNAP-9a plutonium release was nearly double the 9000Ci added by all the atmospheric weapons tests to that date.[40][41] The United States Atomic Energy Commission reported a resulting threefold increase in global 238Pu fallout.[42][43] All subsequent Transit satellites were fitted with solar panels; RTG's were designed to remain contained during re-entry.

8 December 1964 – Bunker Hill Air Force Base, USA – Fire, radioactive contamination
USAF B-58 aircraft carrying a nuclear weapon caught fire while taxiing. Nuclear weapon burned, causing contamination of the crash area.[6]

January 1965 – Livermore, California, USA – Release of nuclear materials
An accident at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory released 300 kCi (11 PBq) of tritium gas. Subsequent study found this release was not likely to produce adverse health effects in the surrounding communities.[44]

11 October 1965 – Rocky Flats Plant, Golden, Colorado, USA – Fire, exposure of workers
A fire at Rocky Flats exposed a crew of 25 to up to 17 times the legal limit for radiation.

December 5, 1965 – coast of Japan – Loss of a nuclear bomb
A U.S. Navy A-4E Skyhawk aircraft with one B43 nuclear bomb on board fell off the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga into 16,200 feet (4,900 m) of water while the ship was underway from Vietnam to Yokosuka, Japan. The plane, pilot and weapon were never recovered. There is dispute over exactly where the incident took place—the U.S. Defense Department originally stated it took place 500 miles (800 km) off the coast of Japan, but Navy documents later show it happened about 80 miles (130 km) from the Ryukyu Islands and 200 miles (320 km) from Okinawa.[45]

January 17, 1966 – Palomares incident – Accidental destruction, loss and recovery of nuclear bombs
A USAF B-52 carrying four hydrogen bombs collided with a USAF KC-135 jet tanker during over-ocean in-flight refueling. Four of the B-52's seven crew members parachuted to safety while the remaining three were killed along with all four of the KC-135's crew. The conventional explosives in two of the bombs detonated upon impact with the ground, dispersing plutonium over nearby farms. A third bomb landed intact near Palomares while the fourth fell 12 miles (19 km) off the coast into the Mediterranean sea. The US Navy conducted a three month search involving 12,000 men and successfully recovered the fourth bomb. The U.S. Navy employed the use of the deep-diving research submarine DSV Alvin to aid in the recovery efforts. During the ensuing cleanup, 1,500 tonnes (1,700 short tons) of radioactive soil and tomato plants were shipped to a nuclear dump in Aiken, South Carolina. The U.S. settled claims by 522 Palomares residents for $600,000. The town also received a $200,000 desalinization plant. The motion picture Men of Honor (2000), starring Cuba Gooding, Jr., as USN Diver Carl Brashear, and Robert De Niro as USN Diver Billy Sunday, contained an account of the fourth bomb's recovery.[46]

January 21, 1968 – 1968 Thule Air Base B-52 crash, Greenland – Loss and partial recovery of nuclear bombs
A fire broke out in the navigator's compartment of a USAF B-52 near Thule Air Base, Greenland. The bomber crashed 7 miles (11 km) from the air base, rupturing its nuclear payload of four hydrogen bombs. The recovery and decontamination effort was complicated by Greenland's harsh weather. Contaminated ice and debris were buried in the United States. Bomb fragments were recycled by Pantex, in Amarillo, Texas. The incident caused outrage and protests in Denmark, as Greenland is a Danish possession and Denmark forbade nuclear weapons on its territory.

May 22, 1968 – 740 km (400 nmi) southwest of the Azores – Loss of nuclear reactor and two W34 nuclear warheads
The USS Scorpion (SSN-589) sank while enroute from Rota, Spain, to Naval Base Norfolk. The cause of sinking remains unknown; all 99 officers and men on board were killed. The wreckage of the ship, its S5W reactor, and its two Mark 45 torpedoes with W34 nuclear warheads, remain on the sea floor in more than 3,000 m (9,800 ft) of water.

May 24, 1968 – location unknown – Loss of cooling, radioactive contamination, nuclear fuel damaged
During sea trials the Soviet nuclear submarine K-27 (Project 645) suffered severe problems with its reactor cooling systems. After spending some time at reduced power, reactor output inexplicably dropped and sensors detected an increase of gamma radiation in the reactor compartment to 150 rad/h. The safety buffer tank released radioactive gases further contaminating the submarine. The crew shut the reactor down and subsequent investigation found that approximately 20% of the fuel assemblies were damaged. The entire submarine was scuttled in the Kara Sea in 1981.

August 27, 1968 – Severodvinsk, Russia (then USSR) – Reactor power excursion, contamination
While in the naval yards at Severodvinsk for repairs Soviet Yankee-class nuclear submarine K-140 suffered an uncontrolled increase of the reactor's power output. One of the reactors activated automatically when workers raised control rods to a higher position and power increased to 18 times normal, while pressure and temperature levels in the reactor increased to four times normal. The accident also increased radiation levels aboard the vessel. The problem was traced to the incorrect installation of control rod electrical cables.

May 11, 1969 – Rocky Flats Plant, Golden, Colorado, USA – Plutonium fire, contamination
An accident in which 5 kilograms of plutonium burnt inside a glovebox at Rocky Flats. Cleanup took two years and was the costliest industrial accident ever to occur in the United States at that time.[47][48][49]

1970s

April 12, 1970 – Bay of Biscay – Loss of a nuclear submarine
The Soviet November-class attack submarine K-8 sank during salvage with 52 sailors onboard after suffering fires in two compartments simultaneously. Both reactors were shut down. The crew attempted to hook a tow line to an Eastern Bloc merchant vessel, but ultimately failed.[50]

Baneberry's radioactive plume rises from a shock fissure. Contaminants were carried in three different directions by the wind

December 18, 1970 – Nevada Test Site – Accidental venting of nuclear explosion
In Area 8 on Yucca Flat, the 10 kiloton "Baneberry" weapons test of Operation Emery detonated as planned at the bottom of a sealed vertical shaft 900 feet below the Earth's surface but the device's energy cracked the soil in unexpected ways, causing a fissure near ground zero and the failure of the shaft stemming and cap.[51] A plume of hot gases and radioactive dust was released three and a half minutes after ignition,[52] and continuing for many hours, raining fallout on workers within NTS. Six percent of the explosion's radioactive products were vented. The plume released 6.7 MCi of radioactive material, including 80 kCi of Iodine-131 and a high ratio of noble gases.[53] After dropping a portion of its load in the area, the hot cloud's lighter particles were carried to three altitudes and conveyed by winter storms and the jet stream to be deposited heavily as radionuclide-laden snow in Lassen and Sierra counties in northeast California, and to lesser degrees in northern Nevada, southern Idaho and some eastern sections of Oregon and Washington states.[54] The three diverging jet stream layers conducted radionuclides across the US to Canada, the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean. Some 86 workers at the site were exposed to radioactivity, but according to the Department of Energy none received a dose exceeding site guidelines and, similarly, radiation drifting offsite was not considered to pose a hazard by the DOE.[55] In March 2009, TIME magazine identified the Baneberry Test as one of the world's worst nuclear disasters.[56]
December 12, 1971 – New London, Connecticut, USA – Spill of irradiated water
During the transfer of radioactive coolant water from the submarine USS Dace to the submarine tender USS Fulton 500 US gallons (1,900 l; 420 imp gal) were spilled into the Thames River (USA).
December 1972 – Pawling, New York, USA – Contamination
A major fire and two explosions contaminated the plant and grounds of a plutonium fabrication facility resulting in a permanent shutdown.

1975 – location unknown – Contamination
Radioactive resin contaminates the American Sturgeon-class submarine USS Guardfish after wind unexpectedly blows the powder back towards the ship. The resin is used to remove dissolved radioactive minerals and particles from the primary coolant loops of submarines. This type of accident was fairly common; however, U.S. Navy nuclear vessels no longer discharge resin at sea.

October 1975 – Apra Harbor, Guam – Spill of irradiated water
While disabled, the submarine tender USS Proteus discharged radioactive coolant water. A Geiger counter at two of the harbor's public beaches showed 100 millirems/hour, fifty times the allowable dose.[citation needed]

August 1976 – Benton County, Washington, USA – Explosion, contamination of worker
An explosion at the Hanford site Plutonium Finishing Plant blew out a quarter-inch-thick lead glass window. Harold McCluskey, a worker, was showered with nitric acid and radioactive glass. He inhaled the largest dose of 241Am ever recorded, about 500 times the U.S. government occupational standards. The worker was placed in isolation for five months and given an experimental drug to flush the isotope from his body. By 1977, his body's radiation count had fallen by about 80 percent. He died of natural causes in 1987 at age 75.[57]

1977 – coast of Kamchatka – Loss and recovery of a nuclear warhead
The Soviet submarine K-171 accidentally released a nuclear warhead. The warhead was recovered after a search involving dozens of ships and aircraft.[58]

January 24, 1978 – Northwest Territories, Canada – Spill of nuclear fuel
Cosmos 954, a Soviet Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite with an onboard nuclear reactor, failed to separate from its booster and broke up on reentry over Canada. The fuel was spread over a wide area and some radioactive pieces were recovered. The Soviet Union eventually paid the Canadian Government $3 million CAD for expenses relating to the crash.

May 22, 1978 – near Puget Sound, Washington, USA – Spill of irradiated water
A valve was mistakenly opened aboard the submarine USS Puffer releasing up to 500 US gallons (1,900 l; 420 imp gal) of radioactive water.

1980s

September 18, 1980 – At about 6:30 p.m., an airman conducting maintenance on a USAF Titan-II missile at Little Rock Air Force Base's Launch Complex 374-7 in Southside (Van Buren County), just north of Damascus, Arkansas, dropped a socket from a socket wrench, which fell about 80 feet (24 m) before hitting and piercing the skin on the rocket's first-stage fuel tank, causing it to leak. The area was evacuated. At about 3:00 a.m., on September 19, 1980, the hypergolic fuel exploded. The W53 warhead landed about 100 feet (30 m) from the launch complex's entry gate; its safety features operated correctly and prevented any loss of radioactive material. An Air Force airman was killed and the launch complex was destroyed.[59]
August 8, 1982 – While on duty in the Barents Sea, there was a release of liquid metal coolant from the reactor of the Soviet Project 705 Alfa-class submarine K-123. The accident was caused by a leak in the steam generator. Approximately two tons of metal alloy leaked into the reactor compartment, irreparably damaging the reactor such that it had to be replaced. It took nine years to repair the submarine.
January 3, 1983 – The Soviet nuclear-powered spy satellite Kosmos 1402 burns up over the South Atlantic.
August 10, 1985 – About 35 miles (56 km) from Vladivostok in Chazhma Bay, Soviet submarine K-431, a Soviet Echo-class submarine had a reactor explosion, producing fatally high levels of radiation. Ten men were killed, but the deadly cloud of radioactivity did not reach Vladivostok.[60]
1986 – The U.S. government declassifies 19,000 pages of documents indicating that between 1946 and 1986, the Hanford Site near Richland, Washington, released thousands of US gallons of radioactive liquids. Many of the people living in the affected area received low doses of radiation from 131I.
October 3, 1986 – 480 miles (770 km) east of Bermuda, K-219, a Soviet Yankee I-class submarine experienced an explosion in one of its nuclear missile tubes and at least three crew members were killed. Sixteen nuclear missiles and two reactors were on board. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev privately communicated news of the disaster to U.S. President Ronald Reagan before publicly acknowledging the incident on October 4. Two days later, on October 6, the submarine sank in the Atlantic Ocean while under tow in 18,000 feet (5,500 m) of water.[61]
October 1988 – At the nuclear trigger assembly facility at Rocky Flats in Colorado, two employees and a D.O.E. inspector inhaled radioactive particles, causing closure of the plant. Several safety violations were cited, including uncalibrated monitors, inadequate fire equipment, and groundwater contaminated with radioactivity.

1990s

1997 – Georgian soldiers suffer radiation poisoning and burns. They are eventually traced back to training sources abandoned, forgotten, and unlabeled after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. One was a 137Cs pellet in a pocket of a shared jacket which put out about 130,000 times the level of background radiation at 1 meter distance.[62]

2000s

February 2003: Oak Ridge, Tennessee Y-12 facility. During the final testing of a new saltless uranium processing method, there was a small explosion followed by a fire. The explosion occurred in an unvented vessel containing unreacted calcium, water and depleted uranium. An exothermic reaction among these articles generated enough steam to burst the container. This small explosion breached its glovebox, allowing air to enter and ignite some loose uranium powder. Three employees were contaminated. BWXT Y-12 (now B&W Y-12), a partnership of Babcock & Wilcox and Bechtel, was fined $82,500 for the accident.[63]

4.
The Karlsruhe plutonium affair

An unnamed man was convicted of attempting to poison his ex-wife in 2001 with plutonium stolen from WAK (Wiederaufbereitungsanlage Karlsruhe), a small scale reprocessing plant where he worked. He did not steal a large amount of plutonium, only rags used for wiping surfaces and a small amount of liquid waste.[1][2] At least two people (besides the criminal) were contaminated by the plutonium.[3] Two flats in Landau in the Rhineland-Palatinate were contaminated, and had to be cleaned at a cost of two million euro.[4] Photographs of the case and details of other nuclear crimes have been presented by a worker at the Institute for Transuranium Elements.[5]
The Litvinenko assassination

Alexander Litvinenko died from polonium-210 poisoning in 2006. British officials said investigators had concluded the murder of Litvinenko was "a 'state-sponsored' assassination orchestrated by Russian security services."[6] On 20 January 2007 British police announced that they had "identified the man they believe poisoned Alexander Litvinenko," Andrei Lugovoi.[7]
Roman Tsepov homicide

Roman Tsepov, a politically influential Russian who provided security to Vladimir Putin and others, fell sick on September 11, 2004 after a trip to Moscow, and died on September 24. A postmortem investigation found a poisoning by an unspecified radioactive material. He had symptoms similar to Aleksandr Litvinenko[8][9][10].
Zheleznodorozhny criminal radiological act

An unnamed truck driver was killed by 5 months of radiation exposure to a 1.3 Curie cesium 137 source that had been put into the door of his truck around February 1995. He died of radiation-induced leukemia on 27 April 1997.[11]
Vladimir Kaplun radiation homicide

In 1993, director of the Kartontara packing company Vladimir Kaplun was killed by radioactive material (probably cesium-137) placed in his chair. He died of radiation sickness after a month of hospitalization. The source of the radiation was found after his death.[12]
Intentional theft/attempted theft of radioactive material

For accidental theft or attempted theft of radioactive materials, see the list of radiation accidents.
Grozny cobalt theft/attempted theft

On 13 September 1999, six people attempted to steal radioactive cobalt rods from a chemical plant in the city of Grozny in the Chechen Republic. During the theft, the suspects opened the radioactive material container and handled it, resulting in the deaths of three of the suspects and injury of the remaining three. The suspect who held the material directly in his hands died of radiation exposure 30 minutes later. This incident is described as an attempted theft, but some of the rods are reportedly still missing.[13]
Criminal use of X-ray equipment and other radiation technology by secret police

Some former East German dissidents claim that the Stasi used X-ray equipment to induce cancer in political prisoners.[14]

Similarly, some anti-Castro activists claim that the Cuban secret police sometimes used radioactive isotopes to induce cancer in "adversaries they wished to destroy with as little notice as possible".[15] In 1997, the Cuban expatriate columnist Carlos Alberto Montaner called this method "the Bulgarian Treatment", after its alleged use by the Bulgarian secret police.[16]
Quack medicine

In the early 20th century a series of "medical" products which contained radioactive elements were marketed to the general public. These are included in this discussion of nuclear/radioactive crime because the sale and production of these products is now covered by criminal law. Because some perfectly good radioactive medical products exist, (such as iodine-131 for the treatment of cancer), it is important to note that sale of products similar to those described below is criminal, as they are unlicensed medicines.

Radithor, a well known patent medicine/snake oil, is possibly the best known example of radioactive quackery. It consisted of triple distilled water containing at a minimum 1 microcurie each of the radium 226 and 228 isotopes.[17]

Radithor was manufactured from 1918 - 1928 by the Bailey Radium Laboratories, Inc., of East Orange, New Jersey. The head of the laboratories was listed as Dr. William J. A. Bailey, not a medical doctor.[18] It was advertised as "A Cure for the Living Dead"[19] as well as "Perpetual Sunshine".

These radium elixirs were marketed similar to the way opiates were peddled to the masses with laudanum an age earlier, and electrical cure-alls during the same time period such as the Prostate Warmer.[20]

The eventual death of the socialite Eben Byers from Radithor consumption and the associated radiation poisoning led to the strengthening of the Food and Drug Administration's powers and the demise of most radiation quack cures.

5.
Nuclear proliferation
See also: List of states with nuclear weapons

Research into the development of nuclear weapons was undertaken during World War II by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and the USSR. The United States was the first and is the only country to have used a nuclear weapon in war, when it used two bombs against Japan in August 1945. With their loss during the war, Germany and Japan ceased to be involved in any nuclear weapon research. In August 1949, the USSR tested a nuclear weapon.[1] The United Kingdom tested a nuclear weapon in October 1952. France developed a nuclear weapon in 1960. The People's Republic of China detonated a nuclear weapon in 1964. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, and Pakistan tested a weapon in 1998. In 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test.
Non-proliferation efforts

Early efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation involved intense government secrecy, the wartime acquisition of known uranium stores (the Combined Development Trust), and at times even outright sabotage—such as the bombing of a heavy-water facility thought to be used for a German nuclear program. None of these efforts were explicitly public, because the weapon developments themselves were kept secret until the bombing of Hiroshima.

Earnest international efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation began soon after World War II, when the Truman Administration proposed the Baruch Plan[2] of 1946, named after Bernard Baruch, America's first representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. The Baruch Plan, which drew heavily from the Acheson–Lilienthal Report of 1946, proposed the verifiable dismantlement and destruction of the U.S. nuclear arsenal (which, at that time, was the only nuclear arsenal in the world) after all governments had cooperated successfully to accomplish two things: (1) the establishment of an "international atomic development authority," which would actually own and control all military-applicable nuclear materials and activities, and (2) the creation of a system of automatic sanctions, which not even the U.N. Security Council could veto, and which would proportionately punish states attempting to acquire the capability to make nuclear weapons or fissile material.

Although the Baruch Plan enjoyed wide international support, it failed to emerge from the UNAEC because the Soviet Union planned to veto it in the Security Council. Still, it remained official American policy until 1953, when President Eisenhower made his "Atoms for Peace" proposal before the U.N. General Assembly. Eisenhower's proposal led eventually to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957. Under the "Atoms for Peace" program thousands of scientists from around the world were educated in nuclear science and then dispatched home, where many later pursued secret weapons programs in their home country.[3]

Efforts to conclude an international agreement to limit the spread of nuclear weapons did not begin until the early 1960s, after four nations (the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France) had acquired nuclear weapons (see List of countries with nuclear weapons for more information). Although these efforts stalled in the early 1960s, they renewed once again in 1964, after China detonated a nuclear weapon. In 1968, governments represented at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) finished negotiations on the text of the NPT. In June 1968, the U.N. General Assembly endorsed the NPT with General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII), and in July 1968, the NPT opened for signature in Washington, DC, London and Moscow. The NPT entered into force in March 1970.

Since the mid-1970s, the primary focus of non-proliferation efforts has been to maintain, and even increase, international control over the fissile material and specialized technologies necessary to build such devices because these are the most difficult and expensive parts of a nuclear weapons program. The main materials whose generation and distribution is controlled are highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Other than the acquisition of these special materials, the scientific and technical means for weapons construction to develop rudimentary, but working, nuclear explosive devices are considered to be within the reach of industrialized nations.

Since its founding by the United Nations in 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has promoted two, sometimes contradictory, missions: on the one hand, the Agency seeks to promote and spread internationally the use of civilian nuclear energy; on the other hand, it seeks to prevent, or at least detect, the diversion of civilian nuclear energy to nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices or purposes unknown. The IAEA now operates a safeguards system as specified under Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, which aims to ensure that civil stocks of uranium, plutonium, as well as facilities and technologies associated with these nuclear materials, are used only for peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation or nuclear weapons programs. It is often argued that proliferation of nuclear weapons to many other states has been prevented by the extension of assurances and mutual defence treaties to these states by nuclear powers, but other factors, such as national prestige, or specific historical experiences, also play a part in hastening or stopping nuclear proliferation.[4]
Dual use technology

Dual use technology refers to the possibility of military use of civilian nuclear power technology. Many technologies and materials associated with the creation of a nuclear power program have a dual-use capability, in that they can be used to make nuclear weapons if a country chooses to do so. When this happens a nuclear power program can become a route leading to the atomic bomb or a public annex to a secret bomb program. The crisis over Iran’s nuclear activities is a case in point.[5]

Many UN and US agencies warn that building more nuclear reactors unavoidably increases nuclear proliferation risks.[6] A fundamental goal for American and global security is to minimize the proliferation risks associated with the expansion of nuclear power. If this development is "poorly managed or efforts to contain risks are unsuccessful, the nuclear future will be dangerous".[5] For nuclear power programs to be developed and managed safely and securely, it is important that countries have domestic “good governance” characteristics that will encourage proper nuclear operations and management:[5]

These characteristics include low degrees of corruption (to avoid officials selling materials and technology for their own personal gain as occurred with the A.Q. Khan smuggling network in Pakistan), high degrees of political stability (defined by the World Bank as “likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism”), high governmental effectiveness scores (a World Bank aggregate measure of “the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures [and] the quality of policy formulation and implementation”), and a strong degree of regulatory competence.[5]

International cooperation
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Main article: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

At present, 189 countries are States Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, more commonly known as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT. These include the five Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) recognized by the NPT: the People's Republic of China, France, Russian Federation, the UK, and the United States.

Notable non-signatories to the NPT are Israel, Pakistan, and India (the latter two have since tested nuclear weapons, while Israel is considered by most to be an unacknowledged nuclear weapons state). North Korea was once a signatory but withdrew in January 2003. The legality of North Korea's withdrawal is debatable but as of 9 October 2006, North Korea clearly possesses the capability to make a nuclear explosive device.
International Atomic Energy Agency
Main article: International Atomic Energy Agency

The IAEA was established on 29 July 1957 to help nations develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Allied to this role is the administration of safeguards arrangements to provide assurance to the international community that individual countries are honoring their commitments under the treaty. Though established under its own international treaty, the IAEA reports to both the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council.

The IAEA regularly inspects civil nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation supplied to it. The agency checks inventories, and samples and analyzes materials. Safeguards are designed to deter diversion of nuclear material by increasing the risk of early detection. They are complemented by controls on the export of sensitive technology from countries such as UK and United States through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The main concern of the IAEA is that uranium not be enriched beyond what is necessary for commercial civil plants, and that plutonium which is produced by nuclear reactors not be refined into a form that would be suitable for bomb production.
Scope of safeguards
See also: Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials

Traditional safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes.

Parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguard measures applied by the IAEA. These require that operators of nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed accounting records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear material. Over 550 facilities and several hundred other locations are subject to regular inspection, and their records and the nuclear material being audited. Inspections by the IAEA are complemented by other measures such as surveillance cameras and instrumentation.

The inspections act as an alert system providing a warning of the possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities. The system relies on;

Material Accountancy – tracking all inward and outward transfers and the flow of materials in any nuclear facility. This includes sampling and analysis of nuclear material, on-site inspections, and review and verification of operating records.
Physical Security – restricting access to nuclear materials at the site.
Containment and Surveillance – use of seals, automatic cameras and other instruments to detect unreported movement or tampering with nuclear materials, as well as spot checks on-site.

All NPT non-weapons states must accept these full-scope safeguards. In the five weapons states plus the non-NPT states (India, Pakistan and Israel), facility-specific safeguards apply. IAEA inspectors regularly visit these facilities to verify completeness and accuracy of records.

The terms of the NPT cannot be enforced by the IAEA itself, nor can nations be forced to sign the treaty. In reality, as shown in Iraq and North Korea, safeguards can be backed up by diplomatic, political and economic measures.

While traditional safeguards easily verified the correctness of formal declarations by suspect states, in the 1990s attention turned to what might not have been declared. While accepting safeguards at declared facilities, Iraq had set up elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium to weapons grade. North Korea attempted to use research reactors (not commercial electricity-generating reactors) and a reprocessing plant to produce some weapons-grade plutonium.

The weakness of the NPT regime lay in the fact that no obvious diversion of material was involved. The uranium used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and the nuclear facilities were built by the countries themselves without being declared or placed under safeguards. Iraq, as an NPT party, was obliged to declare all facilities but did not do so. Nevertheless, the activities were detected and brought under control using international diplomacy. In Iraq, a military defeat assisted this process.

In North Korea, the activities concerned took place before the conclusion of its NPT safeguards agreement. With North Korea, the promised provision of commercial power reactors appeared to resolve the situation for a time, but it later withdrew from the NPT and declared it had nuclear weapons.
Additional Protocol

In 1993 a program was initiated to strengthen and extend the classical safeguards system, and a model protocol was agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors 1997. The measures boosted the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the civil fuel cycle.

Innovations were of two kinds. Some could be implemented on the basis of IAEA's existing legal authority through safeguards agreements and inspections. Others required further legal authority to be conferred through an Additional Protocol. This must be agreed by each non-weapons state with IAEA, as a supplement to any existing comprehensive safeguards agreement. Weapons states have agreed to accept the principles of the model additional protocol.

Key elements of the model Additional Protocol:

The IAEA is to be given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including R & D, production of uranium and thorium (regardless of whether it is traded), and nuclear-related imports and exports.
IAEA inspectors will have greater rights of access. This will include any suspect location, it can be at short notice (e.g., two hours), and the IAEA can deploy environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities.
States must streamline administrative procedures so that IAEA inspectors get automatic visa renewal and can communicate more readily with IAEA headquarters.
Further evolution of safeguards is towards evaluation of each state, taking account of its particular situation and the kind of nuclear materials it has. This will involve greater judgement on the part of IAEA and the development of effective methodologies which reassure NPT States.

As of 20 December 2010, 139 countries have signed Additional Protocols, 104 have brought them into force, and one (Iraq) is implementing its protocol provisionally.[7] The IAEA is also applying the measures of the Additional Protocol in Taiwan.[8] Among the leading countries that have not signed the Additional Protocol are Egypt, which says it will not sign until Israel accepts comprehensive IAEA safeguards,[9] and Brazil, which opposes making the protocol a requirement for international cooperation on enrichment and reprocessing,[10] but has not ruled out signing.[11]
Limitations of Safeguards

The greatest risk from nuclear weapons proliferation comes from countries which have not joined the NPT and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities; India, Pakistan, and Israel fall within this category. While safeguards apply to some of their activities, others remain beyond scrutiny.

A further concern is that countries may develop various sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities and research reactors under full safeguards and then subsequently opt out of the NPT. Bilateral agreements, such as insisted upon by Australia and Canada for sale of uranium, address this by including fallback provisions, but many countries are outside the scope of these agreements. If a nuclear-capable country does leave the NPT, it is likely to be reported by the IAEA to the UN Security Council, just as if it were in breach of its safeguards agreement. Trade sanctions would then be likely.

IAEA safeguards, together with bilateral safeguards applied under the NPT can, and do, ensure that uranium supplied by countries such as Australia and Canada does not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact, the worldwide application of those safeguards and the substantial world trade in uranium for nuclear electricity make the proliferation of nuclear weapons much less likely.

The Additional Protocol, once it is widely in force, will provide credible assurance that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in the states concerned. This will be a major step forward in preventing nuclear proliferation.
Other developments

The Nuclear Suppliers Group communicated its guidelines, essentially a set of export rules, to the IAEA in 1978. These were to ensure that transfers of nuclear material or equipment would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, and formal government assurances to this effect were required from recipients. The Guidelines also recognised the need for physical protection measures in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials, and strengthened retransfer provisions. The group began with seven members – the United States, the former USSR, the UK, France, Germany, Canada and Japan – but now includes 46 countries including all five nuclear weapons states.

According to Kenneth D. Bergeron's Tritium on Ice: The Dangerous New Alliance of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power, tritium is not classified as a 'special nuclear material' but rather as a 'by-product'. It is seen as an important litmus test on the seriousness of the United States' intention to nuclear disarm. This radioactive super-heavy hydrogen isotope is used to boost the efficiency of fissile materials in nuclear weapons. The United States resumed tritium production in 2003 for the first time in 15 years. This could indicate that there is a potential nuclear arm stockpile replacement since the isotope naturally decays.

In May 1995, NPT parties reaffirmed their commitment to a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty to prohibit the production of any further fissile material for weapons. This aims to complement the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996 (not entered into force as of 2011) and to codify commitments made by the United States, the UK, France and Russia to cease production of weapons material, as well as putting a similar ban on China. This treaty will also put more pressure on Israel, India and Pakistan to agree to international verification.[citation needed]

On 9 August 2005, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. Khamenei's official statement was made at the meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. [2] As of February 2006 Iran formally announced that uranium enrichment within their borders has continued. Iran claims it is for peaceful purposes but the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States claim the purpose is for nuclear weapons research and construction.[12]
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NPT Non-Signatories

India, Pakistan and Israel have been "threshold" countries in terms of the international non-proliferation regime. They possess or are quickly capable of assembling one or more nuclear weapons. They have remained outside the 1970 NPT. They are thus largely excluded from trade in nuclear plant or materials, except for safety-related devices for a few safeguarded facilities.

In May 1998 India and Pakistan each exploded several nuclear devices underground. This heightened concerns regarding an arms race between them, with Pakistan involving the People's Republic of China, an acknowledged nuclear weapons state. Both countries are opposed to the NPT as it stands, and India has consistently attacked the Treaty since its inception in 1970 labeling it as a lopsided treaty in favor of the nuclear powers.

Relations between the two countries are tense and hostile, and the risks of nuclear conflict between them have long been considered quite high. Kashmir is a prime cause of bilateral tension, its sovereignty being in dispute since 1948. There is persistent low level military conflict due to Pakistan backing an insurgency there and the disputed status of Kashmir.

Both engaged in a conventional arms race in the 1980s, including sophisticated technology and equipment capable of delivering nuclear weapons. In the 1990s the arms race quickened. In 1994 India reversed a four-year trend of reduced allocations for defence, and despite its much smaller economy, Pakistan was expected to push its own expenditures yet higher. Both have lost their patrons: India, the former USSR, and Pakistan, the United States.

But it is the growth and modernization of China's nuclear arsenal and its assistance with Pakistan's nuclear power programme and, reportedly, with missile technology, which exacerbate Indian concerns. In particular, Pakistan is aided by China's People's Liberation Army, which operates somewhat autonomously within that country as an exporter of military material.
India

Nuclear power for civil use is well established in India. Its civil nuclear strategy has been directed towards complete independence in the nuclear fuel cycle, necessary because of its outspoken rejection of the NPT. This self-sufficiency extends from uranium exploration and mining through fuel fabrication, heavy water production, reactor design and construction, to reprocessing and waste management. It has a small fast breeder reactor and is planning a much larger one. It is also developing technology to utilise its abundant resources of thorium as a nuclear fuel.

India has 14 small nuclear power reactors in commercial operation, two larger ones under construction, and ten more planned. The 14 operating ones (2548 MWe total) comprise:

two 150 MWe BWRs from the United States, which started up in 1969, now use locally enriched uranium and are under safeguards,
two small Canadian PHWRs (1972 & 1980), also under safeguards, and
ten local PHWRs based on Canadian designs, two of 150 and eight 200 MWe.
two new 540 MWe and two 700 MWe plants at tarapore (known as TAPP :Tarapore Atomic Power Project)

The two under construction and two of the planned ones are 450 MWe versions of these 200 MWe domestic products. Construction has been seriously delayed by financial and technical problems. In 2001 a final agreement was signed with Russia for the country's first large nuclear power plant, comprising two VVER-1000 reactors, under a Russian-financed US$3 billion contract. The first unit is due to be commissioned in 2007. A further two Russian units are under consideration for the site.

Nuclear power supplied 3.1% of India's electricity in 2000 and this was expected to reach 10% by 2005. Its industry is largely without IAEA safeguards, though a few plants (see above) are under facility-specific safeguards. As a result India's nuclear power programme proceeds largely without fuel or technological assistance from other countries.

Its weapons material appears to come from a Canadian-designed 40MW "research" reactor which started up in 1960, well before the NPT, and a 100MW indigenous unit in operation since 1985. Both use local uranium, as India does not import any nuclear fuel. It is estimated that India may have built up enough weapons-grade plutonium for a hundred nuclear warheads.

It is widely believed that the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan used CANDU reactors to produce fissionable materials for their weapons; however, this is not accurate. Both Canada (by supplying the 40 MW research reactor) and the United States (by supplying 21 tons of heavy water) supplied India with the technology necessary to create a nuclear weapons program, dubbed CIRUS (Canada-India Reactor, United States). Canada sold India the reactor on the condition that the reactor and any by-products would be "employed for peaceful purposes only.". Similarly, the United States sold India heavy water for use in the reactor "only... in connection with research into and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes". India, in violation of these agreements, used the Canadian-supplied reactor and American-supplied heavy water to produce plutonium for their first nuclear explosion, Smiling Buddha.[13] The Indian government controversially justified this, however, by claiming that Smiling Buddha was a "peaceful nuclear explosion."

The country has at least three other research reactors including the tiny one which is exploring the use of thorium as a nuclear fuel, by breeding fissile U-233. In addition, an advanced heavy-water thorium cycle is under development.

India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, the so-called Smiling Buddha test, which it has consistently claimed was for peaceful purposes. Others saw it as a response to China's nuclear weapons capability. It was then universally perceived, notwithstanding official denials, to possess, or to be able to quickly assemble, nuclear weapons. In 1999 it deployed its own medium-range missile and has developed an intermediate-range missile capable of reaching targets in China's industrial heartland.

In 1995 the United States quietly intervened to head off a proposed nuclear test. However, in 1998 there were five more tests in Operation Shakti. These were unambiguously military, including one claimed to be of a sophisticated thermonuclear device, and their declared purpose was "to help in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields and different delivery systems".

Indian security policies are driven by:

its determination to be recognized as a dominant power in the region
its increasing concern with China's expanding nuclear weapons and missile delivery programmes
its concern with Pakistan's capability to deliver nuclear weapons deep into India

It perceives nuclear weapons as a cost-effective political counter to China's nuclear and conventional weaponry, and the effects of its nuclear weapons policy in provoking Pakistan is, by some accounts, considered incidental. India has had an unhappy relationship with China. After an uneasy ceasefire ended the 1962 war, relations between the two nations were frozen until 1998. Since then a degree of high-level contact has been established and a few elementary confidence-building measures put in place. China still occupies some territory which it captured during the aforementioned war, claimed by India, and India still occupies some territory claimed by China. Its nuclear weapon and missile support for Pakistan is a major bone of contention.

American President George W. Bush met with India Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to discuss India's involvement with nuclear weapons. The two countries agreed that the United States would give nuclear power assistance to India.[citation needed]
Pakistan
This section needs additional citations for verification. (July 2011)
In 2003, Libya admitted that the nuclear weapons-related material including these centrifuges were acquired from Pakistan

Nuclear power supplies only 2.34% of Pakistan's electricity. It has one small (125 MWe) Canadian PHWR nuclear power reactor from 1971 which is under international safeguards, and two 300 MWe PWRs supplied by China under safeguards, which started up in June 2000 and May 2011. China is supplying the low-enriched uranium fuel for these PWRs, along with two additional reactors.

Pakistan also has a 9 MW research reactor of 1965 vintage, and there are persistent reports of another "multipurpose" reactor, a 50 MW PHWR near Khushab, which is presumed to have potential for producing weapons plutonium.

Pakistan has also produced nuclear weapons, using indigenous uranium to produce both highly enriched uranium and, more recently, plutonium. It has at least one small centrifuge enrichment plant. In 1990 the United States cut off military assistance to Pakistan because it was unable to certify that Pakistan was not pursuing a policy of manufacturing nuclear weapons. This was relaxed late in 2001.

Pakistan made it clear in early 1996 that it had done the basic development work, and that if India staged a nuclear test, Pakistan would immediately start assembling its own nuclear explosive device. It is assumed to now have enough highly enriched uranium for up to forty nuclear warheads. In May 1998, within weeks of India's nuclear tests, Pakistan announced that it had conducted six underground tests in the Chagai Hills, five on the 28th and one on the 30th of that month. Seismic events consistent with these claims were recorded.

In the 1970s, Pakistan first focused on the plutonium route, expecting to obtain the fissile material from a reprocessing plant to be provided by France. This plan failed due to U.S. intervention. Pakistan, not wanting to give up, redoubled its efforts to obtain uranium enrichment technology. The main efforts towards this direction were done under Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. Dr. Khan had earlier worked with Fysisch Dynamisch Onderzoekslaboratorium (FDO). FDO was a subsidiary of the Dutch firm VMF-Stork based in Amsterdam. From 1972 to 1975 Dr. Khan had access to classified data used to enrich ordinary uranium to weapons grade concentrations. FDO was working on the development of ultra high-speed centrifuges for URENCO.

In 1974 while he was on secondment for 17 days as a translator to the URENCO plant in Almelo, he obtained photographs and documents of the plant. Dr. Khan returned to Pakistan in 1976 and initiated the Uranium enrichment program on the basis of the technology he had stolen from his previous employer.[citation needed] After the British Government stopped the British subsidiary of the American Emerson Electric Co from shipping the nuclear technology to Pakistan, Dr. Khan describes his frustration with a supplier from Germany as "That man from the German team was unethical. When he did not get the order from us, he wrote a letter to a Labour Party member and questions were asked in [British] Parliament."[3]

A.Q Khan's efforts made him into a national hero. In 1981, as a tribute, the president of Pakistan, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, renamed the enrichment plant the A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories.

In 2003, the IAEA unearthed a nuclear black market with close ties to Pakistan. It was widely believed to have direct involvement of the government of Pakistan. This claim could not be verified due to the refusal of the government of Pakistan to allow IAEA to interview the alleged head of the nuclear black market, who happened to be no other than Dr. Khan. Dr. Khan later confessed to his crimes on national television, bailing out the government by taking full responsibility. He confessed to nuclear proliferation from Pakistan to Iran and North Korea. He was immediately given presidential immunity. Exact nature of the involvement at the governmental level is still unclear, but the manner in which the government acted cast doubt on the sincerity of Pakistan.[citation needed]
North Korea

North Korea joined the NPT in 1985 and had subsequently signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. However it was believed that North Korea was diverting plutonium extracted from the fuel of its reactor at Yongbyon, for use in nuclear weapons. The subsequent confrontation with IAEA on the issue of inspections and suspected violations, resulted in North Korea threatening to withdraw from the NPT in 1993. This eventually led to negotiations with the United States resulting in the Agreed Framework of 1994, which provided for IAEA safeguards being applied to its reactors and spent fuel rods. These spent fuel rods were sealed in canisters by the United States to prevent North Korea from extracting plutonium from them. North Korea had to therefore freeze its plutonium programme.

During this period Pakistan-North Korea cooperation in missile technology transfer was being established. A high level Pakistani military delegation visited North Korea in August–September 1992, reportedly to discuss the supply of Scud missile technology to Pakistan. In 1993, PM Benazir Bhutto traveled to China and North Korea. The visits are believed to be related to the subsequent acquisition of Ghauri (North Korean No-dong) missiles by Pakistan. During the period 1992–1994, A.Q. Khan was reported to have visited North Korea thirteen times. The missile cooperation program with North Korea was under Dr. A. Q. Khan's Kahuta Research Laboratories. At this time China was under U.S. pressure not to supply the M series of missiles to Pakistan. This forced the latter (possibly with Chinese connivance) to approach North Korea for missile transfers. Reports indicate that North Korea was willing to supply missile sub-systems including rocket motors, inertial guidance systems, control and testing equipment of Scud SSMs for US$ 50 million.

It is not clear what North Korea got in return. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. in Jane's Defence Weekly (27 November 2002) reports that Western analysts had begun to question what North Korea received in payment for the missiles; many suspected it was nuclear technology and components. Khan's KRL was in charge of both Pakistan's uranium enrichment program and also of the missile program with North Korea. It is therefore likely during this period that cooperation in nuclear technology between Pakistan and North Korea was initiated. Western intelligence agencies began to notice exchange of personnel, technology and components between KRL and entities of the North Korean 2nd Economic Committee (responsible for weapons production).

A New York Times report on 18 October 2002 quoted U.S. intelligence officials having stated that Pakistan was a major supplier of critical equipment to North Korea. The report added that equipment such as gas centrifuges appeared to have been "part of a barter deal" in which North Korea supplied Pakistan with missiles. Separate reports indicate (Washington Times, 22 November 2002) that U.S. intelligence had as early as 1999 picked up signs that North Korea was continuing to develop nuclear arms. Other reports also indicate that North Korea had been working covertly to develop an enrichment capability for nuclear weapons for at least five years and had used technology obtained from Pakistan (Washington Times, 18 October 2002).
Israel

Israel is also thought to possess an arsenal of potentially up to several hundred nuclear warheads based on estimates of the amount of fissile material produced by Israel.[14] This has never been openly confirmed or denied however, due to Israel's policy of deliberate ambiguity.[15]

An Israeli nuclear installation is located about ten kilometers to the south of Dimona, the Negev Nuclear Research Center. Its construction commenced in 1958, with French assistance. The official reason given by the Israeli and French governments was to build a nuclear reactor to power a "desalination plant", in order to "green the Negev". The purpose of the Dimona plant is widely assumed to be the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, and the majority of defense experts have concluded that it does in fact do that.[citation needed] However, the Israeli government refuses to confirm or deny this publicly, a policy it refers to as "ambiguity".

Norway sold 20 tonnes of heavy water needed for the reactor to Israel in 1959 and 1960 in a secret deal. There were no "safeguards" required in this deal to prevent usage of the heavy water for non-peaceful purposes. The British newspaper Daily Express accused Israel of working on a bomb in 1960. [3] When the United States intelligence community discovered the purpose of the Dimona plant in the early 1960s, it demanded that Israel agree to international inspections. Israel agreed, but on a condition that U.S., rather than IAEA, inspectors were used, and that Israel would receive advanced notice of all inspections.

Some claim that because Israel knew the schedule of the inspectors' visits, it was able to hide the alleged purpose of the site from the inspectors by installing temporary false walls and other devices before each inspection. The inspectors eventually informed the U.S. government that their inspections were useless due to Israeli restrictions on what areas of the facility they could inspect. In 1969, the United States terminated the inspections.

In 1986, Mordechai Vanunu, a former technician at the Dimona plant, revealed to the media some evidence of Israel's nuclear program. Israeli agents arrested him from Italy, drugged him and transported him to Israel, and an Israeli court then tried him in secret on charges of treason and espionage[citation needed], and sentenced him to eighteen years imprisonment. He was freed on 21 April 2004, but was severely limited by the Israeli government. He was arrested again on 11 November 2004, though formal charges were not immediately filed.

Comments on photographs taken by Mordechai Vanunu inside the Negev Nuclear Research Center have been made by prominent scientists. British nuclear weapons scientist Frank Barnaby, who questioned Vanunu over several days, estimated Israel had enough plutonium for about 150 weapons.[16] Ted Taylor, a bomb designer employed by the United States of America has confirmed the several hundred warhead estimate based on Vanunu's photographs.[citation needed]
See also: Israel and weapons of mass destruction
Nuclear arms control in South Asia

The public stance of the two states on non-proliferation differs markedly. Pakistan appears to have dominated a continuing propaganda debate.

Pakistan has initiated a series of regional security proposals. It has repeatedly proposed a nuclear free zone in South Asia and has proclaimed its willingness to engage in nuclear disarmament and to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty if India would do so. It has endorsed a United States proposal for a regional five power conference to consider non-proliferation in South Asia.

India has taken the view that solutions to regional security issues should be found at the international rather than the regional level, since its chief concern is with China. It therefore rejects Pakistan's proposals.

Instead, the 'Gandhi Plan', put forward in 1988, proposed the revision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it regards as inherently discriminatory in favor of the nuclear-weapon States, and a timetable for complete nuclear weapons disarmament. It endorsed early proposals for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and for an international convention to ban the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes, known as the 'cut-off' convention.

The United States for some years, especially under the Clinton administration, pursued a variety of initiatives to persuade India and Pakistan to abandon their nuclear weapons programs and to accept comprehensive international safeguards on all their nuclear activities. To this end, the Clinton administration proposed a conference of the five nuclear-weapon states, Japan, Germany, India and Pakistan.

India refused this and similar previous proposals, and countered with demands that other potential weapons states, such as Iran and North Korea, should be invited, and that regional limitations would only be acceptable if they were accepted equally by China. The United States would not accept the participation of Iran and North Korea and these initiatives have lapsed.

Another, more recent approach, centers on 'capping' the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, which would hopefully be followed by 'roll back'. To this end, India and the United States jointly sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution in 1993 calling for negotiations for a 'cut-off' convention. Should India and Pakistan join such a convention, they would have to agree to halt the production of fissile materials for weapons and to accept international verification on their relevant nuclear facilities (enrichment and reprocessing plants). It appears that India is now prepared to join negotiations regarding such a Cut-off Treaty, under the UN Conference on Disarmament.

Bilateral confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan to reduce the prospects of confrontation have been limited. In 1990 each side ratified a treaty not to attack the other's nuclear installations, and at the end of 1991 they provided one another with a list showing the location of all their nuclear plants, even though the respective lists were regarded as not being wholly accurate. Early in 1994 India proposed a bilateral agreement for a 'no first use' of nuclear weapons and an extension of the 'no attack' treaty to cover civilian and industrial targets as well as nuclear installations.

Having promoted the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty since 1954, India dropped its support in 1995 and in 1996 attempted to block the Treaty. Following the 1998 tests the question has been reopened and both Pakistan and India have indicated their intention to sign the CTBT. Indian ratification may be conditional upon the five weapons states agreeing to specific reductions in nuclear arsenals. The UN Conference on Disarmament has also called upon both countries "to accede without delay to the Non-Proliferation Treaty", presumably as non-weapons states.
NPT signatories
Egypt

In 2004 and 2005, Egypt disclosed past undeclared nuclear activities and material to the IAEA. In 2007 and 2008, high enriched and low enriched uranium particles were found in environmental samples taken in Egypt.[17] In 2008, the IAEA states Egypt's statements were consistent with its own findings.[18] In May 2009, Reuters reported that the IAEA was conducting further investigation in Egypt.[19][20]
Iran
Main article: Iran and weapons of mass destruction#Nuclear weapons
See also: Nuclear program of Iran

In 2003, the IAEA reported that Iran had been in breach of its obligations to comply with provisions of its safeguard agreement.[21] In 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors voted in a rare non-consensus decision to find Iran in non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to report that non-compliance to the UN Security Council.[22][23] In response, the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions citing concerns about the program.[24][25][26][27][28] Iran's representative to the UN argues sanctions compel Iran to abandon its rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to peaceful nuclear technology.[29] Iran says its uranium enrichment program is exclusively for peaceful purposes[30][31] and has enriched uranium to "less than 5 percent," consistent with fuel for a nuclear power plant and significantly below the purity of WEU (around 90%) typically used in a weapons program.[32][33] The director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano, said in 2009 he had not seen any evidence in IAEA official documents that Iran was developing nuclear weapons.[34]
Iraq

Up to the late 1980s it was generally assumed that any undeclared nuclear activities would have to be based on the diversion of nuclear material from safeguards. States acknowledged the possibility of nuclear activities entirely separate from those covered by safeguards, but it was assumed they would be detected by national intelligence activities. There was no particular effort by IAEA to attempt to detect them.

Iraq had been making efforts to secure a nuclear potential since the 1960s. In the late 1970s a specialised plant, Osiraq, was constructed near Baghdad. The plant was attacked during the Iran–Iraq War and was destroyed by Israeli bombers in June 1981.

Not until the 1990 NPT Review Conference did some states raise the possibility of making more use of (for example) provisions for "special inspections" in existing NPT Safeguards Agreements. Special inspections can be undertaken at locations other than those where safeguards routinely apply, if there is reason to believe there may be undeclared material or activities.

After inspections in Iraq following the UN Gulf War cease-fire resolution showed the extent of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, it became clear that the IAEA would have to broaden the scope of its activities. Iraq was an NPT Party, and had thus agreed to place all its nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. But the inspections revealed that it had been pursuing an extensive clandestine uranium enrichment programme, as well as a nuclear weapons design programme.

The main thrust of Iraq's uranium enrichment program was the development of technology for electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) of indigenous uranium. This uses the same principles as a mass spectrometer (albeit on a much larger scale). Ions of uranium-238 and uranium-235 are separated because they describe arcs of different radii when they move through a magnetic field. This process was used in the Manhattan Project to make the highly enriched uranium used in the Hiroshima bomb, but was abandoned soon afterwards.

The Iraqis did the basic research work at their nuclear research establishment at Tuwaitha, near Baghdad, and were building two full-scale facilities at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat, north of Baghdad. However, when the war broke out, only a few separators had been installed at Tarmiya, and none at Ash Sharqat.

The Iraqis were also very interested in centrifuge enrichment, and had been able to acquire some components including some carbon-fibre rotors, which they were at an early stage of testing.

They were clearly in violation of their NPT and safeguards obligations, and the IAEA Board of Governors ruled to that effect. The UN Security Council then ordered the IAEA to remove, destroy or render harmless Iraq's nuclear weapons capability. This was done by mid 1998, but Iraq then ceased all cooperation with the UN, so the IAEA withdrew from this work.

The revelations from Iraq provided the impetus for a very far-reaching reconsideration of what safeguards are intended to achieve.
See also: Iraq and weapons of mass destruction
Libya
Main article: Libya and nuclear technology
[icon] This section requires expansion. (September 2010)
Myanmar

A report in the Sydney Morning Herald and Searchina, a Japanese newspaper, report that two Myanmarese defectors saying that the Myanmar junta was secretly building a nuclear reactor and plutonium extraction facility with North Korea's help, with the aim of acquiring its first nuclear bomb in five years. According to the report, "The secret complex, much of it in caves tunnelled into a mountain at Naung Laing in northern Burma, runs parallel to a civilian reactor being built at another site by Russia that both the Russians and Burmese say will be put under international safeguards."[35] In 2002, Myanmar had notified IAEA of its intention to pursue a civilian nuclear programme. Later, Russia announced that it would build a nuclear reactor in Myanmar. There have also been reports that two Pakistani scientists, from the AQ Khan stable, had been dispatched to Myanmar where they had settled down, to help Myanmar's project.[citation needed] Recently, the David Albright-led Institute for Science and International Security rang alarm bells about Myanmar attempting a nuclear project with North Korean help.[citation needed] If true, the full weight of international pressure will be brought against Myanmar, said officials familiar with developments. But equally, the information that has been peddled by the defectors is also "preliminary" and could be used by the west to turn the screws on Myanmar—on democracy and human rights issues—in the run-up to the elections in the country in 2010.[citation needed] During an ASEAN meeting in Thailand in July 2009, US secretary of state Hillary Clinton highlighted concerns of the North Korean link. "We know there are also growing concerns about military cooperation between North Korea and Burma which we take very seriously," Clinton said.[36]
North Korea

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) acceded to the NPT in 1985 as a condition for the supply of a nuclear power station by the USSR. However, it delayed concluding its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, a process which should take only 18 months, until April 1992.

During that period, it brought into operation a small gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, natural-uranium (metal) fuelled "Experimental Power Reactor" of about 25 MWt (5 MWe), based on the UK Magnox design. While this was a well-suited design to start a wholly indigenous nuclear reactor development, it also exhibited all the features of a small plutonium production reactor for weapons purposes. North Korea also made substantial progress in the construction of two larger reactors designed on the same principles, a prototype of about 200 MWt (50 MWe), and a full-scale version of about 800 MWt (200 MWe). They made only slow progress; construction halted on both in 1994 and has not resumed. Both reactors have degraded considerably since that time and would take significant efforts to refurbish.

In addition it completed and commissioned a reprocessing plant that makes the Magnox spent nuclear fuel safe, recovering uranium and plutonium. That plutonium, if the fuel was only irradiated to a very low burn-up, would have been in a form very suitable for weapons. Although all these facilities at Yongbyon were to be under safeguards, there was always the risk that at some stage, the DPRK would withdraw from the NPT and use the plutonium for weapons.

One of the first steps in applying NPT safeguards is for the IAEA to verify the initial stocks of uranium and plutonium to ensure that all the nuclear materials in the country have been declared for safeguards purposes. While undertaking this work in 1992, IAEA inspectors found discrepancies which indicated that the reprocessing plant had been used more often than the DPRK had declared, which suggested that the DPRK could have weapons-grade plutonium which it had not declared to the IAEA. Information passed to the IAEA by a Member State (as required by the IAEA) supported that suggestion by indicating that the DPRK had two undeclared waste or other storage sites.

In February 1993 the IAEA called on the DPRK to allow special inspections of the two sites so that the initial stocks of nuclear material could be verified. The DPRK refused, and on 12 March announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT (three months' notice is required). In April 1993 the IAEA Board concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and reported the matter to the UN Security Council. In June 1993 the DPRK announced that it had "suspended" its withdrawal from the NPT, but subsequently claimed a "special status" with respect to its safeguards obligations. This was rejected by IAEA.

Once the DPRK's non-compliance had been reported to the UN Security Council, the essential part of the IAEA's mission had been completed. Inspections in the DPRK continued, although inspectors were increasingly hampered in what they were permitted to do by the DPRK's claim of a "special status". However, some 8,000 corroding fuel rods associated with the experimental reactor have remained under close surveillance.

Following bilateral negotiations between the United States and the DPRK, and the conclusion of the Agreed Framework in October 1994, the IAEA has been given additional responsibilities. The agreement requires a freeze on the operation and construction of the DPRK's plutonium production reactors and their related facilities, and the IAEA is responsible for monitoring the freeze until the facilities are eventually dismantled. The DPRK remains uncooperative with the IAEA verification work and has yet to comply with its safeguards agreement.

While Iraq was defeated in a war, allowing the UN the opportunity to seek out and destroy its nuclear weapons programme as part of the cease-fire conditions, the DPRK was not defeated, nor was it vulnerable to other measures, such as trade sanctions. It can scarcely afford to import anything, and sanctions on vital commodities, such as oil, would either be ineffective or risk provoking war.[citation needed]

Ultimately, the DPRK was persuaded to stop what appeared to be its nuclear weapons programme in exchange, under the agreed framework, for about US$5 billion in energy-related assistance. This included two 1000 MWe light water nuclear power reactors based on an advanced U.S. System-80 design.

In January 2003 the DPRK withdrew from the NPT. In response, a series of discussions among the DPRK, the United States, and China, a series of six-party talks (the parties being the DPRK, the ROK, China, Japan, the United States and Russia) were held in Beijing; the first beginning in April 2004 concerning North Korea's weapons program.

On 10 January 2005, North Korea declared that it was in the possession of nuclear weapons. On 19 September 2005, the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks ended with a joint statement in which North Korea agreed to end its nuclear programs and return to the NPT in exchange for diplomatic, energy and economic assistance. However, by the end of 2005 the DPRK had halted all six-party talks because the United States froze certain DPRK international financial assets such as those in a bank in Macau.

On 9 October 2006, North Korea announced that it has performed its first-ever nuclear weapon test. On 18 December 2006, the six-party talks finally resumed. On 13 February 2007, the parties announced "Initial Actions" to implement the 2005 joint statement including shutdown and disablement of North Korean nuclear facilities in exchange for energy assistance. Reacting to UN sanctions imposed after missile tests in April 2009, North Korea withdrew from the six-party talks, restarted its nuclear facilities and conducted a second nuclear test on 25 May 2009.

See also: North Korea and weapons of mass destruction and Six-party talks
Russia

Security of nuclear weapons in Russia remains a matter of concern. According to high-ranking Russian SVR defector Tretyakov, he had a meeting with two Russian businessman representing a state-created C-W corporation in 1991. They came up with a project of destroying large quantities of chemical wastes collected from Western countries at the island of Novaya Zemlya (a test place for Soviet nuclear weapons) using an underground nuclear blast. The project was rejected by Canadian representatives, but one of the businessmen told Tretyakov that he keeps his own nuclear bomb at his dacha outside Moscow. Tretyakov thought that man was insane, but the "businessmen" (Vladimir K. Dmitriev) replied: "Do not be so naive. With economic conditions the way they are in Russia today, anyone with enough money can buy a nuclear bomb. It's no big deal really".[37]
South Africa

In 1991, South Africa acceded to the NPT, concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and submitted a report on its nuclear material subject to safeguards. At the time, the state had a nuclear power programme producing nearly 10% of the country's electricity, whereas Iraq and North Korea only had research reactors.

The IAEA's initial verification task was complicated by South Africa's announcement that between 1979 and 1989 it built and then dismantled a number of nuclear weapons. South Africa asked the IAEA to verify the conclusion of its weapons programme. In 1995 the IAEA declared that it was satisfied all materials were accounted for and the weapons programme had been terminated and dismantled.

South Africa has signed the NPT, and now holds the distinction of being the only known state to have indigenously produced nuclear weapons, and then verifiably dismantled them.[38]
Syria
Main article: Syria and weapons of mass destruction

On September 6, 2007, Israel bombed an officially unidentified site in Syria which it later asserted was a nuclear reactor under construction (see Operation Orchard).[39] The alleged reactor was not asserted to be operational and it was not asserted that nuclear material had been introduced into it.[17] Syria said the site was a military site and was not involved in any nuclear activities.[17] The IAEA requested Syria to provide further access to the site and any other locations where the debris and equipment from the building had been stored.[17] Syria denounced what it called the Western "fabrication and forging of facts" in regards to the incident.[40] IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei criticized the strikes and deplored that information regarding the matter had not been shared with his agency earlier.[41]
United States cooperation on nuclear weapons with the United Kingdom

The United States has given the UK considerable assistance with nuclear weapon design and construction since the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement. In 1974 a CIA proliferation assessment noted that "In many cases [Britain's sensitive technology in nuclear and missile fields] is based on technology received from the United States and could not legitimately be passed on without U.S. permission."[42]

The U.S. President authorized the transfer of "nuclear weapon parts" to the UK between at least the years 1975 to 1996.[43][44] The UK National Audit Office noted that most of the UK Trident warhead development and production expenditure was incurred in the United States, which would supply "certain warhead-related components".[45][46] Some of the fissile materials for the UK Trident warhead were purchased from the United States.[46] Declassified U.S. Department of Energy documents indicate the UK Trident warhead system was involved in non-nuclear design activities alongside the U.S. W76 nuclear warhead fitted in some U.S. Navy Trident missiles,[47] leading the Federation of American Scientists to speculate that the UK warhead may share design information from the W76.[48]

Under the Mutual Defence Agreement 5.37 tonnes of UK-produced plutonium was sent to the United States in return for 6.7 kg of tritium and 7.5 tonnes of highly enriched uranium over the period 1960–1979. A further 0.47 tonne of plutonium was swapped between the UK and United States for reasons that remain classified.[49] Some of the UK produced plutonium was used in 1962 by the United States for a nuclear weapon test of reactor-grade plutonium .[50]

The United States has supplied nuclear weapon delivery systems to support the UK nuclear forces since before the signing of the NPT. The renewal of this agreement is due to take place through the second decade of the 21st century. [4] [5]
Arguments in favor of proliferation
Main article: Nuclear peace

There has been much debate in the academic study of International Security as to the advisability of proliferation. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Gen. Pierre Marie Gallois of France, an adviser to Charles DeGaulle, argued in books like The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age (1961) that mere possession of a nuclear arsenal, what the French called the force de frappe, was enough to ensure deterrence, and thus concluded that the spread of nuclear weapons could increase international stability.

Some very prominent neo-realist scholars, such as Kenneth Waltz, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, and John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, continue to argue along the lines of Gallois (though these scholars rarely acknowledge their intellectual debt to Gallois and his contemporaries). Specifically, these scholars advocate some forms of nuclear proliferation, arguing that it will decrease the likelihood of war, especially in troubled regions of the world. Aside from the majority opinion which opposes proliferation in any form, there are two schools of thought on the matter: those, like Mearsheimer, who favor selective proliferation,[51] and those such as Waltz, who advocate a laissez-faire attitude to programs like North Korea's.
Total proliferation

In embryo, Waltz argues that the logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD) should work in all security environments, regardless of historical tensions or recent hostility. He sees the Cold War as the ultimate proof of MAD logic – the only occasion when enmity between two Great Powers did not result in military conflict. This was, he argues, because nuclear weapons promote caution in decision-makers. Neither Washington nor Moscow would risk nuclear Armageddon to advance territorial or power goals, hence a peaceful stalemate ensued (Waltz and Sagan (2003), p. 24). Waltz believes there to be no reason why this effect would not occur in all circumstances.
Selective proliferation

John Mearsheimer would not support Waltz's optimism in the majority of potential instances; however, he has argued for nuclear proliferation as policy in certain places, such as post–Cold War Europe. In two famous articles, Professor Mearsheimer opines that Europe is bound to return to its pre–Cold War environment of regular conflagration and suspicion at some point in the future. He advocates arming both Germany and the Ukraine with nuclear weaponry in order to achieve a balance of power between these states in the east and France/Britain in the west. If this does not occur, he is certain that war will eventually break out on the European continent (Mearsheimer (1990), pp. 5–56 and (1993), pp. 50–66).

Another separate argument against Waltz's open proliferation and in favor of Mearsheimer's selective distribution is the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Some countries included in the aforementioned laissez-faire distribution could predispose the transfer of nuclear materials or a bomb falling into the hands of groups not affiliated with any governments. Such countries would not have the political will or ability to safeguard attempts at devices being transferred to a third party. Not being deterred by self-annihilation, terrorism groups could push forth their own nuclear agendas or be used as shadow fronts to carry out the attack plans by mentioned unstable governments.
Arguments against both positions

There are numerous arguments presented against both selective and total proliferation, generally targeting the very neorealist assumptions (such as the primacy of military security in state agendas, the weakness of international institutions, and the long-run unimportance of economic integration and globalization to state strategy) its proponents tend to make. With respect to Mearsheimer's specific example of Europe, many economists and neoliberals argue that the economic integration of Europe through the development of the European Union has made war in most of the European continent so disastrous economically so as to serve as an effective deterrent. Constructivists take this one step further, frequently arguing that the development of EU political institutions has led or will lead to the development of a nascent European identity, which most states on the European continent wish to partake in to some degree or another, and which makes all states within or aspiring to be within the EU regard war between them as unthinkable.

As for Waltz, the general opinion is that most states are not in a position to safely guard against nuclear use, that he underestimates the long-standing antipathy in many regions, and that weak states will be unable to prevent – or will actively provide for – the disastrous possibility of nuclear terrorism. Waltz has dealt with all of these objections at some point in his work; though to many, he has not adequately responded (Betts (2000)).

The Learning Channel documentary Doomsday: "On The Brink" illustrated 40 years of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons accidents. Even the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident demonstrated a potential scenario in which Russian democratization and military downsizing at the end of the Cold War did not eliminate the danger of accidental nuclear war through command and control errors. After asking: might a future Russian ruler or renegade Russian general be tempted to use nuclear weapons to make foreign policy? the documentary writers revealed a greater danger of Russian security over its nuclear stocks, but especially the ultimate danger of human nature to want the ultimate weapon of mass destruction to exercise political and military power. Future world leaders might not understand how close the Soviets, Russians, and Americans were to doomsday, how easy it all seemed because apocalypse was avoided for a mere 40 years between rivals, politicians not terrorists, who loved their children and did not want to die, against 30,000 years of human prehistory. History and military experts agree that proliferation can be slowed, but never stopped (technology cannot be uninvented).[52]
Proliferation begets proliferation

Proliferation begets proliferation is a concept described by Scott Sagan in his article, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?". This concept can be described as a strategic chain reaction. If one state produces a nuclear weapon it creates almost a domino effect within the region. States in the region will seek to acquire nuclear weapons to balance or eliminate the security threat. Sagan describes this reaction best in his article when he states, “Every time one state develops nuclear weapons to balance against its main rival, it also creates a nuclear threat to another region, which then has to initiate its own nuclear weapons program to maintain its national security” (Sagan, pg. 70). Going back through history we can see how this has taken place. When the United States demonstrated that it had nuclear power capabilities after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Russians started to develop their program in preparation for the Cold War. With the Russian military buildup, France and Great Britain perceived this as a security threat and therefore they pursued nuclear weapons (Sagan, pg 71).
Nuclear apartheid
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The effective prohibition on nuclear proliferation has been characterised as a form of technological apartheid, as only a select few states (particularly the member-nations of the United Nations Security Council) are able to acquire nuclear technology and that they can use their power to prevent other states from research and development of nuclear technology. In theory, only states that are allied with states that already have nuclear power would be able to acquire nuclear technology themselves.
Iran

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been a frequent critic of the concept of nuclear apartheid as it has been put into practice by several countries, particularly the United States. In an interview with CNN's Christiane Amanpour, Ahmadinejad said that Iran was "against 'nuclear apartheid,' which means some have the right to possess it, use the fuel, and then sell it to another country for 10 times its value. We're against that. We say clean energy is the right of all countries. But also it is the duty and the responsibility of all countries, including ours, to set up frameworks to stop the proliferation of it." Hours after that interview, he spoke passionately in favor of Iran's right to develop nuclear technology, claiming the nation should have the same liberties.[53]

Iran is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and claims that any work done in regards to nuclear technology is related only to civilian uses, which is acceptable under the treaty.[54] Iran violated the treaty by performing uranium-enrichment in secret, after which the United Nations Security Council ordered Iran to stop all uranium-enrichment.[55]
India

India has also been discussed in the context of nuclear apartheid. India has consistently attempted to pass measures that would call for full international disarmament, however they have not succeeded due to protests from those states that already have nuclear weapons. In light of this, India viewed nuclear weapons as a necessary right for all nations as long as certain states were still in possession of nuclear weapons. India stated that nuclear issues were directly related to national security.

Years before India's first underground nuclear test in 1998, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was passed. Some have argued that coercive language was used in an attempt to persuade India to sign the treaty, which was pushed for heavily by neighboring China.[56] India viewed the treaty as a means for countries that already had nuclear weapons, primarily the five nations of the United Nations Security Council, to keep their weapons while ensuring that no other nations could develop them.[57]

6.
Radiological Weapons

It is feared that a terrorist group could detonate a radiological or "dirty bomb." A "dirty bomb" is composed of any radioactive source and a conventional explosive. The radioactive material is dispersed by the detonation of the explosive. Detonation of such a weapon is not as powerful as a nuclear blast, but can produce considerable radioactive fallout. There are other radiological weapons called radiological exposure devices where an explosive is not necessary. A radiological weapon may be very appealing to terrorist groups as it is highly successful in instilling fear and panic amongst a population (particularly because of the threat of radiation poisoning), and would contaminate the immediate area for some period of time, disrupting attempts to repair the damage and subsequently inflicting significant economic losses.

Nuclear weapons materials on the black market are a global concern,[16][17] and there is concern about the possible detonation of a small, crude nuclear weapon by a terrorist group in a major city, with significant loss of life and property.[18][19]

According to leaked diplomatic documents, al-Qaeda is on the verge of producing radiological weapons, after sourcing nuclear material and recruiting rogue scientists to build "dirty bombs".[20]
Terrorist Groups

Al-Qaeda, along with some North Caucasus terrorist groups that seek to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Russia, have consistently stated they seek nuclear weapons and have tried to acquire them.[9] Al-Qaeda has sought nuclear weapons for almost two decades by attempting to purchase stolen nuclear material and weapons and has sought nuclear expertise on numerous occasions. Osama bin Laden has stated that the acquisition of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction is a “religious duty.”[21] While pressure from a wide range of counter-terrorist activity has hampered Al-Qaeda’s ability to manage such a complex project, there is no sign that it has jettisoned its goals of acquiring fissile material. Statements made as recently as 2008 indicate that Al-Qaeda’s nuclear ambitions are still very strong.[9]

North Caucasus terrorists have attempted to seize a nuclear submarine armed with nuclear weapons. They have also engaged in reconnaissance activities on nuclear storage facilities and have repeatedly threatened to sabotage nuclear facilities. Similar to Al-Qaeda, these groups’ activities have been hampered by counter-terrorism activity; nevertheless they remain committed to launching such a devastating attack within Russia.[9]

The Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo, which used nerve gas to attack a Tokyo subway in 1995, has also tried to acquire nuclear weapons. However, according to nuclear terrorism researchers at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, there is no evidence that they continue to do so.[9]
Alleged Nuclear Terrorism and Theft of Material

There have been 18 incidences of theft or loss of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[21]
Security specialist Shaun Gregory argued in an article that terrorists have attacked Pakistani nuclear facilities three times in the recent past; twice in 2007 and once in 2008.[22]
In November 2007, burglars with unknown intentions infiltrated the Pelindaba nuclear research facility near Pretoria, South Africa. The burglars escaped without acquiring any of the uranium held at the facility.[23][24]
In June 2007, the Federal Bureau of Investigation released to the press the name of Adnan Gulshair el Shukrijumah, allegedly the operations leader for developing tactical plans for detonating nuclear bombs in several American cities simultaneously.[25]
In November 2006, MI5 warned that al-Qaida were planning on using nuclear weapons against cities in the United Kingdom by obtaining the bombs via clandestine means.[26]
In February 2006, Oleg Khinsagov of Russia was arrested in Georgia, along with three Georgian accomplices, with 79.5 grams of 89 percent enriched HEU.[21]
The Alexander Litvinenko poisoning with radioactive polonium "represents an ominous landmark: the beginning of an era of nuclear terrorism," according to Andrew J. Patterson.[27]
In June 2002, U.S. citizen Jose Padilla was arrested for allegedly planning a radiological attack on the city of Chicago; however, he was never charged with such conduct. He was instead convicted of charges that he conspired to "murder, kidnap and maim" people overseas.

Pakistan

After several incidents in Pakistan in which terrorists attacked three of its military nuclear facilities, it became clear that there emerged a serious danger that they would gain access to the country’s nuclear arsenal, according to a journal published by the US Military Academy at West Point.[28] In January 2010, it was revealed that the US army was training a specialised unit "to seal off and snatch back" Pakistani nuclear weapons in the event that militants would obtain a nuclear device or materials that could make one. Pakistan supposedly possesses about 80 nuclear warheads. US officials refused to speak on the record about the American safety plans.[29]

A study by Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University titled "Securing the Bomb 2010," found that Pakistan's stockpile "faces a greater threat from Islamic extremists seeking nuclear weapons than any other nuclear stockpile on earth."[30]

According to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former investigator with the CIA and the US Department of Energy, there is "a greater possibility of a nuclear meltdown in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world. The region has more violent extremists than any other, the country is unstable, and its arsenal of nuclear weapons is expanding."[31]

Nuclear weapons expert David Albright and author of "Peddling Peril" has also expressed concerns that Pakistan's stockpile may not be secure despite assurances by both Pakistan and U.S. government. He stated that Pakistan "has had many leaks from its program of classified information and sensitive nuclear equipment, and so you have to worry that it could be acquired in Pakistan," [32]

A 2010 study by the Congressional Research Service titled 'Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues' noted that even though Pakistan had taken several steps to enhance nuclear security in recent years, "instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question."[33]
United States

President Barack Obama has reviewed Homeland Security policy and concluded that "attacks using improvised nuclear devices ... pose a serious and increasing national security risk".[34] In their presidential contest, President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry both agreed that the most serious danger facing the United States is the possibility that terrorists could obtain a nuclear bomb.[35] Most nuclear-weapon analysts agree that "building such a device would pose few technological challenges to reasonably competent terrorists". The main barrier is acquiring highly enriched uranium.[36]

Despite a number of claims,[37][38] there is no credible evidence that any terrorist group has yet succeeded in obtaining a nuclear bomb or the materials needed to make one.[35][39] In 2004, Graham Allison, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Clinton administration, wrote that “on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not".[40] However, in 2004, Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information stated: "I wouldn't be at all surprised if nuclear weapons are used over the next 15 or 20 years, first and foremost by a terrorist group that gets its hands on a Russian nuclear weapon or a Pakistani nuclear weapon".[19] In 2006, Robert Gallucci, Dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, estimated that, “it is more likely than not that al-Qaeda or one of its affiliates will detonate a nuclear weapon in a U.S. city within the next five to ten years."[40]

Detonation of a nuclear weapon in a major U.S. city could kill more than 500,000 people and cause more than a trillion dollars in damage.[18][19] Hundreds of thousands could die from fallout, the resulting fires and collapsing buildings. In this scenario, uncontrolled fires would burn for days and emergency services and hospitals would be completely overwhelmed.[35][41][42]

The Obama administration will focus on reducing the risk of high-consequence, non-traditional nuclear threats. Nuclear security is to be strengthened by enhancing "nuclear detection architecture and ensuring that our own nuclear materials are secure," and by "establishing well-planned, well-rehearsed, plans for co-ordinated response."[34] According to senior Pentagon officials, the United States will make "thwarting nuclear-armed terrorists a central aim of American strategic nuclear planning."[43] Nuclear attribution is another strategy being pursued to counter terrorism. Led by the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center, attribution would allow the government to determine the likely source of nuclear material used in the event of a nuclear attack. This would prevent terrorist groups, and any states willing to help them, from being able to pull off a covert attack without assurance of retaliation.[44]

In July 2010 medical personnel from the U.S. Army practiced the techniques they would use to treat people injured by an atomic blast. The exercises were carried out at a training center in Indiana, and were set up to "simulate the aftermath of a small nuclear bomb blast, set off in a U.S. city by terrorists."[45]
Recovering Lost Weapons and Material

In 2004, the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) was established in order to consolidate nuclear stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, and assemble nuclear weapons at fewer locations.[46] Additionally, the GTRI converted HEU fuels to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels, which has prevented their use in making a nuclear bomb. HEU that has not been converted to LEU has been shipped back to secure sites, while amplified security measures have taken hold around vulnerable nuclear facilities.[47]

In August 2002, the United States launched a program to track and secure enriched uranium from 24 Soviet-style reactors in 16 countries, in order to reduce the risk of the materials falling into the hands of terrorists or "rogue states". The first such operation was Project Vinca, "a multinational, public-private effort to remove nuclear material from a poorly-secured Yugoslav research institute." The project has been hailed as "a nonproliferation success story" with the "potential to inform broader 'global cleanout' efforts to address one of the weakest links in the nuclear nonproliferation chain: insufficiently secured civilian nuclear research facilities."[48]

The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), which is also known as the Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction, is a 1992 law sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar. The CTR established a program that gave the U.S. Department of Defense a direct stake in securing loose fissile material inside the since-dissolved USSR. According to Graham Allison, director of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, this law is a major reason why not a single nuclear weapon has been discovered outside the control of Russia’s nuclear custodians.[49]

7.
Before 1950s

Clarence Madison Dally (1865–1904) - No INES level - New Jersey - Overexposure of laboratory worker
Various dates - No INES level - France - Overexposure of scientists
Marie Curie (1867–1934) was a Polish-French physicist and chemist. She was a pioneer in the early field of radioactivity, later becoming the first two-time Nobel laureate and the only person with Nobel Prizes in physics and chemistry. Her death, at age 67, in 1934 was from aplastic anemia due to massive exposure to radiation in her work,[1] much of which was carried out in a shed with no proper safety measures being taken, as the damaging effects of hard radiation were not generally understood at that time. She was known to carry test tubes full of radioactive isotopes in her pocket, and to store them in her desk drawer, resulting in massive exposure to radiation. She was known to remark on the pretty blue-green light the metals gave off in the dark. Because of their levels of radioactivity, her papers from the 1890s are considered too dangerous to handle. Even her cookbook is highly radioactive. They are kept in lead-lined boxes, and those who wish to consult them must wear protective clothing.[2]
Various dates - No INES level - various locations - Overexposure of workers
Luminescent radium was used to paint watches and other items that glowed. The most famous incident is the Radium girls of Orange, New Jersey where a large number of workers got radiation poisoning. Other towns including Ottawa, Illinois experienced contamination of homes and other structures and became Superfund cleanup sites.
Various dates - No INES Level - Colorado, USA - Contamination
Radium mining and manufacturing left a number of streets in the state's capital and largest city of Denver contaminated.[3]
1927–1930 - No INES Level - USA - Radium poisoning
Eben Byers ingests almosts 1400 bottles of Radithor, a radioactive patent medicine, leading to his death in 1932. He is buried in Allegheny Cemetery in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in a lead-lined coffin.[4]

1950s

March, 1957 - No INES level - Houston, Texas, USA - Exposure of workers
Two employees of a company licensed by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to encapsulate sources for radiographic cameras received radiation burns after being exposed to Ir192(Iridium-192) powder. The incident was reported in Look Magazine in 1961, but investigations published by the Mayo Clinic that same year found few of the radiological injuries claimed in widespread press reports.

1970s

1977 — Dounreay, UK — - release of nuclear material

An explosion at the research establishment causes a mixture of unrecorded waste to be leaked from a waste disposal shaft.[5]

July 16, 1979 – Church Rock, New Mexico – release of radioactive mine tailings

An earth/clay dike of an United Nuclear Corporation's uranium mill's settling/evaporating pond failed. The broken dam released 100 million U.S. gallons (380,000 m³) of radioactive liquids and 1,100 short tons (1,000 metric tonnes) of solid wastes, which settled out up to 70 miles (100 km) down the Puerco River[6] and also near a Navaho farming community that uses surface waters. The pond was past its planned and licensed life and had been filled two feet (60 cm) deeper than design, despite evident cracking.

See also: Church Rock uranium mill spill

September 29, 1979 - Tritium leak at American Atomics in Tucson, Arizona at the public school across the street from the plant. $300,000 worth of food was found to be contaminated; the chocolate cake had 56 nCi/L. By contrast, the EPA safety limit for drinking water is 20 nCi/L (740 Bq/L) based on consumption of 2 liters per day.[7][8][9][10]

1980s

July 1981 – Lycoming, Nine Mile Point, New York. An overloaded wastewater tank was deliberately flushed into the waste building sub-basement, filling it to a depth of four feet. This caused some of the approximately 150 55-gallon drums that were stored there to overturn and spill their contents. Fifty thousand U.S. gallons (190 m³) of lesser-contaminated water was discharged into Lake Ontario.[11]
1982 – "International Nutronics" of Dover, New Jersey spilled an unknown quantity of radioactive cobalt solution used to treat gems for color, modify chemicals, and sterilize food and medical supplies. The solution spilled into the Dover sewer system and forced the closure of the plant. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was only informed of the accident ten months later by a whistleblower. In 1986 International Nutronics was fined $35,000 and one of its top executives was sentenced to probation for failure to report the spill.[12][13][14]
1982 – Radioactive steel scavenged from a nuclear reactor was melted into rebar and used in the construction of apartment buildings in northern Taiwan, mostly in Taipei, from 1982 through 1984. Over 2,000 apartment units and shops were suspected as having been built with the materials.[15] At least 10,000 people are known to have been exposed to long-term low-level irradiation as a result, with at least 40 deaths due to cancer.[16] In 1985, the Taiwanese Atomic Energy Commission covered up the discovery of high levels of radiation in an apartment building by blaming a dentist operating an imaging machine. However, in the summer of 1992, a utility worker for the Taiwanese state-run electric utility Taipower brought a Geiger counter to his apartment to learn more about the device, and discovered that his apartment was contaminated.[16] Despite awareness of the problem, owners of some of the buildings known to be contaminated have continued to rent apartments out to tenants (in part because selling the units is illegal), and as of at least 2003 and likely to the present, no coordinated effort has been made to track down the remaining affected structures. The Taiwan AEC has harassed medical researchers looking into the consequences.[16] Some researchers from Taiwan claimed that the gamma rays from the cobalt-60 had a beneficial effect upon the health of the tenants,[17][18] but their results proved to be based on methodological errors[19][20]
December 6, 1983 – Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, A local resident salvaged materials from a discarded radiation therapy machine carrying 6,000 pellets of 60Co. The dismantling and transport of the material led to severe contamination of his truck; when the truck was scrapped, it in turn contaminated another 5,000 metric tonnes of steel with an estimated 300 Ci (11 TBq) of activity. This material was sold for kitchen or restaurant table legs and building materials, some of which was sent to the U.S. and Canada; the incident was discovered when a truck delivering contaminated building materials months later to the Los Alamos National Laboratory accidentally drove through a radiation monitoring station. Contamination was later measured on the roads that were used to transport the original damaged radiation source. In some cases pellets were actually found embedded in the roadway. In the state of Sinaloa, 109 houses were condemned due to contaminated building material. This incident prompted the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Customs Service to install radiation detection equipment at all major border crossings.[21]
1985 to 1987, Therac-25 was a radiation therapy machine produced by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. It was involved with at least six known accidents between 1985 and 1987, in which patients were given massive overdoses of radiation, which were in some cases on the order of hundreds of Grays. At least five patients died of the overdoses. These accidents highlighted the dangers of software control of safety-critical systems.
September 13, 1987 – In the Goiânia accident, scavengers broke open a radiation-therapy machine in an abandoned clinic of Goiânia, Brazil. They sold the kilocurie (40 TBq) 137Cs source as a glowing curiosity. Two hundred and fifty were contaminated; four died.[22]
June 6, 1988 – "Radiation Sterilizers" in Decatur, Georgia, reported a leak of 137Cs at their facility. Seventy thousand medical supply containers and milk cartons were recalled. Ten employees were exposed, and three "had enough on them that they contaminated other surfaces," including their homes and cars.[23]
5 February 1989 Three workers were exposed to gamma rays from the 60Co source in a medical products irradiation plant in San Salvador, El Salvador. The most exposed person died while another lost a limb. This was a human error accident where a person made the wrong choice to enter the irradiation room.[24]
In 1989, a small capsule containing highly radioactive caesium-137 was found inside the concrete wall in an apartment building in Kramatorsk, Ukraine. It is believed that the capsule, originally a part of a measurement device, was lost sometime during late 1970s and ended up mixed with gravel used to construct that building in 1980. By the time the capsule was discovered, 6 residents of the building died from leukemia and 17 more received varying doses of radiation.[25] See Kramatorsk nuclear poisoning incident.

1990s

June 24, 1990 – Soreq, Israel – An operator at a commercial irradiation facility bypassed the safety systems on the JS6500 sterilizer to clear a jam in the product conveyor area. The one to two minute exposure resulted in a whole body dose estimated at 10 Gy or more. He died 36 days later despite extensive medical care. See Fool Irradiation[26] for a discussion of this type of event.[27]
October 26, 1991 – Nesvizh, Belarus – An operator at an atomic sterilization facility bypassed the safety systems to clear a jammed conveyor. Upon entering the irradiation chamber he was exposed to an estimated whole body dose of 11 Gy, with some portions of the body receiving upwards of 20 Gy. Despite prompt intensive medical care, he died 113 days after the accident.[28]
August 31, 1994 – Commerce Township, Michigan – David Hahn's experimental reactor was discovered in his mother's back yard. The unshielded reactor exposed his neighborhood to 1,000 times the normal levels of background radiation.[29]
October 21, 1994 – a large 137Cs source was stolen by scrap metal scavengers in Tammiku, Estonia.[30]
May 1998 – Recycler Acerinox in Cádiz, Spain, unwittingly melted scrap metal containing radioactive sources; the radioactive cloud drifted all the way to Switzerland before being detected.[22][31] (See Acerinox accident.)
December 1998 – Istanbul, Turkey – two cobalt-60 teletherapy sources planned for export in 1993 were instead stored in a warehouse in Ankara, then moved to Istanbul, where a new owner sold them off as scrap metal. The buyers dismantled the containers, exposing themselves and others to ionizing radiation. Eighteen persons, including seven children, developed acute radiation syndrome. The exposed source was retrieved, but the other was still unaccounted for one year later.[32]
1999 – A road near Mrima Hill, Kenya was rebuilt using local materials later found to be radioactive. Some workers were exposed to excessive radiation, and many residents of the area were tested for exposure. 2,975 tons[vague] of roadway material were to be dug up to eliminate the hazard.[33]

2000s

February 1, 2000 – Samut Prakan radiation accident: The radiation source of an expired teletherapy unit was purchased and transferred without registration, and stored in an unguarded parking lot without warning signs. [34] It was then stolen from a parking lot in Samut Prakarn, Thailand and dismantled in a junkyard for scrap metal. Workers completely removed the 60Co source from the lead shielding, and became ill shortly thereafter. The radioactive nature of the metal and the resulting contamination was not discovered until 18 days later. Seven injuries and three deaths were a result of this incident.[35]

August 2000 -March 2001; at the Instituto Oncologico Nacional of Panama, 28 patients receiving treatment for prostate cancer and cancer of the cervix receive lethal doses of radiations due to a modification in the protocol of measurement of radiation used without a verification test. The negligence, unique in its scope, was investigated by the IAT on date of 26 May-1 June 2001.[36]

December 2000 – Three woodcutters in the nation of Georgia spent the night beside several "warm" canisters they found deep in the woods and were subsequently hospitalized with severe radiation burns. The canisters were found to contain concentrated 90Sr. The disposal team consisted of 25 men who were restricted to 40 seconds' worth of exposure each while transferring the canisters to lead-lined drums. The canisters are believed to have been components of radioisotope thermoelectric generators intended for use as generators for remote lighthouses and navigational beacons, part of a Soviet plan dating back to 1983.[37]

February 2001 – A medical accelerator at the Bialystok Oncology Center in Poland malfunctioned, resulting in five female patients receiving excessive doses of radiation while undergoing breast cancer treatment.[38] The incident was revealed when one of the patients complained of a painful radiation burn. In response, a local technician was called in to repair the device, but was unable to do so, and in fact caused further damage. Subsequently, competent authorities were notified, but as the apparatus had been tampered with, they were unable to ascertain the exact doses of radiation received by the patients (localized doses may have been in excess of 60 Gy). No deaths were reported as a result of this incident, although all affected patients had to receive skin grafts. The attending doctor was charged with criminal negligence, but in 2003 a district court ruled that she was not responsible for the incident. The hospital technician was fined.[39]

March 11, 2002 - INES Level 2 – A 2.5 metric tonne 60Co gamma source was transported from Cookridge Hospital, Leeds, UK, to Sellafield with defective shielding. As the radiation escaped from the package downwards into the ground, it is not thought that this event caused any injury or disease in either a human or an animal. This event was treated in a serious manner because the defense in depth type of protection for the source had been eroded. If the container had been tipped over in a road crash then a strong beam of gamma rays (83.5 Gy h-1) would have been aligned in a direction in which it would've been likely to irradiate humans. The company responsible for the transport of the source, AEA Technology plc, was fined £250,000 by a British court.

2003 – Cape of Navarin, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Russia. A radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) located on the Arctic shore was discovered in a highly degraded state. The level of the exposition dose at the generator surface was as high as 15 R/h; in July 2004 a second inspection of the same RTG showed that gamma radiation emission had risen to 87 R/h and that 90Sr had begun to leak into the environment.[3] In November 2003, a completely dismantled RTG located on the Island of Yuzhny Goryachinsky in the Kola Bay was found. The generator's radioactive heat source was found on the ground near the shoreline in the northern part of the island.[4]
September 10, 2004 – Yakutia, Russia. Two radioisotope thermoelectric generators were dropped 50 meters onto the tundra at Zemlya Bunge island during an airlift when the helicopter flew into heavy weather. According to the nuclear regulators, the impact compromised the RTGs' external radiation shielding. At a height of 10 meters above the impact site, the intensity of gamma radiation was measured at 4 mSv/hr. [5]
2005 – Dounreay, UK. In September, the site's cementation plant was closed when 266 liters of radioactive reprocessing residues were spilled inside containment. [6][7]. In October, another of the site's reprocessing laboratories was closed down after nose-blow tests of eight workers tested positive for trace radioactivity. [8]
November 3, 2005 – Haddam, Connecticut, USA. The Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company reported that water containing quantities (below safe drinking water limits) of 137Cs, 60Co, 90Sr, and 3H leaked from a spent fuel pond. Independent measurements and review of the incident by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission are due to begin November 7, 2005. [9][10][11]
March 11, 2006 – at Fleurus, Belgium, an operator working for the company Sterigenics [12], at a medical equipment sterilization site, entered the irradiation room and remained there for 20 seconds. The room contained a source of 60Co which was not in the pool of water.[13] Three weeks later, the worker suffered of symptoms typical of an irradiation (vomiting, loss of hair, fatigue). One estimate that he was exposed to a dose of between 4.4 and 4.8 Gy due to a malfunction of the control-command hydraulic system maintaining the radioactive source in the pool. The operator spent over one month in a specialized hospital before going back home. To protect workers, the federal nuclear control agency AFCN and private auditors from AVN recommended Sterigenics to install a redundant system of security. It is an accident of level 4 on the INES scale.[14][15][16]
May 5, 2006 – An accidental release of 131I gas at the Prairie Island Nuclear Power Plant in Minnesota exposed approximately one hundred plant workers to low-level radiation. Most workers received 10 to 20 millirads (0.1-0.2 mSv), about the same as a dental X-ray. The workers were wearing protective gear at the time, and no radiation leaked outside the plant to the surrounding area. [17]
Lisa Norris died in 2006 after having been given an overdose of radiation as a result of human error during treatment for a brain tumor at Beatson Oncology Centre in Glasgow (Scotland).[18][19][20]. The Scottish Government have published an independent investigation of this case.[21]. The intended treatment for Lisa Norris was 35 Gy to be delivered by a LINAC machine to the whole of the central nervous system to be delivered in twenty equal fractions of 1.75 Gy, which was to be followed by 19.8 Gy to be delivered to the tumor only (in eleven fractions of 1.8 Gy). In the first phase of the treatment a 58% overdose occurred, and the CNS of Lisa Norris suffered a dose of 55.5 Gy. The second phase of the treatment was abandoned on medical advice, after having lived for some time after the overdose Lisa Norris passed away.
August 23–24, 2008 — INES Level 3 - Fleurus, Belgium - Nuclear material leak

A gaseous leak of a radioisotope of iodine, 131I, was detected at a large medical radioisotope laboratory, Institut national des Radio-Eléments. Belgian authorities implemented restrictions on use of local farming produce within 5 km of the leak, when higher-than-expected levels of contamination was detected in local grass. The particular isotope of iodine has a half-life of 8 days [22] [23]. The European Commission sent out a warning over their ECURIE-alert system on the 29th of August.[40] The quantity of radioactivity released into the environment was estimated at 45 GBq I-131, which corresponds to a dose of 160 microsievert (effective dose) for a hypothetical person remaining permanently at the site's enclosure.[41]

January 23, 2008- A licensed Radiologic Technologist, Raven Knickerbocker, at Mad River Community Hospital in Arcata, California performed 151 CT scan slices on a single 3mm level on the head of a 23 month old child over a 65 minute period. The child suffered radiation burns (skin erythema) to much of his head. The hospital's nuclear health physicist estimated that the child received a localized dose possibly as high as 11Gy, later analysis concluded it was 7.5 Gy. An independent investigation of the child's blood found that he had severe chromosome abnormalities because of the exposure. The technologist was fired, and her license was permanently revoked on March 16, 2011 by the state of California, citing "gross negligence". [42] The hospital's radiology manager, Bruce Fleck, testified that Knickerbocker's conduct was "a rogue act of insanity".
February 2008-August 2009 - A software misconfiguration in a CT scanner used for brain perfusion scanning at Cedar Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles, California, resulted in 206 patients receiving radiation doses approximately 8 times higher than intended during an 18 month period starting in February, 2008. Some patients reported temporary hair loss and erythema. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has estimated that patients received doses between 3Gy and 4Gy.[43]

2010s

April 2010 - INES level 4 - A 35-year old man was hospitalized in New Delhi after handling radioactive scrap metal. Investigation led to the discovery of an amount of scrap metal containing Cobalt-60 in the New Delhi industrial district of Mayapuri. The 35-year old man later died from his injuries, while six others remained hospitalized.[44][45]

July 2010 - During a routine inspection at the Port of Genoa, on Italy's northwest coast, a cargo container from Saudi Arabia containing nearly 50,000 pounds of scrap copper was detected to be emitting gamma radiation at a rate of around 500 millisieverts per hour. After spending over a year in quarantine on Port grounds, Italian officials dissected the container using robots and discovered a rod of cobalt-60 nine inches long and one-third of an inch in diameter intermingled with the scrap. Officials suspected its provenance to be inappropriately disposed of medical or food-processing equipment. The rod was sent to Germany for further analysis, after which it was likely to be recycled.[46]

8.
1970s

17 April 1970 — Tonga Trench

The SNAP 27 radioisotope thermoelectric generator aboard the Lunar Module Aquarius reentered the Earth's atmosphere. The LM had been used as a "lifeboat" to help the Apollo 13 crew return to Earth after the Command Module lost electrical power. The vehicle was targeted for the Pacific Ocean to reduce the risk of contamination in the event the RTG broke up, but it is believed to have survived reentry and water impact intact. Periodic radiation checks of the area have found no signs of leakage.

22 March 1975 — Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant, AL, United States

A fire caused by careless technicians cut off many control circuits for two nuclear power reactors of the Tennessee Valley Authority at Browns Ferry Station in Alabama. The fire burned uncontrolled for 7.5 hours and the two operating GE nuclear reactors were at full power when the fire began. One of them went "dangerously out of control" for several hours and was not stabilized until a few hours after the fire was put out.[2] There was some concern about a meltdown, but this did not occur and there was no radioactive contamination.[3]

March 1977 — Toledo, OH, United States

An electromagnetic relief valve stuck open following a reactor scram at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant near Toledo, OH. The valve was noticed by operators, and the reactor, manufactured by Babcock & Wilcox, was only slightly damaged.[3]

1990s

27 December 1999 — Blayais Nuclear Power Plant, France

Flooding at the Blayais Nuclear Power Plant caused by a combination of high tides and a storm caused damage to equipment and failure of power supplies, leading to a Level 2 event on the International Nuclear Event Scale.

2000s

July, 2002 — Chapelcross nuclear power station, UK

UK Authorities blamed an incident at a Scottish nuclear plant on "procedural and hardware deficiencies". Fuel rods falling to the floor were deemed responsible for the incident.[4]

September and October, 2005 — Dounreay, UK

In September, the site's cementation plant was closed when 266 litres of radioactive reprocessing residues were spilled inside containment.[5] In October, another of the site's reprocessing laboratories was closed down after nose-blow tests of eight workers tested positive for trace radioactivity.[6]

July 25, 2006 -INES Level 2 – Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant, Sweden

Mains power lost to reactor 1 after an electrical fault. Two of four diesel generators fail, problems related to computer systems[7] (e.g. readings of core water levels) due to earlier electrical fault SCRAMed.

4 June 2008 — Krško Nuclear Power Plant, Slovenia – Loss of coolant

Emergency response system ECURIE (European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange) received an alert message following a loss of coolant accident at the Krsko Nuclear Power Plant.[8]

2010s
See also: 2011 Japanese nuclear accidents and Timeline of the Fukushima nuclear accidents

March 11–13, 2011 – INES Level needed, Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant, Japan – Turbine damage, possible radioactivity emergency
After the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami of March 11, a fire from the turbine section of the Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant following the earthquake was reported by Kyodo News.[9][10][11] The blaze was in a building housing the turbine, which is sited separately from the plant's reactor,[12] and was soon extinguished.[13]
On 13 March the lowest-level state of emergency was declared regarding the Onagawa plant by TEPCO, as radioactivity readings temporarily[14][15] exceeded allowed levels in the area of the plant.[16][17] TEPCO stated this was due to radiation from the Fukushima I nuclear accidents and not from the Onagawa plant itself.[18] Events are still developing.
March 11–13, 2011 – INES Level needed, Tōkai Nuclear Power Plant, Japan – Reactor cooling pump damage
Following the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami the number 2 reactor was one of eleven nuclear reactors to be shut down automatically.[19] It was reported on 14 March that a cooling system pump for the number 2 reactor had stopped working.[20] Japan Atomic Power Company stated that there was a second operational pump and cooling was working, but that two of three diesel generators used to power the cooling system were out of order.[21]

forum.politics.be laat geen langere lijstjes toe. Jammer.

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door maddox

Daar twijfelen we niet aan, en als het niet de sluiting van Doel 3 is, dan zal er wel iets anders zijn dat electriciteit een stuk duurder gaat maken. U luistert niet naar politici. Maar betalen zal U.

Ja, omdat kiezers als u vasthouden aan verroeste energietechnologieën en weigeren de triljardensubsidies daarvoor af te schaffen.

Maar goed, mijn kinderen zullen daar later hartelijk om lachen. Dat er effectief in mijn tijd mensen bestonden die tegen de goedkope, veilige, propere en efficiënte én hernieuwbare bronnen waren.

Een beetje zoals de stoomketeltypes die geen toekomst zagen in de verbrandingsmotor.

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door maddox

Iedere energiebron gelijk voor de wet.

Maar doe het dan eens, in plaats van het alleen te zeggen. Doen durft ge niet, want dan weet ge dat kernenergie, steenkool en gas niet kunnen concurreren.

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door maddox

Grootheidswaanzin. Met onze aantallen schijten en zeiken we ons naar de verdoemenis als soort.

En klimaatverandering, weeral grootheidswaanzin van U om de mens daar zo'n grote rol in te geven.

Wel wel, een klimaatontkenner, wie had dat nu toch gedacht na al wat we hier al lazen.

[C2C]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door maddox

Vele catastrophes? Geef eens een lijst.

U vraagt, wij draaien:

1.

Nuclear power plant accidents and incidents
with multiple fatalities and/or more than US$100 million in property damage, 1952-2011[5][14][15] Date Location Description Deaths Cost
(in millions
2006 $US) INES
level[16]
January 3, 1961 Idaho Falls, Idaho, United States Explosion at SL-1 prototype at the National Reactor Testing Station. All 3 operators were killed when a control rod was removed too far. 3 22 4
October 5, 1966 Frenchtown Charter Township, Michigan, United States Partial core meltdown of the Fermi 1 Reactor at the Enrico Fermi Nuclear Generating Station. No radiation leakage into the environment. 0
January 21, 1969 Lucens reactor, Vaud, Switzerland On January 21, 1969, it suffered a loss-of-coolant accident, leading to a partial core meltdown and massive radioactive contamination of the cavern, which was then sealed. 0 4
1975 Sosnovyi Bor, Leningrad Oblast, Russia There was reportedly a partial nuclear meltdown in Leningrad nuclear power plant reactor unit 1.
December 7, 1975 Greifswald, East Germany Electrical error causes fire in the main trough that destroys control lines and five main coolant pumps 0 443 3
January 5, 1976 Jaslovské Bohunice, Czechoslovakia Malfunction during fuel replacement. Fuel rod ejected from reactor into the reactor hall by coolant (CO2).[17] 2 4
February 22, 1977 Jaslovské Bohunice, Czechoslovakia Severe corrosion of reactor and release of radioactivity into the plant area, necessitating total decommission 0 1,700 4
March 28, 1979 Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, United States Loss of coolant and partial core meltdown due to operator errors. There is a small release of radioactive gases. See also Three Mile Island accident health effects. 0 2,400 5
September 15, 1984 Athens, Alabama, United States Safety violations, operator error, and design problems force a six year outage at Browns Ferry Unit 2. 0 110
March 9, 1985 Athens, Alabama, United States Instrumentation systems malfunction during startup, which led to suspension of operations at all three Browns Ferry Units 0 1,830
April 11, 1986 Plymouth, Massachusetts, United States Recurring equipment problems force emergency shutdown of Boston Edison’s Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant 0 1,001
April 26, 1986 Chernobyl, Ukrainian SSR Overheating, steam explosion, fire, and meltdown, necessitating the evacuation of 300,000 people from Chernobyl and dispersing radioactive material across Europe (see Chernobyl disaster effects) 56 direct; 4,000 cancer[18] 6,700 7
May 4, 1986 Hamm-Uentrop, Germany Experimental THTR-300 reactor releases small amounts of fission products (0.1 GBq Co-60, Cs-137, Pa-233) to surrounding area 0 267
March 31, 1987 Delta, Pennsylvania, United States Peach Bottom units 2 and 3 shutdown due to cooling malfunctions and unexplained equipment problems 0 400
December 19, 1987 Lycoming, New York, United States Malfunctions force Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation to shut down Nine Mile Point Unit 1 0 150
March 17, 1989 Lusby, Maryland, United States Inspections at Calvert Cliff Units 1 and 2 reveal cracks at pressurized heater sleeves, forcing extended shutdowns 0 120
March 1992 Sosnovyi Bor, Leningrad Oblast, Russia An accident at the Sosnovy Bor nuclear plant leaked radioactive gases and iodine into the air through a ruptured fuel channel.
February 20, 1996 Waterford, Connecticut, United States Leaking valve forces shutdown Millstone Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2, multiple equipment failures found 0 254
September 2, 1996 Crystal River, Florida, United States Balance-of-plant equipment malfunction forces shutdown and extensive repairs at Crystal River Unit 3 0 384
September 30, 1999 Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan Tokaimura nuclear accident killed two workers, and exposed one more to radiation levels above permissible limits. 2 54 4
February 16, 2002 Oak Harbor, Ohio, United States Severe corrosion of control rod forces 24-month outage of Davis-Besse reactor 0 143 3
August 9, 2004 Fukui Prefecture, Japan Steam explosion at Mihama Nuclear Power Plant kills 5 workers and injures 6 more 5 9 1
March 11, 2011 Fukushima, Japan A tsunami flooded and damaged the 5 active reactor plants drowning two workers. Loss of backup electrical power led to overheating, meltdowns, and evacuations.[19] One man died suddenly while carrying equipment during the clean-up. 3[20] 7[21]
Nuclear reactor attacks

Nuclear reactors become preferred targets during military conflict and, over the past three decades, have been repeatedly attacked during military air strikes, occupations, invasions and campaigns:[22]

Between 18 December 1977 and 13 June 1979 ETA carried out several attacks on Lemoniz Nuclear Power Plant in Spain while it was still under construction.
In September 1980, Iran bombed the Al Tuwaitha nuclear complex in Iraq.
In June 1981, an Israeli air strike completely destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear research facility.
On 8 January 1982, Umkhonto we Sizwe attacked Koeberg nuclear power plant in South Africa while it was still under construction.
Between 1984 and 1987, Iraq bombed Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant six times.
In Iraq in 1991, the U.S. bombed three nuclear reactors and an enrichment pilot facility.
In 1991, Iraq launched Scud missiles at Israel’s Dimona nuclear power plant.
In September 2003, Israel bombed a Syrian reactor under construction.[22]

Radiation and other accidents

Serious radiation and other accidents include:

1950s

February 13, 1950 : a Convair B-36B crashed in northern British Columbia after jettisoning a Mark IV atomic bomb. This was the first such nuclear weapon loss in history.
December 12, 1952: AECL Chalk River Laboratories, Chalk River, Ontario, Canada. Partial meltdown, about 10,000 Curies released. [10][11]
September 1957: a plutonium fire occurred at the Rocky Flats Plant, which resulted in the contamination of Building 71 and the release of plutonium into the atmosphere, causing US $818,600 in damage.
September 1957: Mayak nuclear waste storage tank explosion at Chelyabinsk. Two hundred plus fatalities, believed to be a conservative estimate; 270,000 people were exposed to dangerous radiation levels. Over thirty small communities had been removed from Soviet maps between 1958 and 1991.[23] (INES level 6).[16]
October 1957: Windscale fire, UK. Fire ignites plutonium piles and contaminates surrounding dairy farms.[5][24] An estimated 33 cancer deaths.[5][24]
March 1959: Santa Susana Field Laboratory, Los Angeles, California. Fire in a fuel processing facility.
July 1959: Santa Susana Field Laboratory, Los Angeles, California. Partial meltdown.

1960s

24 January 1961: the 1961 Goldsboro B-52 crash occurred near Goldsboro, North Carolina. A B-52 Stratofortress carrying two Mark 39 nuclear bombs broke up in mid-air, dropping its nuclear payload in the process.[25][26]
July 1961: soviet submarine K-19 accident. Eight fatalities and more than 30 people were over-exposed to radiation.[8]
March, 21 -August 1962: radiation accident in Mexico City, four fatalities.
1964, 1969: Santa Susana Field Laboratory, Los Angeles, California. Partial meltdowns.
1965 Philippine Sea A-4 crash, where a Skyhawk attack aircraft with a nuclear weapon fell into the sea.[27] The pilot, the aircraft, and the B43 nuclear bomb were never recovered.[28] It was not until the 1980s that the Pentagon revealed the loss of the one-megaton bomb.[29]
January 17, 1966: the 1966 Palomares B-52 crash occurred when a B-52G bomber of the USAF collided with a KC-135 tanker during mid-air refuelling off the coast of Spain. The KC-135 was completely destroyed when its fuel load ignited, killing all four crew members. The B-52G broke apart, killing three of the seven crew members aboard.[30] Of the four Mk28 type hydrogen bombs the B-52G carried,[31] three were found on land near Almer�*a, Spain. The non-nuclear explosives in two of the weapons detonated upon impact with the ground, resulting in the contamination of a 2-square-kilometer (490-acre) (0.78 square mile) area by radioactive plutonium. The fourth, which fell into the Mediterranean Sea, was recovered intact after a 2½-month-long search.[32]
January 21, 1968: the 1968 Thule Air Base B-52 crash involved a United States Air Force (USAF) B-52 bomber. The aircraft was carrying four hydrogen bombs when a cabin fire forced the crew to abandon the aircraft. Six crew members ejected safely, but one who did not have an ejection seat was killed while trying to bail out. The bomber crashed onto sea ice in Greenland, causing the nuclear payload to rupture and disperse, which resulted in widespread radioactive contamination.
May 1968: soviet submarine K-27 reactor near meltdown. 9 people died, 83 people were injured.[9]
January 1969: Lucens reactor in Switzerland undergoes partial core meltdown leading to massive radioactive contamination of a cavern.

1970s

July 1978: Anatoli Bugorski was working on U-70, the largest Soviet particle accelerator, when he accidentally exposed his head directly to the proton beam. He survived, despite suffering some long-term damage.
July 1979: Church Rock Uranium Mill Spill in New Mexico, USA, when United Nuclear Corporation's uranium mill tailings disposal pond breached its dam. Over 1,000 tons of radioactive mill waste and millions of gallons of mine effluent flowed into the Puerco River, and contaminants traveled downstream.[33]

1980s

March 1984: radiation accident in Morocco, eight fatalities.[11] 　
August 1985: soviet submarine K-431 accident. Ten fatalities and 49 other people suffered radiation injuries.[6]
October 1986: soviet submarine K-219 reactor almost had a meltdown. Sergei Preminin died after he manually lowered the control rods, and stopped the explosion. The submarine sank three days later.
September 1987: Goiania accident. Four fatalities, and following radiological screening of more than 100,000 people, it was ascertained that 249 people received serious radiation contamination.[12][34] In the cleanup operation, topsoil had to be removed from several sites, and several houses were demolished. All the objects from within those houses were removed and examined. Time magazine has identified the accident as one of the world's "worst nuclear disasters" and the International Atomic Energy Agency called it "one of the world's worst radiological incidents".[35][36]

1990s

December 1990: radiotherapy accident in Zaragoza. Eleven fatalities and 27 other patients were injured.[8]
April 1993: accident at the Tomsk-7 Reprocessing Complex, when a tank exploded while being cleaned with nitric acid. The explosion released a cloud of radioactive gas. (INES level 4).[16]
August — December 1996: radiotherapy accident in Costa Rica. Thirteen fatalities and 114 other patients received an overdose of radiation.[10]
September 1999: criticality accident at Tokai nuclear fuel plant (Japan)

2000s

January-February 2000: Samut Prakan radiation accident: three deaths and ten injuries resulted in Samut Prakarn when a radiation-therapy unit was dismantled.[13]
April 2010: Mayapuri radiological accident, India, one fatality.[13]

2010s

March 2011: Fukushima I nuclear accidents, Japan and the radioactive discharge at the Fukushima Daiichi Power Station[37]

Accident types

For a list of many of the most important accidents see the International Atomic Energy Agency site.[38]
Loss of coolant accident
Main article: Loss of coolant
See also: Nuclear meltdown and Design basis accident
Criticality accidents

A criticality accident (also sometimes referred to as an "excursion" or "power excursion") occurs when a nuclear chain reaction is accidentally allowed to occur in fissile material, such as enriched uranium or plutonium. The Chernobyl accident is an example of a criticality accident. This accident destroyed a reactor at the plant and left a large geographic area uninhabitable. In a smaller scale accident at Sarov a technician working with highly enriched uranium was irradiated while preparing an experiment involving a sphere of fissile material. The Sarov accident is interesting because the system remained critical for many days before it could be stopped, though safely located in a shielded experimental hall.[39] This is an example of a limited scope accident where only a few people can be harmed, while no release of radioactivity into the environment occurred. A criticality accident with limited off site release of both radiation (gamma and neutron) and a very small release of radioactivity occurred at Tokaimura in 1999 during the production of enriched uranium fuel.[40] Two workers died, a third was permanently injured, and 350 citizens were exposed to radiation.
Decay heat

Decay heat accidents are where the heat generated by the radioactive decay causes harm. In a large nuclear reactor, a loss of coolant accident can damage the core: for example, at Three Mile Island a recently shutdown (SCRAMed) PWR reactor was left for a length of time without cooling water. As a result the nuclear fuel was damaged, and the core partially melted. The removal of the decay heat is a significant reactor safety concern, especially shortly after shutdown. Failure to remove decay heat may cause the reactor core temperature to rise to dangerous levels and has caused nuclear accidents. The heat removal is usually achieved through several redundant and diverse systems, and the heat is often dissipated to an 'ultimate heat sink' which has a large capacity and requires no active power, though this method is typically used after decay heat has reduced to a very small value. However, the main cause of release of radioactivity in the Three Mile Island accident was a pilot-operated relief valve on the primary loop which stuck in the open position. This caused the overflow tank into which it drained to rupture and release large amounts of radioactive cooling water into the containment building.

In 2011, an earthquake and tsunami caused a loss of power to two plants in Fukushima, Japan, crippling the reactor as decay heat caused 90% of the fuel rods in the core of the Daiichi Unit 3 reactor to become uncovered.[41] As of May 30, 2011, the removal of decay heat is still a cause for concern.
Transport

Transport accidents can cause a release of radioactivity resulting in contamination or shielding to be damaged resulting in direct irradiation. In Cochabamba a defective gamma radiography set was transported in a passenger bus as cargo. The gamma source was outside the shielding, and it irradiated some bus passengers.

In the United Kingdom, it was revealed in a court case that in March 2002 a radiotherapy source was transported from Leeds to Sellafield with defective shielding. The shielding had a gap on the underside. It is thought that no human has been seriously harmed by the escaping radiation.[42]
Equipment failure

Equipment failure is one possible type of accident, recently at Białystok in Poland the electronics associated with a particle accelerator used for the treatment of cancer suffered a malfunction.[43] This then led to the overexposure of at least one patient. While the initial failure was the simple failure of a semiconductor diode, it set in motion a series of events which led to a radiation injury.

A related cause of accidents is failure of control software, as in the cases involving the Therac-25 medical radiotherapy equipment: the elimination of a hardware safety interlock in a new design model exposed a previously undetected bug in the control software, which could lead to patients receiving massive overdoses under a specific set of conditions.
Human error
A sketch used by doctors to determine the amount of radiation to which each person had been exposed during the Slotin excursion

Many of the major nuclear accidents have been directly attributable to operator or human error. This was obviously the case in the analysis of both the Chernobyl and TMI-2 accidents. At Chernobyl, a test procedure was being conducted prior to the accident. The leaders of the test permitted operators to disable and ignore key protection circuits and warnings that would have normally shut the reactor down. At TMI-2, operators permitted thousands of gallons of water to escape from the reactor plant before observing that the coolant pumps were behaving abnormally. The coolant pumps were thus turned off to protect the pumps, which in turn led to the destruction of the reactor itself as cooling was completely lost within the core.

A detailed investigation into SL-1 determined that one operator (perhaps inadvertently) manually pulled the 84-pound (38 kg) central control rod out about 26 inches rather than the maintenance procedure's intention of about 4 inches.[44]

An assessment conducted by the Commissariat �* l’Énergie Atomique (CEA) in France concluded that no amount of technical innovation can eliminate the risk of human-induced errors associated with the operation of nuclear power plants. Two types of mistakes were deemed most serious: errors committed during field operations, such as maintenance and testing, that can cause an accident; and human errors made during small accidents that cascade to complete failure.[5]

In 1946 Canadian Manhattan Project physicist Louis Slotin performed a risky experiment known as "tickling the dragon's tail"[45] which involved two hemispheres of neutron-reflective beryllium being brought together around a plutonium core to bring it to criticality. Against operating procedures, the hemispheres were separated only by a screwdriver. The screwdriver slipped and set off a chain reaction criticality accident filling the room with harmful radiation and a flash of blue light (caused by excited, ionized air particles returning to their unexcited states). Slotin reflexively separated the hemispheres in reaction to the heat flash and blue light, preventing further irradiation of several co-workers present in the room. However Slotin absorbed a lethal dose of the radiation and died nine days afterwards. The infamous plutonium mass used in the experiment was referred to as the demon core.
Lost source

Lost source accidents,[46][47] also referred to as an orphan source are incidents in which a radioactive source is lost, stolen or abandoned. The source then might cause harm to humans. For example, in 1996 sources were left behind by the Soviet army in Lilo, Georgia.[48] Another case occurred at Yanango where a radiography source was lost, also at Samut Prakarn a phosphorus teletherapy source was lost[49] and at Gilan in Iran a radiography source harmed a welder.[50] The best known example of this type of event is the Goiânia accident which occurred in Brazil.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has provided guides for scrap metal collectors on what a sealed source might look like.[51][52] The scrap metal industry is the one where lost sources are most likely to be found.[53]
Trafficking in radioactive and nuclear materials

Information reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) shows "a persistent problem with the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials, thefts, losses and other unauthorized activities".[18]

From 1993 to 2006, the IAEA confirmed 1080 illicit trafficking incidents reported by participating countries. Of the 1080 confirmed incidents, 275 incidents involved unauthorized possession and related criminal activity, 332 incidents involved theft or loss of nuclear or other radioactive materials, 398 incidents involved other unauthorized activities, and in 75 incidents the reported information was not sufficient to determine the category of incident. Several hundred additional incidents have been reported in various open sources, but are not yet confirmed.[18][54]

2.
1950s

December 12, 1952 — INES Level 5[citation needed] - Chalk River, Ontario, Canada - Reactor core damaged
A reactor shutoff rod failure, combined with several operator errors, led to a major power excursion of more than double the reactor's rated output at AECL's NRX reactor. The operators purged the reactor's heavy water moderator, and the reaction stopped in under 30 seconds. A cover gas system failure led to hydrogen explosions, which severely damaged the reactor core. The fission products from approximately 30 kg of uranium were released through the reactor stack. Irradiated light-water coolant leaked from the damaged coolant circuit into the reactor building; some 4,000 cubic meters were pumped via pipeline to a disposal area to avoid contamination of the Ottawa River. Subsequent monitoring of surrounding water sources revealed no contamination. No immediate fatalities or injuries resulted from the incident; a 1982 followup study of exposed workers showed no long-term health effects. Future U.S. President Jimmy Carter, then a Lieutenant in the US Navy, was among the cleanup crew.[1]
September 29, 1957 — INES Level 6 - Kyshtym disaster - Mayak, Russia (then a part of the Soviet Union)
The Kyshtym disaster was a radiation contamination incident that occurred on 29 September 1957 at Mayak, a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Russia (then a part of the Soviet Union). It measured as a Level 6 disaster on the International Nuclear Event Scale, making it the third most serious nuclear accident ever recorded (after the Chernobyl disaster, and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, both Level 7 on the INES scale). The cooling system in one of the tanks containing about 70–80 tons of liquid radioactive waste failed and was not repaired. The temperature in it started to rise, resulting in evaporation and a chemical explosion of the dried waste, consisting mainly of ammonium nitrate and acetates (see ammonium nitrate bomb). The explosion, estimated to have a force of about 70–100 tons of TNT threw the concrete lid, weighing 160 tons, into the air.[2] There were no immediate casualties as a result of the explosion, which released an estimated 2 to 50 MCi (74 to 1850 PBq) of radioactivity.[3][4][5] In the next 10 to 11 hours, the radioactive cloud moved towards the northeast, reaching 300–350 kilometers from the accident. The fallout of the cloud resulted in a long-term contamination of an area of more than 800 square kilometers, primarily with caesium-137 and strontium-90.[3] This area is usually referred to as the East-Ural Radioactive Trace (EURT).[6]
May 24, 1958 — INES Level needed - Chalk River, Ontario, Canada - Fuel damaged
Due to inadequate cooling a damaged uranium fuel rod caught fire and was torn in two as it was being removed from the core at the NRU reactor. The fire was extinguished, but not before radioactive combustion products contaminated the interior of the reactor building and, to a lesser degree, an area surrounding the laboratory site. Over 600 people were employed in the clean-up.[7][8]
October 25, 1958 - INES Level needed - Vinča, Serbia (then Yugoslavia) - Criticality excursion, irradiation of personnel
During a subcritical counting experiment a power buildup went undetected at the Vinca Nuclear Institute's zero-power natural uranium heavy water moderated research reactor.[9] Saturation of radiation detection chambers gave the researchers false readings and the level of moderator in the reactor tank was raised triggering a criticality excursion which a researcher detected from the smell of ozone.[10] Six scientists received radiation doses of 2—4 Sv (200—400 rems) [11] (p. 96). An experimental bone marrow transplant treatment was performed on all of them in France and five survived, despite the ultimate rejection of the marrow in all cases. A single woman among them later had a child without apparent complications. This was one of the first nuclear incidents investigated by then newly formed IAEA.[12]

July 26, 1959 — INES Level needed - Santa Susana Field Laboratory, California, United States - Partial meltdown
A partial core meltdown may have taken place when the Sodium Reactor Experiment (SRE) experienced a power excursion that caused severe overheating of the reactor core, resulting in the melting of one-third of the nuclear fuel and significant releases of radioactive gases.[13]

1960s

April 3, 1960 - INES Level needed – Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, United States

A core melt accident occurred at the Westinghouse Waltz Mill test reactor. From what information remains of the event, one fuel element melted, resulting in the disposition of 2 million gallons of contaminated water generated during the accident. At least a portion of the water was retained on site in lagoons, a condition which eventually led to detectable Sr-90 in ground water plus contaminated soil. The site is currently undergoing cleanup.

July 24, 1964 - INES Level needed - Charlestown, Rhode Island, United States - Criticality Accident

An error by a worker at a United Nuclear Corporation fuel facility led to an accidental criticality. Robert Peabody, believing he was using a diluted uranium solution, accidentally put concentrated solution into an agitation tank containing sodium carbonate. Peabody was exposed to 10,000rad (100Gy) of radiation and died two days later. Ninety minutes after the criticality, a plant manager and another administrator returned to the building and were exposed to 100rad (1Gy), but suffered no ill effects.[14][15]

October 5, 1966 — INES Level needed - Monroe, Michigan, United States - Partial meltdown

A sodium cooling system malfunction caused a partial meltdown at the Enrico Fermi demonstration nuclear breeder reactor (Enrico Fermi-1 fast breeder reactor). The accident was attributed to a zirconium fragment that obstructed a flow-guide in the sodium cooling system. Two of the 105 fuel assemblies melted during the incident, but no contamination was recorded outside the containment vessel.[16]

Winter 1966-1967 (date unknown) – INES Level needed – location unknown – loss of coolant accident
The Soviet icebreaker Lenin, the USSR’s first nuclear-powered surface ship, suffered a major accident (possibly a meltdown — exactly what happened remains a matter of controversy in the West) in one of its three reactors. To find the leak the crew broke through the concrete and steel radiation shield with sledgehammers, causing irreparable damage. It was rumored that around 30 of the crew were killed. The ship was abandoned for a year to allow radiation levels to drop before the three reactors were removed, to be dumped into the Tsivolko Fjord on the Kara Sea, along with 60% of the fuel elements packed in a separate container. The reactors were replaced with two new ones, and the ship re-entered service in 1970, serving until 1989.

May 1967 — INES Level needed - Dumfries and Galloway, Scotland, United Kingdom - Partial meltdown

Graphite debris partially blocked a fuel channel causing a fuel element to melt and catch fire at the Chapelcross nuclear power station. Contamination was confined to the reactor core. The core was repaired and restarted in 1969, operating until the plant's shutdown in 2004.[17][18]

January 21, 1969 — INES Level: None - Lucens, Canton of Vaud, Switzerland - Explosion

A total loss of coolant led to a power excursion and explosion of an experimental nuclear reactor in a large cave at Lucens. The underground location of this reactor acted like a containment building and prevented any outside contamination. The cavern was heavily contaminated and was sealed. No injuries or fatalities resulted.[19][20]
De-fuelling and partial dismantling occurred from 1969 to 1973. In 1988, the lowest caverns were filled with concrete, and a regulatory permit was issued in December 1990. Currently, the archives of the Canton of Vaud are located in the caverns.[21]

1970s

December 7, 1975 – INES Level 3 - Greifswald, Germany (then East Germany) - Partly damaged

Operators disabled three of six cooling pumps' electrical supply circuits to test emergency shutoffs. Instead of the expected automatic shutdown, a fourth pump failed causing excessive heating which damaged ten fuel rods. The accident was attributed to sticky relay contacts and generally poor construction in the Soviet-built reactor.[22]

February 22, 1977 – INES Level 4 - Jaslovské Bohunice, Slovakia (then Czechoslovakia) - Fuel damaged

Operators neglected to remove moisture-absorbing materials from a fuel rod assembly before loading it into the KS 150 reactor at power plant A-1. The accident resulted in damaged fuel integrity, extensive corrosion damage of fuel cladding and release of radioactivity into the plant area. The affected reactor was decommissioned following this accident.[23]

March 28, 1979 – INES Level 5[citation needed] - Middletown, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, United States - Partial meltdown

Equipment failures and worker mistakes contributed to a loss of coolant and a partial core meltdown at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station 15 km (9.3 mi) southeast of Harrisburg. While the reactor was extensively damaged, on-site radiation exposure was under 100 millirems (less than annual exposure due to natural sources). Area residents received a smaller exposure of 1 millirem (10 µSv), or about 1/3 the dose from eating a banana per day for one year. There were no fatalities. Follow-up radiological studies predict between zero and one long-term cancer fatality.[24][25][26]

See also: Three Mile Island accident

1980s

March 13, 1980 - INES Level 4 - Orléans, France - Nuclear materials leak

A brief power excursion in Reactor A2 led to a rupture of fuel bundles and a minor release (8 x 1010 Bq) of nuclear materials at the Saint-Laurent Nuclear Power Plant. The reactor was repaired and continued operation until its decommissioning in 1992.[27]

March, 1981 — INES Level 2 - Tsuruga, Japan - Radioactive materials released into Sea of Japan + Overexposure of workers

More than 100 workers were exposed to doses of up to 155 millirem per day radiation during repairs of the Tsuruga Nuclear Power Plant, violating the Japan Atomic Power Company's limit of 100 millirems (1 mSv) per day.[28]

September 23, 1983 — INES Level 4 - Buenos Aires, Argentina - Accidental criticality

An operator error during a fuel plate reconfiguration in an experimental test reactor led to an excursion of 3×1017 fissions at the RA-2 facility. The operator absorbed 2000 rad (20 Gy) of gamma and 1700 rad (17 Gy) of neutron radiation which killed him two days later. Another 17 people outside of the reactor room absorbed doses ranging from 35 rad (0.35 Gy) to less than 1 rad (0.01 Gy).[29] pg103[30]

April 26, 1986 — INES Level 7 - Prypiat, Ukraine (then USSR) - Power excursion, explosion, complete meltdown

An inadequate reactor safety system[31] led to an uncontrolled power excursion, causing a severe steam explosion, meltdown and release of radioactive material at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant located approximately 100 kilometers north-northwest of Kiev. Approximately fifty fatalities (mostly cleanup personnel) resulted from the accident and the immediate aftermath. An additional nine fatal cases of thyroid cancer in children in the Chernobyl area have been attributed to the accident. The explosion and combustion of the graphite reactor core spread radioactive material over much of Europe. 100,000 people were evacuated from the areas immediately surrounding Chernobyl in addition to 300,000 from the areas of heavy fallout in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. An "Exclusion Zone" was created surrounding the site encompassing approximately 1,000 mi² (3,000 km²) and deemed off-limits for human habitation for an indefinite period. Several studies by governments, UN agencies and environmental groups have estimated the consequences and eventual number of casualties. Their findings are subject to controversy.

See also: Chernobyl disaster

May 4, 1986 – INES Level 3-5 (need ref) - Hamm-Uentrop, Germany (then West Germany) - Fuel damaged

A spherical fuel pebble became lodged in the pipe used to deliver fuel elements to the reactor at an experimental 300-megawatt THTR-300 HTGR. Attempts by an operator to dislodge the fuel pebble damaged its cladding, releasing radiation detectable up to two kilometers from the reactor.[32]

1990s

April 6, 1993 — INES Level 4 - Tomsk, Russia - Explosion

A pressure buildup led to an explosive mechanical failure in a 34 cubic meter stainless steel reaction vessel buried in a concrete bunker under building 201 of the radiochemical works at the Tomsk-7 Siberian Chemical Enterprise plutonium reprocessing facility. The vessel contained a mixture of concentrated nitric acid, uranium (8757 kg), plutonium (449 g) along with a mixture of radioactive and organic waste from a prior extraction cycle. The explosion dislodged the concrete lid of the bunker and blew a large hole in the roof of the building, releasing approximately 6 GBq of Pu 239 and 30 TBq of various other radionuclides into the environment. The contamination plume extended 28 km NE of building 201, 20 km beyond the facility property. The small village of Georgievka (pop. 200) was at the end of the fallout plume, but no fatalities, illnesses or injuries were reported. The accident exposed 160 on-site workers and almost two thousand cleanup workers to total doses of up to 50 mSv (the threshold limit for radiation workers is 100 mSv per 5 years).[33][34][35]

June, 1999 — INES Level 2[36] - Ishikawa Prefecture, Japan - Control rod malfunction

Operators attempting to insert one control rod during an inspection neglected procedure and instead withdrew three causing a 15 minute uncontrolled sustained reaction at the number 1 reactor of Shika Nuclear Power Plant. The Hokuriku Electric Power Company who owned the reactor did not report this incident and falsified records, covering it up until March, 2007.[37]

September 30, 1999 — INES Level 4 - Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan - Accidental criticality

Inadequately trained part-time workers prepared a uranyl nitrate solution containing about 16.6 kg of uranium, which exceeded the critical mass, into a precipitation tank at a uranium reprocessing facility in Tokai-mura northeast of Tokyo, Japan. The tank was not designed to dissolve this type of solution and was not configured to prevent eventual criticality. Three workers were exposed to (neutron) radiation doses in excess of allowable limits. Two of these workers died. 116 other workers received lesser doses of 1 mSv or greater though not in excess of the allowable limit.[38][39][40][41]

See also: Tokaimura nuclear accident

2000s

April 10, 2003 — INES Level 3 - Paks, Hungary - Fuel damaged

Partially spent fuel rods undergoing cleaning in a tank of heavy water ruptured and spilled fuel pellets at Paks Nuclear Power Plant. It is suspected that inadequate cooling of the rods during the cleaning process combined with a sudden influx of cold water thermally shocked fuel rods causing them to split. Boric acid was added to the tank to prevent the loose fuel pellets from achieving criticality. Ammonia and hydrazine were also added to absorb iodine-131.[42]

April 19, 2005 — INES Level 3 - Sellafield, England, United Kingdom - Nuclear material leak

20 metric tons of uranium and 160 kilograms of plutonium dissolved in 83,000 litres of nitric acid leaked over several months from a cracked pipe into a stainless steel sump chamber at the Thorp nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. The partially processed spent fuel was drained into holding tanks outside the plant.[43][44]

November 2005 — INES Level needed - Braidwood, Illinois, United States - Nuclear material leak

Tritium contamination of groundwater was discovered at Exelon's Braidwood station. Groundwater off site remains within safe drinking standards though the NRC is requiring the plant to correct any problems related to the release.[45]

March 6, 2006 — INES Level 2[46] - Erwin, Tennessee, United States - Nuclear material leak

Thirty-five litres of a highly enriched uranium solution leaked during transfer into a lab at Nuclear Fuel Services Erwin Plant. The incident caused a seven-month shutdown. A required public hearing on the licensing of the plant was not held due to the absence of public notification.[47][48][49][50]

2010s
See also: Timeline of the Fukushima nuclear accidents

March 11–20, 2011 - INES Level 7[51][52](previously rating is 5[53]) as of April 12 (A final rating is expected after the situation has been completely resolved).
Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, Japan - partial meltdowns in multiple reactors [54]

Main article: Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster

After the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami of March 11, the emergency power supply of the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant failed. This was followed by deliberate releases of radioactive gas from reactors 1 and 2 to relieve pressure. On March 12, triggered by falling water levels, a hydrogen explosion occurred at reactor 1, resulting in the collapse of the concrete outer structure.[55][56][57][58][59] Although the reactor containment itself was confirmed to be intact,[60][61][62] the hourly radiation from the plant reached 1,015 microsievert (0.1015 rem) - an amount equivalent to that allowable for ordinary people in one year."[63][64] Residents of the Fukushima area were advised to stay inside, close doors and windows, turn off air conditioning, and to cover their mouths with masks, towels or handkerchiefs as well as not to drink tap water.[65] By the evening of March 12, the exclusion zone had been extended to 20 kilometres (12 mi) around the plant[66] and 70,000 to 80,000 people had been evacuated from homes in northern Japan.[67] A second, nearly identical hydrogen explosion occurred in the reactor building for Unit 3 on March 14, with similar effects.[68] A third explosion in the “pressure suppression room” of Unit 2[69] initially was said not to have breached the reactor’s inner steel containment vessel,[70] but later reports indicated that the explosion damaged the steel containment structure of Unit 2 and much larger releases of radiation were expected than previously.[69]
Disposed rods of reactor Unit 4 were stored outside the reactor in a separate pool which ran dry, yielding fire and risk of serious contamination.[71]
Staff was brought down from 800 Fukushima, who have been named the "Fukushima 50" by the press.[71] Events are still developing.

March 11–13, 2011 - INES Level 3,[72] Fukushima II Nuclear Power Plant, Japan - Overheating, possible radioactivity emergency.

After the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami of March 11, the cooling systems for three reactors (numbers 1, 2 and 4) of the Fukushima-Daini nuclear power plant were compromised due to damage from the tsunami.[73] Nuclear Engineering International reported that all four units were successfully automatically shut down, but emergency diesel generators at the site were Damaged by the 9.0 magnitude earthquake[74] People were evacuated around 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) from the plant. An evacuation order was issued, because of possible radioactive contamination.[75][76] October 2011, events are still developing.

3.
1940s

June 23, 1942 – Leipzig, Germany (then Nazi Germany) – Steam explosion and reactor fire*
Shortly after the Leipzig L-IV atomic pile — worked on by Werner Heisenberg and Robert Doepel — demonstrated Germany's first signs of neutron propagation, the device was checked for a possible heavy water leak. During the inspection, air leaked in, igniting the uranium powder inside. The burning uranium boiled the water jacket, generating enough steam pressure to blow the reactor apart. Burning uranium powder scattered throughout the lab causing a larger fire at the facility.[1][2]

A sketch of Louis Slotin's criticality accident used to determine exposure of those in the room at the time.

August 21, 1945 – Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA – Accidental criticality
Harry K. Daghlian, Jr. dropped a tungsten carbide brick onto a plutonium core, inadvertently creating a critical mass at the Los Alamos Omega site. He quickly removed the brick, but was fatally irradiated, dying September 15.[3]
May 21, 1946 – Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA – Accidental criticality
While demonstrating his technique to visiting scientists at Los Alamos, Canadian physicist Louis Slotin manually assembled a critical mass of plutonium. A momentary slip of a screwdriver caused a prompt critical reaction. Slotin died on May 30 from massive radiation poisoning, with an estimated dose of 1,000 rads (rad), or 10 grays (Gy). Seven observers, who received doses as high as 166 rads, survived, yet three died within a few decades from conditions believed to be radiation-related.[4]

In the above incidents, both Daghlian (August 21, 1945 case) and Slotin (May 21, 1946 case), were working with the same bomb core which became known as the "demon core".
1950s

February 13, 1950 – British Columbia, Canada – 1950 British Columbia B-36 crash—non-nuclear detonation of a simulated atomic bomb
A USAF B-36 bomber, AF Ser. No. 44-92075, was flying a simulated combat mission from Eielson Air Force Base, near Fairbanks, Alaska, to Carswell Air Force Base in Fort Worth, Texas, carrying one weapon containing a dummy warhead. The warhead contained uranium instead of plutonium. After six hours of flight, the bomber experienced mechanical problems and was forced to shut down three of its six engines at an altitude of 12,000 feet (3,700 m). Fearing that severe weather and icing would jeopardize a safe emergency landing, the weapon was jettisoned over the Pacific Ocean from a height of 8,000 ft (2,400 m). The weapon's high explosives detonated upon impact. All of the sixteen crew members and one passenger were able to parachute from the plane and twelve were subsequently rescued from Princess Royal Island. The Pentagon's summary report does not mention if the weapon was later recovered.[5]
April 11, 1950 – Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA – Loss and recovery of nuclear materials
Three minutes after departure from Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque a USAF B-29 bomber carrying a nuclear weapon, four spare detonators, and a crew of thirteen crashed into a mountain near Manzano Base. The crash resulted in a fire which the New York Times reported as being visible from 15 miles (24 km). The bomb's casing was completely demolished and its high explosives ignited upon contact with the plane's burning fuel. However, according to the Department of Defense, the four spare detonators and all nuclear components were recovered. A nuclear detonation was not possible because, while on board, the weapon's core was not in the weapon for safety reasons. All thirteen crew members died.[5]
July 13, 1950 – Lebanon, Ohio, USA – Non-nuclear detonation of an atomic bomb
USAF B-50 aircraft on a training mission from Biggs Air Force Base with a nuclear weapon flew into the ground resulting in a high explosive detonation, but no nuclear explosion.[6]
November 10, 1950 – Rivière-du-Loup, Québec, Canada – Non-nuclear detonation of an atomic bomb
Returning one of several U.S. Mark 4 nuclear bombs secretly deployed in Canada, a USAF B-50 had engine trouble and jettisoned the weapon at 10,500 feet (3,200 m). The crew set the bomb to self-destruct at 2,500 ft (760 m) and dropped over the St. Lawrence River. The explosion shook area residents and scattered nearly 100 pounds (45 kg) of uranium (U-238) used in the weapon's tamper. The plutonium core ("pit") was not in the bomb at the time.[7]

The Castle Bravo fallout pattern.

March 1, 1954 – Bikini Atoll, Republic of the Marshall Islands (then Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands) – Nuclear test accident
During the Castle Bravo test of the first deployable hydrogen bomb, a miscalculation resulted in the explosion being over twice as large as predicted, with a total explosive force of 15 megatons of TNT (63 PJ). Of the total yield, 10 Mt (42 PJ) were from fission of the natural uranium tamper, but those fission reactions were quite dirty, producing a large amount of fallout. Combined with the much larger than expected yield and an unanticipated wind shift radioactive fallout was spread eastward onto the inhabited Rongelap and Rongerik Atolls. These islands were not evacuated before the explosion due to the financial cost involved, but many of the Marshall Islands natives have since suffered from radiation burns and radioactive dusting and also similar fates as the Japanese fishermen and their children and grandchildren have suffered from birth defects and have received little if any compensation from the federal government[citation needed]. A Japanese fishing boat, Daigo Fukuryu Maru/Lucky Dragon, also came into contact with the fallout, which caused many of the crew to take ill with one fatality. The test resulted in an international uproar and reignited Japanese concerns about radiation, especially with regard to the possible contamination of fish. Personal accounts of the Rongelap people can be seen in the documentary Children of Armageddon.
November 29, 1955 – Idaho, USA – Partial meltdown
Operator error led to a partial core meltdown in the experimental EBR-I breeder reactor, resulting in temporarily elevated radioactivity levels in the reactor building and necessitating significant repair.[8][9]
March 10, 1956 – Over the Mediterranean Sea – Nuclear weapons lost
A USAF B-47 Stratojet, AF Ser. No. 52-534, on a non-stop mission from MacDill Air Force Base to an overseas base descended into a cloud formation at 14,000 feet over the Mediterranean in preparation for an in-air refuelling and vanished while carrying two nuclear weapon cores. The plane was lost while flying through dense clouds, and the cores and other wreckage were never located.[10][11][12]
July 27, 1956 – Lakenheath in Suffolk, UK – Nuclear weapons damaged
A USAF B-47 crashed into a storage igloo spreading burning fuel over three Mark 6 nuclear bombs at RAF Lakenheath. A bomb disposal expert stated it was a miracle exposed detonators on one bomb did not fire, which presumably would have released nuclear material into the environment.[13]
May 22, 1957 – Kirtland AFB in New Mexico, USA – Non-nuclear detonation of an atomic weapon
A B-36 ferrying a nuclear weapon from Biggs AFB to Kirtland AFB dropped a nuclear weapon on approach to Kirtland AFB. The weapon impacted the ground 4.5 miles south of the Kirtland control tower and 0.3 miles west of the Sandia Base reservation. The weapon was completely destroyed by the detonation of its high explosive material, creating a crater 12 feet deep and 25 feet in diameter. Radioactive contamination at the crater lip amounted to 0.5 milliroentgen.[12]
July 28, 1957 – Atlantic Ocean – Two weapons jettisoned and not recovered
A USAF C-124 aircraft from Dover Air Force Base, Delaware was carrying three nuclear bombs over the Atlantic Ocean when it experienced a loss of power. The crew jettisoned two nuclear bombs to protect their safety, which were never recovered.[6]
September 11, 1957 – Rocky Flats Plant, Golden, Colorado, USA – Fire, release of nuclear materials
A fire began in a materials handling glove box and spread through the ventilation system into the stack filters at the Rocky Flats weapons mill 27 kilometres (17 mi) from Denver, Colorado. Plutonium and other contaminants were released, but the exact amount of which contaminants is unknown; estimates range from 25 mg to 250 kg.[14][15][16][17]
29 September 1957 – Kyshtym, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Russia (then USSR) – Explosion, release of nuclear materials
See Kyshtym disaster. A cooling system failure at the Mayak nuclear processing plant resulted in a major explosion and release of radioactive materials. Hundreds of people died and hundreds of thousands were evacuated.[18]
October 8–12, 1957 – Sellafield, Cumbria, UK – Reactor core fire
See Windscale fire. Technicians mistakenly overheated Windscale Pile No. 1 during an annealing process to release Wigner energy from graphite portions of the reactor. Poorly placed temperature sensors indicated the reactor was cooling rather than heating. The excess heat led to the failure of a nuclear cartridge, which in turn allowed uranium and irradiated graphite to react with air. The resulting fire burned for days, damaging a significant portion of the reactor core. About 150 burning fuel cells could not be lifted from the core, but operators succeeded in creating a firebreak by removing nearby fuel cells. An effort to cool the graphite core with water eventually quenched the fire. The reactor had released radioactive gases into the surrounding countryside, primarily in the form of iodine-131 (131I). Milk distribution was banned in a 200-square-mile (520 km2) area around the reactor for several weeks. A 1987 report by the National Radiological Protection Board predicted the accident would cause as many as 33 long-term cancer deaths, although the Medical Research Council Committee concluded that "it is in the highest degree unlikely that any harm has been done to the health of anybody, whether a worker in the Windscale plant or a member of the general public." The reactor that burned was one of two air-cooled graphite-moderated natural uranium reactors at the site used for production of plutonium.[19][20][21]

October 11, 1957 – Homestead Air Force Base, Florida – Nuclear bomb burned after B-47 aircraft accident[22]
B-47 aircraft crashed during take-off after a wheel exploded; one nuclear bomb burned in the resulting fire.
January 31, 1958 – Morocco – Nuclear bomb damaged in crash[22]
During a simulated takeoff a wheel casting failure caused the tail of a USAF B-47 carrying an armed nuclear weapon to hit the runway, rupturing a fuel tank and sparking a fire. Some contamination was detected immediately following the accident.[23][24]
February 5, 1958 – Savannah, Georgia, USA – Nuclear bomb lost
See 1958 Tybee Island mid-air collision. A USAF B-47 bomber jettisoned a Mark 15 Mod 0 nuclear bomb over the Atlantic Ocean after a midair collision with a USAF F-86 Sabre during a simulated combat mission from Homestead Air Force Base, Florida. The F-86's pilot ejected and parachuted to safety. The USAF claimed the B-47 tried landing at Hunter Air Force Base, Georgia three times before the bomb was jettisoned at 7,200 ft (2,200 m) near Tybee Island, Georgia. The B-47 pilot successfully landed in one attempt only after he first jettisoned the bomb. A 3-square-mile (7.8 km2) area near Wassaw Sound was searched for 9 weeks before the search was called off. The bomb was searched for in 2001 and not found. A group of investigators in 2004 claim to have found an underwater object which they think is the bomb.[25]
March 11, 1958 – Mars Bluff, South Carolina, USA – Non-nuclear detonation of a nuclear bomb
A USAF B-47 bomber flying from Hunter Air Force Base in Savannah, Georgia accidentally released an atomic bomb.[26] A home was destroyed and several people injured but the bomb's plutonium core did not explode.[27]
June 16, 1958 – Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA – Accidental criticality
A supercritical portion of highly enriched uranyl nitrate was allowed to collect in the drum causing a prompt neutron criticality in the C-1 wing of building 9212 at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Y-12 complex. It is estimated that the reaction produced 1.3 * 10^{18} fissions. Eight employees were in close proximity to the drum during the accident, receiving neutron doses ranging from 30 to 477 rems. No fatalities were reported.[28]
December 30, 1958 – Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA – Accidental criticality
During chemical purification a critical mass of a plutonium solution was accidentally assembled at Los Alamos National Laboratory. A chemical operator named Cecil Kelley died of acute radiation sickness. The March, 1961 Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine printed a special supplement medically analyzing this accident. Hand-manipulations of critical assemblies were abandoned as a matter of policy in U.S. federal facilities after this accident.[28]
July, 1959 – Simi Valley, California, USA – Explosion
The Sodium Reactor Experiment was a pioneering nuclear power plant built by Atomics International at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory, nearby Simi Valley, California. The reactor operated from 1957 to 1964. In July 1959, the reactor suffered a serious incident in which the reactor core was damaged causing the controlled release of radioactive gas to the atmosphere.[29]
November 20, 1959 – Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA – Explosion
A chemical explosion occurred during decontamination of processing machinery in the radiochemical processing plant at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee . (Report ORNL-2989, Oak Ridge National Laboratory). The accident resulted in the release of about 15 grams (0.53 oz) of 239Pu.

1960s

June 7, 1960 – New Egypt, New Jersey, USA – Nuclear warhead damaged by fire
A helium tank exploded and ruptured the fuel tanks of a USAF BOMARC-A surface-to-air missile at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey. The fire destroyed the missile, and contaminated the area directly below and adjacent to the missile.[24][30]
October 13, 1960 – Barents Sea, Arctic Ocean – Release of nuclear materials
A leak developed in the steam generators and in a pipe leading to the compensator reception on the ill-fated K-8 while the Soviet Northern Fleet November-class submarine was on exercise. While the crew rigged an improvised cooling system, radioactive gases leaked into the vessel and three of the crew suffered visible radiation injuries according to radiological experts in Moscow. Some crew members had been exposed to doses of up to 1.8–2 Sv (180–200 rem).[31]

SL-1 reactor being removed from the National Reactor Testing Station.

January 3, 1961 – National Reactor Testing Station, Idaho, USA – Accidental criticality, steam explosion, 3 fatalities, release of fission products
During a maintenance shutdown, the SL-1 experimental nuclear reactor underwent a prompt critical reaction causing core materials to explosively vaporize. Water hammer estimated at 10,000 pounds per square inch (69,000 kPa) struck the top of the reactor vessel propelling the entire reactor vessel upwards over 9 feet (2.7 m) in the air. One operator who had been standing on top of the vessel was killed when a shield plug impaled him and lodged in the ceiling. Two other military personnel were also killed from the trauma of the explosion, one of which had removed the central control rod too far. The plant had to be dismantled and the contamination was buried permanently nearby. Most of the release of radioactive materials was concentrated within the reactor building.

For more details on this topic, see SL-1.

January 24, 1961 – Goldsboro B-52 crash – Physical destruction of a nuclear bomb, loss of nuclear materials
A USAF B-52 bomber caught fire and exploded in midair due to a major leak in a wing fuel cell 12 miles (19 km) north of Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina. Five crewmen parachuted to safety, but three died—two in the aircraft and one on landing. The incident released the bomber's two Mark 39 hydrogen bombs. Three of the four arming devices on one of the bombs activated, causing it to carry out many of the steps needed to arm itself, such as the charging of the firing capacitors and, critically, the deployment of a 100-foot (30 m) diameter retardation parachute. The parachute allowed the bomb to hit the ground with little damage. The fourth arming device — the pilot's safe/arm switch — was not activated preventing detonation. The second bomb plunged into a muddy field at around 700 mph (300 m/s) and disintegrated. Its tail was discovered about 20 feet (6 m) down and much of the bomb recovered, including the tritium bottle and the plutonium. However, excavation was abandoned due to uncontrollable ground water flooding. Most of the thermonuclear stage, containing uranium, was left in situ. It is estimated to lie around 55 feet (17 m) below ground. The Air Force purchased the land and fenced it off to prevent its disturbance, and it is tested regularly for contamination, although none has so far been found.[32]

March 14, 1961 – 1961 Yuba City B-52 crash
USAF B-52 bomber experienced a decompression event that required it to fly below 10,000 feet. Resulting increased fuel consumption led to fuel exhaustion; the aircraft crashed with two nuclear bombs, which did not trigger a nuclear explosion.

July 4, 1961 – coast of Norway – Near meltdown
The Soviet Hotel-class submarine K-19 suffered a failure in its cooling system. Reactor core temperatures reached 800 °C (1,500 °F), nearly enough to melt the fuel rods, although the crew was able to regain temperature control by using emergency procedures. The incident contaminated parts of the ship, some of the onboard ballistic missiles and the crew, resulting in several fatalities. The movie K-19: The Widowmaker, starring Harrison Ford and Liam Neeson, offers a controversially fictionalized story of these events.

May 1, 1962 – Sahara desert, French Algeria – Accidental venting of underground nuclear test
The second French underground nuclear test, codenamed Béryl, took place in a shaft under mount Taourirt, near In Ecker, 150 km (100 mi) north of Tamanrasset, Algerian Sahara. Due to improper sealing of the shaft, a spectacular flame burst through the concrete cap and radioactive gases and dust were vented into the atmosphere. The plume climbed up to 2600 m (8500 ft) high and radiation was detected hundreds of km away. About a hundred soldiers and officials, including two ministers, were irradiated. The number of contaminated Algerians is unknown.

April 10, 1963 – Loss of nuclear reactor
Submarine USS Thresher sinks about 190 nmi (220 mi; 350 km) east of Cape Cod, Massachusetts due to improper welds allowing in seawater which forced a shutdown of the reactor. Poor design of its emergency ballast system prevented the ship from surfacing and the disabled ship ultimately descended to crush depth and imploded.

January 13, 1964 – Salisbury, Pennsylvania and Frostburg, Maryland, USA – Accidental loss and recovery of thermonuclear bombs
A USAF B-52 on airborne alert duty encountered a severe winter storm and extreme turbulence, ultimately disintegrating in mid-air over South Central Pennsylvania.[33] Only the two pilots survived. One crew member failed to bail out and the rest succumbed to injuries or exposure to the harsh winter weather. A search for the missing weapons was initiated, and recovery was effected from portions of the wreckage at a farm northwest of Frostburg, MD.

April 21, 1964 – Indian Ocean – Launch failure of a RTG powered satellite
A U.S. Transit-5BN-3 nuclear-powered navigational satellite failed to reach orbital velocity and began falling back down at 150,000 feet (46 km) above the Indian Ocean.[34] The satellite's SNAP-9a generator contained 17 kCi (630 TBq)[35] of 238Pu (2.1 pounds), which at least partially burned upon reentry.[36][37][38][39] Increased levels of 238Pu were first documented in the stratosphere four months later. Indeed NASA (in the 1995 Cassini FEIS)[35] indicated that the SNAP-9a plutonium release was nearly double the 9000Ci added by all the atmospheric weapons tests to that date.[40][41] The United States Atomic Energy Commission reported a resulting threefold increase in global 238Pu fallout.[42][43] All subsequent Transit satellites were fitted with solar panels; RTG's were designed to remain contained during re-entry.

8 December 1964 – Bunker Hill Air Force Base, USA – Fire, radioactive contamination
USAF B-58 aircraft carrying a nuclear weapon caught fire while taxiing. Nuclear weapon burned, causing contamination of the crash area.[6]

January 1965 – Livermore, California, USA – Release of nuclear materials
An accident at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory released 300 kCi (11 PBq) of tritium gas. Subsequent study found this release was not likely to produce adverse health effects in the surrounding communities.[44]

11 October 1965 – Rocky Flats Plant, Golden, Colorado, USA – Fire, exposure of workers
A fire at Rocky Flats exposed a crew of 25 to up to 17 times the legal limit for radiation.

December 5, 1965 – coast of Japan – Loss of a nuclear bomb
A U.S. Navy A-4E Skyhawk aircraft with one B43 nuclear bomb on board fell off the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga into 16,200 feet (4,900 m) of water while the ship was underway from Vietnam to Yokosuka, Japan. The plane, pilot and weapon were never recovered. There is dispute over exactly where the incident took place—the U.S. Defense Department originally stated it took place 500 miles (800 km) off the coast of Japan, but Navy documents later show it happened about 80 miles (130 km) from the Ryukyu Islands and 200 miles (320 km) from Okinawa.[45]

January 17, 1966 – Palomares incident – Accidental destruction, loss and recovery of nuclear bombs
A USAF B-52 carrying four hydrogen bombs collided with a USAF KC-135 jet tanker during over-ocean in-flight refueling. Four of the B-52's seven crew members parachuted to safety while the remaining three were killed along with all four of the KC-135's crew. The conventional explosives in two of the bombs detonated upon impact with the ground, dispersing plutonium over nearby farms. A third bomb landed intact near Palomares while the fourth fell 12 miles (19 km) off the coast into the Mediterranean sea. The US Navy conducted a three month search involving 12,000 men and successfully recovered the fourth bomb. The U.S. Navy employed the use of the deep-diving research submarine DSV Alvin to aid in the recovery efforts. During the ensuing cleanup, 1,500 tonnes (1,700 short tons) of radioactive soil and tomato plants were shipped to a nuclear dump in Aiken, South Carolina. The U.S. settled claims by 522 Palomares residents for $600,000. The town also received a $200,000 desalinization plant. The motion picture Men of Honor (2000), starring Cuba Gooding, Jr., as USN Diver Carl Brashear, and Robert De Niro as USN Diver Billy Sunday, contained an account of the fourth bomb's recovery.[46]

January 21, 1968 – 1968 Thule Air Base B-52 crash, Greenland – Loss and partial recovery of nuclear bombs
A fire broke out in the navigator's compartment of a USAF B-52 near Thule Air Base, Greenland. The bomber crashed 7 miles (11 km) from the air base, rupturing its nuclear payload of four hydrogen bombs. The recovery and decontamination effort was complicated by Greenland's harsh weather. Contaminated ice and debris were buried in the United States. Bomb fragments were recycled by Pantex, in Amarillo, Texas. The incident caused outrage and protests in Denmark, as Greenland is a Danish possession and Denmark forbade nuclear weapons on its territory.

May 22, 1968 – 740 km (400 nmi) southwest of the Azores – Loss of nuclear reactor and two W34 nuclear warheads
The USS Scorpion (SSN-589) sank while enroute from Rota, Spain, to Naval Base Norfolk. The cause of sinking remains unknown; all 99 officers and men on board were killed. The wreckage of the ship, its S5W reactor, and its two Mark 45 torpedoes with W34 nuclear warheads, remain on the sea floor in more than 3,000 m (9,800 ft) of water.

May 24, 1968 – location unknown – Loss of cooling, radioactive contamination, nuclear fuel damaged
During sea trials the Soviet nuclear submarine K-27 (Project 645) suffered severe problems with its reactor cooling systems. After spending some time at reduced power, reactor output inexplicably dropped and sensors detected an increase of gamma radiation in the reactor compartment to 150 rad/h. The safety buffer tank released radioactive gases further contaminating the submarine. The crew shut the reactor down and subsequent investigation found that approximately 20% of the fuel assemblies were damaged. The entire submarine was scuttled in the Kara Sea in 1981.

August 27, 1968 – Severodvinsk, Russia (then USSR) – Reactor power excursion, contamination
While in the naval yards at Severodvinsk for repairs Soviet Yankee-class nuclear submarine K-140 suffered an uncontrolled increase of the reactor's power output. One of the reactors activated automatically when workers raised control rods to a higher position and power increased to 18 times normal, while pressure and temperature levels in the reactor increased to four times normal. The accident also increased radiation levels aboard the vessel. The problem was traced to the incorrect installation of control rod electrical cables.

May 11, 1969 – Rocky Flats Plant, Golden, Colorado, USA – Plutonium fire, contamination
An accident in which 5 kilograms of plutonium burnt inside a glovebox at Rocky Flats. Cleanup took two years and was the costliest industrial accident ever to occur in the United States at that time.[47][48][49]

1970s

April 12, 1970 – Bay of Biscay – Loss of a nuclear submarine
The Soviet November-class attack submarine K-8 sank during salvage with 52 sailors onboard after suffering fires in two compartments simultaneously. Both reactors were shut down. The crew attempted to hook a tow line to an Eastern Bloc merchant vessel, but ultimately failed.[50]

Baneberry's radioactive plume rises from a shock fissure. Contaminants were carried in three different directions by the wind

December 18, 1970 – Nevada Test Site – Accidental venting of nuclear explosion
In Area 8 on Yucca Flat, the 10 kiloton "Baneberry" weapons test of Operation Emery detonated as planned at the bottom of a sealed vertical shaft 900 feet below the Earth's surface but the device's energy cracked the soil in unexpected ways, causing a fissure near ground zero and the failure of the shaft stemming and cap.[51] A plume of hot gases and radioactive dust was released three and a half minutes after ignition,[52] and continuing for many hours, raining fallout on workers within NTS. Six percent of the explosion's radioactive products were vented. The plume released 6.7 MCi of radioactive material, including 80 kCi of Iodine-131 and a high ratio of noble gases.[53] After dropping a portion of its load in the area, the hot cloud's lighter particles were carried to three altitudes and conveyed by winter storms and the jet stream to be deposited heavily as radionuclide-laden snow in Lassen and Sierra counties in northeast California, and to lesser degrees in northern Nevada, southern Idaho and some eastern sections of Oregon and Washington states.[54] The three diverging jet stream layers conducted radionuclides across the US to Canada, the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean. Some 86 workers at the site were exposed to radioactivity, but according to the Department of Energy none received a dose exceeding site guidelines and, similarly, radiation drifting offsite was not considered to pose a hazard by the DOE.[55] In March 2009, TIME magazine identified the Baneberry Test as one of the world's worst nuclear disasters.[56]
December 12, 1971 – New London, Connecticut, USA – Spill of irradiated water
During the transfer of radioactive coolant water from the submarine USS Dace to the submarine tender USS Fulton 500 US gallons (1,900 l; 420 imp gal) were spilled into the Thames River (USA).
December 1972 – Pawling, New York, USA – Contamination
A major fire and two explosions contaminated the plant and grounds of a plutonium fabrication facility resulting in a permanent shutdown.

1975 – location unknown – Contamination
Radioactive resin contaminates the American Sturgeon-class submarine USS Guardfish after wind unexpectedly blows the powder back towards the ship. The resin is used to remove dissolved radioactive minerals and particles from the primary coolant loops of submarines. This type of accident was fairly common; however, U.S. Navy nuclear vessels no longer discharge resin at sea.

October 1975 – Apra Harbor, Guam – Spill of irradiated water
While disabled, the submarine tender USS Proteus discharged radioactive coolant water. A Geiger counter at two of the harbor's public beaches showed 100 millirems/hour, fifty times the allowable dose.[citation needed]

August 1976 – Benton County, Washington, USA – Explosion, contamination of worker
An explosion at the Hanford site Plutonium Finishing Plant blew out a quarter-inch-thick lead glass window. Harold McCluskey, a worker, was showered with nitric acid and radioactive glass. He inhaled the largest dose of 241Am ever recorded, about 500 times the U.S. government occupational standards. The worker was placed in isolation for five months and given an experimental drug to flush the isotope from his body. By 1977, his body's radiation count had fallen by about 80 percent. He died of natural causes in 1987 at age 75.[57]

1977 – coast of Kamchatka – Loss and recovery of a nuclear warhead
The Soviet submarine K-171 accidentally released a nuclear warhead. The warhead was recovered after a search involving dozens of ships and aircraft.[58]

January 24, 1978 – Northwest Territories, Canada – Spill of nuclear fuel
Cosmos 954, a Soviet Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite with an onboard nuclear reactor, failed to separate from its booster and broke up on reentry over Canada. The fuel was spread over a wide area and some radioactive pieces were recovered. The Soviet Union eventually paid the Canadian Government $3 million CAD for expenses relating to the crash.

May 22, 1978 – near Puget Sound, Washington, USA – Spill of irradiated water
A valve was mistakenly opened aboard the submarine USS Puffer releasing up to 500 US gallons (1,900 l; 420 imp gal) of radioactive water.

1980s

September 18, 1980 – At about 6:30 p.m., an airman conducting maintenance on a USAF Titan-II missile at Little Rock Air Force Base's Launch Complex 374-7 in Southside (Van Buren County), just north of Damascus, Arkansas, dropped a socket from a socket wrench, which fell about 80 feet (24 m) before hitting and piercing the skin on the rocket's first-stage fuel tank, causing it to leak. The area was evacuated. At about 3:00 a.m., on September 19, 1980, the hypergolic fuel exploded. The W53 warhead landed about 100 feet (30 m) from the launch complex's entry gate; its safety features operated correctly and prevented any loss of radioactive material. An Air Force airman was killed and the launch complex was destroyed.[59]
August 8, 1982 – While on duty in the Barents Sea, there was a release of liquid metal coolant from the reactor of the Soviet Project 705 Alfa-class submarine K-123. The accident was caused by a leak in the steam generator. Approximately two tons of metal alloy leaked into the reactor compartment, irreparably damaging the reactor such that it had to be replaced. It took nine years to repair the submarine.
January 3, 1983 – The Soviet nuclear-powered spy satellite Kosmos 1402 burns up over the South Atlantic.
August 10, 1985 – About 35 miles (56 km) from Vladivostok in Chazhma Bay, Soviet submarine K-431, a Soviet Echo-class submarine had a reactor explosion, producing fatally high levels of radiation. Ten men were killed, but the deadly cloud of radioactivity did not reach Vladivostok.[60]
1986 – The U.S. government declassifies 19,000 pages of documents indicating that between 1946 and 1986, the Hanford Site near Richland, Washington, released thousands of US gallons of radioactive liquids. Many of the people living in the affected area received low doses of radiation from 131I.
October 3, 1986 – 480 miles (770 km) east of Bermuda, K-219, a Soviet Yankee I-class submarine experienced an explosion in one of its nuclear missile tubes and at least three crew members were killed. Sixteen nuclear missiles and two reactors were on board. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev privately communicated news of the disaster to U.S. President Ronald Reagan before publicly acknowledging the incident on October 4. Two days later, on October 6, the submarine sank in the Atlantic Ocean while under tow in 18,000 feet (5,500 m) of water.[61]
October 1988 – At the nuclear trigger assembly facility at Rocky Flats in Colorado, two employees and a D.O.E. inspector inhaled radioactive particles, causing closure of the plant. Several safety violations were cited, including uncalibrated monitors, inadequate fire equipment, and groundwater contaminated with radioactivity.

1990s

1997 – Georgian soldiers suffer radiation poisoning and burns. They are eventually traced back to training sources abandoned, forgotten, and unlabeled after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. One was a 137Cs pellet in a pocket of a shared jacket which put out about 130,000 times the level of background radiation at 1 meter distance.[62]

2000s

February 2003: Oak Ridge, Tennessee Y-12 facility. During the final testing of a new saltless uranium processing method, there was a small explosion followed by a fire. The explosion occurred in an unvented vessel containing unreacted calcium, water and depleted uranium. An exothermic reaction among these articles generated enough steam to burst the container. This small explosion breached its glovebox, allowing air to enter and ignite some loose uranium powder. Three employees were contaminated. BWXT Y-12 (now B&W Y-12), a partnership of Babcock & Wilcox and Bechtel, was fined $82,500 for the accident.[63]

4.
The Karlsruhe plutonium affair

An unnamed man was convicted of attempting to poison his ex-wife in 2001 with plutonium stolen from WAK (Wiederaufbereitungsanlage Karlsruhe), a small scale reprocessing plant where he worked. He did not steal a large amount of plutonium, only rags used for wiping surfaces and a small amount of liquid waste.[1][2] At least two people (besides the criminal) were contaminated by the plutonium.[3] Two flats in Landau in the Rhineland-Palatinate were contaminated, and had to be cleaned at a cost of two million euro.[4] Photographs of the case and details of other nuclear crimes have been presented by a worker at the Institute for Transuranium Elements.[5]
The Litvinenko assassination

Alexander Litvinenko died from polonium-210 poisoning in 2006. British officials said investigators had concluded the murder of Litvinenko was "a 'state-sponsored' assassination orchestrated by Russian security services."[6] On 20 January 2007 British police announced that they had "identified the man they believe poisoned Alexander Litvinenko," Andrei Lugovoi.[7]
Roman Tsepov homicide

Roman Tsepov, a politically influential Russian who provided security to Vladimir Putin and others, fell sick on September 11, 2004 after a trip to Moscow, and died on September 24. A postmortem investigation found a poisoning by an unspecified radioactive material. He had symptoms similar to Aleksandr Litvinenko[8][9][10].
Zheleznodorozhny criminal radiological act

An unnamed truck driver was killed by 5 months of radiation exposure to a 1.3 Curie cesium 137 source that had been put into the door of his truck around February 1995. He died of radiation-induced leukemia on 27 April 1997.[11]
Vladimir Kaplun radiation homicide

In 1993, director of the Kartontara packing company Vladimir Kaplun was killed by radioactive material (probably cesium-137) placed in his chair. He died of radiation sickness after a month of hospitalization. The source of the radiation was found after his death.[12]
Intentional theft/attempted theft of radioactive material

For accidental theft or attempted theft of radioactive materials, see the list of radiation accidents.
Grozny cobalt theft/attempted theft

On 13 September 1999, six people attempted to steal radioactive cobalt rods from a chemical plant in the city of Grozny in the Chechen Republic. During the theft, the suspects opened the radioactive material container and handled it, resulting in the deaths of three of the suspects and injury of the remaining three. The suspect who held the material directly in his hands died of radiation exposure 30 minutes later. This incident is described as an attempted theft, but some of the rods are reportedly still missing.[13]
Criminal use of X-ray equipment and other radiation technology by secret police

Some former East German dissidents claim that the Stasi used X-ray equipment to induce cancer in political prisoners.[14]

Similarly, some anti-Castro activists claim that the Cuban secret police sometimes used radioactive isotopes to induce cancer in "adversaries they wished to destroy with as little notice as possible".[15] In 1997, the Cuban expatriate columnist Carlos Alberto Montaner called this method "the Bulgarian Treatment", after its alleged use by the Bulgarian secret police.[16]
Quack medicine

In the early 20th century a series of "medical" products which contained radioactive elements were marketed to the general public. These are included in this discussion of nuclear/radioactive crime because the sale and production of these products is now covered by criminal law. Because some perfectly good radioactive medical products exist, (such as iodine-131 for the treatment of cancer), it is important to note that sale of products similar to those described below is criminal, as they are unlicensed medicines.

Radithor, a well known patent medicine/snake oil, is possibly the best known example of radioactive quackery. It consisted of triple distilled water containing at a minimum 1 microcurie each of the radium 226 and 228 isotopes.[17]

Radithor was manufactured from 1918 - 1928 by the Bailey Radium Laboratories, Inc., of East Orange, New Jersey. The head of the laboratories was listed as Dr. William J. A. Bailey, not a medical doctor.[18] It was advertised as "A Cure for the Living Dead"[19] as well as "Perpetual Sunshine".

These radium elixirs were marketed similar to the way opiates were peddled to the masses with laudanum an age earlier, and electrical cure-alls during the same time period such as the Prostate Warmer.[20]

The eventual death of the socialite Eben Byers from Radithor consumption and the associated radiation poisoning led to the strengthening of the Food and Drug Administration's powers and the demise of most radiation quack cures.

5.
Nuclear proliferation
See also: List of states with nuclear weapons

Research into the development of nuclear weapons was undertaken during World War II by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and the USSR. The United States was the first and is the only country to have used a nuclear weapon in war, when it used two bombs against Japan in August 1945. With their loss during the war, Germany and Japan ceased to be involved in any nuclear weapon research. In August 1949, the USSR tested a nuclear weapon.[1] The United Kingdom tested a nuclear weapon in October 1952. France developed a nuclear weapon in 1960. The People's Republic of China detonated a nuclear weapon in 1964. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, and Pakistan tested a weapon in 1998. In 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test.
Non-proliferation efforts

Early efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation involved intense government secrecy, the wartime acquisition of known uranium stores (the Combined Development Trust), and at times even outright sabotage—such as the bombing of a heavy-water facility thought to be used for a German nuclear program. None of these efforts were explicitly public, because the weapon developments themselves were kept secret until the bombing of Hiroshima.

Earnest international efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation began soon after World War II, when the Truman Administration proposed the Baruch Plan[2] of 1946, named after Bernard Baruch, America's first representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. The Baruch Plan, which drew heavily from the Acheson–Lilienthal Report of 1946, proposed the verifiable dismantlement and destruction of the U.S. nuclear arsenal (which, at that time, was the only nuclear arsenal in the world) after all governments had cooperated successfully to accomplish two things: (1) the establishment of an "international atomic development authority," which would actually own and control all military-applicable nuclear materials and activities, and (2) the creation of a system of automatic sanctions, which not even the U.N. Security Council could veto, and which would proportionately punish states attempting to acquire the capability to make nuclear weapons or fissile material.

Although the Baruch Plan enjoyed wide international support, it failed to emerge from the UNAEC because the Soviet Union planned to veto it in the Security Council. Still, it remained official American policy until 1953, when President Eisenhower made his "Atoms for Peace" proposal before the U.N. General Assembly. Eisenhower's proposal led eventually to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957. Under the "Atoms for Peace" program thousands of scientists from around the world were educated in nuclear science and then dispatched home, where many later pursued secret weapons programs in their home country.[3]

Efforts to conclude an international agreement to limit the spread of nuclear weapons did not begin until the early 1960s, after four nations (the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France) had acquired nuclear weapons (see List of countries with nuclear weapons for more information). Although these efforts stalled in the early 1960s, they renewed once again in 1964, after China detonated a nuclear weapon. In 1968, governments represented at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) finished negotiations on the text of the NPT. In June 1968, the U.N. General Assembly endorsed the NPT with General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII), and in July 1968, the NPT opened for signature in Washington, DC, London and Moscow. The NPT entered into force in March 1970.

Since the mid-1970s, the primary focus of non-proliferation efforts has been to maintain, and even increase, international control over the fissile material and specialized technologies necessary to build such devices because these are the most difficult and expensive parts of a nuclear weapons program. The main materials whose generation and distribution is controlled are highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Other than the acquisition of these special materials, the scientific and technical means for weapons construction to develop rudimentary, but working, nuclear explosive devices are considered to be within the reach of industrialized nations.

Since its founding by the United Nations in 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has promoted two, sometimes contradictory, missions: on the one hand, the Agency seeks to promote and spread internationally the use of civilian nuclear energy; on the other hand, it seeks to prevent, or at least detect, the diversion of civilian nuclear energy to nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices or purposes unknown. The IAEA now operates a safeguards system as specified under Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, which aims to ensure that civil stocks of uranium, plutonium, as well as facilities and technologies associated with these nuclear materials, are used only for peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation or nuclear weapons programs. It is often argued that proliferation of nuclear weapons to many other states has been prevented by the extension of assurances and mutual defence treaties to these states by nuclear powers, but other factors, such as national prestige, or specific historical experiences, also play a part in hastening or stopping nuclear proliferation.[4]
Dual use technology

Dual use technology refers to the possibility of military use of civilian nuclear power technology. Many technologies and materials associated with the creation of a nuclear power program have a dual-use capability, in that they can be used to make nuclear weapons if a country chooses to do so. When this happens a nuclear power program can become a route leading to the atomic bomb or a public annex to a secret bomb program. The crisis over Iran’s nuclear activities is a case in point.[5]

Many UN and US agencies warn that building more nuclear reactors unavoidably increases nuclear proliferation risks.[6] A fundamental goal for American and global security is to minimize the proliferation risks associated with the expansion of nuclear power. If this development is "poorly managed or efforts to contain risks are unsuccessful, the nuclear future will be dangerous".[5] For nuclear power programs to be developed and managed safely and securely, it is important that countries have domestic “good governance” characteristics that will encourage proper nuclear operations and management:[5]

These characteristics include low degrees of corruption (to avoid officials selling materials and technology for their own personal gain as occurred with the A.Q. Khan smuggling network in Pakistan), high degrees of political stability (defined by the World Bank as “likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism”), high governmental effectiveness scores (a World Bank aggregate measure of “the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures [and] the quality of policy formulation and implementation”), and a strong degree of regulatory competence.[5]

International cooperation
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Main article: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

At present, 189 countries are States Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, more commonly known as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT. These include the five Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) recognized by the NPT: the People's Republic of China, France, Russian Federation, the UK, and the United States.

Notable non-signatories to the NPT are Israel, Pakistan, and India (the latter two have since tested nuclear weapons, while Israel is considered by most to be an unacknowledged nuclear weapons state). North Korea was once a signatory but withdrew in January 2003. The legality of North Korea's withdrawal is debatable but as of 9 October 2006, North Korea clearly possesses the capability to make a nuclear explosive device.
International Atomic Energy Agency
Main article: International Atomic Energy Agency

The IAEA was established on 29 July 1957 to help nations develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Allied to this role is the administration of safeguards arrangements to provide assurance to the international community that individual countries are honoring their commitments under the treaty. Though established under its own international treaty, the IAEA reports to both the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council.

The IAEA regularly inspects civil nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation supplied to it. The agency checks inventories, and samples and analyzes materials. Safeguards are designed to deter diversion of nuclear material by increasing the risk of early detection. They are complemented by controls on the export of sensitive technology from countries such as UK and United States through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The main concern of the IAEA is that uranium not be enriched beyond what is necessary for commercial civil plants, and that plutonium which is produced by nuclear reactors not be refined into a form that would be suitable for bomb production.
Scope of safeguards
See also: Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials

Traditional safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes.

Parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguard measures applied by the IAEA. These require that operators of nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed accounting records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear material. Over 550 facilities and several hundred other locations are subject to regular inspection, and their records and the nuclear material being audited. Inspections by the IAEA are complemented by other measures such as surveillance cameras and instrumentation.

The inspections act as an alert system providing a warning of the possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities. The system relies on;

Material Accountancy – tracking all inward and outward transfers and the flow of materials in any nuclear facility. This includes sampling and analysis of nuclear material, on-site inspections, and review and verification of operating records.
Physical Security – restricting access to nuclear materials at the site.
Containment and Surveillance – use of seals, automatic cameras and other instruments to detect unreported movement or tampering with nuclear materials, as well as spot checks on-site.

All NPT non-weapons states must accept these full-scope safeguards. In the five weapons states plus the non-NPT states (India, Pakistan and Israel), facility-specific safeguards apply. IAEA inspectors regularly visit these facilities to verify completeness and accuracy of records.

The terms of the NPT cannot be enforced by the IAEA itself, nor can nations be forced to sign the treaty. In reality, as shown in Iraq and North Korea, safeguards can be backed up by diplomatic, political and economic measures.

While traditional safeguards easily verified the correctness of formal declarations by suspect states, in the 1990s attention turned to what might not have been declared. While accepting safeguards at declared facilities, Iraq had set up elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium to weapons grade. North Korea attempted to use research reactors (not commercial electricity-generating reactors) and a reprocessing plant to produce some weapons-grade plutonium.

The weakness of the NPT regime lay in the fact that no obvious diversion of material was involved. The uranium used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and the nuclear facilities were built by the countries themselves without being declared or placed under safeguards. Iraq, as an NPT party, was obliged to declare all facilities but did not do so. Nevertheless, the activities were detected and brought under control using international diplomacy. In Iraq, a military defeat assisted this process.

In North Korea, the activities concerned took place before the conclusion of its NPT safeguards agreement. With North Korea, the promised provision of commercial power reactors appeared to resolve the situation for a time, but it later withdrew from the NPT and declared it had nuclear weapons.
Additional Protocol

In 1993 a program was initiated to strengthen and extend the classical safeguards system, and a model protocol was agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors 1997. The measures boosted the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the civil fuel cycle.

Innovations were of two kinds. Some could be implemented on the basis of IAEA's existing legal authority through safeguards agreements and inspections. Others required further legal authority to be conferred through an Additional Protocol. This must be agreed by each non-weapons state with IAEA, as a supplement to any existing comprehensive safeguards agreement. Weapons states have agreed to accept the principles of the model additional protocol.

Key elements of the model Additional Protocol:

The IAEA is to be given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including R & D, production of uranium and thorium (regardless of whether it is traded), and nuclear-related imports and exports.
IAEA inspectors will have greater rights of access. This will include any suspect location, it can be at short notice (e.g., two hours), and the IAEA can deploy environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities.
States must streamline administrative procedures so that IAEA inspectors get automatic visa renewal and can communicate more readily with IAEA headquarters.
Further evolution of safeguards is towards evaluation of each state, taking account of its particular situation and the kind of nuclear materials it has. This will involve greater judgement on the part of IAEA and the development of effective methodologies which reassure NPT States.

As of 20 December 2010, 139 countries have signed Additional Protocols, 104 have brought them into force, and one (Iraq) is implementing its protocol provisionally.[7] The IAEA is also applying the measures of the Additional Protocol in Taiwan.[8] Among the leading countries that have not signed the Additional Protocol are Egypt, which says it will not sign until Israel accepts comprehensive IAEA safeguards,[9] and Brazil, which opposes making the protocol a requirement for international cooperation on enrichment and reprocessing,[10] but has not ruled out signing.[11]
Limitations of Safeguards

The greatest risk from nuclear weapons proliferation comes from countries which have not joined the NPT and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities; India, Pakistan, and Israel fall within this category. While safeguards apply to some of their activities, others remain beyond scrutiny.

A further concern is that countries may develop various sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities and research reactors under full safeguards and then subsequently opt out of the NPT. Bilateral agreements, such as insisted upon by Australia and Canada for sale of uranium, address this by including fallback provisions, but many countries are outside the scope of these agreements. If a nuclear-capable country does leave the NPT, it is likely to be reported by the IAEA to the UN Security Council, just as if it were in breach of its safeguards agreement. Trade sanctions would then be likely.

IAEA safeguards, together with bilateral safeguards applied under the NPT can, and do, ensure that uranium supplied by countries such as Australia and Canada does not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact, the worldwide application of those safeguards and the substantial world trade in uranium for nuclear electricity make the proliferation of nuclear weapons much less likely.

The Additional Protocol, once it is widely in force, will provide credible assurance that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in the states concerned. This will be a major step forward in preventing nuclear proliferation.
Other developments

The Nuclear Suppliers Group communicated its guidelines, essentially a set of export rules, to the IAEA in 1978. These were to ensure that transfers of nuclear material or equipment would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, and formal government assurances to this effect were required from recipients. The Guidelines also recognised the need for physical protection measures in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials, and strengthened retransfer provisions. The group began with seven members – the United States, the former USSR, the UK, France, Germany, Canada and Japan – but now includes 46 countries including all five nuclear weapons states.

According to Kenneth D. Bergeron's Tritium on Ice: The Dangerous New Alliance of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power, tritium is not classified as a 'special nuclear material' but rather as a 'by-product'. It is seen as an important litmus test on the seriousness of the United States' intention to nuclear disarm. This radioactive super-heavy hydrogen isotope is used to boost the efficiency of fissile materials in nuclear weapons. The United States resumed tritium production in 2003 for the first time in 15 years. This could indicate that there is a potential nuclear arm stockpile replacement since the isotope naturally decays.

In May 1995, NPT parties reaffirmed their commitment to a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty to prohibit the production of any further fissile material for weapons. This aims to complement the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996 (not entered into force as of 2011) and to codify commitments made by the United States, the UK, France and Russia to cease production of weapons material, as well as putting a similar ban on China. This treaty will also put more pressure on Israel, India and Pakistan to agree to international verification.[citation needed]

On 9 August 2005, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. Khamenei's official statement was made at the meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. [2] As of February 2006 Iran formally announced that uranium enrichment within their borders has continued. Iran claims it is for peaceful purposes but the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States claim the purpose is for nuclear weapons research and construction.[12]
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NPT Non-Signatories

India, Pakistan and Israel have been "threshold" countries in terms of the international non-proliferation regime. They possess or are quickly capable of assembling one or more nuclear weapons. They have remained outside the 1970 NPT. They are thus largely excluded from trade in nuclear plant or materials, except for safety-related devices for a few safeguarded facilities.

In May 1998 India and Pakistan each exploded several nuclear devices underground. This heightened concerns regarding an arms race between them, with Pakistan involving the People's Republic of China, an acknowledged nuclear weapons state. Both countries are opposed to the NPT as it stands, and India has consistently attacked the Treaty since its inception in 1970 labeling it as a lopsided treaty in favor of the nuclear powers.

Relations between the two countries are tense and hostile, and the risks of nuclear conflict between them have long been considered quite high. Kashmir is a prime cause of bilateral tension, its sovereignty being in dispute since 1948. There is persistent low level military conflict due to Pakistan backing an insurgency there and the disputed status of Kashmir.

Both engaged in a conventional arms race in the 1980s, including sophisticated technology and equipment capable of delivering nuclear weapons. In the 1990s the arms race quickened. In 1994 India reversed a four-year trend of reduced allocations for defence, and despite its much smaller economy, Pakistan was expected to push its own expenditures yet higher. Both have lost their patrons: India, the former USSR, and Pakistan, the United States.

But it is the growth and modernization of China's nuclear arsenal and its assistance with Pakistan's nuclear power programme and, reportedly, with missile technology, which exacerbate Indian concerns. In particular, Pakistan is aided by China's People's Liberation Army, which operates somewhat autonomously within that country as an exporter of military material.
India

Nuclear power for civil use is well established in India. Its civil nuclear strategy has been directed towards complete independence in the nuclear fuel cycle, necessary because of its outspoken rejection of the NPT. This self-sufficiency extends from uranium exploration and mining through fuel fabrication, heavy water production, reactor design and construction, to reprocessing and waste management. It has a small fast breeder reactor and is planning a much larger one. It is also developing technology to utilise its abundant resources of thorium as a nuclear fuel.

India has 14 small nuclear power reactors in commercial operation, two larger ones under construction, and ten more planned. The 14 operating ones (2548 MWe total) comprise:

two 150 MWe BWRs from the United States, which started up in 1969, now use locally enriched uranium and are under safeguards,
two small Canadian PHWRs (1972 & 1980), also under safeguards, and
ten local PHWRs based on Canadian designs, two of 150 and eight 200 MWe.
two new 540 MWe and two 700 MWe plants at tarapore (known as TAPP :Tarapore Atomic Power Project)

The two under construction and two of the planned ones are 450 MWe versions of these 200 MWe domestic products. Construction has been seriously delayed by financial and technical problems. In 2001 a final agreement was signed with Russia for the country's first large nuclear power plant, comprising two VVER-1000 reactors, under a Russian-financed US$3 billion contract. The first unit is due to be commissioned in 2007. A further two Russian units are under consideration for the site.

Nuclear power supplied 3.1% of India's electricity in 2000 and this was expected to reach 10% by 2005. Its industry is largely without IAEA safeguards, though a few plants (see above) are under facility-specific safeguards. As a result India's nuclear power programme proceeds largely without fuel or technological assistance from other countries.

Its weapons material appears to come from a Canadian-designed 40MW "research" reactor which started up in 1960, well before the NPT, and a 100MW indigenous unit in operation since 1985. Both use local uranium, as India does not import any nuclear fuel. It is estimated that India may have built up enough weapons-grade plutonium for a hundred nuclear warheads.

It is widely believed that the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan used CANDU reactors to produce fissionable materials for their weapons; however, this is not accurate. Both Canada (by supplying the 40 MW research reactor) and the United States (by supplying 21 tons of heavy water) supplied India with the technology necessary to create a nuclear weapons program, dubbed CIRUS (Canada-India Reactor, United States). Canada sold India the reactor on the condition that the reactor and any by-products would be "employed for peaceful purposes only.". Similarly, the United States sold India heavy water for use in the reactor "only... in connection with research into and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes". India, in violation of these agreements, used the Canadian-supplied reactor and American-supplied heavy water to produce plutonium for their first nuclear explosion, Smiling Buddha.[13] The Indian government controversially justified this, however, by claiming that Smiling Buddha was a "peaceful nuclear explosion."

The country has at least three other research reactors including the tiny one which is exploring the use of thorium as a nuclear fuel, by breeding fissile U-233. In addition, an advanced heavy-water thorium cycle is under development.

India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, the so-called Smiling Buddha test, which it has consistently claimed was for peaceful purposes. Others saw it as a response to China's nuclear weapons capability. It was then universally perceived, notwithstanding official denials, to possess, or to be able to quickly assemble, nuclear weapons. In 1999 it deployed its own medium-range missile and has developed an intermediate-range missile capable of reaching targets in China's industrial heartland.

In 1995 the United States quietly intervened to head off a proposed nuclear test. However, in 1998 there were five more tests in Operation Shakti. These were unambiguously military, including one claimed to be of a sophisticated thermonuclear device, and their declared purpose was "to help in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields and different delivery systems".

Indian security policies are driven by:

its determination to be recognized as a dominant power in the region
its increasing concern with China's expanding nuclear weapons and missile delivery programmes
its concern with Pakistan's capability to deliver nuclear weapons deep into India

It perceives nuclear weapons as a cost-effective political counter to China's nuclear and conventional weaponry, and the effects of its nuclear weapons policy in provoking Pakistan is, by some accounts, considered incidental. India has had an unhappy relationship with China. After an uneasy ceasefire ended the 1962 war, relations between the two nations were frozen until 1998. Since then a degree of high-level contact has been established and a few elementary confidence-building measures put in place. China still occupies some territory which it captured during the aforementioned war, claimed by India, and India still occupies some territory claimed by China. Its nuclear weapon and missile support for Pakistan is a major bone of contention.

American President George W. Bush met with India Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to discuss India's involvement with nuclear weapons. The two countries agreed that the United States would give nuclear power assistance to India.[citation needed]
Pakistan
This section needs additional citations for verification. (July 2011)
In 2003, Libya admitted that the nuclear weapons-related material including these centrifuges were acquired from Pakistan

Nuclear power supplies only 2.34% of Pakistan's electricity. It has one small (125 MWe) Canadian PHWR nuclear power reactor from 1971 which is under international safeguards, and two 300 MWe PWRs supplied by China under safeguards, which started up in June 2000 and May 2011. China is supplying the low-enriched uranium fuel for these PWRs, along with two additional reactors.

Pakistan also has a 9 MW research reactor of 1965 vintage, and there are persistent reports of another "multipurpose" reactor, a 50 MW PHWR near Khushab, which is presumed to have potential for producing weapons plutonium.

Pakistan has also produced nuclear weapons, using indigenous uranium to produce both highly enriched uranium and, more recently, plutonium. It has at least one small centrifuge enrichment plant. In 1990 the United States cut off military assistance to Pakistan because it was unable to certify that Pakistan was not pursuing a policy of manufacturing nuclear weapons. This was relaxed late in 2001.

Pakistan made it clear in early 1996 that it had done the basic development work, and that if India staged a nuclear test, Pakistan would immediately start assembling its own nuclear explosive device. It is assumed to now have enough highly enriched uranium for up to forty nuclear warheads. In May 1998, within weeks of India's nuclear tests, Pakistan announced that it had conducted six underground tests in the Chagai Hills, five on the 28th and one on the 30th of that month. Seismic events consistent with these claims were recorded.

In the 1970s, Pakistan first focused on the plutonium route, expecting to obtain the fissile material from a reprocessing plant to be provided by France. This plan failed due to U.S. intervention. Pakistan, not wanting to give up, redoubled its efforts to obtain uranium enrichment technology. The main efforts towards this direction were done under Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. Dr. Khan had earlier worked with Fysisch Dynamisch Onderzoekslaboratorium (FDO). FDO was a subsidiary of the Dutch firm VMF-Stork based in Amsterdam. From 1972 to 1975 Dr. Khan had access to classified data used to enrich ordinary uranium to weapons grade concentrations. FDO was working on the development of ultra high-speed centrifuges for URENCO.

In 1974 while he was on secondment for 17 days as a translator to the URENCO plant in Almelo, he obtained photographs and documents of the plant. Dr. Khan returned to Pakistan in 1976 and initiated the Uranium enrichment program on the basis of the technology he had stolen from his previous employer.[citation needed] After the British Government stopped the British subsidiary of the American Emerson Electric Co from shipping the nuclear technology to Pakistan, Dr. Khan describes his frustration with a supplier from Germany as "That man from the German team was unethical. When he did not get the order from us, he wrote a letter to a Labour Party member and questions were asked in [British] Parliament."[3]

A.Q Khan's efforts made him into a national hero. In 1981, as a tribute, the president of Pakistan, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, renamed the enrichment plant the A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories.

In 2003, the IAEA unearthed a nuclear black market with close ties to Pakistan. It was widely believed to have direct involvement of the government of Pakistan. This claim could not be verified due to the refusal of the government of Pakistan to allow IAEA to interview the alleged head of the nuclear black market, who happened to be no other than Dr. Khan. Dr. Khan later confessed to his crimes on national television, bailing out the government by taking full responsibility. He confessed to nuclear proliferation from Pakistan to Iran and North Korea. He was immediately given presidential immunity. Exact nature of the involvement at the governmental level is still unclear, but the manner in which the government acted cast doubt on the sincerity of Pakistan.[citation needed]
North Korea

North Korea joined the NPT in 1985 and had subsequently signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. However it was believed that North Korea was diverting plutonium extracted from the fuel of its reactor at Yongbyon, for use in nuclear weapons. The subsequent confrontation with IAEA on the issue of inspections and suspected violations, resulted in North Korea threatening to withdraw from the NPT in 1993. This eventually led to negotiations with the United States resulting in the Agreed Framework of 1994, which provided for IAEA safeguards being applied to its reactors and spent fuel rods. These spent fuel rods were sealed in canisters by the United States to prevent North Korea from extracting plutonium from them. North Korea had to therefore freeze its plutonium programme.

During this period Pakistan-North Korea cooperation in missile technology transfer was being established. A high level Pakistani military delegation visited North Korea in August–September 1992, reportedly to discuss the supply of Scud missile technology to Pakistan. In 1993, PM Benazir Bhutto traveled to China and North Korea. The visits are believed to be related to the subsequent acquisition of Ghauri (North Korean No-dong) missiles by Pakistan. During the period 1992–1994, A.Q. Khan was reported to have visited North Korea thirteen times. The missile cooperation program with North Korea was under Dr. A. Q. Khan's Kahuta Research Laboratories. At this time China was under U.S. pressure not to supply the M series of missiles to Pakistan. This forced the latter (possibly with Chinese connivance) to approach North Korea for missile transfers. Reports indicate that North Korea was willing to supply missile sub-systems including rocket motors, inertial guidance systems, control and testing equipment of Scud SSMs for US$ 50 million.

It is not clear what North Korea got in return. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. in Jane's Defence Weekly (27 November 2002) reports that Western analysts had begun to question what North Korea received in payment for the missiles; many suspected it was nuclear technology and components. Khan's KRL was in charge of both Pakistan's uranium enrichment program and also of the missile program with North Korea. It is therefore likely during this period that cooperation in nuclear technology between Pakistan and North Korea was initiated. Western intelligence agencies began to notice exchange of personnel, technology and components between KRL and entities of the North Korean 2nd Economic Committee (responsible for weapons production).

A New York Times report on 18 October 2002 quoted U.S. intelligence officials having stated that Pakistan was a major supplier of critical equipment to North Korea. The report added that equipment such as gas centrifuges appeared to have been "part of a barter deal" in which North Korea supplied Pakistan with missiles. Separate reports indicate (Washington Times, 22 November 2002) that U.S. intelligence had as early as 1999 picked up signs that North Korea was continuing to develop nuclear arms. Other reports also indicate that North Korea had been working covertly to develop an enrichment capability for nuclear weapons for at least five years and had used technology obtained from Pakistan (Washington Times, 18 October 2002).
Israel

Israel is also thought to possess an arsenal of potentially up to several hundred nuclear warheads based on estimates of the amount of fissile material produced by Israel.[14] This has never been openly confirmed or denied however, due to Israel's policy of deliberate ambiguity.[15]

An Israeli nuclear installation is located about ten kilometers to the south of Dimona, the Negev Nuclear Research Center. Its construction commenced in 1958, with French assistance. The official reason given by the Israeli and French governments was to build a nuclear reactor to power a "desalination plant", in order to "green the Negev". The purpose of the Dimona plant is widely assumed to be the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, and the majority of defense experts have concluded that it does in fact do that.[citation needed] However, the Israeli government refuses to confirm or deny this publicly, a policy it refers to as "ambiguity".

Norway sold 20 tonnes of heavy water needed for the reactor to Israel in 1959 and 1960 in a secret deal. There were no "safeguards" required in this deal to prevent usage of the heavy water for non-peaceful purposes. The British newspaper Daily Express accused Israel of working on a bomb in 1960. [3] When the United States intelligence community discovered the purpose of the Dimona plant in the early 1960s, it demanded that Israel agree to international inspections. Israel agreed, but on a condition that U.S., rather than IAEA, inspectors were used, and that Israel would receive advanced notice of all inspections.

Some claim that because Israel knew the schedule of the inspectors' visits, it was able to hide the alleged purpose of the site from the inspectors by installing temporary false walls and other devices before each inspection. The inspectors eventually informed the U.S. government that their inspections were useless due to Israeli restrictions on what areas of the facility they could inspect. In 1969, the United States terminated the inspections.

In 1986, Mordechai Vanunu, a former technician at the Dimona plant, revealed to the media some evidence of Israel's nuclear program. Israeli agents arrested him from Italy, drugged him and transported him to Israel, and an Israeli court then tried him in secret on charges of treason and espionage[citation needed], and sentenced him to eighteen years imprisonment. He was freed on 21 April 2004, but was severely limited by the Israeli government. He was arrested again on 11 November 2004, though formal charges were not immediately filed.

Comments on photographs taken by Mordechai Vanunu inside the Negev Nuclear Research Center have been made by prominent scientists. British nuclear weapons scientist Frank Barnaby, who questioned Vanunu over several days, estimated Israel had enough plutonium for about 150 weapons.[16] Ted Taylor, a bomb designer employed by the United States of America has confirmed the several hundred warhead estimate based on Vanunu's photographs.[citation needed]
See also: Israel and weapons of mass destruction
Nuclear arms control in South Asia

The public stance of the two states on non-proliferation differs markedly. Pakistan appears to have dominated a continuing propaganda debate.

Pakistan has initiated a series of regional security proposals. It has repeatedly proposed a nuclear free zone in South Asia and has proclaimed its willingness to engage in nuclear disarmament and to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty if India would do so. It has endorsed a United States proposal for a regional five power conference to consider non-proliferation in South Asia.

India has taken the view that solutions to regional security issues should be found at the international rather than the regional level, since its chief concern is with China. It therefore rejects Pakistan's proposals.

Instead, the 'Gandhi Plan', put forward in 1988, proposed the revision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it regards as inherently discriminatory in favor of the nuclear-weapon States, and a timetable for complete nuclear weapons disarmament. It endorsed early proposals for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and for an international convention to ban the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes, known as the 'cut-off' convention.

The United States for some years, especially under the Clinton administration, pursued a variety of initiatives to persuade India and Pakistan to abandon their nuclear weapons programs and to accept comprehensive international safeguards on all their nuclear activities. To this end, the Clinton administration proposed a conference of the five nuclear-weapon states, Japan, Germany, India and Pakistan.

India refused this and similar previous proposals, and countered with demands that other potential weapons states, such as Iran and North Korea, should be invited, and that regional limitations would only be acceptable if they were accepted equally by China. The United States would not accept the participation of Iran and North Korea and these initiatives have lapsed.

Another, more recent approach, centers on 'capping' the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, which would hopefully be followed by 'roll back'. To this end, India and the United States jointly sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution in 1993 calling for negotiations for a 'cut-off' convention. Should India and Pakistan join such a convention, they would have to agree to halt the production of fissile materials for weapons and to accept international verification on their relevant nuclear facilities (enrichment and reprocessing plants). It appears that India is now prepared to join negotiations regarding such a Cut-off Treaty, under the UN Conference on Disarmament.

Bilateral confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan to reduce the prospects of confrontation have been limited. In 1990 each side ratified a treaty not to attack the other's nuclear installations, and at the end of 1991 they provided one another with a list showing the location of all their nuclear plants, even though the respective lists were regarded as not being wholly accurate. Early in 1994 India proposed a bilateral agreement for a 'no first use' of nuclear weapons and an extension of the 'no attack' treaty to cover civilian and industrial targets as well as nuclear installations.

Having promoted the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty since 1954, India dropped its support in 1995 and in 1996 attempted to block the Treaty. Following the 1998 tests the question has been reopened and both Pakistan and India have indicated their intention to sign the CTBT. Indian ratification may be conditional upon the five weapons states agreeing to specific reductions in nuclear arsenals. The UN Conference on Disarmament has also called upon both countries "to accede without delay to the Non-Proliferation Treaty", presumably as non-weapons states.
NPT signatories
Egypt

In 2004 and 2005, Egypt disclosed past undeclared nuclear activities and material to the IAEA. In 2007 and 2008, high enriched and low enriched uranium particles were found in environmental samples taken in Egypt.[17] In 2008, the IAEA states Egypt's statements were consistent with its own findings.[18] In May 2009, Reuters reported that the IAEA was conducting further investigation in Egypt.[19][20]
Iran
Main article: Iran and weapons of mass destruction#Nuclear weapons
See also: Nuclear program of Iran

In 2003, the IAEA reported that Iran had been in breach of its obligations to comply with provisions of its safeguard agreement.[21] In 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors voted in a rare non-consensus decision to find Iran in non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to report that non-compliance to the UN Security Council.[22][23] In response, the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions citing concerns about the program.[24][25][26][27][28] Iran's representative to the UN argues sanctions compel Iran to abandon its rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to peaceful nuclear technology.[29] Iran says its uranium enrichment program is exclusively for peaceful purposes[30][31] and has enriched uranium to "less than 5 percent," consistent with fuel for a nuclear power plant and significantly below the purity of WEU (around 90%) typically used in a weapons program.[32][33] The director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano, said in 2009 he had not seen any evidence in IAEA official documents that Iran was developing nuclear weapons.[34]
Iraq

Up to the late 1980s it was generally assumed that any undeclared nuclear activities would have to be based on the diversion of nuclear material from safeguards. States acknowledged the possibility of nuclear activities entirely separate from those covered by safeguards, but it was assumed they would be detected by national intelligence activities. There was no particular effort by IAEA to attempt to detect them.

Iraq had been making efforts to secure a nuclear potential since the 1960s. In the late 1970s a specialised plant, Osiraq, was constructed near Baghdad. The plant was attacked during the Iran–Iraq War and was destroyed by Israeli bombers in June 1981.

Not until the 1990 NPT Review Conference did some states raise the possibility of making more use of (for example) provisions for "special inspections" in existing NPT Safeguards Agreements. Special inspections can be undertaken at locations other than those where safeguards routinely apply, if there is reason to believe there may be undeclared material or activities.

After inspections in Iraq following the UN Gulf War cease-fire resolution showed the extent of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, it became clear that the IAEA would have to broaden the scope of its activities. Iraq was an NPT Party, and had thus agreed to place all its nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. But the inspections revealed that it had been pursuing an extensive clandestine uranium enrichment programme, as well as a nuclear weapons design programme.

The main thrust of Iraq's uranium enrichment program was the development of technology for electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) of indigenous uranium. This uses the same principles as a mass spectrometer (albeit on a much larger scale). Ions of uranium-238 and uranium-235 are separated because they describe arcs of different radii when they move through a magnetic field. This process was used in the Manhattan Project to make the highly enriched uranium used in the Hiroshima bomb, but was abandoned soon afterwards.

The Iraqis did the basic research work at their nuclear research establishment at Tuwaitha, near Baghdad, and were building two full-scale facilities at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat, north of Baghdad. However, when the war broke out, only a few separators had been installed at Tarmiya, and none at Ash Sharqat.

The Iraqis were also very interested in centrifuge enrichment, and had been able to acquire some components including some carbon-fibre rotors, which they were at an early stage of testing.

They were clearly in violation of their NPT and safeguards obligations, and the IAEA Board of Governors ruled to that effect. The UN Security Council then ordered the IAEA to remove, destroy or render harmless Iraq's nuclear weapons capability. This was done by mid 1998, but Iraq then ceased all cooperation with the UN, so the IAEA withdrew from this work.

The revelations from Iraq provided the impetus for a very far-reaching reconsideration of what safeguards are intended to achieve.
See also: Iraq and weapons of mass destruction
Libya
Main article: Libya and nuclear technology
[icon] This section requires expansion. (September 2010)
Myanmar

A report in the Sydney Morning Herald and Searchina, a Japanese newspaper, report that two Myanmarese defectors saying that the Myanmar junta was secretly building a nuclear reactor and plutonium extraction facility with North Korea's help, with the aim of acquiring its first nuclear bomb in five years. According to the report, "The secret complex, much of it in caves tunnelled into a mountain at Naung Laing in northern Burma, runs parallel to a civilian reactor being built at another site by Russia that both the Russians and Burmese say will be put under international safeguards."[35] In 2002, Myanmar had notified IAEA of its intention to pursue a civilian nuclear programme. Later, Russia announced that it would build a nuclear reactor in Myanmar. There have also been reports that two Pakistani scientists, from the AQ Khan stable, had been dispatched to Myanmar where they had settled down, to help Myanmar's project.[citation needed] Recently, the David Albright-led Institute for Science and International Security rang alarm bells about Myanmar attempting a nuclear project with North Korean help.[citation needed] If true, the full weight of international pressure will be brought against Myanmar, said officials familiar with developments. But equally, the information that has been peddled by the defectors is also "preliminary" and could be used by the west to turn the screws on Myanmar—on democracy and human rights issues—in the run-up to the elections in the country in 2010.[citation needed] During an ASEAN meeting in Thailand in July 2009, US secretary of state Hillary Clinton highlighted concerns of the North Korean link. "We know there are also growing concerns about military cooperation between North Korea and Burma which we take very seriously," Clinton said.[36]
North Korea

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) acceded to the NPT in 1985 as a condition for the supply of a nuclear power station by the USSR. However, it delayed concluding its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, a process which should take only 18 months, until April 1992.

During that period, it brought into operation a small gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, natural-uranium (metal) fuelled "Experimental Power Reactor" of about 25 MWt (5 MWe), based on the UK Magnox design. While this was a well-suited design to start a wholly indigenous nuclear reactor development, it also exhibited all the features of a small plutonium production reactor for weapons purposes. North Korea also made substantial progress in the construction of two larger reactors designed on the same principles, a prototype of about 200 MWt (50 MWe), and a full-scale version of about 800 MWt (200 MWe). They made only slow progress; construction halted on both in 1994 and has not resumed. Both reactors have degraded considerably since that time and would take significant efforts to refurbish.

In addition it completed and commissioned a reprocessing plant that makes the Magnox spent nuclear fuel safe, recovering uranium and plutonium. That plutonium, if the fuel was only irradiated to a very low burn-up, would have been in a form very suitable for weapons. Although all these facilities at Yongbyon were to be under safeguards, there was always the risk that at some stage, the DPRK would withdraw from the NPT and use the plutonium for weapons.

One of the first steps in applying NPT safeguards is for the IAEA to verify the initial stocks of uranium and plutonium to ensure that all the nuclear materials in the country have been declared for safeguards purposes. While undertaking this work in 1992, IAEA inspectors found discrepancies which indicated that the reprocessing plant had been used more often than the DPRK had declared, which suggested that the DPRK could have weapons-grade plutonium which it had not declared to the IAEA. Information passed to the IAEA by a Member State (as required by the IAEA) supported that suggestion by indicating that the DPRK had two undeclared waste or other storage sites.

In February 1993 the IAEA called on the DPRK to allow special inspections of the two sites so that the initial stocks of nuclear material could be verified. The DPRK refused, and on 12 March announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT (three months' notice is required). In April 1993 the IAEA Board concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and reported the matter to the UN Security Council. In June 1993 the DPRK announced that it had "suspended" its withdrawal from the NPT, but subsequently claimed a "special status" with respect to its safeguards obligations. This was rejected by IAEA.

Once the DPRK's non-compliance had been reported to the UN Security Council, the essential part of the IAEA's mission had been completed. Inspections in the DPRK continued, although inspectors were increasingly hampered in what they were permitted to do by the DPRK's claim of a "special status". However, some 8,000 corroding fuel rods associated with the experimental reactor have remained under close surveillance.

Following bilateral negotiations between the United States and the DPRK, and the conclusion of the Agreed Framework in October 1994, the IAEA has been given additional responsibilities. The agreement requires a freeze on the operation and construction of the DPRK's plutonium production reactors and their related facilities, and the IAEA is responsible for monitoring the freeze until the facilities are eventually dismantled. The DPRK remains uncooperative with the IAEA verification work and has yet to comply with its safeguards agreement.

While Iraq was defeated in a war, allowing the UN the opportunity to seek out and destroy its nuclear weapons programme as part of the cease-fire conditions, the DPRK was not defeated, nor was it vulnerable to other measures, such as trade sanctions. It can scarcely afford to import anything, and sanctions on vital commodities, such as oil, would either be ineffective or risk provoking war.[citation needed]

Ultimately, the DPRK was persuaded to stop what appeared to be its nuclear weapons programme in exchange, under the agreed framework, for about US$5 billion in energy-related assistance. This included two 1000 MWe light water nuclear power reactors based on an advanced U.S. System-80 design.

In January 2003 the DPRK withdrew from the NPT. In response, a series of discussions among the DPRK, the United States, and China, a series of six-party talks (the parties being the DPRK, the ROK, China, Japan, the United States and Russia) were held in Beijing; the first beginning in April 2004 concerning North Korea's weapons program.

On 10 January 2005, North Korea declared that it was in the possession of nuclear weapons. On 19 September 2005, the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks ended with a joint statement in which North Korea agreed to end its nuclear programs and return to the NPT in exchange for diplomatic, energy and economic assistance. However, by the end of 2005 the DPRK had halted all six-party talks because the United States froze certain DPRK international financial assets such as those in a bank in Macau.

On 9 October 2006, North Korea announced that it has performed its first-ever nuclear weapon test. On 18 December 2006, the six-party talks finally resumed. On 13 February 2007, the parties announced "Initial Actions" to implement the 2005 joint statement including shutdown and disablement of North Korean nuclear facilities in exchange for energy assistance. Reacting to UN sanctions imposed after missile tests in April 2009, North Korea withdrew from the six-party talks, restarted its nuclear facilities and conducted a second nuclear test on 25 May 2009.

See also: North Korea and weapons of mass destruction and Six-party talks
Russia

Security of nuclear weapons in Russia remains a matter of concern. According to high-ranking Russian SVR defector Tretyakov, he had a meeting with two Russian businessman representing a state-created C-W corporation in 1991. They came up with a project of destroying large quantities of chemical wastes collected from Western countries at the island of Novaya Zemlya (a test place for Soviet nuclear weapons) using an underground nuclear blast. The project was rejected by Canadian representatives, but one of the businessmen told Tretyakov that he keeps his own nuclear bomb at his dacha outside Moscow. Tretyakov thought that man was insane, but the "businessmen" (Vladimir K. Dmitriev) replied: "Do not be so naive. With economic conditions the way they are in Russia today, anyone with enough money can buy a nuclear bomb. It's no big deal really".[37]
South Africa

In 1991, South Africa acceded to the NPT, concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and submitted a report on its nuclear material subject to safeguards. At the time, the state had a nuclear power programme producing nearly 10% of the country's electricity, whereas Iraq and North Korea only had research reactors.

The IAEA's initial verification task was complicated by South Africa's announcement that between 1979 and 1989 it built and then dismantled a number of nuclear weapons. South Africa asked the IAEA to verify the conclusion of its weapons programme. In 1995 the IAEA declared that it was satisfied all materials were accounted for and the weapons programme had been terminated and dismantled.

South Africa has signed the NPT, and now holds the distinction of being the only known state to have indigenously produced nuclear weapons, and then verifiably dismantled them.[38]
Syria
Main article: Syria and weapons of mass destruction

On September 6, 2007, Israel bombed an officially unidentified site in Syria which it later asserted was a nuclear reactor under construction (see Operation Orchard).[39] The alleged reactor was not asserted to be operational and it was not asserted that nuclear material had been introduced into it.[17] Syria said the site was a military site and was not involved in any nuclear activities.[17] The IAEA requested Syria to provide further access to the site and any other locations where the debris and equipment from the building had been stored.[17] Syria denounced what it called the Western "fabrication and forging of facts" in regards to the incident.[40] IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei criticized the strikes and deplored that information regarding the matter had not been shared with his agency earlier.[41]
United States cooperation on nuclear weapons with the United Kingdom

The United States has given the UK considerable assistance with nuclear weapon design and construction since the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement. In 1974 a CIA proliferation assessment noted that "In many cases [Britain's sensitive technology in nuclear and missile fields] is based on technology received from the United States and could not legitimately be passed on without U.S. permission."[42]

The U.S. President authorized the transfer of "nuclear weapon parts" to the UK between at least the years 1975 to 1996.[43][44] The UK National Audit Office noted that most of the UK Trident warhead development and production expenditure was incurred in the United States, which would supply "certain warhead-related components".[45][46] Some of the fissile materials for the UK Trident warhead were purchased from the United States.[46] Declassified U.S. Department of Energy documents indicate the UK Trident warhead system was involved in non-nuclear design activities alongside the U.S. W76 nuclear warhead fitted in some U.S. Navy Trident missiles,[47] leading the Federation of American Scientists to speculate that the UK warhead may share design information from the W76.[48]

Under the Mutual Defence Agreement 5.37 tonnes of UK-produced plutonium was sent to the United States in return for 6.7 kg of tritium and 7.5 tonnes of highly enriched uranium over the period 1960–1979. A further 0.47 tonne of plutonium was swapped between the UK and United States for reasons that remain classified.[49] Some of the UK produced plutonium was used in 1962 by the United States for a nuclear weapon test of reactor-grade plutonium .[50]

The United States has supplied nuclear weapon delivery systems to support the UK nuclear forces since before the signing of the NPT. The renewal of this agreement is due to take place through the second decade of the 21st century. [4] [5]
Arguments in favor of proliferation
Main article: Nuclear peace

There has been much debate in the academic study of International Security as to the advisability of proliferation. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Gen. Pierre Marie Gallois of France, an adviser to Charles DeGaulle, argued in books like The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age (1961) that mere possession of a nuclear arsenal, what the French called the force de frappe, was enough to ensure deterrence, and thus concluded that the spread of nuclear weapons could increase international stability.

Some very prominent neo-realist scholars, such as Kenneth Waltz, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, and John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, continue to argue along the lines of Gallois (though these scholars rarely acknowledge their intellectual debt to Gallois and his contemporaries). Specifically, these scholars advocate some forms of nuclear proliferation, arguing that it will decrease the likelihood of war, especially in troubled regions of the world. Aside from the majority opinion which opposes proliferation in any form, there are two schools of thought on the matter: those, like Mearsheimer, who favor selective proliferation,[51] and those such as Waltz, who advocate a laissez-faire attitude to programs like North Korea's.
Total proliferation

In embryo, Waltz argues that the logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD) should work in all security environments, regardless of historical tensions or recent hostility. He sees the Cold War as the ultimate proof of MAD logic – the only occasion when enmity between two Great Powers did not result in military conflict. This was, he argues, because nuclear weapons promote caution in decision-makers. Neither Washington nor Moscow would risk nuclear Armageddon to advance territorial or power goals, hence a peaceful stalemate ensued (Waltz and Sagan (2003), p. 24). Waltz believes there to be no reason why this effect would not occur in all circumstances.
Selective proliferation

John Mearsheimer would not support Waltz's optimism in the majority of potential instances; however, he has argued for nuclear proliferation as policy in certain places, such as post–Cold War Europe. In two famous articles, Professor Mearsheimer opines that Europe is bound to return to its pre–Cold War environment of regular conflagration and suspicion at some point in the future. He advocates arming both Germany and the Ukraine with nuclear weaponry in order to achieve a balance of power between these states in the east and France/Britain in the west. If this does not occur, he is certain that war will eventually break out on the European continent (Mearsheimer (1990), pp. 5–56 and (1993), pp. 50–66).

Another separate argument against Waltz's open proliferation and in favor of Mearsheimer's selective distribution is the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Some countries included in the aforementioned laissez-faire distribution could predispose the transfer of nuclear materials or a bomb falling into the hands of groups not affiliated with any governments. Such countries would not have the political will or ability to safeguard attempts at devices being transferred to a third party. Not being deterred by self-annihilation, terrorism groups could push forth their own nuclear agendas or be used as shadow fronts to carry out the attack plans by mentioned unstable governments.
Arguments against both positions

There are numerous arguments presented against both selective and total proliferation, generally targeting the very neorealist assumptions (such as the primacy of military security in state agendas, the weakness of international institutions, and the long-run unimportance of economic integration and globalization to state strategy) its proponents tend to make. With respect to Mearsheimer's specific example of Europe, many economists and neoliberals argue that the economic integration of Europe through the development of the European Union has made war in most of the European continent so disastrous economically so as to serve as an effective deterrent. Constructivists take this one step further, frequently arguing that the development of EU political institutions has led or will lead to the development of a nascent European identity, which most states on the European continent wish to partake in to some degree or another, and which makes all states within or aspiring to be within the EU regard war between them as unthinkable.

As for Waltz, the general opinion is that most states are not in a position to safely guard against nuclear use, that he underestimates the long-standing antipathy in many regions, and that weak states will be unable to prevent – or will actively provide for – the disastrous possibility of nuclear terrorism. Waltz has dealt with all of these objections at some point in his work; though to many, he has not adequately responded (Betts (2000)).

The Learning Channel documentary Doomsday: "On The Brink" illustrated 40 years of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons accidents. Even the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident demonstrated a potential scenario in which Russian democratization and military downsizing at the end of the Cold War did not eliminate the danger of accidental nuclear war through command and control errors. After asking: might a future Russian ruler or renegade Russian general be tempted to use nuclear weapons to make foreign policy? the documentary writers revealed a greater danger of Russian security over its nuclear stocks, but especially the ultimate danger of human nature to want the ultimate weapon of mass destruction to exercise political and military power. Future world leaders might not understand how close the Soviets, Russians, and Americans were to doomsday, how easy it all seemed because apocalypse was avoided for a mere 40 years between rivals, politicians not terrorists, who loved their children and did not want to die, against 30,000 years of human prehistory. History and military experts agree that proliferation can be slowed, but never stopped (technology cannot be uninvented).[52]
Proliferation begets proliferation

Proliferation begets proliferation is a concept described by Scott Sagan in his article, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?". This concept can be described as a strategic chain reaction. If one state produces a nuclear weapon it creates almost a domino effect within the region. States in the region will seek to acquire nuclear weapons to balance or eliminate the security threat. Sagan describes this reaction best in his article when he states, “Every time one state develops nuclear weapons to balance against its main rival, it also creates a nuclear threat to another region, which then has to initiate its own nuclear weapons program to maintain its national security” (Sagan, pg. 70). Going back through history we can see how this has taken place. When the United States demonstrated that it had nuclear power capabilities after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Russians started to develop their program in preparation for the Cold War. With the Russian military buildup, France and Great Britain perceived this as a security threat and therefore they pursued nuclear weapons (Sagan, pg 71).
Nuclear apartheid
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The effective prohibition on nuclear proliferation has been characterised as a form of technological apartheid, as only a select few states (particularly the member-nations of the United Nations Security Council) are able to acquire nuclear technology and that they can use their power to prevent other states from research and development of nuclear technology. In theory, only states that are allied with states that already have nuclear power would be able to acquire nuclear technology themselves.
Iran

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been a frequent critic of the concept of nuclear apartheid as it has been put into practice by several countries, particularly the United States. In an interview with CNN's Christiane Amanpour, Ahmadinejad said that Iran was "against 'nuclear apartheid,' which means some have the right to possess it, use the fuel, and then sell it to another country for 10 times its value. We're against that. We say clean energy is the right of all countries. But also it is the duty and the responsibility of all countries, including ours, to set up frameworks to stop the proliferation of it." Hours after that interview, he spoke passionately in favor of Iran's right to develop nuclear technology, claiming the nation should have the same liberties.[53]

Iran is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and claims that any work done in regards to nuclear technology is related only to civilian uses, which is acceptable under the treaty.[54] Iran violated the treaty by performing uranium-enrichment in secret, after which the United Nations Security Council ordered Iran to stop all uranium-enrichment.[55]
India

India has also been discussed in the context of nuclear apartheid. India has consistently attempted to pass measures that would call for full international disarmament, however they have not succeeded due to protests from those states that already have nuclear weapons. In light of this, India viewed nuclear weapons as a necessary right for all nations as long as certain states were still in possession of nuclear weapons. India stated that nuclear issues were directly related to national security.

Years before India's first underground nuclear test in 1998, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was passed. Some have argued that coercive language was used in an attempt to persuade India to sign the treaty, which was pushed for heavily by neighboring China.[56] India viewed the treaty as a means for countries that already had nuclear weapons, primarily the five nations of the United Nations Security Council, to keep their weapons while ensuring that no other nations could develop them.[57]

6.
Radiological Weapons

It is feared that a terrorist group could detonate a radiological or "dirty bomb." A "dirty bomb" is composed of any radioactive source and a conventional explosive. The radioactive material is dispersed by the detonation of the explosive. Detonation of such a weapon is not as powerful as a nuclear blast, but can produce considerable radioactive fallout. There are other radiological weapons called radiological exposure devices where an explosive is not necessary. A radiological weapon may be very appealing to terrorist groups as it is highly successful in instilling fear and panic amongst a population (particularly because of the threat of radiation poisoning), and would contaminate the immediate area for some period of time, disrupting attempts to repair the damage and subsequently inflicting significant economic losses.

Nuclear weapons materials on the black market are a global concern,[16][17] and there is concern about the possible detonation of a small, crude nuclear weapon by a terrorist group in a major city, with significant loss of life and property.[18][19]

According to leaked diplomatic documents, al-Qaeda is on the verge of producing radiological weapons, after sourcing nuclear material and recruiting rogue scientists to build "dirty bombs".[20]
Terrorist Groups

Al-Qaeda, along with some North Caucasus terrorist groups that seek to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Russia, have consistently stated they seek nuclear weapons and have tried to acquire them.[9] Al-Qaeda has sought nuclear weapons for almost two decades by attempting to purchase stolen nuclear material and weapons and has sought nuclear expertise on numerous occasions. Osama bin Laden has stated that the acquisition of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction is a “religious duty.”[21] While pressure from a wide range of counter-terrorist activity has hampered Al-Qaeda’s ability to manage such a complex project, there is no sign that it has jettisoned its goals of acquiring fissile material. Statements made as recently as 2008 indicate that Al-Qaeda’s nuclear ambitions are still very strong.[9]

North Caucasus terrorists have attempted to seize a nuclear submarine armed with nuclear weapons. They have also engaged in reconnaissance activities on nuclear storage facilities and have repeatedly threatened to sabotage nuclear facilities. Similar to Al-Qaeda, these groups’ activities have been hampered by counter-terrorism activity; nevertheless they remain committed to launching such a devastating attack within Russia.[9]

The Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo, which used nerve gas to attack a Tokyo subway in 1995, has also tried to acquire nuclear weapons. However, according to nuclear terrorism researchers at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, there is no evidence that they continue to do so.[9]
Alleged Nuclear Terrorism and Theft of Material

There have been 18 incidences of theft or loss of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[21]
Security specialist Shaun Gregory argued in an article that terrorists have attacked Pakistani nuclear facilities three times in the recent past; twice in 2007 and once in 2008.[22]
In November 2007, burglars with unknown intentions infiltrated the Pelindaba nuclear research facility near Pretoria, South Africa. The burglars escaped without acquiring any of the uranium held at the facility.[23][24]
In June 2007, the Federal Bureau of Investigation released to the press the name of Adnan Gulshair el Shukrijumah, allegedly the operations leader for developing tactical plans for detonating nuclear bombs in several American cities simultaneously.[25]
In November 2006, MI5 warned that al-Qaida were planning on using nuclear weapons against cities in the United Kingdom by obtaining the bombs via clandestine means.[26]
In February 2006, Oleg Khinsagov of Russia was arrested in Georgia, along with three Georgian accomplices, with 79.5 grams of 89 percent enriched HEU.[21]
The Alexander Litvinenko poisoning with radioactive polonium "represents an ominous landmark: the beginning of an era of nuclear terrorism," according to Andrew J. Patterson.[27]
In June 2002, U.S. citizen Jose Padilla was arrested for allegedly planning a radiological attack on the city of Chicago; however, he was never charged with such conduct. He was instead convicted of charges that he conspired to "murder, kidnap and maim" people overseas.

Pakistan

After several incidents in Pakistan in which terrorists attacked three of its military nuclear facilities, it became clear that there emerged a serious danger that they would gain access to the country’s nuclear arsenal, according to a journal published by the US Military Academy at West Point.[28] In January 2010, it was revealed that the US army was training a specialised unit "to seal off and snatch back" Pakistani nuclear weapons in the event that militants would obtain a nuclear device or materials that could make one. Pakistan supposedly possesses about 80 nuclear warheads. US officials refused to speak on the record about the American safety plans.[29]

A study by Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University titled "Securing the Bomb 2010," found that Pakistan's stockpile "faces a greater threat from Islamic extremists seeking nuclear weapons than any other nuclear stockpile on earth."[30]

According to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former investigator with the CIA and the US Department of Energy, there is "a greater possibility of a nuclear meltdown in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world. The region has more violent extremists than any other, the country is unstable, and its arsenal of nuclear weapons is expanding."[31]

Nuclear weapons expert David Albright and author of "Peddling Peril" has also expressed concerns that Pakistan's stockpile may not be secure despite assurances by both Pakistan and U.S. government. He stated that Pakistan "has had many leaks from its program of classified information and sensitive nuclear equipment, and so you have to worry that it could be acquired in Pakistan," [32]

A 2010 study by the Congressional Research Service titled 'Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues' noted that even though Pakistan had taken several steps to enhance nuclear security in recent years, "instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question."[33]
United States

President Barack Obama has reviewed Homeland Security policy and concluded that "attacks using improvised nuclear devices ... pose a serious and increasing national security risk".[34] In their presidential contest, President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry both agreed that the most serious danger facing the United States is the possibility that terrorists could obtain a nuclear bomb.[35] Most nuclear-weapon analysts agree that "building such a device would pose few technological challenges to reasonably competent terrorists". The main barrier is acquiring highly enriched uranium.[36]

Despite a number of claims,[37][38] there is no credible evidence that any terrorist group has yet succeeded in obtaining a nuclear bomb or the materials needed to make one.[35][39] In 2004, Graham Allison, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Clinton administration, wrote that “on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not".[40] However, in 2004, Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information stated: "I wouldn't be at all surprised if nuclear weapons are used over the next 15 or 20 years, first and foremost by a terrorist group that gets its hands on a Russian nuclear weapon or a Pakistani nuclear weapon".[19] In 2006, Robert Gallucci, Dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, estimated that, “it is more likely than not that al-Qaeda or one of its affiliates will detonate a nuclear weapon in a U.S. city within the next five to ten years."[40]

Detonation of a nuclear weapon in a major U.S. city could kill more than 500,000 people and cause more than a trillion dollars in damage.[18][19] Hundreds of thousands could die from fallout, the resulting fires and collapsing buildings. In this scenario, uncontrolled fires would burn for days and emergency services and hospitals would be completely overwhelmed.[35][41][42]

The Obama administration will focus on reducing the risk of high-consequence, non-traditional nuclear threats. Nuclear security is to be strengthened by enhancing "nuclear detection architecture and ensuring that our own nuclear materials are secure," and by "establishing well-planned, well-rehearsed, plans for co-ordinated response."[34] According to senior Pentagon officials, the United States will make "thwarting nuclear-armed terrorists a central aim of American strategic nuclear planning."[43] Nuclear attribution is another strategy being pursued to counter terrorism. Led by the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center, attribution would allow the government to determine the likely source of nuclear material used in the event of a nuclear attack. This would prevent terrorist groups, and any states willing to help them, from being able to pull off a covert attack without assurance of retaliation.[44]

In July 2010 medical personnel from the U.S. Army practiced the techniques they would use to treat people injured by an atomic blast. The exercises were carried out at a training center in Indiana, and were set up to "simulate the aftermath of a small nuclear bomb blast, set off in a U.S. city by terrorists."[45]
Recovering Lost Weapons and Material

In 2004, the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) was established in order to consolidate nuclear stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, and assemble nuclear weapons at fewer locations.[46] Additionally, the GTRI converted HEU fuels to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels, which has prevented their use in making a nuclear bomb. HEU that has not been converted to LEU has been shipped back to secure sites, while amplified security measures have taken hold around vulnerable nuclear facilities.[47]

In August 2002, the United States launched a program to track and secure enriched uranium from 24 Soviet-style reactors in 16 countries, in order to reduce the risk of the materials falling into the hands of terrorists or "rogue states". The first such operation was Project Vinca, "a multinational, public-private effort to remove nuclear material from a poorly-secured Yugoslav research institute." The project has been hailed as "a nonproliferation success story" with the "potential to inform broader 'global cleanout' efforts to address one of the weakest links in the nuclear nonproliferation chain: insufficiently secured civilian nuclear research facilities."[48]

The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), which is also known as the Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction, is a 1992 law sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar. The CTR established a program that gave the U.S. Department of Defense a direct stake in securing loose fissile material inside the since-dissolved USSR. According to Graham Allison, director of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, this law is a major reason why not a single nuclear weapon has been discovered outside the control of Russia’s nuclear custodians.[49]

7.
Before 1950s

Clarence Madison Dally (1865–1904) - No INES level - New Jersey - Overexposure of laboratory worker
Various dates - No INES level - France - Overexposure of scientists
Marie Curie (1867–1934) was a Polish-French physicist and chemist. She was a pioneer in the early field of radioactivity, later becoming the first two-time Nobel laureate and the only person with Nobel Prizes in physics and chemistry. Her death, at age 67, in 1934 was from aplastic anemia due to massive exposure to radiation in her work,[1] much of which was carried out in a shed with no proper safety measures being taken, as the damaging effects of hard radiation were not generally understood at that time. She was known to carry test tubes full of radioactive isotopes in her pocket, and to store them in her desk drawer, resulting in massive exposure to radiation. She was known to remark on the pretty blue-green light the metals gave off in the dark. Because of their levels of radioactivity, her papers from the 1890s are considered too dangerous to handle. Even her cookbook is highly radioactive. They are kept in lead-lined boxes, and those who wish to consult them must wear protective clothing.[2]
Various dates - No INES level - various locations - Overexposure of workers
Luminescent radium was used to paint watches and other items that glowed. The most famous incident is the Radium girls of Orange, New Jersey where a large number of workers got radiation poisoning. Other towns including Ottawa, Illinois experienced contamination of homes and other structures and became Superfund cleanup sites.
Various dates - No INES Level - Colorado, USA - Contamination
Radium mining and manufacturing left a number of streets in the state's capital and largest city of Denver contaminated.[3]
1927–1930 - No INES Level - USA - Radium poisoning
Eben Byers ingests almosts 1400 bottles of Radithor, a radioactive patent medicine, leading to his death in 1932. He is buried in Allegheny Cemetery in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in a lead-lined coffin.[4]

1950s

March, 1957 - No INES level - Houston, Texas, USA - Exposure of workers
Two employees of a company licensed by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to encapsulate sources for radiographic cameras received radiation burns after being exposed to Ir192(Iridium-192) powder. The incident was reported in Look Magazine in 1961, but investigations published by the Mayo Clinic that same year found few of the radiological injuries claimed in widespread press reports.

1970s

1977 — Dounreay, UK — - release of nuclear material

An explosion at the research establishment causes a mixture of unrecorded waste to be leaked from a waste disposal shaft.[5]

July 16, 1979 – Church Rock, New Mexico – release of radioactive mine tailings

An earth/clay dike of an United Nuclear Corporation's uranium mill's settling/evaporating pond failed. The broken dam released 100 million U.S. gallons (380,000 m³) of radioactive liquids and 1,100 short tons (1,000 metric tonnes) of solid wastes, which settled out up to 70 miles (100 km) down the Puerco River[6] and also near a Navaho farming community that uses surface waters. The pond was past its planned and licensed life and had been filled two feet (60 cm) deeper than design, despite evident cracking.

See also: Church Rock uranium mill spill

September 29, 1979 - Tritium leak at American Atomics in Tucson, Arizona at the public school across the street from the plant. $300,000 worth of food was found to be contaminated; the chocolate cake had 56 nCi/L. By contrast, the EPA safety limit for drinking water is 20 nCi/L (740 Bq/L) based on consumption of 2 liters per day.[7][8][9][10]

1980s

July 1981 – Lycoming, Nine Mile Point, New York. An overloaded wastewater tank was deliberately flushed into the waste building sub-basement, filling it to a depth of four feet. This caused some of the approximately 150 55-gallon drums that were stored there to overturn and spill their contents. Fifty thousand U.S. gallons (190 m³) of lesser-contaminated water was discharged into Lake Ontario.[11]
1982 – "International Nutronics" of Dover, New Jersey spilled an unknown quantity of radioactive cobalt solution used to treat gems for color, modify chemicals, and sterilize food and medical supplies. The solution spilled into the Dover sewer system and forced the closure of the plant. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was only informed of the accident ten months later by a whistleblower. In 1986 International Nutronics was fined $35,000 and one of its top executives was sentenced to probation for failure to report the spill.[12][13][14]
1982 – Radioactive steel scavenged from a nuclear reactor was melted into rebar and used in the construction of apartment buildings in northern Taiwan, mostly in Taipei, from 1982 through 1984. Over 2,000 apartment units and shops were suspected as having been built with the materials.[15] At least 10,000 people are known to have been exposed to long-term low-level irradiation as a result, with at least 40 deaths due to cancer.[16] In 1985, the Taiwanese Atomic Energy Commission covered up the discovery of high levels of radiation in an apartment building by blaming a dentist operating an imaging machine. However, in the summer of 1992, a utility worker for the Taiwanese state-run electric utility Taipower brought a Geiger counter to his apartment to learn more about the device, and discovered that his apartment was contaminated.[16] Despite awareness of the problem, owners of some of the buildings known to be contaminated have continued to rent apartments out to tenants (in part because selling the units is illegal), and as of at least 2003 and likely to the present, no coordinated effort has been made to track down the remaining affected structures. The Taiwan AEC has harassed medical researchers looking into the consequences.[16] Some researchers from Taiwan claimed that the gamma rays from the cobalt-60 had a beneficial effect upon the health of the tenants,[17][18] but their results proved to be based on methodological errors[19][20]
December 6, 1983 – Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, A local resident salvaged materials from a discarded radiation therapy machine carrying 6,000 pellets of 60Co. The dismantling and transport of the material led to severe contamination of his truck; when the truck was scrapped, it in turn contaminated another 5,000 metric tonnes of steel with an estimated 300 Ci (11 TBq) of activity. This material was sold for kitchen or restaurant table legs and building materials, some of which was sent to the U.S. and Canada; the incident was discovered when a truck delivering contaminated building materials months later to the Los Alamos National Laboratory accidentally drove through a radiation monitoring station. Contamination was later measured on the roads that were used to transport the original damaged radiation source. In some cases pellets were actually found embedded in the roadway. In the state of Sinaloa, 109 houses were condemned due to contaminated building material. This incident prompted the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Customs Service to install radiation detection equipment at all major border crossings.[21]
1985 to 1987, Therac-25 was a radiation therapy machine produced by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. It was involved with at least six known accidents between 1985 and 1987, in which patients were given massive overdoses of radiation, which were in some cases on the order of hundreds of Grays. At least five patients died of the overdoses. These accidents highlighted the dangers of software control of safety-critical systems.
September 13, 1987 – In the Goiânia accident, scavengers broke open a radiation-therapy machine in an abandoned clinic of Goiânia, Brazil. They sold the kilocurie (40 TBq) 137Cs source as a glowing curiosity. Two hundred and fifty were contaminated; four died.[22]
June 6, 1988 – "Radiation Sterilizers" in Decatur, Georgia, reported a leak of 137Cs at their facility. Seventy thousand medical supply containers and milk cartons were recalled. Ten employees were exposed, and three "had enough on them that they contaminated other surfaces," including their homes and cars.[23]
5 February 1989 Three workers were exposed to gamma rays from the 60Co source in a medical products irradiation plant in San Salvador, El Salvador. The most exposed person died while another lost a limb. This was a human error accident where a person made the wrong choice to enter the irradiation room.[24]
In 1989, a small capsule containing highly radioactive caesium-137 was found inside the concrete wall in an apartment building in Kramatorsk, Ukraine. It is believed that the capsule, originally a part of a measurement device, was lost sometime during late 1970s and ended up mixed with gravel used to construct that building in 1980. By the time the capsule was discovered, 6 residents of the building died from leukemia and 17 more received varying doses of radiation.[25] See Kramatorsk nuclear poisoning incident.

1990s

June 24, 1990 – Soreq, Israel – An operator at a commercial irradiation facility bypassed the safety systems on the JS6500 sterilizer to clear a jam in the product conveyor area. The one to two minute exposure resulted in a whole body dose estimated at 10 Gy or more. He died 36 days later despite extensive medical care. See Fool Irradiation[26] for a discussion of this type of event.[27]
October 26, 1991 – Nesvizh, Belarus – An operator at an atomic sterilization facility bypassed the safety systems to clear a jammed conveyor. Upon entering the irradiation chamber he was exposed to an estimated whole body dose of 11 Gy, with some portions of the body receiving upwards of 20 Gy. Despite prompt intensive medical care, he died 113 days after the accident.[28]
August 31, 1994 – Commerce Township, Michigan – David Hahn's experimental reactor was discovered in his mother's back yard. The unshielded reactor exposed his neighborhood to 1,000 times the normal levels of background radiation.[29]
October 21, 1994 – a large 137Cs source was stolen by scrap metal scavengers in Tammiku, Estonia.[30]
May 1998 – Recycler Acerinox in Cádiz, Spain, unwittingly melted scrap metal containing radioactive sources; the radioactive cloud drifted all the way to Switzerland before being detected.[22][31] (See Acerinox accident.)
December 1998 – Istanbul, Turkey – two cobalt-60 teletherapy sources planned for export in 1993 were instead stored in a warehouse in Ankara, then moved to Istanbul, where a new owner sold them off as scrap metal. The buyers dismantled the containers, exposing themselves and others to ionizing radiation. Eighteen persons, including seven children, developed acute radiation syndrome. The exposed source was retrieved, but the other was still unaccounted for one year later.[32]
1999 – A road near Mrima Hill, Kenya was rebuilt using local materials later found to be radioactive. Some workers were exposed to excessive radiation, and many residents of the area were tested for exposure. 2,975 tons[vague] of roadway material were to be dug up to eliminate the hazard.[33]

2000s

February 1, 2000 – Samut Prakan radiation accident: The radiation source of an expired teletherapy unit was purchased and transferred without registration, and stored in an unguarded parking lot without warning signs. [34] It was then stolen from a parking lot in Samut Prakarn, Thailand and dismantled in a junkyard for scrap metal. Workers completely removed the 60Co source from the lead shielding, and became ill shortly thereafter. The radioactive nature of the metal and the resulting contamination was not discovered until 18 days later. Seven injuries and three deaths were a result of this incident.[35]

August 2000 -March 2001; at the Instituto Oncologico Nacional of Panama, 28 patients receiving treatment for prostate cancer and cancer of the cervix receive lethal doses of radiations due to a modification in the protocol of measurement of radiation used without a verification test. The negligence, unique in its scope, was investigated by the IAT on date of 26 May-1 June 2001.[36]

December 2000 – Three woodcutters in the nation of Georgia spent the night beside several "warm" canisters they found deep in the woods and were subsequently hospitalized with severe radiation burns. The canisters were found to contain concentrated 90Sr. The disposal team consisted of 25 men who were restricted to 40 seconds' worth of exposure each while transferring the canisters to lead-lined drums. The canisters are believed to have been components of radioisotope thermoelectric generators intended for use as generators for remote lighthouses and navigational beacons, part of a Soviet plan dating back to 1983.[37]

February 2001 – A medical accelerator at the Bialystok Oncology Center in Poland malfunctioned, resulting in five female patients receiving excessive doses of radiation while undergoing breast cancer treatment.[38] The incident was revealed when one of the patients complained of a painful radiation burn. In response, a local technician was called in to repair the device, but was unable to do so, and in fact caused further damage. Subsequently, competent authorities were notified, but as the apparatus had been tampered with, they were unable to ascertain the exact doses of radiation received by the patients (localized doses may have been in excess of 60 Gy). No deaths were reported as a result of this incident, although all affected patients had to receive skin grafts. The attending doctor was charged with criminal negligence, but in 2003 a district court ruled that she was not responsible for the incident. The hospital technician was fined.[39]

March 11, 2002 - INES Level 2 – A 2.5 metric tonne 60Co gamma source was transported from Cookridge Hospital, Leeds, UK, to Sellafield with defective shielding. As the radiation escaped from the package downwards into the ground, it is not thought that this event caused any injury or disease in either a human or an animal. This event was treated in a serious manner because the defense in depth type of protection for the source had been eroded. If the container had been tipped over in a road crash then a strong beam of gamma rays (83.5 Gy h-1) would have been aligned in a direction in which it would've been likely to irradiate humans. The company responsible for the transport of the source, AEA Technology plc, was fined £250,000 by a British court.

2003 – Cape of Navarin, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Russia. A radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) located on the Arctic shore was discovered in a highly degraded state. The level of the exposition dose at the generator surface was as high as 15 R/h; in July 2004 a second inspection of the same RTG showed that gamma radiation emission had risen to 87 R/h and that 90Sr had begun to leak into the environment.[3] In November 2003, a completely dismantled RTG located on the Island of Yuzhny Goryachinsky in the Kola Bay was found. The generator's radioactive heat source was found on the ground near the shoreline in the northern part of the island.[4]
September 10, 2004 – Yakutia, Russia. Two radioisotope thermoelectric generators were dropped 50 meters onto the tundra at Zemlya Bunge island during an airlift when the helicopter flew into heavy weather. According to the nuclear regulators, the impact compromised the RTGs' external radiation shielding. At a height of 10 meters above the impact site, the intensity of gamma radiation was measured at 4 mSv/hr. [5]
2005 – Dounreay, UK. In September, the site's cementation plant was closed when 266 liters of radioactive reprocessing residues were spilled inside containment. [6][7]. In October, another of the site's reprocessing laboratories was closed down after nose-blow tests of eight workers tested positive for trace radioactivity. [8]
November 3, 2005 – Haddam, Connecticut, USA. The Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company reported that water containing quantities (below safe drinking water limits) of 137Cs, 60Co, 90Sr, and 3H leaked from a spent fuel pond. Independent measurements and review of the incident by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission are due to begin November 7, 2005. [9][10][11]
March 11, 2006 – at Fleurus, Belgium, an operator working for the company Sterigenics [12], at a medical equipment sterilization site, entered the irradiation room and remained there for 20 seconds. The room contained a source of 60Co which was not in the pool of water.[13] Three weeks later, the worker suffered of symptoms typical of an irradiation (vomiting, loss of hair, fatigue). One estimate that he was exposed to a dose of between 4.4 and 4.8 Gy due to a malfunction of the control-command hydraulic system maintaining the radioactive source in the pool. The operator spent over one month in a specialized hospital before going back home. To protect workers, the federal nuclear control agency AFCN and private auditors from AVN recommended Sterigenics to install a redundant system of security. It is an accident of level 4 on the INES scale.[14][15][16]
May 5, 2006 – An accidental release of 131I gas at the Prairie Island Nuclear Power Plant in Minnesota exposed approximately one hundred plant workers to low-level radiation. Most workers received 10 to 20 millirads (0.1-0.2 mSv), about the same as a dental X-ray. The workers were wearing protective gear at the time, and no radiation leaked outside the plant to the surrounding area. [17]
Lisa Norris died in 2006 after having been given an overdose of radiation as a result of human error during treatment for a brain tumor at Beatson Oncology Centre in Glasgow (Scotland).[18][19][20]. The Scottish Government have published an independent investigation of this case.[21]. The intended treatment for Lisa Norris was 35 Gy to be delivered by a LINAC machine to the whole of the central nervous system to be delivered in twenty equal fractions of 1.75 Gy, which was to be followed by 19.8 Gy to be delivered to the tumor only (in eleven fractions of 1.8 Gy). In the first phase of the treatment a 58% overdose occurred, and the CNS of Lisa Norris suffered a dose of 55.5 Gy. The second phase of the treatment was abandoned on medical advice, after having lived for some time after the overdose Lisa Norris passed away.
August 23–24, 2008 — INES Level 3 - Fleurus, Belgium - Nuclear material leak

A gaseous leak of a radioisotope of iodine, 131I, was detected at a large medical radioisotope laboratory, Institut national des Radio-Eléments. Belgian authorities implemented restrictions on use of local farming produce within 5 km of the leak, when higher-than-expected levels of contamination was detected in local grass. The particular isotope of iodine has a half-life of 8 days [22] [23]. The European Commission sent out a warning over their ECURIE-alert system on the 29th of August.[40] The quantity of radioactivity released into the environment was estimated at 45 GBq I-131, which corresponds to a dose of 160 microsievert (effective dose) for a hypothetical person remaining permanently at the site's enclosure.[41]

January 23, 2008- A licensed Radiologic Technologist, Raven Knickerbocker, at Mad River Community Hospital in Arcata, California performed 151 CT scan slices on a single 3mm level on the head of a 23 month old child over a 65 minute period. The child suffered radiation burns (skin erythema) to much of his head. The hospital's nuclear health physicist estimated that the child received a localized dose possibly as high as 11Gy, later analysis concluded it was 7.5 Gy. An independent investigation of the child's blood found that he had severe chromosome abnormalities because of the exposure. The technologist was fired, and her license was permanently revoked on March 16, 2011 by the state of California, citing "gross negligence". [42] The hospital's radiology manager, Bruce Fleck, testified that Knickerbocker's conduct was "a rogue act of insanity".
February 2008-August 2009 - A software misconfiguration in a CT scanner used for brain perfusion scanning at Cedar Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles, California, resulted in 206 patients receiving radiation doses approximately 8 times higher than intended during an 18 month period starting in February, 2008. Some patients reported temporary hair loss and erythema. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has estimated that patients received doses between 3Gy and 4Gy.[43]

2010s

April 2010 - INES level 4 - A 35-year old man was hospitalized in New Delhi after handling radioactive scrap metal. Investigation led to the discovery of an amount of scrap metal containing Cobalt-60 in the New Delhi industrial district of Mayapuri. The 35-year old man later died from his injuries, while six others remained hospitalized.[44][45]

July 2010 - During a routine inspection at the Port of Genoa, on Italy's northwest coast, a cargo container from Saudi Arabia containing nearly 50,000 pounds of scrap copper was detected to be emitting gamma radiation at a rate of around 500 millisieverts per hour. After spending over a year in quarantine on Port grounds, Italian officials dissected the container using robots and discovered a rod of cobalt-60 nine inches long and one-third of an inch in diameter intermingled with the scrap. Officials suspected its provenance to be inappropriately disposed of medical or food-processing equipment. The rod was sent to Germany for further analysis, after which it was likely to be recycled.[46]

8.
1970s

17 April 1970 — Tonga Trench

The SNAP 27 radioisotope thermoelectric generator aboard the Lunar Module Aquarius reentered the Earth's atmosphere. The LM had been used as a "lifeboat" to help the Apollo 13 crew return to Earth after the Command Module lost electrical power. The vehicle was targeted for the Pacific Ocean to reduce the risk of contamination in the event the RTG broke up, but it is believed to have survived reentry and water impact intact. Periodic radiation checks of the area have found no signs of leakage.

22 March 1975 — Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant, AL, United States

A fire caused by careless technicians cut off many control circuits for two nuclear power reactors of the Tennessee Valley Authority at Browns Ferry Station in Alabama. The fire burned uncontrolled for 7.5 hours and the two operating GE nuclear reactors were at full power when the fire began. One of them went "dangerously out of control" for several hours and was not stabilized until a few hours after the fire was put out.[2] There was some concern about a meltdown, but this did not occur and there was no radioactive contamination.[3]

March 1977 — Toledo, OH, United States

An electromagnetic relief valve stuck open following a reactor scram at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant near Toledo, OH. The valve was noticed by operators, and the reactor, manufactured by Babcock & Wilcox, was only slightly damaged.[3]

1990s

27 December 1999 — Blayais Nuclear Power Plant, France

Flooding at the Blayais Nuclear Power Plant caused by a combination of high tides and a storm caused damage to equipment and failure of power supplies, leading to a Level 2 event on the International Nuclear Event Scale.

2000s

July, 2002 — Chapelcross nuclear power station, UK

UK Authorities blamed an incident at a Scottish nuclear plant on "procedural and hardware deficiencies". Fuel rods falling to the floor were deemed responsible for the incident.[4]

September and October, 2005 — Dounreay, UK

In September, the site's cementation plant was closed when 266 litres of radioactive reprocessing residues were spilled inside containment.[5] In October, another of the site's reprocessing laboratories was closed down after nose-blow tests of eight workers tested positive for trace radioactivity.[6]

July 25, 2006 -INES Level 2 – Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant, Sweden

Mains power lost to reactor 1 after an electrical fault. Two of four diesel generators fail, problems related to computer systems[7] (e.g. readings of core water levels) due to earlier electrical fault SCRAMed.

4 June 2008 — Krško Nuclear Power Plant, Slovenia – Loss of coolant

Emergency response system ECURIE (European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange) received an alert message following a loss of coolant accident at the Krsko Nuclear Power Plant.[8]

2010s
See also: 2011 Japanese nuclear accidents and Timeline of the Fukushima nuclear accidents

March 11–13, 2011 – INES Level needed, Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant, Japan – Turbine damage, possible radioactivity emergency
After the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami of March 11, a fire from the turbine section of the Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant following the earthquake was reported by Kyodo News.[9][10][11] The blaze was in a building housing the turbine, which is sited separately from the plant's reactor,[12] and was soon extinguished.[13]
On 13 March the lowest-level state of emergency was declared regarding the Onagawa plant by TEPCO, as radioactivity readings temporarily[14][15] exceeded allowed levels in the area of the plant.[16][17] TEPCO stated this was due to radiation from the Fukushima I nuclear accidents and not from the Onagawa plant itself.[18] Events are still developing.
March 11–13, 2011 – INES Level needed, Tōkai Nuclear Power Plant, Japan – Reactor cooling pump damage
Following the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami the number 2 reactor was one of eleven nuclear reactors to be shut down automatically.[19] It was reported on 14 March that a cooling system pump for the number 2 reactor had stopped working.[20] Japan Atomic Power Company stated that there was a second operational pump and cooling was working, but that two of three diesel generators used to power the cooling system were out of order.[21]

forum.politics.be laat geen langere lijstjes toe. Jammer.

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door maddox

Daar twijfelen we niet aan, en als het niet de sluiting van Doel 3 is, dan zal er wel iets anders zijn dat electriciteit een stuk duurder gaat maken. U luistert niet naar politici. Maar betalen zal U.

Ja, omdat kiezers als u vasthouden aan verroeste energietechnologieën en weigeren de triljardensubsidies daarvoor af te schaffen.

Maar goed, mijn kinderen zullen daar later hartelijk om lachen. Dat er effectief in mijn tijd mensen bestonden die tegen de goedkope, veilige, propere en efficiënte én hernieuwbare bronnen waren.

Een beetje zoals de stoomketeltypes die geen toekomst zagen in de verbrandingsmotor.

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door maddox

Iedere energiebron gelijk voor de wet.

Maar doe het dan eens, in plaats van het alleen te zeggen. Doen durft ge niet, want dan weet ge dat kernenergie, steenkool en gas niet kunnen concurreren.

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door maddox

Grootheidswaanzin. Met onze aantallen schijten en zeiken we ons naar de verdoemenis als soort.

En klimaatverandering, weeral grootheidswaanzin van U om de mens daar zo'n grote rol in te geven.

Wel wel, een klimaatontkenner, wie had dat nu toch gedacht na al wat we hier al lazen.

[C2C]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door maddox

Vele catastrophes? Geef eens een lijst.

U vraagt, wij draaien:

1.

Nuclear power plant accidents and incidents
with multiple fatalities and/or more than US$100 million in property damage, 1952-2011[5][14][15] Date Location Description Deaths Cost
(in millions
2006 $US) INES
level[16]
January 3, 1961 Idaho Falls, Idaho, United States Explosion at SL-1 prototype at the National Reactor Testing Station. All 3 operators were killed when a control rod was removed too far. 3 22 4
October 5, 1966 Frenchtown Charter Township, Michigan, United States Partial core meltdown of the Fermi 1 Reactor at the Enrico Fermi Nuclear Generating Station. No radiation leakage into the environment. 0
January 21, 1969 Lucens reactor, Vaud, Switzerland On January 21, 1969, it suffered a loss-of-coolant accident, leading to a partial core meltdown and massive radioactive contamination of the cavern, which was then sealed. 0 4
1975 Sosnovyi Bor, Leningrad Oblast, Russia There was reportedly a partial nuclear meltdown in Leningrad nuclear power plant reactor unit 1.
December 7, 1975 Greifswald, East Germany Electrical error causes fire in the main trough that destroys control lines and five main coolant pumps 0 443 3
January 5, 1976 Jaslovské Bohunice, Czechoslovakia Malfunction during fuel replacement. Fuel rod ejected from reactor into the reactor hall by coolant (CO2).[17] 2 4
February 22, 1977 Jaslovské Bohunice, Czechoslovakia Severe corrosion of reactor and release of radioactivity into the plant area, necessitating total decommission 0 1,700 4
March 28, 1979 Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, United States Loss of coolant and partial core meltdown due to operator errors. There is a small release of radioactive gases. See also Three Mile Island accident health effects. 0 2,400 5
September 15, 1984 Athens, Alabama, United States Safety violations, operator error, and design problems force a six year outage at Browns Ferry Unit 2. 0 110
March 9, 1985 Athens, Alabama, United States Instrumentation systems malfunction during startup, which led to suspension of operations at all three Browns Ferry Units 0 1,830
April 11, 1986 Plymouth, Massachusetts, United States Recurring equipment problems force emergency shutdown of Boston Edison’s Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant 0 1,001
April 26, 1986 Chernobyl, Ukrainian SSR Overheating, steam explosion, fire, and meltdown, necessitating the evacuation of 300,000 people from Chernobyl and dispersing radioactive material across Europe (see Chernobyl disaster effects) 56 direct; 4,000 cancer[18] 6,700 7
May 4, 1986 Hamm-Uentrop, Germany Experimental THTR-300 reactor releases small amounts of fission products (0.1 GBq Co-60, Cs-137, Pa-233) to surrounding area 0 267
March 31, 1987 Delta, Pennsylvania, United States Peach Bottom units 2 and 3 shutdown due to cooling malfunctions and unexplained equipment problems 0 400
December 19, 1987 Lycoming, New York, United States Malfunctions force Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation to shut down Nine Mile Point Unit 1 0 150
March 17, 1989 Lusby, Maryland, United States Inspections at Calvert Cliff Units 1 and 2 reveal cracks at pressurized heater sleeves, forcing extended shutdowns 0 120
March 1992 Sosnovyi Bor, Leningrad Oblast, Russia An accident at the Sosnovy Bor nuclear plant leaked radioactive gases and iodine into the air through a ruptured fuel channel.
February 20, 1996 Waterford, Connecticut, United States Leaking valve forces shutdown Millstone Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2, multiple equipment failures found 0 254
September 2, 1996 Crystal River, Florida, United States Balance-of-plant equipment malfunction forces shutdown and extensive repairs at Crystal River Unit 3 0 384
September 30, 1999 Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan Tokaimura nuclear accident killed two workers, and exposed one more to radiation levels above permissible limits. 2 54 4
February 16, 2002 Oak Harbor, Ohio, United States Severe corrosion of control rod forces 24-month outage of Davis-Besse reactor 0 143 3
August 9, 2004 Fukui Prefecture, Japan Steam explosion at Mihama Nuclear Power Plant kills 5 workers and injures 6 more 5 9 1
March 11, 2011 Fukushima, Japan A tsunami flooded and damaged the 5 active reactor plants drowning two workers. Loss of backup electrical power led to overheating, meltdowns, and evacuations.[19] One man died suddenly while carrying equipment during the clean-up. 3[20] 7[21]
Nuclear reactor attacks

Nuclear reactors become preferred targets during military conflict and, over the past three decades, have been repeatedly attacked during military air strikes, occupations, invasions and campaigns:[22]

Between 18 December 1977 and 13 June 1979 ETA carried out several attacks on Lemoniz Nuclear Power Plant in Spain while it was still under construction.
In September 1980, Iran bombed the Al Tuwaitha nuclear complex in Iraq.
In June 1981, an Israeli air strike completely destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear research facility.
On 8 January 1982, Umkhonto we Sizwe attacked Koeberg nuclear power plant in South Africa while it was still under construction.
Between 1984 and 1987, Iraq bombed Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant six times.
In Iraq in 1991, the U.S. bombed three nuclear reactors and an enrichment pilot facility.
In 1991, Iraq launched Scud missiles at Israel’s Dimona nuclear power plant.
In September 2003, Israel bombed a Syrian reactor under construction.[22]

Radiation and other accidents

Serious radiation and other accidents include:

1950s

February 13, 1950 : a Convair B-36B crashed in northern British Columbia after jettisoning a Mark IV atomic bomb. This was the first such nuclear weapon loss in history.
December 12, 1952: AECL Chalk River Laboratories, Chalk River, Ontario, Canada. Partial meltdown, about 10,000 Curies released. [10][11]
September 1957: a plutonium fire occurred at the Rocky Flats Plant, which resulted in the contamination of Building 71 and the release of plutonium into the atmosphere, causing US $818,600 in damage.
September 1957: Mayak nuclear waste storage tank explosion at Chelyabinsk. Two hundred plus fatalities, believed to be a conservative estimate; 270,000 people were exposed to dangerous radiation levels. Over thirty small communities had been removed from Soviet maps between 1958 and 1991.[23] (INES level 6).[16]
October 1957: Windscale fire, UK. Fire ignites plutonium piles and contaminates surrounding dairy farms.[5][24] An estimated 33 cancer deaths.[5][24]
March 1959: Santa Susana Field Laboratory, Los Angeles, California. Fire in a fuel processing facility.
July 1959: Santa Susana Field Laboratory, Los Angeles, California. Partial meltdown.

1960s

24 January 1961: the 1961 Goldsboro B-52 crash occurred near Goldsboro, North Carolina. A B-52 Stratofortress carrying two Mark 39 nuclear bombs broke up in mid-air, dropping its nuclear payload in the process.[25][26]
July 1961: soviet submarine K-19 accident. Eight fatalities and more than 30 people were over-exposed to radiation.[8]
March, 21 -August 1962: radiation accident in Mexico City, four fatalities.
1964, 1969: Santa Susana Field Laboratory, Los Angeles, California. Partial meltdowns.
1965 Philippine Sea A-4 crash, where a Skyhawk attack aircraft with a nuclear weapon fell into the sea.[27] The pilot, the aircraft, and the B43 nuclear bomb were never recovered.[28] It was not until the 1980s that the Pentagon revealed the loss of the one-megaton bomb.[29]
January 17, 1966: the 1966 Palomares B-52 crash occurred when a B-52G bomber of the USAF collided with a KC-135 tanker during mid-air refuelling off the coast of Spain. The KC-135 was completely destroyed when its fuel load ignited, killing all four crew members. The B-52G broke apart, killing three of the seven crew members aboard.[30] Of the four Mk28 type hydrogen bombs the B-52G carried,[31] three were found on land near Almer�*a, Spain. The non-nuclear explosives in two of the weapons detonated upon impact with the ground, resulting in the contamination of a 2-square-kilometer (490-acre) (0.78 square mile) area by radioactive plutonium. The fourth, which fell into the Mediterranean Sea, was recovered intact after a 2½-month-long search.[32]
January 21, 1968: the 1968 Thule Air Base B-52 crash involved a United States Air Force (USAF) B-52 bomber. The aircraft was carrying four hydrogen bombs when a cabin fire forced the crew to abandon the aircraft. Six crew members ejected safely, but one who did not have an ejection seat was killed while trying to bail out. The bomber crashed onto sea ice in Greenland, causing the nuclear payload to rupture and disperse, which resulted in widespread radioactive contamination.
May 1968: soviet submarine K-27 reactor near meltdown. 9 people died, 83 people were injured.[9]
January 1969: Lucens reactor in Switzerland undergoes partial core meltdown leading to massive radioactive contamination of a cavern.

1970s

July 1978: Anatoli Bugorski was working on U-70, the largest Soviet particle accelerator, when he accidentally exposed his head directly to the proton beam. He survived, despite suffering some long-term damage.
July 1979: Church Rock Uranium Mill Spill in New Mexico, USA, when United Nuclear Corporation's uranium mill tailings disposal pond breached its dam. Over 1,000 tons of radioactive mill waste and millions of gallons of mine effluent flowed into the Puerco River, and contaminants traveled downstream.[33]

1980s

March 1984: radiation accident in Morocco, eight fatalities.[11] 　
August 1985: soviet submarine K-431 accident. Ten fatalities and 49 other people suffered radiation injuries.[6]
October 1986: soviet submarine K-219 reactor almost had a meltdown. Sergei Preminin died after he manually lowered the control rods, and stopped the explosion. The submarine sank three days later.
September 1987: Goiania accident. Four fatalities, and following radiological screening of more than 100,000 people, it was ascertained that 249 people received serious radiation contamination.[12][34] In the cleanup operation, topsoil had to be removed from several sites, and several houses were demolished. All the objects from within those houses were removed and examined. Time magazine has identified the accident as one of the world's "worst nuclear disasters" and the International Atomic Energy Agency called it "one of the world's worst radiological incidents".[35][36]

1990s

December 1990: radiotherapy accident in Zaragoza. Eleven fatalities and 27 other patients were injured.[8]
April 1993: accident at the Tomsk-7 Reprocessing Complex, when a tank exploded while being cleaned with nitric acid. The explosion released a cloud of radioactive gas. (INES level 4).[16]
August — December 1996: radiotherapy accident in Costa Rica. Thirteen fatalities and 114 other patients received an overdose of radiation.[10]
September 1999: criticality accident at Tokai nuclear fuel plant (Japan)

2000s

January-February 2000: Samut Prakan radiation accident: three deaths and ten injuries resulted in Samut Prakarn when a radiation-therapy unit was dismantled.[13]
April 2010: Mayapuri radiological accident, India, one fatality.[13]

2010s

March 2011: Fukushima I nuclear accidents, Japan and the radioactive discharge at the Fukushima Daiichi Power Station[37]

Accident types

For a list of many of the most important accidents see the International Atomic Energy Agency site.[38]
Loss of coolant accident
Main article: Loss of coolant
See also: Nuclear meltdown and Design basis accident
Criticality accidents

A criticality accident (also sometimes referred to as an "excursion" or "power excursion") occurs when a nuclear chain reaction is accidentally allowed to occur in fissile material, such as enriched uranium or plutonium. The Chernobyl accident is an example of a criticality accident. This accident destroyed a reactor at the plant and left a large geographic area uninhabitable. In a smaller scale accident at Sarov a technician working with highly enriched uranium was irradiated while preparing an experiment involving a sphere of fissile material. The Sarov accident is interesting because the system remained critical for many days before it could be stopped, though safely located in a shielded experimental hall.[39] This is an example of a limited scope accident where only a few people can be harmed, while no release of radioactivity into the environment occurred. A criticality accident with limited off site release of both radiation (gamma and neutron) and a very small release of radioactivity occurred at Tokaimura in 1999 during the production of enriched uranium fuel.[40] Two workers died, a third was permanently injured, and 350 citizens were exposed to radiation.
Decay heat

Decay heat accidents are where the heat generated by the radioactive decay causes harm. In a large nuclear reactor, a loss of coolant accident can damage the core: for example, at Three Mile Island a recently shutdown (SCRAMed) PWR reactor was left for a length of time without cooling water. As a result the nuclear fuel was damaged, and the core partially melted. The removal of the decay heat is a significant reactor safety concern, especially shortly after shutdown. Failure to remove decay heat may cause the reactor core temperature to rise to dangerous levels and has caused nuclear accidents. The heat removal is usually achieved through several redundant and diverse systems, and the heat is often dissipated to an 'ultimate heat sink' which has a large capacity and requires no active power, though this method is typically used after decay heat has reduced to a very small value. However, the main cause of release of radioactivity in the Three Mile Island accident was a pilot-operated relief valve on the primary loop which stuck in the open position. This caused the overflow tank into which it drained to rupture and release large amounts of radioactive cooling water into the containment building.

In 2011, an earthquake and tsunami caused a loss of power to two plants in Fukushima, Japan, crippling the reactor as decay heat caused 90% of the fuel rods in the core of the Daiichi Unit 3 reactor to become uncovered.[41] As of May 30, 2011, the removal of decay heat is still a cause for concern.
Transport

Transport accidents can cause a release of radioactivity resulting in contamination or shielding to be damaged resulting in direct irradiation. In Cochabamba a defective gamma radiography set was transported in a passenger bus as cargo. The gamma source was outside the shielding, and it irradiated some bus passengers.

In the United Kingdom, it was revealed in a court case that in March 2002 a radiotherapy source was transported from Leeds to Sellafield with defective shielding. The shielding had a gap on the underside. It is thought that no human has been seriously harmed by the escaping radiation.[42]
Equipment failure

Equipment failure is one possible type of accident, recently at Białystok in Poland the electronics associated with a particle accelerator used for the treatment of cancer suffered a malfunction.[43] This then led to the overexposure of at least one patient. While the initial failure was the simple failure of a semiconductor diode, it set in motion a series of events which led to a radiation injury.

A related cause of accidents is failure of control software, as in the cases involving the Therac-25 medical radiotherapy equipment: the elimination of a hardware safety interlock in a new design model exposed a previously undetected bug in the control software, which could lead to patients receiving massive overdoses under a specific set of conditions.
Human error
A sketch used by doctors to determine the amount of radiation to which each person had been exposed during the Slotin excursion

Many of the major nuclear accidents have been directly attributable to operator or human error. This was obviously the case in the analysis of both the Chernobyl and TMI-2 accidents. At Chernobyl, a test procedure was being conducted prior to the accident. The leaders of the test permitted operators to disable and ignore key protection circuits and warnings that would have normally shut the reactor down. At TMI-2, operators permitted thousands of gallons of water to escape from the reactor plant before observing that the coolant pumps were behaving abnormally. The coolant pumps were thus turned off to protect the pumps, which in turn led to the destruction of the reactor itself as cooling was completely lost within the core.

A detailed investigation into SL-1 determined that one operator (perhaps inadvertently) manually pulled the 84-pound (38 kg) central control rod out about 26 inches rather than the maintenance procedure's intention of about 4 inches.[44]

An assessment conducted by the Commissariat �* l’Énergie Atomique (CEA) in France concluded that no amount of technical innovation can eliminate the risk of human-induced errors associated with the operation of nuclear power plants. Two types of mistakes were deemed most serious: errors committed during field operations, such as maintenance and testing, that can cause an accident; and human errors made during small accidents that cascade to complete failure.[5]

In 1946 Canadian Manhattan Project physicist Louis Slotin performed a risky experiment known as "tickling the dragon's tail"[45] which involved two hemispheres of neutron-reflective beryllium being brought together around a plutonium core to bring it to criticality. Against operating procedures, the hemispheres were separated only by a screwdriver. The screwdriver slipped and set off a chain reaction criticality accident filling the room with harmful radiation and a flash of blue light (caused by excited, ionized air particles returning to their unexcited states). Slotin reflexively separated the hemispheres in reaction to the heat flash and blue light, preventing further irradiation of several co-workers present in the room. However Slotin absorbed a lethal dose of the radiation and died nine days afterwards. The infamous plutonium mass used in the experiment was referred to as the demon core.
Lost source

Lost source accidents,[46][47] also referred to as an orphan source are incidents in which a radioactive source is lost, stolen or abandoned. The source then might cause harm to humans. For example, in 1996 sources were left behind by the Soviet army in Lilo, Georgia.[48] Another case occurred at Yanango where a radiography source was lost, also at Samut Prakarn a phosphorus teletherapy source was lost[49] and at Gilan in Iran a radiography source harmed a welder.[50] The best known example of this type of event is the Goiânia accident which occurred in Brazil.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has provided guides for scrap metal collectors on what a sealed source might look like.[51][52] The scrap metal industry is the one where lost sources are most likely to be found.[53]
Trafficking in radioactive and nuclear materials

Information reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) shows "a persistent problem with the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials, thefts, losses and other unauthorized activities".[18]

From 1993 to 2006, the IAEA confirmed 1080 illicit trafficking incidents reported by participating countries. Of the 1080 confirmed incidents, 275 incidents involved unauthorized possession and related criminal activity, 332 incidents involved theft or loss of nuclear or other radioactive materials, 398 incidents involved other unauthorized activities, and in 75 incidents the reported information was not sufficient to determine the category of incident. Several hundred additional incidents have been reported in various open sources, but are not yet confirmed.[18][54]

2.
1950s

December 12, 1952 — INES Level 5[citation needed] - Chalk River, Ontario, Canada - Reactor core damaged
A reactor shutoff rod failure, combined with several operator errors, led to a major power excursion of more than double the reactor's rated output at AECL's NRX reactor. The operators purged the reactor's heavy water moderator, and the reaction stopped in under 30 seconds. A cover gas system failure led to hydrogen explosions, which severely damaged the reactor core. The fission products from approximately 30 kg of uranium were released through the reactor stack. Irradiated light-water coolant leaked from the damaged coolant circuit into the reactor building; some 4,000 cubic meters were pumped via pipeline to a disposal area to avoid contamination of the Ottawa River. Subsequent monitoring of surrounding water sources revealed no contamination. No immediate fatalities or injuries resulted from the incident; a 1982 followup study of exposed workers showed no long-term health effects. Future U.S. President Jimmy Carter, then a Lieutenant in the US Navy, was among the cleanup crew.[1]
September 29, 1957 — INES Level 6 - Kyshtym disaster - Mayak, Russia (then a part of the Soviet Union)
The Kyshtym disaster was a radiation contamination incident that occurred on 29 September 1957 at Mayak, a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Russia (then a part of the Soviet Union). It measured as a Level 6 disaster on the International Nuclear Event Scale, making it the third most serious nuclear accident ever recorded (after the Chernobyl disaster, and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, both Level 7 on the INES scale). The cooling system in one of the tanks containing about 70–80 tons of liquid radioactive waste failed and was not repaired. The temperature in it started to rise, resulting in evaporation and a chemical explosion of the dried waste, consisting mainly of ammonium nitrate and acetates (see ammonium nitrate bomb). The explosion, estimated to have a force of about 70–100 tons of TNT threw the concrete lid, weighing 160 tons, into the air.[2] There were no immediate casualties as a result of the explosion, which released an estimated 2 to 50 MCi (74 to 1850 PBq) of radioactivity.[3][4][5] In the next 10 to 11 hours, the radioactive cloud moved towards the northeast, reaching 300–350 kilometers from the accident. The fallout of the cloud resulted in a long-term contamination of an area of more than 800 square kilometers, primarily with caesium-137 and strontium-90.[3] This area is usually referred to as the East-Ural Radioactive Trace (EURT).[6]
May 24, 1958 — INES Level needed - Chalk River, Ontario, Canada - Fuel damaged
Due to inadequate cooling a damaged uranium fuel rod caught fire and was torn in two as it was being removed from the core at the NRU reactor. The fire was extinguished, but not before radioactive combustion products contaminated the interior of the reactor building and, to a lesser degree, an area surrounding the laboratory site. Over 600 people were employed in the clean-up.[7][8]
October 25, 1958 - INES Level needed - Vinča, Serbia (then Yugoslavia) - Criticality excursion, irradiation of personnel
During a subcritical counting experiment a power buildup went undetected at the Vinca Nuclear Institute's zero-power natural uranium heavy water moderated research reactor.[9] Saturation of radiation detection chambers gave the researchers false readings and the level of moderator in the reactor tank was raised triggering a criticality excursion which a researcher detected from the smell of ozone.[10] Six scientists received radiation doses of 2—4 Sv (200—400 rems) [11] (p. 96). An experimental bone marrow transplant treatment was performed on all of them in France and five survived, despite the ultimate rejection of the marrow in all cases. A single woman among them later had a child without apparent complications. This was one of the first nuclear incidents investigated by then newly formed IAEA.[12]

July 26, 1959 — INES Level needed - Santa Susana Field Laboratory, California, United States - Partial meltdown
A partial core meltdown may have taken place when the Sodium Reactor Experiment (SRE) experienced a power excursion that caused severe overheating of the reactor core, resulting in the melting of one-third of the nuclear fuel and significant releases of radioactive gases.[13]

1960s

April 3, 1960 - INES Level needed – Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, United States

A core melt accident occurred at the Westinghouse Waltz Mill test reactor. From what information remains of the event, one fuel element melted, resulting in the disposition of 2 million gallons of contaminated water generated during the accident. At least a portion of the water was retained on site in lagoons, a condition which eventually led to detectable Sr-90 in ground water plus contaminated soil. The site is currently undergoing cleanup.

July 24, 1964 - INES Level needed - Charlestown, Rhode Island, United States - Criticality Accident

An error by a worker at a United Nuclear Corporation fuel facility led to an accidental criticality. Robert Peabody, believing he was using a diluted uranium solution, accidentally put concentrated solution into an agitation tank containing sodium carbonate. Peabody was exposed to 10,000rad (100Gy) of radiation and died two days later. Ninety minutes after the criticality, a plant manager and another administrator returned to the building and were exposed to 100rad (1Gy), but suffered no ill effects.[14][15]

October 5, 1966 — INES Level needed - Monroe, Michigan, United States - Partial meltdown

A sodium cooling system malfunction caused a partial meltdown at the Enrico Fermi demonstration nuclear breeder reactor (Enrico Fermi-1 fast breeder reactor). The accident was attributed to a zirconium fragment that obstructed a flow-guide in the sodium cooling system. Two of the 105 fuel assemblies melted during the incident, but no contamination was recorded outside the containment vessel.[16]

Winter 1966-1967 (date unknown) – INES Level needed – location unknown – loss of coolant accident
The Soviet icebreaker Lenin, the USSR’s first nuclear-powered surface ship, suffered a major accident (possibly a meltdown — exactly what happened remains a matter of controversy in the West) in one of its three reactors. To find the leak the crew broke through the concrete and steel radiation shield with sledgehammers, causing irreparable damage. It was rumored that around 30 of the crew were killed. The ship was abandoned for a year to allow radiation levels to drop before the three reactors were removed, to be dumped into the Tsivolko Fjord on the Kara Sea, along with 60% of the fuel elements packed in a separate container. The reactors were replaced with two new ones, and the ship re-entered service in 1970, serving until 1989.

May 1967 — INES Level needed - Dumfries and Galloway, Scotland, United Kingdom - Partial meltdown

Graphite debris partially blocked a fuel channel causing a fuel element to melt and catch fire at the Chapelcross nuclear power station. Contamination was confined to the reactor core. The core was repaired and restarted in 1969, operating until the plant's shutdown in 2004.[17][18]

January 21, 1969 — INES Level: None - Lucens, Canton of Vaud, Switzerland - Explosion

A total loss of coolant led to a power excursion and explosion of an experimental nuclear reactor in a large cave at Lucens. The underground location of this reactor acted like a containment building and prevented any outside contamination. The cavern was heavily contaminated and was sealed. No injuries or fatalities resulted.[19][20]
De-fuelling and partial dismantling occurred from 1969 to 1973. In 1988, the lowest caverns were filled with concrete, and a regulatory permit was issued in December 1990. Currently, the archives of the Canton of Vaud are located in the caverns.[21]

1970s

December 7, 1975 – INES Level 3 - Greifswald, Germany (then East Germany) - Partly damaged

Operators disabled three of six cooling pumps' electrical supply circuits to test emergency shutoffs. Instead of the expected automatic shutdown, a fourth pump failed causing excessive heating which damaged ten fuel rods. The accident was attributed to sticky relay contacts and generally poor construction in the Soviet-built reactor.[22]

February 22, 1977 – INES Level 4 - Jaslovské Bohunice, Slovakia (then Czechoslovakia) - Fuel damaged

Operators neglected to remove moisture-absorbing materials from a fuel rod assembly before loading it into the KS 150 reactor at power plant A-1. The accident resulted in damaged fuel integrity, extensive corrosion damage of fuel cladding and release of radioactivity into the plant area. The affected reactor was decommissioned following this accident.[23]

March 28, 1979 – INES Level 5[citation needed] - Middletown, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, United States - Partial meltdown

Equipment failures and worker mistakes contributed to a loss of coolant and a partial core meltdown at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station 15 km (9.3 mi) southeast of Harrisburg. While the reactor was extensively damaged, on-site radiation exposure was under 100 millirems (less than annual exposure due to natural sources). Area residents received a smaller exposure of 1 millirem (10 µSv), or about 1/3 the dose from eating a banana per day for one year. There were no fatalities. Follow-up radiological studies predict between zero and one long-term cancer fatality.[24][25][26]

See also: Three Mile Island accident

1980s

March 13, 1980 - INES Level 4 - Orléans, France - Nuclear materials leak

A brief power excursion in Reactor A2 led to a rupture of fuel bundles and a minor release (8 x 1010 Bq) of nuclear materials at the Saint-Laurent Nuclear Power Plant. The reactor was repaired and continued operation until its decommissioning in 1992.[27]

March, 1981 — INES Level 2 - Tsuruga, Japan - Radioactive materials released into Sea of Japan + Overexposure of workers

More than 100 workers were exposed to doses of up to 155 millirem per day radiation during repairs of the Tsuruga Nuclear Power Plant, violating the Japan Atomic Power Company's limit of 100 millirems (1 mSv) per day.[28]

September 23, 1983 — INES Level 4 - Buenos Aires, Argentina - Accidental criticality

An operator error during a fuel plate reconfiguration in an experimental test reactor led to an excursion of 3×1017 fissions at the RA-2 facility. The operator absorbed 2000 rad (20 Gy) of gamma and 1700 rad (17 Gy) of neutron radiation which killed him two days later. Another 17 people outside of the reactor room absorbed doses ranging from 35 rad (0.35 Gy) to less than 1 rad (0.01 Gy).[29] pg103[30]

April 26, 1986 — INES Level 7 - Prypiat, Ukraine (then USSR) - Power excursion, explosion, complete meltdown

An inadequate reactor safety system[31] led to an uncontrolled power excursion, causing a severe steam explosion, meltdown and release of radioactive material at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant located approximately 100 kilometers north-northwest of Kiev. Approximately fifty fatalities (mostly cleanup personnel) resulted from the accident and the immediate aftermath. An additional nine fatal cases of thyroid cancer in children in the Chernobyl area have been attributed to the accident. The explosion and combustion of the graphite reactor core spread radioactive material over much of Europe. 100,000 people were evacuated from the areas immediately surrounding Chernobyl in addition to 300,000 from the areas of heavy fallout in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. An "Exclusion Zone" was created surrounding the site encompassing approximately 1,000 mi² (3,000 km²) and deemed off-limits for human habitation for an indefinite period. Several studies by governments, UN agencies and environmental groups have estimated the consequences and eventual number of casualties. Their findings are subject to controversy.

See also: Chernobyl disaster

May 4, 1986 – INES Level 3-5 (need ref) - Hamm-Uentrop, Germany (then West Germany) - Fuel damaged

A spherical fuel pebble became lodged in the pipe used to deliver fuel elements to the reactor at an experimental 300-megawatt THTR-300 HTGR. Attempts by an operator to dislodge the fuel pebble damaged its cladding, releasing radiation detectable up to two kilometers from the reactor.[32]

1990s

April 6, 1993 — INES Level 4 - Tomsk, Russia - Explosion

A pressure buildup led to an explosive mechanical failure in a 34 cubic meter stainless steel reaction vessel buried in a concrete bunker under building 201 of the radiochemical works at the Tomsk-7 Siberian Chemical Enterprise plutonium reprocessing facility. The vessel contained a mixture of concentrated nitric acid, uranium (8757 kg), plutonium (449 g) along with a mixture of radioactive and organic waste from a prior extraction cycle. The explosion dislodged the concrete lid of the bunker and blew a large hole in the roof of the building, releasing approximately 6 GBq of Pu 239 and 30 TBq of various other radionuclides into the environment. The contamination plume extended 28 km NE of building 201, 20 km beyond the facility property. The small village of Georgievka (pop. 200) was at the end of the fallout plume, but no fatalities, illnesses or injuries were reported. The accident exposed 160 on-site workers and almost two thousand cleanup workers to total doses of up to 50 mSv (the threshold limit for radiation workers is 100 mSv per 5 years).[33][34][35]

June, 1999 — INES Level 2[36] - Ishikawa Prefecture, Japan - Control rod malfunction

Operators attempting to insert one control rod during an inspection neglected procedure and instead withdrew three causing a 15 minute uncontrolled sustained reaction at the number 1 reactor of Shika Nuclear Power Plant. The Hokuriku Electric Power Company who owned the reactor did not report this incident and falsified records, covering it up until March, 2007.[37]

September 30, 1999 — INES Level 4 - Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan - Accidental criticality

Inadequately trained part-time workers prepared a uranyl nitrate solution containing about 16.6 kg of uranium, which exceeded the critical mass, into a precipitation tank at a uranium reprocessing facility in Tokai-mura northeast of Tokyo, Japan. The tank was not designed to dissolve this type of solution and was not configured to prevent eventual criticality. Three workers were exposed to (neutron) radiation doses in excess of allowable limits. Two of these workers died. 116 other workers received lesser doses of 1 mSv or greater though not in excess of the allowable limit.[38][39][40][41]

See also: Tokaimura nuclear accident

2000s

April 10, 2003 — INES Level 3 - Paks, Hungary - Fuel damaged

Partially spent fuel rods undergoing cleaning in a tank of heavy water ruptured and spilled fuel pellets at Paks Nuclear Power Plant. It is suspected that inadequate cooling of the rods during the cleaning process combined with a sudden influx of cold water thermally shocked fuel rods causing them to split. Boric acid was added to the tank to prevent the loose fuel pellets from achieving criticality. Ammonia and hydrazine were also added to absorb iodine-131.[42]

April 19, 2005 — INES Level 3 - Sellafield, England, United Kingdom - Nuclear material leak

20 metric tons of uranium and 160 kilograms of plutonium dissolved in 83,000 litres of nitric acid leaked over several months from a cracked pipe into a stainless steel sump chamber at the Thorp nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. The partially processed spent fuel was drained into holding tanks outside the plant.[43][44]

November 2005 — INES Level needed - Braidwood, Illinois, United States - Nuclear material leak

Tritium contamination of groundwater was discovered at Exelon's Braidwood station. Groundwater off site remains within safe drinking standards though the NRC is requiring the plant to correct any problems related to the release.[45]

March 6, 2006 — INES Level 2[46] - Erwin, Tennessee, United States - Nuclear material leak

Thirty-five litres of a highly enriched uranium solution leaked during transfer into a lab at Nuclear Fuel Services Erwin Plant. The incident caused a seven-month shutdown. A required public hearing on the licensing of the plant was not held due to the absence of public notification.[47][48][49][50]

2010s
See also: Timeline of the Fukushima nuclear accidents

March 11–20, 2011 - INES Level 7[51][52](previously rating is 5[53]) as of April 12 (A final rating is expected after the situation has been completely resolved).
Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, Japan - partial meltdowns in multiple reactors [54]

Main article: Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster

After the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami of March 11, the emergency power supply of the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant failed. This was followed by deliberate releases of radioactive gas from reactors 1 and 2 to relieve pressure. On March 12, triggered by falling water levels, a hydrogen explosion occurred at reactor 1, resulting in the collapse of the concrete outer structure.[55][56][57][58][59] Although the reactor containment itself was confirmed to be intact,[60][61][62] the hourly radiation from the plant reached 1,015 microsievert (0.1015 rem) - an amount equivalent to that allowable for ordinary people in one year."[63][64] Residents of the Fukushima area were advised to stay inside, close doors and windows, turn off air conditioning, and to cover their mouths with masks, towels or handkerchiefs as well as not to drink tap water.[65] By the evening of March 12, the exclusion zone had been extended to 20 kilometres (12 mi) around the plant[66] and 70,000 to 80,000 people had been evacuated from homes in northern Japan.[67] A second, nearly identical hydrogen explosion occurred in the reactor building for Unit 3 on March 14, with similar effects.[68] A third explosion in the “pressure suppression room” of Unit 2[69] initially was said not to have breached the reactor’s inner steel containment vessel,[70] but later reports indicated that the explosion damaged the steel containment structure of Unit 2 and much larger releases of radiation were expected than previously.[69]
Disposed rods of reactor Unit 4 were stored outside the reactor in a separate pool which ran dry, yielding fire and risk of serious contamination.[71]
Staff was brought down from 800 Fukushima, who have been named the "Fukushima 50" by the press.[71] Events are still developing.

March 11–13, 2011 - INES Level 3,[72] Fukushima II Nuclear Power Plant, Japan - Overheating, possible radioactivity emergency.

After the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami of March 11, the cooling systems for three reactors (numbers 1, 2 and 4) of the Fukushima-Daini nuclear power plant were compromised due to damage from the tsunami.[73] Nuclear Engineering International reported that all four units were successfully automatically shut down, but emergency diesel generators at the site were Damaged by the 9.0 magnitude earthquake[74] People were evacuated around 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) from the plant. An evacuation order was issued, because of possible radioactive contamination.[75][76] October 2011, events are still developing.

3.
1940s

June 23, 1942 – Leipzig, Germany (then Nazi Germany) – Steam explosion and reactor fire*
Shortly after the Leipzig L-IV atomic pile — worked on by Werner Heisenberg and Robert Doepel — demonstrated Germany's first signs of neutron propagation, the device was checked for a possible heavy water leak. During the inspection, air leaked in, igniting the uranium powder inside. The burning uranium boiled the water jacket, generating enough steam pressure to blow the reactor apart. Burning uranium powder scattered throughout the lab causing a larger fire at the facility.[1][2]

A sketch of Louis Slotin's criticality accident used to determine exposure of those in the room at the time.

August 21, 1945 – Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA – Accidental criticality
Harry K. Daghlian, Jr. dropped a tungsten carbide brick onto a plutonium core, inadvertently creating a critical mass at the Los Alamos Omega site. He quickly removed the brick, but was fatally irradiated, dying September 15.[3]
May 21, 1946 – Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA – Accidental criticality
While demonstrating his technique to visiting scientists at Los Alamos, Canadian physicist Louis Slotin manually assembled a critical mass of plutonium. A momentary slip of a screwdriver caused a prompt critical reaction. Slotin died on May 30 from massive radiation poisoning, with an estimated dose of 1,000 rads (rad), or 10 grays (Gy). Seven observers, who received doses as high as 166 rads, survived, yet three died within a few decades from conditions believed to be radiation-related.[4]

In the above incidents, both Daghlian (August 21, 1945 case) and Slotin (May 21, 1946 case), were working with the same bomb core which became known as the "demon core".
1950s

February 13, 1950 – British Columbia, Canada – 1950 British Columbia B-36 crash—non-nuclear detonation of a simulated atomic bomb
A USAF B-36 bomber, AF Ser. No. 44-92075, was flying a simulated combat mission from Eielson Air Force Base, near Fairbanks, Alaska, to Carswell Air Force Base in Fort Worth, Texas, carrying one weapon containing a dummy warhead. The warhead contained uranium instead of plutonium. After six hours of flight, the bomber experienced mechanical problems and was forced to shut down three of its six engines at an altitude of 12,000 feet (3,700 m). Fearing that severe weather and icing would jeopardize a safe emergency landing, the weapon was jettisoned over the Pacific Ocean from a height of 8,000 ft (2,400 m). The weapon's high explosives detonated upon impact. All of the sixteen crew members and one passenger were able to parachute from the plane and twelve were subsequently rescued from Princess Royal Island. The Pentagon's summary report does not mention if the weapon was later recovered.[5]
April 11, 1950 – Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA – Loss and recovery of nuclear materials
Three minutes after departure from Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque a USAF B-29 bomber carrying a nuclear weapon, four spare detonators, and a crew of thirteen crashed into a mountain near Manzano Base. The crash resulted in a fire which the New York Times reported as being visible from 15 miles (24 km). The bomb's casing was completely demolished and its high explosives ignited upon contact with the plane's burning fuel. However, according to the Department of Defense, the four spare detonators and all nuclear components were recovered. A nuclear detonation was not possible because, while on board, the weapon's core was not in the weapon for safety reasons. All thirteen crew members died.[5]
July 13, 1950 – Lebanon, Ohio, USA – Non-nuclear detonation of an atomic bomb
USAF B-50 aircraft on a training mission from Biggs Air Force Base with a nuclear weapon flew into the ground resulting in a high explosive detonation, but no nuclear explosion.[6]
November 10, 1950 – Rivière-du-Loup, Québec, Canada – Non-nuclear detonation of an atomic bomb
Returning one of several U.S. Mark 4 nuclear bombs secretly deployed in Canada, a USAF B-50 had engine trouble and jettisoned the weapon at 10,500 feet (3,200 m). The crew set the bomb to self-destruct at 2,500 ft (760 m) and dropped over the St. Lawrence River. The explosion shook area residents and scattered nearly 100 pounds (45 kg) of uranium (U-238) used in the weapon's tamper. The plutonium core ("pit") was not in the bomb at the time.[7]

The Castle Bravo fallout pattern.

March 1, 1954 – Bikini Atoll, Republic of the Marshall Islands (then Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands) – Nuclear test accident
During the Castle Bravo test of the first deployable hydrogen bomb, a miscalculation resulted in the explosion being over twice as large as predicted, with a total explosive force of 15 megatons of TNT (63 PJ). Of the total yield, 10 Mt (42 PJ) were from fission of the natural uranium tamper, but those fission reactions were quite dirty, producing a large amount of fallout. Combined with the much larger than expected yield and an unanticipated wind shift radioactive fallout was spread eastward onto the inhabited Rongelap and Rongerik Atolls. These islands were not evacuated before the explosion due to the financial cost involved, but many of the Marshall Islands natives have since suffered from radiation burns and radioactive dusting and also similar fates as the Japanese fishermen and their children and grandchildren have suffered from birth defects and have received little if any compensation from the federal government[citation needed]. A Japanese fishing boat, Daigo Fukuryu Maru/Lucky Dragon, also came into contact with the fallout, which caused many of the crew to take ill with one fatality. The test resulted in an international uproar and reignited Japanese concerns about radiation, especially with regard to the possible contamination of fish. Personal accounts of the Rongelap people can be seen in the documentary Children of Armageddon.
November 29, 1955 – Idaho, USA – Partial meltdown
Operator error led to a partial core meltdown in the experimental EBR-I breeder reactor, resulting in temporarily elevated radioactivity levels in the reactor building and necessitating significant repair.[8][9]
March 10, 1956 – Over the Mediterranean Sea – Nuclear weapons lost
A USAF B-47 Stratojet, AF Ser. No. 52-534, on a non-stop mission from MacDill Air Force Base to an overseas base descended into a cloud formation at 14,000 feet over the Mediterranean in preparation for an in-air refuelling and vanished while carrying two nuclear weapon cores. The plane was lost while flying through dense clouds, and the cores and other wreckage were never located.[10][11][12]
July 27, 1956 – Lakenheath in Suffolk, UK – Nuclear weapons damaged
A USAF B-47 crashed into a storage igloo spreading burning fuel over three Mark 6 nuclear bombs at RAF Lakenheath. A bomb disposal expert stated it was a miracle exposed detonators on one bomb did not fire, which presumably would have released nuclear material into the environment.[13]
May 22, 1957 – Kirtland AFB in New Mexico, USA – Non-nuclear detonation of an atomic weapon
A B-36 ferrying a nuclear weapon from Biggs AFB to Kirtland AFB dropped a nuclear weapon on approach to Kirtland AFB. The weapon impacted the ground 4.5 miles south of the Kirtland control tower and 0.3 miles west of the Sandia Base reservation. The weapon was completely destroyed by the detonation of its high explosive material, creating a crater 12 feet deep and 25 feet in diameter. Radioactive contamination at the crater lip amounted to 0.5 milliroentgen.[12]
July 28, 1957 – Atlantic Ocean – Two weapons jettisoned and not recovered
A USAF C-124 aircraft from Dover Air Force Base, Delaware was carrying three nuclear bombs over the Atlantic Ocean when it experienced a loss of power. The crew jettisoned two nuclear bombs to protect their safety, which were never recovered.[6]
September 11, 1957 – Rocky Flats Plant, Golden, Colorado, USA – Fire, release of nuclear materials
A fire began in a materials handling glove box and spread through the ventilation system into the stack filters at the Rocky Flats weapons mill 27 kilometres (17 mi) from Denver, Colorado. Plutonium and other contaminants were released, but the exact amount of which contaminants is unknown; estimates range from 25 mg to 250 kg.[14][15][16][17]
29 September 1957 – Kyshtym, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Russia (then USSR) – Explosion, release of nuclear materials
See Kyshtym disaster. A cooling system failure at the Mayak nuclear processing plant resulted in a major explosion and release of radioactive materials. Hundreds of people died and hundreds of thousands were evacuated.[18]
October 8–12, 1957 – Sellafield, Cumbria, UK – Reactor core fire
See Windscale fire. Technicians mistakenly overheated Windscale Pile No. 1 during an annealing process to release Wigner energy from graphite portions of the reactor. Poorly placed temperature sensors indicated the reactor was cooling rather than heating. The excess heat led to the failure of a nuclear cartridge, which in turn allowed uranium and irradiated graphite to react with air. The resulting fire burned for days, damaging a significant portion of the reactor core. About 150 burning fuel cells could not be lifted from the core, but operators succeeded in creating a firebreak by removing nearby fuel cells. An effort to cool the graphite core with water eventually quenched the fire. The reactor had released radioactive gases into the surrounding countryside, primarily in the form of iodine-131 (131I). Milk distribution was banned in a 200-square-mile (520 km2) area around the reactor for several weeks. A 1987 report by the National Radiological Protection Board predicted the accident would cause as many as 33 long-term cancer deaths, although the Medical Research Council Committee concluded that "it is in the highest degree unlikely that any harm has been done to the health of anybody, whether a worker in the Windscale plant or a member of the general public." The reactor that burned was one of two air-cooled graphite-moderated natural uranium reactors at the site used for production of plutonium.[19][20][21]

October 11, 1957 – Homestead Air Force Base, Florida – Nuclear bomb burned after B-47 aircraft accident[22]
B-47 aircraft crashed during take-off after a wheel exploded; one nuclear bomb burned in the resulting fire.
January 31, 1958 – Morocco – Nuclear bomb damaged in crash[22]
During a simulated takeoff a wheel casting failure caused the tail of a USAF B-47 carrying an armed nuclear weapon to hit the runway, rupturing a fuel tank and sparking a fire. Some contamination was detected immediately following the accident.[23][24]
February 5, 1958 – Savannah, Georgia, USA – Nuclear bomb lost
See 1958 Tybee Island mid-air collision. A USAF B-47 bomber jettisoned a Mark 15 Mod 0 nuclear bomb over the Atlantic Ocean after a midair collision with a USAF F-86 Sabre during a simulated combat mission from Homestead Air Force Base, Florida. The F-86's pilot ejected and parachuted to safety. The USAF claimed the B-47 tried landing at Hunter Air Force Base, Georgia three times before the bomb was jettisoned at 7,200 ft (2,200 m) near Tybee Island, Georgia. The B-47 pilot successfully landed in one attempt only after he first jettisoned the bomb. A 3-square-mile (7.8 km2) area near Wassaw Sound was searched for 9 weeks before the search was called off. The bomb was searched for in 2001 and not found. A group of investigators in 2004 claim to have found an underwater object which they think is the bomb.[25]
March 11, 1958 – Mars Bluff, South Carolina, USA – Non-nuclear detonation of a nuclear bomb
A USAF B-47 bomber flying from Hunter Air Force Base in Savannah, Georgia accidentally released an atomic bomb.[26] A home was destroyed and several people injured but the bomb's plutonium core did not explode.[27]
June 16, 1958 – Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA – Accidental criticality
A supercritical portion of highly enriched uranyl nitrate was allowed to collect in the drum causing a prompt neutron criticality in the C-1 wing of building 9212 at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Y-12 complex. It is estimated that the reaction produced 1.3 * 10^{18} fissions. Eight employees were in close proximity to the drum during the accident, receiving neutron doses ranging from 30 to 477 rems. No fatalities were reported.[28]
December 30, 1958 – Los Alamos, New Mexico, USA – Accidental criticality
During chemical purification a critical mass of a plutonium solution was accidentally assembled at Los Alamos National Laboratory. A chemical operator named Cecil Kelley died of acute radiation sickness. The March, 1961 Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine printed a special supplement medically analyzing this accident. Hand-manipulations of critical assemblies were abandoned as a matter of policy in U.S. federal facilities after this accident.[28]
July, 1959 – Simi Valley, California, USA – Explosion
The Sodium Reactor Experiment was a pioneering nuclear power plant built by Atomics International at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory, nearby Simi Valley, California. The reactor operated from 1957 to 1964. In July 1959, the reactor suffered a serious incident in which the reactor core was damaged causing the controlled release of radioactive gas to the atmosphere.[29]
November 20, 1959 – Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA – Explosion
A chemical explosion occurred during decontamination of processing machinery in the radiochemical processing plant at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee . (Report ORNL-2989, Oak Ridge National Laboratory). The accident resulted in the release of about 15 grams (0.53 oz) of 239Pu.

1960s

June 7, 1960 – New Egypt, New Jersey, USA – Nuclear warhead damaged by fire
A helium tank exploded and ruptured the fuel tanks of a USAF BOMARC-A surface-to-air missile at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey. The fire destroyed the missile, and contaminated the area directly below and adjacent to the missile.[24][30]
October 13, 1960 – Barents Sea, Arctic Ocean – Release of nuclear materials
A leak developed in the steam generators and in a pipe leading to the compensator reception on the ill-fated K-8 while the Soviet Northern Fleet November-class submarine was on exercise. While the crew rigged an improvised cooling system, radioactive gases leaked into the vessel and three of the crew suffered visible radiation injuries according to radiological experts in Moscow. Some crew members had been exposed to doses of up to 1.8–2 Sv (180–200 rem).[31]

SL-1 reactor being removed from the National Reactor Testing Station.

January 3, 1961 – National Reactor Testing Station, Idaho, USA – Accidental criticality, steam explosion, 3 fatalities, release of fission products
During a maintenance shutdown, the SL-1 experimental nuclear reactor underwent a prompt critical reaction causing core materials to explosively vaporize. Water hammer estimated at 10,000 pounds per square inch (69,000 kPa) struck the top of the reactor vessel propelling the entire reactor vessel upwards over 9 feet (2.7 m) in the air. One operator who had been standing on top of the vessel was killed when a shield plug impaled him and lodged in the ceiling. Two other military personnel were also killed from the trauma of the explosion, one of which had removed the central control rod too far. The plant had to be dismantled and the contamination was buried permanently nearby. Most of the release of radioactive materials was concentrated within the reactor building.

For more details on this topic, see SL-1.

January 24, 1961 – Goldsboro B-52 crash – Physical destruction of a nuclear bomb, loss of nuclear materials
A USAF B-52 bomber caught fire and exploded in midair due to a major leak in a wing fuel cell 12 miles (19 km) north of Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina. Five crewmen parachuted to safety, but three died—two in the aircraft and one on landing. The incident released the bomber's two Mark 39 hydrogen bombs. Three of the four arming devices on one of the bombs activated, causing it to carry out many of the steps needed to arm itself, such as the charging of the firing capacitors and, critically, the deployment of a 100-foot (30 m) diameter retardation parachute. The parachute allowed the bomb to hit the ground with little damage. The fourth arming device — the pilot's safe/arm switch — was not activated preventing detonation. The second bomb plunged into a muddy field at around 700 mph (300 m/s) and disintegrated. Its tail was discovered about 20 feet (6 m) down and much of the bomb recovered, including the tritium bottle and the plutonium. However, excavation was abandoned due to uncontrollable ground water flooding. Most of the thermonuclear stage, containing uranium, was left in situ. It is estimated to lie around 55 feet (17 m) below ground. The Air Force purchased the land and fenced it off to prevent its disturbance, and it is tested regularly for contamination, although none has so far been found.[32]

March 14, 1961 – 1961 Yuba City B-52 crash
USAF B-52 bomber experienced a decompression event that required it to fly below 10,000 feet. Resulting increased fuel consumption led to fuel exhaustion; the aircraft crashed with two nuclear bombs, which did not trigger a nuclear explosion.

July 4, 1961 – coast of Norway – Near meltdown
The Soviet Hotel-class submarine K-19 suffered a failure in its cooling system. Reactor core temperatures reached 800 °C (1,500 °F), nearly enough to melt the fuel rods, although the crew was able to regain temperature control by using emergency procedures. The incident contaminated parts of the ship, some of the onboard ballistic missiles and the crew, resulting in several fatalities. The movie K-19: The Widowmaker, starring Harrison Ford and Liam Neeson, offers a controversially fictionalized story of these events.

May 1, 1962 – Sahara desert, French Algeria – Accidental venting of underground nuclear test
The second French underground nuclear test, codenamed Béryl, took place in a shaft under mount Taourirt, near In Ecker, 150 km (100 mi) north of Tamanrasset, Algerian Sahara. Due to improper sealing of the shaft, a spectacular flame burst through the concrete cap and radioactive gases and dust were vented into the atmosphere. The plume climbed up to 2600 m (8500 ft) high and radiation was detected hundreds of km away. About a hundred soldiers and officials, including two ministers, were irradiated. The number of contaminated Algerians is unknown.

April 10, 1963 – Loss of nuclear reactor
Submarine USS Thresher sinks about 190 nmi (220 mi; 350 km) east of Cape Cod, Massachusetts due to improper welds allowing in seawater which forced a shutdown of the reactor. Poor design of its emergency ballast system prevented the ship from surfacing and the disabled ship ultimately descended to crush depth and imploded.

January 13, 1964 – Salisbury, Pennsylvania and Frostburg, Maryland, USA – Accidental loss and recovery of thermonuclear bombs
A USAF B-52 on airborne alert duty encountered a severe winter storm and extreme turbulence, ultimately disintegrating in mid-air over South Central Pennsylvania.[33] Only the two pilots survived. One crew member failed to bail out and the rest succumbed to injuries or exposure to the harsh winter weather. A search for the missing weapons was initiated, and recovery was effected from portions of the wreckage at a farm northwest of Frostburg, MD.

April 21, 1964 – Indian Ocean – Launch failure of a RTG powered satellite
A U.S. Transit-5BN-3 nuclear-powered navigational satellite failed to reach orbital velocity and began falling back down at 150,000 feet (46 km) above the Indian Ocean.[34] The satellite's SNAP-9a generator contained 17 kCi (630 TBq)[35] of 238Pu (2.1 pounds), which at least partially burned upon reentry.[36][37][38][39] Increased levels of 238Pu were first documented in the stratosphere four months later. Indeed NASA (in the 1995 Cassini FEIS)[35] indicated that the SNAP-9a plutonium release was nearly double the 9000Ci added by all the atmospheric weapons tests to that date.[40][41] The United States Atomic Energy Commission reported a resulting threefold increase in global 238Pu fallout.[42][43] All subsequent Transit satellites were fitted with solar panels; RTG's were designed to remain contained during re-entry.

8 December 1964 – Bunker Hill Air Force Base, USA – Fire, radioactive contamination
USAF B-58 aircraft carrying a nuclear weapon caught fire while taxiing. Nuclear weapon burned, causing contamination of the crash area.[6]

January 1965 – Livermore, California, USA – Release of nuclear materials
An accident at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory released 300 kCi (11 PBq) of tritium gas. Subsequent study found this release was not likely to produce adverse health effects in the surrounding communities.[44]

11 October 1965 – Rocky Flats Plant, Golden, Colorado, USA – Fire, exposure of workers
A fire at Rocky Flats exposed a crew of 25 to up to 17 times the legal limit for radiation.

December 5, 1965 – coast of Japan – Loss of a nuclear bomb
A U.S. Navy A-4E Skyhawk aircraft with one B43 nuclear bomb on board fell off the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga into 16,200 feet (4,900 m) of water while the ship was underway from Vietnam to Yokosuka, Japan. The plane, pilot and weapon were never recovered. There is dispute over exactly where the incident took place—the U.S. Defense Department originally stated it took place 500 miles (800 km) off the coast of Japan, but Navy documents later show it happened about 80 miles (130 km) from the Ryukyu Islands and 200 miles (320 km) from Okinawa.[45]

January 17, 1966 – Palomares incident – Accidental destruction, loss and recovery of nuclear bombs
A USAF B-52 carrying four hydrogen bombs collided with a USAF KC-135 jet tanker during over-ocean in-flight refueling. Four of the B-52's seven crew members parachuted to safety while the remaining three were killed along with all four of the KC-135's crew. The conventional explosives in two of the bombs detonated upon impact with the ground, dispersing plutonium over nearby farms. A third bomb landed intact near Palomares while the fourth fell 12 miles (19 km) off the coast into the Mediterranean sea. The US Navy conducted a three month search involving 12,000 men and successfully recovered the fourth bomb. The U.S. Navy employed the use of the deep-diving research submarine DSV Alvin to aid in the recovery efforts. During the ensuing cleanup, 1,500 tonnes (1,700 short tons) of radioactive soil and tomato plants were shipped to a nuclear dump in Aiken, South Carolina. The U.S. settled claims by 522 Palomares residents for $600,000. The town also received a $200,000 desalinization plant. The motion picture Men of Honor (2000), starring Cuba Gooding, Jr., as USN Diver Carl Brashear, and Robert De Niro as USN Diver Billy Sunday, contained an account of the fourth bomb's recovery.[46]

January 21, 1968 – 1968 Thule Air Base B-52 crash, Greenland – Loss and partial recovery of nuclear bombs
A fire broke out in the navigator's compartment of a USAF B-52 near Thule Air Base, Greenland. The bomber crashed 7 miles (11 km) from the air base, rupturing its nuclear payload of four hydrogen bombs. The recovery and decontamination effort was complicated by Greenland's harsh weather. Contaminated ice and debris were buried in the United States. Bomb fragments were recycled by Pantex, in Amarillo, Texas. The incident caused outrage and protests in Denmark, as Greenland is a Danish possession and Denmark forbade nuclear weapons on its territory.

May 22, 1968 – 740 km (400 nmi) southwest of the Azores – Loss of nuclear reactor and two W34 nuclear warheads
The USS Scorpion (SSN-589) sank while enroute from Rota, Spain, to Naval Base Norfolk. The cause of sinking remains unknown; all 99 officers and men on board were killed. The wreckage of the ship, its S5W reactor, and its two Mark 45 torpedoes with W34 nuclear warheads, remain on the sea floor in more than 3,000 m (9,800 ft) of water.

May 24, 1968 – location unknown – Loss of cooling, radioactive contamination, nuclear fuel damaged
During sea trials the Soviet nuclear submarine K-27 (Project 645) suffered severe problems with its reactor cooling systems. After spending some time at reduced power, reactor output inexplicably dropped and sensors detected an increase of gamma radiation in the reactor compartment to 150 rad/h. The safety buffer tank released radioactive gases further contaminating the submarine. The crew shut the reactor down and subsequent investigation found that approximately 20% of the fuel assemblies were damaged. The entire submarine was scuttled in the Kara Sea in 1981.

August 27, 1968 – Severodvinsk, Russia (then USSR) – Reactor power excursion, contamination
While in the naval yards at Severodvinsk for repairs Soviet Yankee-class nuclear submarine K-140 suffered an uncontrolled increase of the reactor's power output. One of the reactors activated automatically when workers raised control rods to a higher position and power increased to 18 times normal, while pressure and temperature levels in the reactor increased to four times normal. The accident also increased radiation levels aboard the vessel. The problem was traced to the incorrect installation of control rod electrical cables.

May 11, 1969 – Rocky Flats Plant, Golden, Colorado, USA – Plutonium fire, contamination
An accident in which 5 kilograms of plutonium burnt inside a glovebox at Rocky Flats. Cleanup took two years and was the costliest industrial accident ever to occur in the United States at that time.[47][48][49]

1970s

April 12, 1970 – Bay of Biscay – Loss of a nuclear submarine
The Soviet November-class attack submarine K-8 sank during salvage with 52 sailors onboard after suffering fires in two compartments simultaneously. Both reactors were shut down. The crew attempted to hook a tow line to an Eastern Bloc merchant vessel, but ultimately failed.[50]

Baneberry's radioactive plume rises from a shock fissure. Contaminants were carried in three different directions by the wind

December 18, 1970 – Nevada Test Site – Accidental venting of nuclear explosion
In Area 8 on Yucca Flat, the 10 kiloton "Baneberry" weapons test of Operation Emery detonated as planned at the bottom of a sealed vertical shaft 900 feet below the Earth's surface but the device's energy cracked the soil in unexpected ways, causing a fissure near ground zero and the failure of the shaft stemming and cap.[51] A plume of hot gases and radioactive dust was released three and a half minutes after ignition,[52] and continuing for many hours, raining fallout on workers within NTS. Six percent of the explosion's radioactive products were vented. The plume released 6.7 MCi of radioactive material, including 80 kCi of Iodine-131 and a high ratio of noble gases.[53] After dropping a portion of its load in the area, the hot cloud's lighter particles were carried to three altitudes and conveyed by winter storms and the jet stream to be deposited heavily as radionuclide-laden snow in Lassen and Sierra counties in northeast California, and to lesser degrees in northern Nevada, southern Idaho and some eastern sections of Oregon and Washington states.[54] The three diverging jet stream layers conducted radionuclides across the US to Canada, the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean. Some 86 workers at the site were exposed to radioactivity, but according to the Department of Energy none received a dose exceeding site guidelines and, similarly, radiation drifting offsite was not considered to pose a hazard by the DOE.[55] In March 2009, TIME magazine identified the Baneberry Test as one of the world's worst nuclear disasters.[56]
December 12, 1971 – New London, Connecticut, USA – Spill of irradiated water
During the transfer of radioactive coolant water from the submarine USS Dace to the submarine tender USS Fulton 500 US gallons (1,900 l; 420 imp gal) were spilled into the Thames River (USA).
December 1972 – Pawling, New York, USA – Contamination
A major fire and two explosions contaminated the plant and grounds of a plutonium fabrication facility resulting in a permanent shutdown.

1975 – location unknown – Contamination
Radioactive resin contaminates the American Sturgeon-class submarine USS Guardfish after wind unexpectedly blows the powder back towards the ship. The resin is used to remove dissolved radioactive minerals and particles from the primary coolant loops of submarines. This type of accident was fairly common; however, U.S. Navy nuclear vessels no longer discharge resin at sea.

October 1975 – Apra Harbor, Guam – Spill of irradiated water
While disabled, the submarine tender USS Proteus discharged radioactive coolant water. A Geiger counter at two of the harbor's public beaches showed 100 millirems/hour, fifty times the allowable dose.[citation needed]

August 1976 – Benton County, Washington, USA – Explosion, contamination of worker
An explosion at the Hanford site Plutonium Finishing Plant blew out a quarter-inch-thick lead glass window. Harold McCluskey, a worker, was showered with nitric acid and radioactive glass. He inhaled the largest dose of 241Am ever recorded, about 500 times the U.S. government occupational standards. The worker was placed in isolation for five months and given an experimental drug to flush the isotope from his body. By 1977, his body's radiation count had fallen by about 80 percent. He died of natural causes in 1987 at age 75.[57]

1977 – coast of Kamchatka – Loss and recovery of a nuclear warhead
The Soviet submarine K-171 accidentally released a nuclear warhead. The warhead was recovered after a search involving dozens of ships and aircraft.[58]

January 24, 1978 – Northwest Territories, Canada – Spill of nuclear fuel
Cosmos 954, a Soviet Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite with an onboard nuclear reactor, failed to separate from its booster and broke up on reentry over Canada. The fuel was spread over a wide area and some radioactive pieces were recovered. The Soviet Union eventually paid the Canadian Government $3 million CAD for expenses relating to the crash.

May 22, 1978 – near Puget Sound, Washington, USA – Spill of irradiated water
A valve was mistakenly opened aboard the submarine USS Puffer releasing up to 500 US gallons (1,900 l; 420 imp gal) of radioactive water.

1980s

September 18, 1980 – At about 6:30 p.m., an airman conducting maintenance on a USAF Titan-II missile at Little Rock Air Force Base's Launch Complex 374-7 in Southside (Van Buren County), just north of Damascus, Arkansas, dropped a socket from a socket wrench, which fell about 80 feet (24 m) before hitting and piercing the skin on the rocket's first-stage fuel tank, causing it to leak. The area was evacuated. At about 3:00 a.m., on September 19, 1980, the hypergolic fuel exploded. The W53 warhead landed about 100 feet (30 m) from the launch complex's entry gate; its safety features operated correctly and prevented any loss of radioactive material. An Air Force airman was killed and the launch complex was destroyed.[59]
August 8, 1982 – While on duty in the Barents Sea, there was a release of liquid metal coolant from the reactor of the Soviet Project 705 Alfa-class submarine K-123. The accident was caused by a leak in the steam generator. Approximately two tons of metal alloy leaked into the reactor compartment, irreparably damaging the reactor such that it had to be replaced. It took nine years to repair the submarine.
January 3, 1983 – The Soviet nuclear-powered spy satellite Kosmos 1402 burns up over the South Atlantic.
August 10, 1985 – About 35 miles (56 km) from Vladivostok in Chazhma Bay, Soviet submarine K-431, a Soviet Echo-class submarine had a reactor explosion, producing fatally high levels of radiation. Ten men were killed, but the deadly cloud of radioactivity did not reach Vladivostok.[60]
1986 – The U.S. government declassifies 19,000 pages of documents indicating that between 1946 and 1986, the Hanford Site near Richland, Washington, released thousands of US gallons of radioactive liquids. Many of the people living in the affected area received low doses of radiation from 131I.
October 3, 1986 – 480 miles (770 km) east of Bermuda, K-219, a Soviet Yankee I-class submarine experienced an explosion in one of its nuclear missile tubes and at least three crew members were killed. Sixteen nuclear missiles and two reactors were on board. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev privately communicated news of the disaster to U.S. President Ronald Reagan before publicly acknowledging the incident on October 4. Two days later, on October 6, the submarine sank in the Atlantic Ocean while under tow in 18,000 feet (5,500 m) of water.[61]
October 1988 – At the nuclear trigger assembly facility at Rocky Flats in Colorado, two employees and a D.O.E. inspector inhaled radioactive particles, causing closure of the plant. Several safety violations were cited, including uncalibrated monitors, inadequate fire equipment, and groundwater contaminated with radioactivity.

1990s

1997 – Georgian soldiers suffer radiation poisoning and burns. They are eventually traced back to training sources abandoned, forgotten, and unlabeled after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. One was a 137Cs pellet in a pocket of a shared jacket which put out about 130,000 times the level of background radiation at 1 meter distance.[62]

2000s

February 2003: Oak Ridge, Tennessee Y-12 facility. During the final testing of a new saltless uranium processing method, there was a small explosion followed by a fire. The explosion occurred in an unvented vessel containing unreacted calcium, water and depleted uranium. An exothermic reaction among these articles generated enough steam to burst the container. This small explosion breached its glovebox, allowing air to enter and ignite some loose uranium powder. Three employees were contaminated. BWXT Y-12 (now B&W Y-12), a partnership of Babcock & Wilcox and Bechtel, was fined $82,500 for the accident.[63]

forum.politics.be laat geen langere lijstjes toe. Jammer. We zullen in schijfjes moeten werken.

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door maddox

Daar twijfelen we niet aan, en als het niet de sluiting van Doel 3 is, dan zal er wel iets anders zijn dat electriciteit een stuk duurder gaat maken. U luistert niet naar politici. Maar betalen zal U.

Ja, omdat kiezers als u vasthouden aan verroeste energietechnologieën en weigeren de triljardensubsidies daarvoor af te schaffen.

Maar goed, mijn kinderen zullen daar later hartelijk om lachen. Dat er effectief in mijn tijd mensen bestonden die tegen de goedkope, veilige, propere en efficiënte én hernieuwbare bronnen waren.

Een beetje zoals de stoomketeltypes die geen toekomst zagen in de verbrandingsmotor.

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door maddox

Iedere energiebron gelijk voor de wet.

Maar doe het dan eens, in plaats van het alleen te zeggen. Doen durft ge niet, want dan weet ge dat kernenergie, steenkool en gas niet kunnen concurreren.

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door maddox

Grootheidswaanzin. Met onze aantallen schijten en zeiken we ons naar de verdoemenis als soort.

En klimaatverandering, weeral grootheidswaanzin van U om de mens daar zo'n grote rol in te geven.

Wel wel, een klimaatontkenner, wie had dat nu toch gedacht na al wat we hier al lazen.

[C2C]

4.
The Karlsruhe plutonium affair

An unnamed man was convicted of attempting to poison his ex-wife in 2001 with plutonium stolen from WAK (Wiederaufbereitungsanlage Karlsruhe), a small scale reprocessing plant where he worked. He did not steal a large amount of plutonium, only rags used for wiping surfaces and a small amount of liquid waste.[1][2] At least two people (besides the criminal) were contaminated by the plutonium.[3] Two flats in Landau in the Rhineland-Palatinate were contaminated, and had to be cleaned at a cost of two million euro.[4] Photographs of the case and details of other nuclear crimes have been presented by a worker at the Institute for Transuranium Elements.[5]
The Litvinenko assassination

Alexander Litvinenko died from polonium-210 poisoning in 2006. British officials said investigators had concluded the murder of Litvinenko was "a 'state-sponsored' assassination orchestrated by Russian security services."[6] On 20 January 2007 British police announced that they had "identified the man they believe poisoned Alexander Litvinenko," Andrei Lugovoi.[7]
Roman Tsepov homicide

Roman Tsepov, a politically influential Russian who provided security to Vladimir Putin and others, fell sick on September 11, 2004 after a trip to Moscow, and died on September 24. A postmortem investigation found a poisoning by an unspecified radioactive material. He had symptoms similar to Aleksandr Litvinenko[8][9][10].
Zheleznodorozhny criminal radiological act

An unnamed truck driver was killed by 5 months of radiation exposure to a 1.3 Curie cesium 137 source that had been put into the door of his truck around February 1995. He died of radiation-induced leukemia on 27 April 1997.[11]
Vladimir Kaplun radiation homicide

In 1993, director of the Kartontara packing company Vladimir Kaplun was killed by radioactive material (probably cesium-137) placed in his chair. He died of radiation sickness after a month of hospitalization. The source of the radiation was found after his death.[12]
Intentional theft/attempted theft of radioactive material

For accidental theft or attempted theft of radioactive materials, see the list of radiation accidents.
Grozny cobalt theft/attempted theft

On 13 September 1999, six people attempted to steal radioactive cobalt rods from a chemical plant in the city of Grozny in the Chechen Republic. During the theft, the suspects opened the radioactive material container and handled it, resulting in the deaths of three of the suspects and injury of the remaining three. The suspect who held the material directly in his hands died of radiation exposure 30 minutes later. This incident is described as an attempted theft, but some of the rods are reportedly still missing.[13]
Criminal use of X-ray equipment and other radiation technology by secret police

Some former East German dissidents claim that the Stasi used X-ray equipment to induce cancer in political prisoners.[14]

Similarly, some anti-Castro activists claim that the Cuban secret police sometimes used radioactive isotopes to induce cancer in "adversaries they wished to destroy with as little notice as possible".[15] In 1997, the Cuban expatriate columnist Carlos Alberto Montaner called this method "the Bulgarian Treatment", after its alleged use by the Bulgarian secret police.[16]
Quack medicine

In the early 20th century a series of "medical" products which contained radioactive elements were marketed to the general public. These are included in this discussion of nuclear/radioactive crime because the sale and production of these products is now covered by criminal law. Because some perfectly good radioactive medical products exist, (such as iodine-131 for the treatment of cancer), it is important to note that sale of products similar to those described below is criminal, as they are unlicensed medicines.

Radithor, a well known patent medicine/snake oil, is possibly the best known example of radioactive quackery. It consisted of triple distilled water containing at a minimum 1 microcurie each of the radium 226 and 228 isotopes.[17]

Radithor was manufactured from 1918 - 1928 by the Bailey Radium Laboratories, Inc., of East Orange, New Jersey. The head of the laboratories was listed as Dr. William J. A. Bailey, not a medical doctor.[18] It was advertised as "A Cure for the Living Dead"[19] as well as "Perpetual Sunshine".

These radium elixirs were marketed similar to the way opiates were peddled to the masses with laudanum an age earlier, and electrical cure-alls during the same time period such as the Prostate Warmer.[20]

The eventual death of the socialite Eben Byers from Radithor consumption and the associated radiation poisoning led to the strengthening of the Food and Drug Administration's powers and the demise of most radiation quack cures.

5.
Nuclear proliferation
See also: List of states with nuclear weapons

Research into the development of nuclear weapons was undertaken during World War II by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and the USSR. The United States was the first and is the only country to have used a nuclear weapon in war, when it used two bombs against Japan in August 1945. With their loss during the war, Germany and Japan ceased to be involved in any nuclear weapon research. In August 1949, the USSR tested a nuclear weapon.[1] The United Kingdom tested a nuclear weapon in October 1952. France developed a nuclear weapon in 1960. The People's Republic of China detonated a nuclear weapon in 1964. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, and Pakistan tested a weapon in 1998. In 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test.
Non-proliferation efforts

Early efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation involved intense government secrecy, the wartime acquisition of known uranium stores (the Combined Development Trust), and at times even outright sabotage—such as the bombing of a heavy-water facility thought to be used for a German nuclear program. None of these efforts were explicitly public, because the weapon developments themselves were kept secret until the bombing of Hiroshima.

Earnest international efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation began soon after World War II, when the Truman Administration proposed the Baruch Plan[2] of 1946, named after Bernard Baruch, America's first representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. The Baruch Plan, which drew heavily from the Acheson–Lilienthal Report of 1946, proposed the verifiable dismantlement and destruction of the U.S. nuclear arsenal (which, at that time, was the only nuclear arsenal in the world) after all governments had cooperated successfully to accomplish two things: (1) the establishment of an "international atomic development authority," which would actually own and control all military-applicable nuclear materials and activities, and (2) the creation of a system of automatic sanctions, which not even the U.N. Security Council could veto, and which would proportionately punish states attempting to acquire the capability to make nuclear weapons or fissile material.

Although the Baruch Plan enjoyed wide international support, it failed to emerge from the UNAEC because the Soviet Union planned to veto it in the Security Council. Still, it remained official American policy until 1953, when President Eisenhower made his "Atoms for Peace" proposal before the U.N. General Assembly. Eisenhower's proposal led eventually to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957. Under the "Atoms for Peace" program thousands of scientists from around the world were educated in nuclear science and then dispatched home, where many later pursued secret weapons programs in their home country.[3]

Efforts to conclude an international agreement to limit the spread of nuclear weapons did not begin until the early 1960s, after four nations (the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France) had acquired nuclear weapons (see List of countries with nuclear weapons for more information). Although these efforts stalled in the early 1960s, they renewed once again in 1964, after China detonated a nuclear weapon. In 1968, governments represented at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) finished negotiations on the text of the NPT. In June 1968, the U.N. General Assembly endorsed the NPT with General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII), and in July 1968, the NPT opened for signature in Washington, DC, London and Moscow. The NPT entered into force in March 1970.

Since the mid-1970s, the primary focus of non-proliferation efforts has been to maintain, and even increase, international control over the fissile material and specialized technologies necessary to build such devices because these are the most difficult and expensive parts of a nuclear weapons program. The main materials whose generation and distribution is controlled are highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Other than the acquisition of these special materials, the scientific and technical means for weapons construction to develop rudimentary, but working, nuclear explosive devices are considered to be within the reach of industrialized nations.

Since its founding by the United Nations in 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has promoted two, sometimes contradictory, missions: on the one hand, the Agency seeks to promote and spread internationally the use of civilian nuclear energy; on the other hand, it seeks to prevent, or at least detect, the diversion of civilian nuclear energy to nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices or purposes unknown. The IAEA now operates a safeguards system as specified under Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, which aims to ensure that civil stocks of uranium, plutonium, as well as facilities and technologies associated with these nuclear materials, are used only for peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation or nuclear weapons programs. It is often argued that proliferation of nuclear weapons to many other states has been prevented by the extension of assurances and mutual defence treaties to these states by nuclear powers, but other factors, such as national prestige, or specific historical experiences, also play a part in hastening or stopping nuclear proliferation.[4]
Dual use technology

Dual use technology refers to the possibility of military use of civilian nuclear power technology. Many technologies and materials associated with the creation of a nuclear power program have a dual-use capability, in that they can be used to make nuclear weapons if a country chooses to do so. When this happens a nuclear power program can become a route leading to the atomic bomb or a public annex to a secret bomb program. The crisis over Iran’s nuclear activities is a case in point.[5]

Many UN and US agencies warn that building more nuclear reactors unavoidably increases nuclear proliferation risks.[6] A fundamental goal for American and global security is to minimize the proliferation risks associated with the expansion of nuclear power. If this development is "poorly managed or efforts to contain risks are unsuccessful, the nuclear future will be dangerous".[5] For nuclear power programs to be developed and managed safely and securely, it is important that countries have domestic “good governance” characteristics that will encourage proper nuclear operations and management:[5]

These characteristics include low degrees of corruption (to avoid officials selling materials and technology for their own personal gain as occurred with the A.Q. Khan smuggling network in Pakistan), high degrees of political stability (defined by the World Bank as “likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism”), high governmental effectiveness scores (a World Bank aggregate measure of “the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures [and] the quality of policy formulation and implementation”), and a strong degree of regulatory competence.[5]

International cooperation
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Main article: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

At present, 189 countries are States Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, more commonly known as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT. These include the five Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) recognized by the NPT: the People's Republic of China, France, Russian Federation, the UK, and the United States.

Notable non-signatories to the NPT are Israel, Pakistan, and India (the latter two have since tested nuclear weapons, while Israel is considered by most to be an unacknowledged nuclear weapons state). North Korea was once a signatory but withdrew in January 2003. The legality of North Korea's withdrawal is debatable but as of 9 October 2006, North Korea clearly possesses the capability to make a nuclear explosive device.
International Atomic Energy Agency
Main article: International Atomic Energy Agency

The IAEA was established on 29 July 1957 to help nations develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Allied to this role is the administration of safeguards arrangements to provide assurance to the international community that individual countries are honoring their commitments under the treaty. Though established under its own international treaty, the IAEA reports to both the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council.

The IAEA regularly inspects civil nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation supplied to it. The agency checks inventories, and samples and analyzes materials. Safeguards are designed to deter diversion of nuclear material by increasing the risk of early detection. They are complemented by controls on the export of sensitive technology from countries such as UK and United States through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The main concern of the IAEA is that uranium not be enriched beyond what is necessary for commercial civil plants, and that plutonium which is produced by nuclear reactors not be refined into a form that would be suitable for bomb production.
Scope of safeguards
See also: Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials

Traditional safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes.

Parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguard measures applied by the IAEA. These require that operators of nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed accounting records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear material. Over 550 facilities and several hundred other locations are subject to regular inspection, and their records and the nuclear material being audited. Inspections by the IAEA are complemented by other measures such as surveillance cameras and instrumentation.

The inspections act as an alert system providing a warning of the possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities. The system relies on;

Material Accountancy – tracking all inward and outward transfers and the flow of materials in any nuclear facility. This includes sampling and analysis of nuclear material, on-site inspections, and review and verification of operating records.
Physical Security – restricting access to nuclear materials at the site.
Containment and Surveillance – use of seals, automatic cameras and other instruments to detect unreported movement or tampering with nuclear materials, as well as spot checks on-site.

All NPT non-weapons states must accept these full-scope safeguards. In the five weapons states plus the non-NPT states (India, Pakistan and Israel), facility-specific safeguards apply. IAEA inspectors regularly visit these facilities to verify completeness and accuracy of records.

The terms of the NPT cannot be enforced by the IAEA itself, nor can nations be forced to sign the treaty. In reality, as shown in Iraq and North Korea, safeguards can be backed up by diplomatic, political and economic measures.

While traditional safeguards easily verified the correctness of formal declarations by suspect states, in the 1990s attention turned to what might not have been declared. While accepting safeguards at declared facilities, Iraq had set up elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium to weapons grade. North Korea attempted to use research reactors (not commercial electricity-generating reactors) and a reprocessing plant to produce some weapons-grade plutonium.

The weakness of the NPT regime lay in the fact that no obvious diversion of material was involved. The uranium used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and the nuclear facilities were built by the countries themselves without being declared or placed under safeguards. Iraq, as an NPT party, was obliged to declare all facilities but did not do so. Nevertheless, the activities were detected and brought under control using international diplomacy. In Iraq, a military defeat assisted this process.

In North Korea, the activities concerned took place before the conclusion of its NPT safeguards agreement. With North Korea, the promised provision of commercial power reactors appeared to resolve the situation for a time, but it later withdrew from the NPT and declared it had nuclear weapons.
Additional Protocol

In 1993 a program was initiated to strengthen and extend the classical safeguards system, and a model protocol was agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors 1997. The measures boosted the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the civil fuel cycle.

Innovations were of two kinds. Some could be implemented on the basis of IAEA's existing legal authority through safeguards agreements and inspections. Others required further legal authority to be conferred through an Additional Protocol. This must be agreed by each non-weapons state with IAEA, as a supplement to any existing comprehensive safeguards agreement. Weapons states have agreed to accept the principles of the model additional protocol.

Key elements of the model Additional Protocol:

The IAEA is to be given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including R & D, production of uranium and thorium (regardless of whether it is traded), and nuclear-related imports and exports.
IAEA inspectors will have greater rights of access. This will include any suspect location, it can be at short notice (e.g., two hours), and the IAEA can deploy environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities.
States must streamline administrative procedures so that IAEA inspectors get automatic visa renewal and can communicate more readily with IAEA headquarters.
Further evolution of safeguards is towards evaluation of each state, taking account of its particular situation and the kind of nuclear materials it has. This will involve greater judgement on the part of IAEA and the development of effective methodologies which reassure NPT States.

As of 20 December 2010, 139 countries have signed Additional Protocols, 104 have brought them into force, and one (Iraq) is implementing its protocol provisionally.[7] The IAEA is also applying the measures of the Additional Protocol in Taiwan.[8] Among the leading countries that have not signed the Additional Protocol are Egypt, which says it will not sign until Israel accepts comprehensive IAEA safeguards,[9] and Brazil, which opposes making the protocol a requirement for international cooperation on enrichment and reprocessing,[10] but has not ruled out signing.[11]
Limitations of Safeguards

The greatest risk from nuclear weapons proliferation comes from countries which have not joined the NPT and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities; India, Pakistan, and Israel fall within this category. While safeguards apply to some of their activities, others remain beyond scrutiny.

A further concern is that countries may develop various sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities and research reactors under full safeguards and then subsequently opt out of the NPT. Bilateral agreements, such as insisted upon by Australia and Canada for sale of uranium, address this by including fallback provisions, but many countries are outside the scope of these agreements. If a nuclear-capable country does leave the NPT, it is likely to be reported by the IAEA to the UN Security Council, just as if it were in breach of its safeguards agreement. Trade sanctions would then be likely.

IAEA safeguards, together with bilateral safeguards applied under the NPT can, and do, ensure that uranium supplied by countries such as Australia and Canada does not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact, the worldwide application of those safeguards and the substantial world trade in uranium for nuclear electricity make the proliferation of nuclear weapons much less likely.

The Additional Protocol, once it is widely in force, will provide credible assurance that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in the states concerned. This will be a major step forward in preventing nuclear proliferation.
Other developments

The Nuclear Suppliers Group communicated its guidelines, essentially a set of export rules, to the IAEA in 1978. These were to ensure that transfers of nuclear material or equipment would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, and formal government assurances to this effect were required from recipients. The Guidelines also recognised the need for physical protection measures in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials, and strengthened retransfer provisions. The group began with seven members – the United States, the former USSR, the UK, France, Germany, Canada and Japan – but now includes 46 countries including all five nuclear weapons states.

According to Kenneth D. Bergeron's Tritium on Ice: The Dangerous New Alliance of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power, tritium is not classified as a 'special nuclear material' but rather as a 'by-product'. It is seen as an important litmus test on the seriousness of the United States' intention to nuclear disarm. This radioactive super-heavy hydrogen isotope is used to boost the efficiency of fissile materials in nuclear weapons. The United States resumed tritium production in 2003 for the first time in 15 years. This could indicate that there is a potential nuclear arm stockpile replacement since the isotope naturally decays.

In May 1995, NPT parties reaffirmed their commitment to a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty to prohibit the production of any further fissile material for weapons. This aims to complement the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996 (not entered into force as of 2011) and to codify commitments made by the United States, the UK, France and Russia to cease production of weapons material, as well as putting a similar ban on China. This treaty will also put more pressure on Israel, India and Pakistan to agree to international verification.[citation needed]

On 9 August 2005, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. Khamenei's official statement was made at the meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. [2] As of February 2006 Iran formally announced that uranium enrichment within their borders has continued. Iran claims it is for peaceful purposes but the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States claim the purpose is for nuclear weapons research and construction.[12]
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NPT Non-Signatories

India, Pakistan and Israel have been "threshold" countries in terms of the international non-proliferation regime. They possess or are quickly capable of assembling one or more nuclear weapons. They have remained outside the 1970 NPT. They are thus largely excluded from trade in nuclear plant or materials, except for safety-related devices for a few safeguarded facilities.

In May 1998 India and Pakistan each exploded several nuclear devices underground. This heightened concerns regarding an arms race between them, with Pakistan involving the People's Republic of China, an acknowledged nuclear weapons state. Both countries are opposed to the NPT as it stands, and India has consistently attacked the Treaty since its inception in 1970 labeling it as a lopsided treaty in favor of the nuclear powers.

Relations between the two countries are tense and hostile, and the risks of nuclear conflict between them have long been considered quite high. Kashmir is a prime cause of bilateral tension, its sovereignty being in dispute since 1948. There is persistent low level military conflict due to Pakistan backing an insurgency there and the disputed status of Kashmir.

Both engaged in a conventional arms race in the 1980s, including sophisticated technology and equipment capable of delivering nuclear weapons. In the 1990s the arms race quickened. In 1994 India reversed a four-year trend of reduced allocations for defence, and despite its much smaller economy, Pakistan was expected to push its own expenditures yet higher. Both have lost their patrons: India, the former USSR, and Pakistan, the United States.

But it is the growth and modernization of China's nuclear arsenal and its assistance with Pakistan's nuclear power programme and, reportedly, with missile technology, which exacerbate Indian concerns. In particular, Pakistan is aided by China's People's Liberation Army, which operates somewhat autonomously within that country as an exporter of military material.
India

Nuclear power for civil use is well established in India. Its civil nuclear strategy has been directed towards complete independence in the nuclear fuel cycle, necessary because of its outspoken rejection of the NPT. This self-sufficiency extends from uranium exploration and mining through fuel fabrication, heavy water production, reactor design and construction, to reprocessing and waste management. It has a small fast breeder reactor and is planning a much larger one. It is also developing technology to utilise its abundant resources of thorium as a nuclear fuel.

India has 14 small nuclear power reactors in commercial operation, two larger ones under construction, and ten more planned. The 14 operating ones (2548 MWe total) comprise:

two 150 MWe BWRs from the United States, which started up in 1969, now use locally enriched uranium and are under safeguards,
two small Canadian PHWRs (1972 & 1980), also under safeguards, and
ten local PHWRs based on Canadian designs, two of 150 and eight 200 MWe.
two new 540 MWe and two 700 MWe plants at tarapore (known as TAPP :Tarapore Atomic Power Project)

The two under construction and two of the planned ones are 450 MWe versions of these 200 MWe domestic products. Construction has been seriously delayed by financial and technical problems. In 2001 a final agreement was signed with Russia for the country's first large nuclear power plant, comprising two VVER-1000 reactors, under a Russian-financed US$3 billion contract. The first unit is due to be commissioned in 2007. A further two Russian units are under consideration for the site.

Nuclear power supplied 3.1% of India's electricity in 2000 and this was expected to reach 10% by 2005. Its industry is largely without IAEA safeguards, though a few plants (see above) are under facility-specific safeguards. As a result India's nuclear power programme proceeds largely without fuel or technological assistance from other countries.

Its weapons material appears to come from a Canadian-designed 40MW "research" reactor which started up in 1960, well before the NPT, and a 100MW indigenous unit in operation since 1985. Both use local uranium, as India does not import any nuclear fuel. It is estimated that India may have built up enough weapons-grade plutonium for a hundred nuclear warheads.

It is widely believed that the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan used CANDU reactors to produce fissionable materials for their weapons; however, this is not accurate. Both Canada (by supplying the 40 MW research reactor) and the United States (by supplying 21 tons of heavy water) supplied India with the technology necessary to create a nuclear weapons program, dubbed CIRUS (Canada-India Reactor, United States). Canada sold India the reactor on the condition that the reactor and any by-products would be "employed for peaceful purposes only.". Similarly, the United States sold India heavy water for use in the reactor "only... in connection with research into and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes". India, in violation of these agreements, used the Canadian-supplied reactor and American-supplied heavy water to produce plutonium for their first nuclear explosion, Smiling Buddha.[13] The Indian government controversially justified this, however, by claiming that Smiling Buddha was a "peaceful nuclear explosion."

The country has at least three other research reactors including the tiny one which is exploring the use of thorium as a nuclear fuel, by breeding fissile U-233. In addition, an advanced heavy-water thorium cycle is under development.

India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, the so-called Smiling Buddha test, which it has consistently claimed was for peaceful purposes. Others saw it as a response to China's nuclear weapons capability. It was then universally perceived, notwithstanding official denials, to possess, or to be able to quickly assemble, nuclear weapons. In 1999 it deployed its own medium-range missile and has developed an intermediate-range missile capable of reaching targets in China's industrial heartland.

In 1995 the United States quietly intervened to head off a proposed nuclear test. However, in 1998 there were five more tests in Operation Shakti. These were unambiguously military, including one claimed to be of a sophisticated thermonuclear device, and their declared purpose was "to help in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields and different delivery systems".

Indian security policies are driven by:

its determination to be recognized as a dominant power in the region
its increasing concern with China's expanding nuclear weapons and missile delivery programmes
its concern with Pakistan's capability to deliver nuclear weapons deep into India

It perceives nuclear weapons as a cost-effective political counter to China's nuclear and conventional weaponry, and the effects of its nuclear weapons policy in provoking Pakistan is, by some accounts, considered incidental. India has had an unhappy relationship with China. After an uneasy ceasefire ended the 1962 war, relations between the two nations were frozen until 1998. Since then a degree of high-level contact has been established and a few elementary confidence-building measures put in place. China still occupies some territory which it captured during the aforementioned war, claimed by India, and India still occupies some territory claimed by China. Its nuclear weapon and missile support for Pakistan is a major bone of contention.

American President George W. Bush met with India Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to discuss India's involvement with nuclear weapons. The two countries agreed that the United States would give nuclear power assistance to India.[citation needed]
Pakistan
This section needs additional citations for verification. (July 2011)
In 2003, Libya admitted that the nuclear weapons-related material including these centrifuges were acquired from Pakistan

Nuclear power supplies only 2.34% of Pakistan's electricity. It has one small (125 MWe) Canadian PHWR nuclear power reactor from 1971 which is under international safeguards, and two 300 MWe PWRs supplied by China under safeguards, which started up in June 2000 and May 2011. China is supplying the low-enriched uranium fuel for these PWRs, along with two additional reactors.

Pakistan also has a 9 MW research reactor of 1965 vintage, and there are persistent reports of another "multipurpose" reactor, a 50 MW PHWR near Khushab, which is presumed to have potential for producing weapons plutonium.

Pakistan has also produced nuclear weapons, using indigenous uranium to produce both highly enriched uranium and, more recently, plutonium. It has at least one small centrifuge enrichment plant. In 1990 the United States cut off military assistance to Pakistan because it was unable to certify that Pakistan was not pursuing a policy of manufacturing nuclear weapons. This was relaxed late in 2001.

Pakistan made it clear in early 1996 that it had done the basic development work, and that if India staged a nuclear test, Pakistan would immediately start assembling its own nuclear explosive device. It is assumed to now have enough highly enriched uranium for up to forty nuclear warheads. In May 1998, within weeks of India's nuclear tests, Pakistan announced that it had conducted six underground tests in the Chagai Hills, five on the 28th and one on the 30th of that month. Seismic events consistent with these claims were recorded.

In the 1970s, Pakistan first focused on the plutonium route, expecting to obtain the fissile material from a reprocessing plant to be provided by France. This plan failed due to U.S. intervention. Pakistan, not wanting to give up, redoubled its efforts to obtain uranium enrichment technology. The main efforts towards this direction were done under Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. Dr. Khan had earlier worked with Fysisch Dynamisch Onderzoekslaboratorium (FDO). FDO was a subsidiary of the Dutch firm VMF-Stork based in Amsterdam. From 1972 to 1975 Dr. Khan had access to classified data used to enrich ordinary uranium to weapons grade concentrations. FDO was working on the development of ultra high-speed centrifuges for URENCO.

In 1974 while he was on secondment for 17 days as a translator to the URENCO plant in Almelo, he obtained photographs and documents of the plant. Dr. Khan returned to Pakistan in 1976 and initiated the Uranium enrichment program on the basis of the technology he had stolen from his previous employer.[citation needed] After the British Government stopped the British subsidiary of the American Emerson Electric Co from shipping the nuclear technology to Pakistan, Dr. Khan describes his frustration with a supplier from Germany as "That man from the German team was unethical. When he did not get the order from us, he wrote a letter to a Labour Party member and questions were asked in [British] Parliament."[3]

A.Q Khan's efforts made him into a national hero. In 1981, as a tribute, the president of Pakistan, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, renamed the enrichment plant the A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories.

In 2003, the IAEA unearthed a nuclear black market with close ties to Pakistan. It was widely believed to have direct involvement of the government of Pakistan. This claim could not be verified due to the refusal of the government of Pakistan to allow IAEA to interview the alleged head of the nuclear black market, who happened to be no other than Dr. Khan. Dr. Khan later confessed to his crimes on national television, bailing out the government by taking full responsibility. He confessed to nuclear proliferation from Pakistan to Iran and North Korea. He was immediately given presidential immunity. Exact nature of the involvement at the governmental level is still unclear, but the manner in which the government acted cast doubt on the sincerity of Pakistan.[citation needed]
North Korea

North Korea joined the NPT in 1985 and had subsequently signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. However it was believed that North Korea was diverting plutonium extracted from the fuel of its reactor at Yongbyon, for use in nuclear weapons. The subsequent confrontation with IAEA on the issue of inspections and suspected violations, resulted in North Korea threatening to withdraw from the NPT in 1993. This eventually led to negotiations with the United States resulting in the Agreed Framework of 1994, which provided for IAEA safeguards being applied to its reactors and spent fuel rods. These spent fuel rods were sealed in canisters by the United States to prevent North Korea from extracting plutonium from them. North Korea had to therefore freeze its plutonium programme.

During this period Pakistan-North Korea cooperation in missile technology transfer was being established. A high level Pakistani military delegation visited North Korea in August–September 1992, reportedly to discuss the supply of Scud missile technology to Pakistan. In 1993, PM Benazir Bhutto traveled to China and North Korea. The visits are believed to be related to the subsequent acquisition of Ghauri (North Korean No-dong) missiles by Pakistan. During the period 1992–1994, A.Q. Khan was reported to have visited North Korea thirteen times. The missile cooperation program with North Korea was under Dr. A. Q. Khan's Kahuta Research Laboratories. At this time China was under U.S. pressure not to supply the M series of missiles to Pakistan. This forced the latter (possibly with Chinese connivance) to approach North Korea for missile transfers. Reports indicate that North Korea was willing to supply missile sub-systems including rocket motors, inertial guidance systems, control and testing equipment of Scud SSMs for US$ 50 million.

It is not clear what North Korea got in return. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. in Jane's Defence Weekly (27 November 2002) reports that Western analysts had begun to question what North Korea received in payment for the missiles; many suspected it was nuclear technology and components. Khan's KRL was in charge of both Pakistan's uranium enrichment program and also of the missile program with North Korea. It is therefore likely during this period that cooperation in nuclear technology between Pakistan and North Korea was initiated. Western intelligence agencies began to notice exchange of personnel, technology and components between KRL and entities of the North Korean 2nd Economic Committee (responsible for weapons production).

A New York Times report on 18 October 2002 quoted U.S. intelligence officials having stated that Pakistan was a major supplier of critical equipment to North Korea. The report added that equipment such as gas centrifuges appeared to have been "part of a barter deal" in which North Korea supplied Pakistan with missiles. Separate reports indicate (Washington Times, 22 November 2002) that U.S. intelligence had as early as 1999 picked up signs that North Korea was continuing to develop nuclear arms. Other reports also indicate that North Korea had been working covertly to develop an enrichment capability for nuclear weapons for at least five years and had used technology obtained from Pakistan (Washington Times, 18 October 2002).
Israel

Israel is also thought to possess an arsenal of potentially up to several hundred nuclear warheads based on estimates of the amount of fissile material produced by Israel.[14] This has never been openly confirmed or denied however, due to Israel's policy of deliberate ambiguity.[15]

An Israeli nuclear installation is located about ten kilometers to the south of Dimona, the Negev Nuclear Research Center. Its construction commenced in 1958, with French assistance. The official reason given by the Israeli and French governments was to build a nuclear reactor to power a "desalination plant", in order to "green the Negev". The purpose of the Dimona plant is widely assumed to be the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, and the majority of defense experts have concluded that it does in fact do that.[citation needed] However, the Israeli government refuses to confirm or deny this publicly, a policy it refers to as "ambiguity".

Norway sold 20 tonnes of heavy water needed for the reactor to Israel in 1959 and 1960 in a secret deal. There were no "safeguards" required in this deal to prevent usage of the heavy water for non-peaceful purposes. The British newspaper Daily Express accused Israel of working on a bomb in 1960. [3] When the United States intelligence community discovered the purpose of the Dimona plant in the early 1960s, it demanded that Israel agree to international inspections. Israel agreed, but on a condition that U.S., rather than IAEA, inspectors were used, and that Israel would receive advanced notice of all inspections.

Some claim that because Israel knew the schedule of the inspectors' visits, it was able to hide the alleged purpose of the site from the inspectors by installing temporary false walls and other devices before each inspection. The inspectors eventually informed the U.S. government that their inspections were useless due to Israeli restrictions on what areas of the facility they could inspect. In 1969, the United States terminated the inspections.

In 1986, Mordechai Vanunu, a former technician at the Dimona plant, revealed to the media some evidence of Israel's nuclear program. Israeli agents arrested him from Italy, drugged him and transported him to Israel, and an Israeli court then tried him in secret on charges of treason and espionage[citation needed], and sentenced him to eighteen years imprisonment. He was freed on 21 April 2004, but was severely limited by the Israeli government. He was arrested again on 11 November 2004, though formal charges were not immediately filed.

Comments on photographs taken by Mordechai Vanunu inside the Negev Nuclear Research Center have been made by prominent scientists. British nuclear weapons scientist Frank Barnaby, who questioned Vanunu over several days, estimated Israel had enough plutonium for about 150 weapons.[16] Ted Taylor, a bomb designer employed by the United States of America has confirmed the several hundred warhead estimate based on Vanunu's photographs.[citation needed]
See also: Israel and weapons of mass destruction
Nuclear arms control in South Asia

The public stance of the two states on non-proliferation differs markedly. Pakistan appears to have dominated a continuing propaganda debate.

Pakistan has initiated a series of regional security proposals. It has repeatedly proposed a nuclear free zone in South Asia and has proclaimed its willingness to engage in nuclear disarmament and to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty if India would do so. It has endorsed a United States proposal for a regional five power conference to consider non-proliferation in South Asia.

India has taken the view that solutions to regional security issues should be found at the international rather than the regional level, since its chief concern is with China. It therefore rejects Pakistan's proposals.

Instead, the 'Gandhi Plan', put forward in 1988, proposed the revision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it regards as inherently discriminatory in favor of the nuclear-weapon States, and a timetable for complete nuclear weapons disarmament. It endorsed early proposals for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and for an international convention to ban the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes, known as the 'cut-off' convention.

The United States for some years, especially under the Clinton administration, pursued a variety of initiatives to persuade India and Pakistan to abandon their nuclear weapons programs and to accept comprehensive international safeguards on all their nuclear activities. To this end, the Clinton administration proposed a conference of the five nuclear-weapon states, Japan, Germany, India and Pakistan.

India refused this and similar previous proposals, and countered with demands that other potential weapons states, such as Iran and North Korea, should be invited, and that regional limitations would only be acceptable if they were accepted equally by China. The United States would not accept the participation of Iran and North Korea and these initiatives have lapsed.

Another, more recent approach, centers on 'capping' the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, which would hopefully be followed by 'roll back'. To this end, India and the United States jointly sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution in 1993 calling for negotiations for a 'cut-off' convention. Should India and Pakistan join such a convention, they would have to agree to halt the production of fissile materials for weapons and to accept international verification on their relevant nuclear facilities (enrichment and reprocessing plants). It appears that India is now prepared to join negotiations regarding such a Cut-off Treaty, under the UN Conference on Disarmament.

Bilateral confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan to reduce the prospects of confrontation have been limited. In 1990 each side ratified a treaty not to attack the other's nuclear installations, and at the end of 1991 they provided one another with a list showing the location of all their nuclear plants, even though the respective lists were regarded as not being wholly accurate. Early in 1994 India proposed a bilateral agreement for a 'no first use' of nuclear weapons and an extension of the 'no attack' treaty to cover civilian and industrial targets as well as nuclear installations.

Having promoted the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty since 1954, India dropped its support in 1995 and in 1996 attempted to block the Treaty. Following the 1998 tests the question has been reopened and both Pakistan and India have indicated their intention to sign the CTBT. Indian ratification may be conditional upon the five weapons states agreeing to specific reductions in nuclear arsenals. The UN Conference on Disarmament has also called upon both countries "to accede without delay to the Non-Proliferation Treaty", presumably as non-weapons states.
NPT signatories
Egypt

In 2004 and 2005, Egypt disclosed past undeclared nuclear activities and material to the IAEA. In 2007 and 2008, high enriched and low enriched uranium particles were found in environmental samples taken in Egypt.[17] In 2008, the IAEA states Egypt's statements were consistent with its own findings.[18] In May 2009, Reuters reported that the IAEA was conducting further investigation in Egypt.[19][20]
Iran
Main article: Iran and weapons of mass destruction#Nuclear weapons
See also: Nuclear program of Iran

In 2003, the IAEA reported that Iran had been in breach of its obligations to comply with provisions of its safeguard agreement.[21] In 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors voted in a rare non-consensus decision to find Iran in non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to report that non-compliance to the UN Security Council.[22][23] In response, the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions citing concerns about the program.[24][25][26][27][28] Iran's representative to the UN argues sanctions compel Iran to abandon its rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to peaceful nuclear technology.[29] Iran says its uranium enrichment program is exclusively for peaceful purposes[30][31] and has enriched uranium to "less than 5 percent," consistent with fuel for a nuclear power plant and significantly below the purity of WEU (around 90%) typically used in a weapons program.[32][33] The director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano, said in 2009 he had not seen any evidence in IAEA official documents that Iran was developing nuclear weapons.[34]
Iraq

Up to the late 1980s it was generally assumed that any undeclared nuclear activities would have to be based on the diversion of nuclear material from safeguards. States acknowledged the possibility of nuclear activities entirely separate from those covered by safeguards, but it was assumed they would be detected by national intelligence activities. There was no particular effort by IAEA to attempt to detect them.

Iraq had been making efforts to secure a nuclear potential since the 1960s. In the late 1970s a specialised plant, Osiraq, was constructed near Baghdad. The plant was attacked during the Iran–Iraq War and was destroyed by Israeli bombers in June 1981.

Not until the 1990 NPT Review Conference did some states raise the possibility of making more use of (for example) provisions for "special inspections" in existing NPT Safeguards Agreements. Special inspections can be undertaken at locations other than those where safeguards routinely apply, if there is reason to believe there may be undeclared material or activities.

After inspections in Iraq following the UN Gulf War cease-fire resolution showed the extent of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, it became clear that the IAEA would have to broaden the scope of its activities. Iraq was an NPT Party, and had thus agreed to place all its nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. But the inspections revealed that it had been pursuing an extensive clandestine uranium enrichment programme, as well as a nuclear weapons design programme.

The main thrust of Iraq's uranium enrichment program was the development of technology for electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) of indigenous uranium. This uses the same principles as a mass spectrometer (albeit on a much larger scale). Ions of uranium-238 and uranium-235 are separated because they describe arcs of different radii when they move through a magnetic field. This process was used in the Manhattan Project to make the highly enriched uranium used in the Hiroshima bomb, but was abandoned soon afterwards.

The Iraqis did the basic research work at their nuclear research establishment at Tuwaitha, near Baghdad, and were building two full-scale facilities at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat, north of Baghdad. However, when the war broke out, only a few separators had been installed at Tarmiya, and none at Ash Sharqat.

The Iraqis were also very interested in centrifuge enrichment, and had been able to acquire some components including some carbon-fibre rotors, which they were at an early stage of testing.

They were clearly in violation of their NPT and safeguards obligations, and the IAEA Board of Governors ruled to that effect. The UN Security Council then ordered the IAEA to remove, destroy or render harmless Iraq's nuclear weapons capability. This was done by mid 1998, but Iraq then ceased all cooperation with the UN, so the IAEA withdrew from this work.

The revelations from Iraq provided the impetus for a very far-reaching reconsideration of what safeguards are intended to achieve.
See also: Iraq and weapons of mass destruction
Libya
Main article: Libya and nuclear technology
[icon] This section requires expansion. (September 2010)
Myanmar

A report in the Sydney Morning Herald and Searchina, a Japanese newspaper, report that two Myanmarese defectors saying that the Myanmar junta was secretly building a nuclear reactor and plutonium extraction facility with North Korea's help, with the aim of acquiring its first nuclear bomb in five years. According to the report, "The secret complex, much of it in caves tunnelled into a mountain at Naung Laing in northern Burma, runs parallel to a civilian reactor being built at another site by Russia that both the Russians and Burmese say will be put under international safeguards."[35] In 2002, Myanmar had notified IAEA of its intention to pursue a civilian nuclear programme. Later, Russia announced that it would build a nuclear reactor in Myanmar. There have also been reports that two Pakistani scientists, from the AQ Khan stable, had been dispatched to Myanmar where they had settled down, to help Myanmar's project.[citation needed] Recently, the David Albright-led Institute for Science and International Security rang alarm bells about Myanmar attempting a nuclear project with North Korean help.[citation needed] If true, the full weight of international pressure will be brought against Myanmar, said officials familiar with developments. But equally, the information that has been peddled by the defectors is also "preliminary" and could be used by the west to turn the screws on Myanmar—on democracy and human rights issues—in the run-up to the elections in the country in 2010.[citation needed] During an ASEAN meeting in Thailand in July 2009, US secretary of state Hillary Clinton highlighted concerns of the North Korean link. "We know there are also growing concerns about military cooperation between North Korea and Burma which we take very seriously," Clinton said.[36]
North Korea

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) acceded to the NPT in 1985 as a condition for the supply of a nuclear power station by the USSR. However, it delayed concluding its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, a process which should take only 18 months, until April 1992.

During that period, it brought into operation a small gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, natural-uranium (metal) fuelled "Experimental Power Reactor" of about 25 MWt (5 MWe), based on the UK Magnox design. While this was a well-suited design to start a wholly indigenous nuclear reactor development, it also exhibited all the features of a small plutonium production reactor for weapons purposes. North Korea also made substantial progress in the construction of two larger reactors designed on the same principles, a prototype of about 200 MWt (50 MWe), and a full-scale version of about 800 MWt (200 MWe). They made only slow progress; construction halted on both in 1994 and has not resumed. Both reactors have degraded considerably since that time and would take significant efforts to refurbish.

In addition it completed and commissioned a reprocessing plant that makes the Magnox spent nuclear fuel safe, recovering uranium and plutonium. That plutonium, if the fuel was only irradiated to a very low burn-up, would have been in a form very suitable for weapons. Although all these facilities at Yongbyon were to be under safeguards, there was always the risk that at some stage, the DPRK would withdraw from the NPT and use the plutonium for weapons.

One of the first steps in applying NPT safeguards is for the IAEA to verify the initial stocks of uranium and plutonium to ensure that all the nuclear materials in the country have been declared for safeguards purposes. While undertaking this work in 1992, IAEA inspectors found discrepancies which indicated that the reprocessing plant had been used more often than the DPRK had declared, which suggested that the DPRK could have weapons-grade plutonium which it had not declared to the IAEA. Information passed to the IAEA by a Member State (as required by the IAEA) supported that suggestion by indicating that the DPRK had two undeclared waste or other storage sites.

In February 1993 the IAEA called on the DPRK to allow special inspections of the two sites so that the initial stocks of nuclear material could be verified. The DPRK refused, and on 12 March announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT (three months' notice is required). In April 1993 the IAEA Board concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and reported the matter to the UN Security Council. In June 1993 the DPRK announced that it had "suspended" its withdrawal from the NPT, but subsequently claimed a "special status" with respect to its safeguards obligations. This was rejected by IAEA.

Once the DPRK's non-compliance had been reported to the UN Security Council, the essential part of the IAEA's mission had been completed. Inspections in the DPRK continued, although inspectors were increasingly hampered in what they were permitted to do by the DPRK's claim of a "special status". However, some 8,000 corroding fuel rods associated with the experimental reactor have remained under close surveillance.

Following bilateral negotiations between the United States and the DPRK, and the conclusion of the Agreed Framework in October 1994, the IAEA has been given additional responsibilities. The agreement requires a freeze on the operation and construction of the DPRK's plutonium production reactors and their related facilities, and the IAEA is responsible for monitoring the freeze until the facilities are eventually dismantled. The DPRK remains uncooperative with the IAEA verification work and has yet to comply with its safeguards agreement.

While Iraq was defeated in a war, allowing the UN the opportunity to seek out and destroy its nuclear weapons programme as part of the cease-fire conditions, the DPRK was not defeated, nor was it vulnerable to other measures, such as trade sanctions. It can scarcely afford to import anything, and sanctions on vital commodities, such as oil, would either be ineffective or risk provoking war.[citation needed]

Ultimately, the DPRK was persuaded to stop what appeared to be its nuclear weapons programme in exchange, under the agreed framework, for about US$5 billion in energy-related assistance. This included two 1000 MWe light water nuclear power reactors based on an advanced U.S. System-80 design.

In January 2003 the DPRK withdrew from the NPT. In response, a series of discussions among the DPRK, the United States, and China, a series of six-party talks (the parties being the DPRK, the ROK, China, Japan, the United States and Russia) were held in Beijing; the first beginning in April 2004 concerning North Korea's weapons program.

On 10 January 2005, North Korea declared that it was in the possession of nuclear weapons. On 19 September 2005, the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks ended with a joint statement in which North Korea agreed to end its nuclear programs and return to the NPT in exchange for diplomatic, energy and economic assistance. However, by the end of 2005 the DPRK had halted all six-party talks because the United States froze certain DPRK international financial assets such as those in a bank in Macau.

On 9 October 2006, North Korea announced that it has performed its first-ever nuclear weapon test. On 18 December 2006, the six-party talks finally resumed. On 13 February 2007, the parties announced "Initial Actions" to implement the 2005 joint statement including shutdown and disablement of North Korean nuclear facilities in exchange for energy assistance. Reacting to UN sanctions imposed after missile tests in April 2009, North Korea withdrew from the six-party talks, restarted its nuclear facilities and conducted a second nuclear test on 25 May 2009.

See also: North Korea and weapons of mass destruction and Six-party talks
Russia

Security of nuclear weapons in Russia remains a matter of concern. According to high-ranking Russian SVR defector Tretyakov, he had a meeting with two Russian businessman representing a state-created C-W corporation in 1991. They came up with a project of destroying large quantities of chemical wastes collected from Western countries at the island of Novaya Zemlya (a test place for Soviet nuclear weapons) using an underground nuclear blast. The project was rejected by Canadian representatives, but one of the businessmen told Tretyakov that he keeps his own nuclear bomb at his dacha outside Moscow. Tretyakov thought that man was insane, but the "businessmen" (Vladimir K. Dmitriev) replied: "Do not be so naive. With economic conditions the way they are in Russia today, anyone with enough money can buy a nuclear bomb. It's no big deal really".[37]
South Africa

In 1991, South Africa acceded to the NPT, concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and submitted a report on its nuclear material subject to safeguards. At the time, the state had a nuclear power programme producing nearly 10% of the country's electricity, whereas Iraq and North Korea only had research reactors.

The IAEA's initial verification task was complicated by South Africa's announcement that between 1979 and 1989 it built and then dismantled a number of nuclear weapons. South Africa asked the IAEA to verify the conclusion of its weapons programme. In 1995 the IAEA declared that it was satisfied all materials were accounted for and the weapons programme had been terminated and dismantled.

South Africa has signed the NPT, and now holds the distinction of being the only known state to have indigenously produced nuclear weapons, and then verifiably dismantled them.[38]
Syria
Main article: Syria and weapons of mass destruction

On September 6, 2007, Israel bombed an officially unidentified site in Syria which it later asserted was a nuclear reactor under construction (see Operation Orchard).[39] The alleged reactor was not asserted to be operational and it was not asserted that nuclear material had been introduced into it.[17] Syria said the site was a military site and was not involved in any nuclear activities.[17] The IAEA requested Syria to provide further access to the site and any other locations where the debris and equipment from the building had been stored.[17] Syria denounced what it called the Western "fabrication and forging of facts" in regards to the incident.[40] IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei criticized the strikes and deplored that information regarding the matter had not been shared with his agency earlier.[41]
United States cooperation on nuclear weapons with the United Kingdom

The United States has given the UK considerable assistance with nuclear weapon design and construction since the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement. In 1974 a CIA proliferation assessment noted that "In many cases [Britain's sensitive technology in nuclear and missile fields] is based on technology received from the United States and could not legitimately be passed on without U.S. permission."[42]

The U.S. President authorized the transfer of "nuclear weapon parts" to the UK between at least the years 1975 to 1996.[43][44] The UK National Audit Office noted that most of the UK Trident warhead development and production expenditure was incurred in the United States, which would supply "certain warhead-related components".[45][46] Some of the fissile materials for the UK Trident warhead were purchased from the United States.[46] Declassified U.S. Department of Energy documents indicate the UK Trident warhead system was involved in non-nuclear design activities alongside the U.S. W76 nuclear warhead fitted in some U.S. Navy Trident missiles,[47] leading the Federation of American Scientists to speculate that the UK warhead may share design information from the W76.[48]

Under the Mutual Defence Agreement 5.37 tonnes of UK-produced plutonium was sent to the United States in return for 6.7 kg of tritium and 7.5 tonnes of highly enriched uranium over the period 1960–1979. A further 0.47 tonne of plutonium was swapped between the UK and United States for reasons that remain classified.[49] Some of the UK produced plutonium was used in 1962 by the United States for a nuclear weapon test of reactor-grade plutonium .[50]

The United States has supplied nuclear weapon delivery systems to support the UK nuclear forces since before the signing of the NPT. The renewal of this agreement is due to take place through the second decade of the 21st century. [4] [5]
Arguments in favor of proliferation
Main article: Nuclear peace

There has been much debate in the academic study of International Security as to the advisability of proliferation. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Gen. Pierre Marie Gallois of France, an adviser to Charles DeGaulle, argued in books like The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age (1961) that mere possession of a nuclear arsenal, what the French called the force de frappe, was enough to ensure deterrence, and thus concluded that the spread of nuclear weapons could increase international stability.

Some very prominent neo-realist scholars, such as Kenneth Waltz, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, and John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, continue to argue along the lines of Gallois (though these scholars rarely acknowledge their intellectual debt to Gallois and his contemporaries). Specifically, these scholars advocate some forms of nuclear proliferation, arguing that it will decrease the likelihood of war, especially in troubled regions of the world. Aside from the majority opinion which opposes proliferation in any form, there are two schools of thought on the matter: those, like Mearsheimer, who favor selective proliferation,[51] and those such as Waltz, who advocate a laissez-faire attitude to programs like North Korea's.
Total proliferation

In embryo, Waltz argues that the logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD) should work in all security environments, regardless of historical tensions or recent hostility. He sees the Cold War as the ultimate proof of MAD logic – the only occasion when enmity between two Great Powers did not result in military conflict. This was, he argues, because nuclear weapons promote caution in decision-makers. Neither Washington nor Moscow would risk nuclear Armageddon to advance territorial or power goals, hence a peaceful stalemate ensued (Waltz and Sagan (2003), p. 24). Waltz believes there to be no reason why this effect would not occur in all circumstances.
Selective proliferation

John Mearsheimer would not support Waltz's optimism in the majority of potential instances; however, he has argued for nuclear proliferation as policy in certain places, such as post–Cold War Europe. In two famous articles, Professor Mearsheimer opines that Europe is bound to return to its pre–Cold War environment of regular conflagration and suspicion at some point in the future. He advocates arming both Germany and the Ukraine with nuclear weaponry in order to achieve a balance of power between these states in the east and France/Britain in the west. If this does not occur, he is certain that war will eventually break out on the European continent (Mearsheimer (1990), pp. 5–56 and (1993), pp. 50–66).

Another separate argument against Waltz's open proliferation and in favor of Mearsheimer's selective distribution is the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Some countries included in the aforementioned laissez-faire distribution could predispose the transfer of nuclear materials or a bomb falling into the hands of groups not affiliated with any governments. Such countries would not have the political will or ability to safeguard attempts at devices being transferred to a third party. Not being deterred by self-annihilation, terrorism groups could push forth their own nuclear agendas or be used as shadow fronts to carry out the attack plans by mentioned unstable governments.
Arguments against both positions

There are numerous arguments presented against both selective and total proliferation, generally targeting the very neorealist assumptions (such as the primacy of military security in state agendas, the weakness of international institutions, and the long-run unimportance of economic integration and globalization to state strategy) its proponents tend to make. With respect to Mearsheimer's specific example of Europe, many economists and neoliberals argue that the economic integration of Europe through the development of the European Union has made war in most of the European continent so disastrous economically so as to serve as an effective deterrent. Constructivists take this one step further, frequently arguing that the development of EU political institutions has led or will lead to the development of a nascent European identity, which most states on the European continent wish to partake in to some degree or another, and which makes all states within or aspiring to be within the EU regard war between them as unthinkable.

As for Waltz, the general opinion is that most states are not in a position to safely guard against nuclear use, that he underestimates the long-standing antipathy in many regions, and that weak states will be unable to prevent – or will actively provide for – the disastrous possibility of nuclear terrorism. Waltz has dealt with all of these objections at some point in his work; though to many, he has not adequately responded (Betts (2000)).

The Learning Channel documentary Doomsday: "On The Brink" illustrated 40 years of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons accidents. Even the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident demonstrated a potential scenario in which Russian democratization and military downsizing at the end of the Cold War did not eliminate the danger of accidental nuclear war through command and control errors. After asking: might a future Russian ruler or renegade Russian general be tempted to use nuclear weapons to make foreign policy? the documentary writers revealed a greater danger of Russian security over its nuclear stocks, but especially the ultimate danger of human nature to want the ultimate weapon of mass destruction to exercise political and military power. Future world leaders might not understand how close the Soviets, Russians, and Americans were to doomsday, how easy it all seemed because apocalypse was avoided for a mere 40 years between rivals, politicians not terrorists, who loved their children and did not want to die, against 30,000 years of human prehistory. History and military experts agree that proliferation can be slowed, but never stopped (technology cannot be uninvented).[52]
Proliferation begets proliferation

Proliferation begets proliferation is a concept described by Scott Sagan in his article, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?". This concept can be described as a strategic chain reaction. If one state produces a nuclear weapon it creates almost a domino effect within the region. States in the region will seek to acquire nuclear weapons to balance or eliminate the security threat. Sagan describes this reaction best in his article when he states, “Every time one state develops nuclear weapons to balance against its main rival, it also creates a nuclear threat to another region, which then has to initiate its own nuclear weapons program to maintain its national security” (Sagan, pg. 70). Going back through history we can see how this has taken place. When the United States demonstrated that it had nuclear power capabilities after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Russians started to develop their program in preparation for the Cold War. With the Russian military buildup, France and Great Britain perceived this as a security threat and therefore they pursued nuclear weapons (Sagan, pg 71).
Nuclear apartheid
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The effective prohibition on nuclear proliferation has been characterised as a form of technological apartheid, as only a select few states (particularly the member-nations of the United Nations Security Council) are able to acquire nuclear technology and that they can use their power to prevent other states from research and development of nuclear technology. In theory, only states that are allied with states that already have nuclear power would be able to acquire nuclear technology themselves.
Iran

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been a frequent critic of the concept of nuclear apartheid as it has been put into practice by several countries, particularly the United States. In an interview with CNN's Christiane Amanpour, Ahmadinejad said that Iran was "against 'nuclear apartheid,' which means some have the right to possess it, use the fuel, and then sell it to another country for 10 times its value. We're against that. We say clean energy is the right of all countries. But also it is the duty and the responsibility of all countries, including ours, to set up frameworks to stop the proliferation of it." Hours after that interview, he spoke passionately in favor of Iran's right to develop nuclear technology, claiming the nation should have the same liberties.[53]

Iran is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and claims that any work done in regards to nuclear technology is related only to civilian uses, which is acceptable under the treaty.[54] Iran violated the treaty by performing uranium-enrichment in secret, after which the United Nations Security Council ordered Iran to stop all uranium-enrichment.[55]
India

India has also been discussed in the context of nuclear apartheid. India has consistently attempted to pass measures that would call for full international disarmament, however they have not succeeded due to protests from those states that already have nuclear weapons. In light of this, India viewed nuclear weapons as a necessary right for all nations as long as certain states were still in possession of nuclear weapons. India stated that nuclear issues were directly related to national security.

Years before India's first underground nuclear test in 1998, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was passed. Some have argued that coercive language was used in an attempt to persuade India to sign the treaty, which was pushed for heavily by neighboring China.[56] India viewed the treaty as a means for countries that already had nuclear weapons, primarily the five nations of the United Nations Security Council, to keep their weapons while ensuring that no other nations could develop them.[57]

[C2C]

6.
Radiological Weapons

It is feared that a terrorist group could detonate a radiological or "dirty bomb." A "dirty bomb" is composed of any radioactive source and a conventional explosive. The radioactive material is dispersed by the detonation of the explosive. Detonation of such a weapon is not as powerful as a nuclear blast, but can produce considerable radioactive fallout. There are other radiological weapons called radiological exposure devices where an explosive is not necessary. A radiological weapon may be very appealing to terrorist groups as it is highly successful in instilling fear and panic amongst a population (particularly because of the threat of radiation poisoning), and would contaminate the immediate area for some period of time, disrupting attempts to repair the damage and subsequently inflicting significant economic losses.

Nuclear weapons materials on the black market are a global concern,[16][17] and there is concern about the possible detonation of a small, crude nuclear weapon by a terrorist group in a major city, with significant loss of life and property.[18][19]

According to leaked diplomatic documents, al-Qaeda is on the verge of producing radiological weapons, after sourcing nuclear material and recruiting rogue scientists to build "dirty bombs".[20]
Terrorist Groups

Al-Qaeda, along with some North Caucasus terrorist groups that seek to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Russia, have consistently stated they seek nuclear weapons and have tried to acquire them.[9] Al-Qaeda has sought nuclear weapons for almost two decades by attempting to purchase stolen nuclear material and weapons and has sought nuclear expertise on numerous occasions. Osama bin Laden has stated that the acquisition of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction is a “religious duty.”[21] While pressure from a wide range of counter-terrorist activity has hampered Al-Qaeda’s ability to manage such a complex project, there is no sign that it has jettisoned its goals of acquiring fissile material. Statements made as recently as 2008 indicate that Al-Qaeda’s nuclear ambitions are still very strong.[9]

North Caucasus terrorists have attempted to seize a nuclear submarine armed with nuclear weapons. They have also engaged in reconnaissance activities on nuclear storage facilities and have repeatedly threatened to sabotage nuclear facilities. Similar to Al-Qaeda, these groups’ activities have been hampered by counter-terrorism activity; nevertheless they remain committed to launching such a devastating attack within Russia.[9]

The Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo, which used nerve gas to attack a Tokyo subway in 1995, has also tried to acquire nuclear weapons. However, according to nuclear terrorism researchers at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, there is no evidence that they continue to do so.[9]
Alleged Nuclear Terrorism and Theft of Material

There have been 18 incidences of theft or loss of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[21]
Security specialist Shaun Gregory argued in an article that terrorists have attacked Pakistani nuclear facilities three times in the recent past; twice in 2007 and once in 2008.[22]
In November 2007, burglars with unknown intentions infiltrated the Pelindaba nuclear research facility near Pretoria, South Africa. The burglars escaped without acquiring any of the uranium held at the facility.[23][24]
In June 2007, the Federal Bureau of Investigation released to the press the name of Adnan Gulshair el Shukrijumah, allegedly the operations leader for developing tactical plans for detonating nuclear bombs in several American cities simultaneously.[25]
In November 2006, MI5 warned that al-Qaida were planning on using nuclear weapons against cities in the United Kingdom by obtaining the bombs via clandestine means.[26]
In February 2006, Oleg Khinsagov of Russia was arrested in Georgia, along with three Georgian accomplices, with 79.5 grams of 89 percent enriched HEU.[21]
The Alexander Litvinenko poisoning with radioactive polonium "represents an ominous landmark: the beginning of an era of nuclear terrorism," according to Andrew J. Patterson.[27]
In June 2002, U.S. citizen Jose Padilla was arrested for allegedly planning a radiological attack on the city of Chicago; however, he was never charged with such conduct. He was instead convicted of charges that he conspired to "murder, kidnap and maim" people overseas.

Pakistan

After several incidents in Pakistan in which terrorists attacked three of its military nuclear facilities, it became clear that there emerged a serious danger that they would gain access to the country’s nuclear arsenal, according to a journal published by the US Military Academy at West Point.[28] In January 2010, it was revealed that the US army was training a specialised unit "to seal off and snatch back" Pakistani nuclear weapons in the event that militants would obtain a nuclear device or materials that could make one. Pakistan supposedly possesses about 80 nuclear warheads. US officials refused to speak on the record about the American safety plans.[29]

A study by Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University titled "Securing the Bomb 2010," found that Pakistan's stockpile "faces a greater threat from Islamic extremists seeking nuclear weapons than any other nuclear stockpile on earth."[30]

According to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former investigator with the CIA and the US Department of Energy, there is "a greater possibility of a nuclear meltdown in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world. The region has more violent extremists than any other, the country is unstable, and its arsenal of nuclear weapons is expanding."[31]

Nuclear weapons expert David Albright and author of "Peddling Peril" has also expressed concerns that Pakistan's stockpile may not be secure despite assurances by both Pakistan and U.S. government. He stated that Pakistan "has had many leaks from its program of classified information and sensitive nuclear equipment, and so you have to worry that it could be acquired in Pakistan," [32]

A 2010 study by the Congressional Research Service titled 'Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues' noted that even though Pakistan had taken several steps to enhance nuclear security in recent years, "instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question."[33]
United States

President Barack Obama has reviewed Homeland Security policy and concluded that "attacks using improvised nuclear devices ... pose a serious and increasing national security risk".[34] In their presidential contest, President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry both agreed that the most serious danger facing the United States is the possibility that terrorists could obtain a nuclear bomb.[35] Most nuclear-weapon analysts agree that "building such a device would pose few technological challenges to reasonably competent terrorists". The main barrier is acquiring highly enriched uranium.[36]

Despite a number of claims,[37][38] there is no credible evidence that any terrorist group has yet succeeded in obtaining a nuclear bomb or the materials needed to make one.[35][39] In 2004, Graham Allison, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Clinton administration, wrote that “on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not".[40] However, in 2004, Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information stated: "I wouldn't be at all surprised if nuclear weapons are used over the next 15 or 20 years, first and foremost by a terrorist group that gets its hands on a Russian nuclear weapon or a Pakistani nuclear weapon".[19] In 2006, Robert Gallucci, Dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, estimated that, “it is more likely than not that al-Qaeda or one of its affiliates will detonate a nuclear weapon in a U.S. city within the next five to ten years."[40]

Detonation of a nuclear weapon in a major U.S. city could kill more than 500,000 people and cause more than a trillion dollars in damage.[18][19] Hundreds of thousands could die from fallout, the resulting fires and collapsing buildings. In this scenario, uncontrolled fires would burn for days and emergency services and hospitals would be completely overwhelmed.[35][41][42]

The Obama administration will focus on reducing the risk of high-consequence, non-traditional nuclear threats. Nuclear security is to be strengthened by enhancing "nuclear detection architecture and ensuring that our own nuclear materials are secure," and by "establishing well-planned, well-rehearsed, plans for co-ordinated response."[34] According to senior Pentagon officials, the United States will make "thwarting nuclear-armed terrorists a central aim of American strategic nuclear planning."[43] Nuclear attribution is another strategy being pursued to counter terrorism. Led by the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center, attribution would allow the government to determine the likely source of nuclear material used in the event of a nuclear attack. This would prevent terrorist groups, and any states willing to help them, from being able to pull off a covert attack without assurance of retaliation.[44]

In July 2010 medical personnel from the U.S. Army practiced the techniques they would use to treat people injured by an atomic blast. The exercises were carried out at a training center in Indiana, and were set up to "simulate the aftermath of a small nuclear bomb blast, set off in a U.S. city by terrorists."[45]
Recovering Lost Weapons and Material

In 2004, the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) was established in order to consolidate nuclear stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, and assemble nuclear weapons at fewer locations.[46] Additionally, the GTRI converted HEU fuels to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels, which has prevented their use in making a nuclear bomb. HEU that has not been converted to LEU has been shipped back to secure sites, while amplified security measures have taken hold around vulnerable nuclear facilities.[47]

In August 2002, the United States launched a program to track and secure enriched uranium from 24 Soviet-style reactors in 16 countries, in order to reduce the risk of the materials falling into the hands of terrorists or "rogue states". The first such operation was Project Vinca, "a multinational, public-private effort to remove nuclear material from a poorly-secured Yugoslav research institute." The project has been hailed as "a nonproliferation success story" with the "potential to inform broader 'global cleanout' efforts to address one of the weakest links in the nuclear nonproliferation chain: insufficiently secured civilian nuclear research facilities."[48]

The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), which is also known as the Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction, is a 1992 law sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar. The CTR established a program that gave the U.S. Department of Defense a direct stake in securing loose fissile material inside the since-dissolved USSR. According to Graham Allison, director of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, this law is a major reason why not a single nuclear weapon has been discovered outside the control of Russia’s nuclear custodians.[49]

7.
Before 1950s

Clarence Madison Dally (1865–1904) - No INES level - New Jersey - Overexposure of laboratory worker
Various dates - No INES level - France - Overexposure of scientists
Marie Curie (1867–1934) was a Polish-French physicist and chemist. She was a pioneer in the early field of radioactivity, later becoming the first two-time Nobel laureate and the only person with Nobel Prizes in physics and chemistry. Her death, at age 67, in 1934 was from aplastic anemia due to massive exposure to radiation in her work,[1] much of which was carried out in a shed with no proper safety measures being taken, as the damaging effects of hard radiation were not generally understood at that time. She was known to carry test tubes full of radioactive isotopes in her pocket, and to store them in her desk drawer, resulting in massive exposure to radiation. She was known to remark on the pretty blue-green light the metals gave off in the dark. Because of their levels of radioactivity, her papers from the 1890s are considered too dangerous to handle. Even her cookbook is highly radioactive. They are kept in lead-lined boxes, and those who wish to consult them must wear protective clothing.[2]
Various dates - No INES level - various locations - Overexposure of workers
Luminescent radium was used to paint watches and other items that glowed. The most famous incident is the Radium girls of Orange, New Jersey where a large number of workers got radiation poisoning. Other towns including Ottawa, Illinois experienced contamination of homes and other structures and became Superfund cleanup sites.
Various dates - No INES Level - Colorado, USA - Contamination
Radium mining and manufacturing left a number of streets in the state's capital and largest city of Denver contaminated.[3]
1927–1930 - No INES Level - USA - Radium poisoning
Eben Byers ingests almosts 1400 bottles of Radithor, a radioactive patent medicine, leading to his death in 1932. He is buried in Allegheny Cemetery in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in a lead-lined coffin.[4]

1950s

March, 1957 - No INES level - Houston, Texas, USA - Exposure of workers
Two employees of a company licensed by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to encapsulate sources for radiographic cameras received radiation burns after being exposed to Ir192(Iridium-192) powder. The incident was reported in Look Magazine in 1961, but investigations published by the Mayo Clinic that same year found few of the radiological injuries claimed in widespread press reports.

1970s

1977 — Dounreay, UK — - release of nuclear material

An explosion at the research establishment causes a mixture of unrecorded waste to be leaked from a waste disposal shaft.[5]

July 16, 1979 – Church Rock, New Mexico – release of radioactive mine tailings

An earth/clay dike of an United Nuclear Corporation's uranium mill's settling/evaporating pond failed. The broken dam released 100 million U.S. gallons (380,000 m³) of radioactive liquids and 1,100 short tons (1,000 metric tonnes) of solid wastes, which settled out up to 70 miles (100 km) down the Puerco River[6] and also near a Navaho farming community that uses surface waters. The pond was past its planned and licensed life and had been filled two feet (60 cm) deeper than design, despite evident cracking.

See also: Church Rock uranium mill spill

September 29, 1979 - Tritium leak at American Atomics in Tucson, Arizona at the public school across the street from the plant. $300,000 worth of food was found to be contaminated; the chocolate cake had 56 nCi/L. By contrast, the EPA safety limit for drinking water is 20 nCi/L (740 Bq/L) based on consumption of 2 liters per day.[7][8][9][10]

1980s

July 1981 – Lycoming, Nine Mile Point, New York. An overloaded wastewater tank was deliberately flushed into the waste building sub-basement, filling it to a depth of four feet. This caused some of the approximately 150 55-gallon drums that were stored there to overturn and spill their contents. Fifty thousand U.S. gallons (190 m³) of lesser-contaminated water was discharged into Lake Ontario.[11]
1982 – "International Nutronics" of Dover, New Jersey spilled an unknown quantity of radioactive cobalt solution used to treat gems for color, modify chemicals, and sterilize food and medical supplies. The solution spilled into the Dover sewer system and forced the closure of the plant. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was only informed of the accident ten months later by a whistleblower. In 1986 International Nutronics was fined $35,000 and one of its top executives was sentenced to probation for failure to report the spill.[12][13][14]
1982 – Radioactive steel scavenged from a nuclear reactor was melted into rebar and used in the construction of apartment buildings in northern Taiwan, mostly in Taipei, from 1982 through 1984. Over 2,000 apartment units and shops were suspected as having been built with the materials.[15] At least 10,000 people are known to have been exposed to long-term low-level irradiation as a result, with at least 40 deaths due to cancer.[16] In 1985, the Taiwanese Atomic Energy Commission covered up the discovery of high levels of radiation in an apartment building by blaming a dentist operating an imaging machine. However, in the summer of 1992, a utility worker for the Taiwanese state-run electric utility Taipower brought a Geiger counter to his apartment to learn more about the device, and discovered that his apartment was contaminated.[16] Despite awareness of the problem, owners of some of the buildings known to be contaminated have continued to rent apartments out to tenants (in part because selling the units is illegal), and as of at least 2003 and likely to the present, no coordinated effort has been made to track down the remaining affected structures. The Taiwan AEC has harassed medical researchers looking into the consequences.[16] Some researchers from Taiwan claimed that the gamma rays from the cobalt-60 had a beneficial effect upon the health of the tenants,[17][18] but their results proved to be based on methodological errors[19][20]
December 6, 1983 – Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, A local resident salvaged materials from a discarded radiation therapy machine carrying 6,000 pellets of 60Co. The dismantling and transport of the material led to severe contamination of his truck; when the truck was scrapped, it in turn contaminated another 5,000 metric tonnes of steel with an estimated 300 Ci (11 TBq) of activity. This material was sold for kitchen or restaurant table legs and building materials, some of which was sent to the U.S. and Canada; the incident was discovered when a truck delivering contaminated building materials months later to the Los Alamos National Laboratory accidentally drove through a radiation monitoring station. Contamination was later measured on the roads that were used to transport the original damaged radiation source. In some cases pellets were actually found embedded in the roadway. In the state of Sinaloa, 109 houses were condemned due to contaminated building material. This incident prompted the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Customs Service to install radiation detection equipment at all major border crossings.[21]
1985 to 1987, Therac-25 was a radiation therapy machine produced by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. It was involved with at least six known accidents between 1985 and 1987, in which patients were given massive overdoses of radiation, which were in some cases on the order of hundreds of Grays. At least five patients died of the overdoses. These accidents highlighted the dangers of software control of safety-critical systems.
September 13, 1987 – In the Goiânia accident, scavengers broke open a radiation-therapy machine in an abandoned clinic of Goiânia, Brazil. They sold the kilocurie (40 TBq) 137Cs source as a glowing curiosity. Two hundred and fifty were contaminated; four died.[22]
June 6, 1988 – "Radiation Sterilizers" in Decatur, Georgia, reported a leak of 137Cs at their facility. Seventy thousand medical supply containers and milk cartons were recalled. Ten employees were exposed, and three "had enough on them that they contaminated other surfaces," including their homes and cars.[23]
5 February 1989 Three workers were exposed to gamma rays from the 60Co source in a medical products irradiation plant in San Salvador, El Salvador. The most exposed person died while another lost a limb. This was a human error accident where a person made the wrong choice to enter the irradiation room.[24]
In 1989, a small capsule containing highly radioactive caesium-137 was found inside the concrete wall in an apartment building in Kramatorsk, Ukraine. It is believed that the capsule, originally a part of a measurement device, was lost sometime during late 1970s and ended up mixed with gravel used to construct that building in 1980. By the time the capsule was discovered, 6 residents of the building died from leukemia and 17 more received varying doses of radiation.[25] See Kramatorsk nuclear poisoning incident.

1990s

June 24, 1990 – Soreq, Israel – An operator at a commercial irradiation facility bypassed the safety systems on the JS6500 sterilizer to clear a jam in the product conveyor area. The one to two minute exposure resulted in a whole body dose estimated at 10 Gy or more. He died 36 days later despite extensive medical care. See Fool Irradiation[26] for a discussion of this type of event.[27]
October 26, 1991 – Nesvizh, Belarus – An operator at an atomic sterilization facility bypassed the safety systems to clear a jammed conveyor. Upon entering the irradiation chamber he was exposed to an estimated whole body dose of 11 Gy, with some portions of the body receiving upwards of 20 Gy. Despite prompt intensive medical care, he died 113 days after the accident.[28]
August 31, 1994 – Commerce Township, Michigan – David Hahn's experimental reactor was discovered in his mother's back yard. The unshielded reactor exposed his neighborhood to 1,000 times the normal levels of background radiation.[29]
October 21, 1994 – a large 137Cs source was stolen by scrap metal scavengers in Tammiku, Estonia.[30]
May 1998 – Recycler Acerinox in Cádiz, Spain, unwittingly melted scrap metal containing radioactive sources; the radioactive cloud drifted all the way to Switzerland before being detected.[22][31] (See Acerinox accident.)
December 1998 – Istanbul, Turkey – two cobalt-60 teletherapy sources planned for export in 1993 were instead stored in a warehouse in Ankara, then moved to Istanbul, where a new owner sold them off as scrap metal. The buyers dismantled the containers, exposing themselves and others to ionizing radiation. Eighteen persons, including seven children, developed acute radiation syndrome. The exposed source was retrieved, but the other was still unaccounted for one year later.[32]
1999 – A road near Mrima Hill, Kenya was rebuilt using local materials later found to be radioactive. Some workers were exposed to excessive radiation, and many residents of the area were tested for exposure. 2,975 tons[vague] of roadway material were to be dug up to eliminate the hazard.[33]

2000s

February 1, 2000 – Samut Prakan radiation accident: The radiation source of an expired teletherapy unit was purchased and transferred without registration, and stored in an unguarded parking lot without warning signs. [34] It was then stolen from a parking lot in Samut Prakarn, Thailand and dismantled in a junkyard for scrap metal. Workers completely removed the 60Co source from the lead shielding, and became ill shortly thereafter. The radioactive nature of the metal and the resulting contamination was not discovered until 18 days later. Seven injuries and three deaths were a result of this incident.[35]

August 2000 -March 2001; at the Instituto Oncologico Nacional of Panama, 28 patients receiving treatment for prostate cancer and cancer of the cervix receive lethal doses of radiations due to a modification in the protocol of measurement of radiation used without a verification test. The negligence, unique in its scope, was investigated by the IAT on date of 26 May-1 June 2001.[36]

December 2000 – Three woodcutters in the nation of Georgia spent the night beside several "warm" canisters they found deep in the woods and were subsequently hospitalized with severe radiation burns. The canisters were found to contain concentrated 90Sr. The disposal team consisted of 25 men who were restricted to 40 seconds' worth of exposure each while transferring the canisters to lead-lined drums. The canisters are believed to have been components of radioisotope thermoelectric generators intended for use as generators for remote lighthouses and navigational beacons, part of a Soviet plan dating back to 1983.[37]

February 2001 – A medical accelerator at the Bialystok Oncology Center in Poland malfunctioned, resulting in five female patients receiving excessive doses of radiation while undergoing breast cancer treatment.[38] The incident was revealed when one of the patients complained of a painful radiation burn. In response, a local technician was called in to repair the device, but was unable to do so, and in fact caused further damage. Subsequently, competent authorities were notified, but as the apparatus had been tampered with, they were unable to ascertain the exact doses of radiation received by the patients (localized doses may have been in excess of 60 Gy). No deaths were reported as a result of this incident, although all affected patients had to receive skin grafts. The attending doctor was charged with criminal negligence, but in 2003 a district court ruled that she was not responsible for the incident. The hospital technician was fined.[39]

March 11, 2002 - INES Level 2 – A 2.5 metric tonne 60Co gamma source was transported from Cookridge Hospital, Leeds, UK, to Sellafield with defective shielding. As the radiation escaped from the package downwards into the ground, it is not thought that this event caused any injury or disease in either a human or an animal. This event was treated in a serious manner because the defense in depth type of protection for the source had been eroded. If the container had been tipped over in a road crash then a strong beam of gamma rays (83.5 Gy h-1) would have been aligned in a direction in which it would've been likely to irradiate humans. The company responsible for the transport of the source, AEA Technology plc, was fined £250,000 by a British court.

2003 – Cape of Navarin, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Russia. A radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) located on the Arctic shore was discovered in a highly degraded state. The level of the exposition dose at the generator surface was as high as 15 R/h; in July 2004 a second inspection of the same RTG showed that gamma radiation emission had risen to 87 R/h and that 90Sr had begun to leak into the environment.[3] In November 2003, a completely dismantled RTG located on the Island of Yuzhny Goryachinsky in the Kola Bay was found. The generator's radioactive heat source was found on the ground near the shoreline in the northern part of the island.[4]
September 10, 2004 – Yakutia, Russia. Two radioisotope thermoelectric generators were dropped 50 meters onto the tundra at Zemlya Bunge island during an airlift when the helicopter flew into heavy weather. According to the nuclear regulators, the impact compromised the RTGs' external radiation shielding. At a height of 10 meters above the impact site, the intensity of gamma radiation was measured at 4 mSv/hr. [5]
2005 – Dounreay, UK. In September, the site's cementation plant was closed when 266 liters of radioactive reprocessing residues were spilled inside containment. [6][7]. In October, another of the site's reprocessing laboratories was closed down after nose-blow tests of eight workers tested positive for trace radioactivity. [8]
November 3, 2005 – Haddam, Connecticut, USA. The Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company reported that water containing quantities (below safe drinking water limits) of 137Cs, 60Co, 90Sr, and 3H leaked from a spent fuel pond. Independent measurements and review of the incident by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission are due to begin November 7, 2005. [9][10][11]
March 11, 2006 – at Fleurus, Belgium, an operator working for the company Sterigenics [12], at a medical equipment sterilization site, entered the irradiation room and remained there for 20 seconds. The room contained a source of 60Co which was not in the pool of water.[13] Three weeks later, the worker suffered of symptoms typical of an irradiation (vomiting, loss of hair, fatigue). One estimate that he was exposed to a dose of between 4.4 and 4.8 Gy due to a malfunction of the control-command hydraulic system maintaining the radioactive source in the pool. The operator spent over one month in a specialized hospital before going back home. To protect workers, the federal nuclear control agency AFCN and private auditors from AVN recommended Sterigenics to install a redundant system of security. It is an accident of level 4 on the INES scale.[14][15][16]
May 5, 2006 – An accidental release of 131I gas at the Prairie Island Nuclear Power Plant in Minnesota exposed approximately one hundred plant workers to low-level radiation. Most workers received 10 to 20 millirads (0.1-0.2 mSv), about the same as a dental X-ray. The workers were wearing protective gear at the time, and no radiation leaked outside the plant to the surrounding area. [17]
Lisa Norris died in 2006 after having been given an overdose of radiation as a result of human error during treatment for a brain tumor at Beatson Oncology Centre in Glasgow (Scotland).[18][19][20]. The Scottish Government have published an independent investigation of this case.[21]. The intended treatment for Lisa Norris was 35 Gy to be delivered by a LINAC machine to the whole of the central nervous system to be delivered in twenty equal fractions of 1.75 Gy, which was to be followed by 19.8 Gy to be delivered to the tumor only (in eleven fractions of 1.8 Gy). In the first phase of the treatment a 58% overdose occurred, and the CNS of Lisa Norris suffered a dose of 55.5 Gy. The second phase of the treatment was abandoned on medical advice, after having lived for some time after the overdose Lisa Norris passed away.
August 23–24, 2008 — INES Level 3 - Fleurus, Belgium - Nuclear material leak

A gaseous leak of a radioisotope of iodine, 131I, was detected at a large medical radioisotope laboratory, Institut national des Radio-Eléments. Belgian authorities implemented restrictions on use of local farming produce within 5 km of the leak, when higher-than-expected levels of contamination was detected in local grass. The particular isotope of iodine has a half-life of 8 days [22] [23]. The European Commission sent out a warning over their ECURIE-alert system on the 29th of August.[40] The quantity of radioactivity released into the environment was estimated at 45 GBq I-131, which corresponds to a dose of 160 microsievert (effective dose) for a hypothetical person remaining permanently at the site's enclosure.[41]

January 23, 2008- A licensed Radiologic Technologist, Raven Knickerbocker, at Mad River Community Hospital in Arcata, California performed 151 CT scan slices on a single 3mm level on the head of a 23 month old child over a 65 minute period. The child suffered radiation burns (skin erythema) to much of his head. The hospital's nuclear health physicist estimated that the child received a localized dose possibly as high as 11Gy, later analysis concluded it was 7.5 Gy. An independent investigation of the child's blood found that he had severe chromosome abnormalities because of the exposure. The technologist was fired, and her license was permanently revoked on March 16, 2011 by the state of California, citing "gross negligence". [42] The hospital's radiology manager, Bruce Fleck, testified that Knickerbocker's conduct was "a rogue act of insanity".
February 2008-August 2009 - A software misconfiguration in a CT scanner used for brain perfusion scanning at Cedar Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles, California, resulted in 206 patients receiving radiation doses approximately 8 times higher than intended during an 18 month period starting in February, 2008. Some patients reported temporary hair loss and erythema. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has estimated that patients received doses between 3Gy and 4Gy.[43]

2010s

April 2010 - INES level 4 - A 35-year old man was hospitalized in New Delhi after handling radioactive scrap metal. Investigation led to the discovery of an amount of scrap metal containing Cobalt-60 in the New Delhi industrial district of Mayapuri. The 35-year old man later died from his injuries, while six others remained hospitalized.[44][45]

July 2010 - During a routine inspection at the Port of Genoa, on Italy's northwest coast, a cargo container from Saudi Arabia containing nearly 50,000 pounds of scrap copper was detected to be emitting gamma radiation at a rate of around 500 millisieverts per hour. After spending over a year in quarantine on Port grounds, Italian officials dissected the container using robots and discovered a rod of cobalt-60 nine inches long and one-third of an inch in diameter intermingled with the scrap. Officials suspected its provenance to be inappropriately disposed of medical or food-processing equipment. The rod was sent to Germany for further analysis, after which it was likely to be recycled.[46]

8.
1970s

17 April 1970 — Tonga Trench

The SNAP 27 radioisotope thermoelectric generator aboard the Lunar Module Aquarius reentered the Earth's atmosphere. The LM had been used as a "lifeboat" to help the Apollo 13 crew return to Earth after the Command Module lost electrical power. The vehicle was targeted for the Pacific Ocean to reduce the risk of contamination in the event the RTG broke up, but it is believed to have survived reentry and water impact intact. Periodic radiation checks of the area have found no signs of leakage.

22 March 1975 — Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant, AL, United States

A fire caused by careless technicians cut off many control circuits for two nuclear power reactors of the Tennessee Valley Authority at Browns Ferry Station in Alabama. The fire burned uncontrolled for 7.5 hours and the two operating GE nuclear reactors were at full power when the fire began. One of them went "dangerously out of control" for several hours and was not stabilized until a few hours after the fire was put out.[2] There was some concern about a meltdown, but this did not occur and there was no radioactive contamination.[3]

March 1977 — Toledo, OH, United States

An electromagnetic relief valve stuck open following a reactor scram at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant near Toledo, OH. The valve was noticed by operators, and the reactor, manufactured by Babcock & Wilcox, was only slightly damaged.[3]

1990s

27 December 1999 — Blayais Nuclear Power Plant, France

Flooding at the Blayais Nuclear Power Plant caused by a combination of high tides and a storm caused damage to equipment and failure of power supplies, leading to a Level 2 event on the International Nuclear Event Scale.

2000s

July, 2002 — Chapelcross nuclear power station, UK

UK Authorities blamed an incident at a Scottish nuclear plant on "procedural and hardware deficiencies". Fuel rods falling to the floor were deemed responsible for the incident.[4]

September and October, 2005 — Dounreay, UK

In September, the site's cementation plant was closed when 266 litres of radioactive reprocessing residues were spilled inside containment.[5] In October, another of the site's reprocessing laboratories was closed down after nose-blow tests of eight workers tested positive for trace radioactivity.[6]

July 25, 2006 -INES Level 2 – Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant, Sweden

Mains power lost to reactor 1 after an electrical fault. Two of four diesel generators fail, problems related to computer systems[7] (e.g. readings of core water levels) due to earlier electrical fault SCRAMed.

4 June 2008 — Krško Nuclear Power Plant, Slovenia – Loss of coolant

Emergency response system ECURIE (European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange) received an alert message following a loss of coolant accident at the Krsko Nuclear Power Plant.[8]

2010s
See also: 2011 Japanese nuclear accidents and Timeline of the Fukushima nuclear accidents

March 11–13, 2011 – INES Level needed, Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant, Japan – Turbine damage, possible radioactivity emergency
After the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami of March 11, a fire from the turbine section of the Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant following the earthquake was reported by Kyodo News.[9][10][11] The blaze was in a building housing the turbine, which is sited separately from the plant's reactor,[12] and was soon extinguished.[13]
On 13 March the lowest-level state of emergency was declared regarding the Onagawa plant by TEPCO, as radioactivity readings temporarily[14][15] exceeded allowed levels in the area of the plant.[16][17] TEPCO stated this was due to radiation from the Fukushima I nuclear accidents and not from the Onagawa plant itself.[18] Events are still developing.
March 11–13, 2011 – INES Level needed, Tōkai Nuclear Power Plant, Japan – Reactor cooling pump damage
Following the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami the number 2 reactor was one of eleven nuclear reactors to be shut down automatically.[19] It was reported on 14 March that a cooling system pump for the number 2 reactor had stopped working.[20] Japan Atomic Power Company stated that there was a second operational pump and cooling was working, but that two of three diesel generators used to power the cooling system were out of order.[21]

[C2C]

9.
The Iraq War, or the War in Iraq (also referred to as the Occupation of Iraq, the Second Gulf War, or Operation Iraqi Freedom by the United States military), was a conflict triggered by an invasion of Iraq by the United States[42][43] from March 20, 2003[44][45] to December 18, 2011,[46][47] though sectarian violence continues and has caused thousands of fatalities.

Prior to the war, the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom claimed that Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) posed a threat to their security and that of their coalition/regional allies.[48][49][50] In 2002, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1441 which called for Iraq to completely cooperate with UN weapon inspectors to verify that Iraq was not in possession of WMD and cruise missiles. Prior to the attack, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) found no evidence of WMD, but could not yet verify the accuracy of Iraq's declarations regarding what weapons it possessed, as their work was still unfinished. The leader of the inspectors Hans Blix estimated the time remaining for disarmament being verified through inspections to be "months".[51][52][53][54][55]

After investigation following the invasion, the U.S.-led Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had ended its nuclear, chemical and biological programs in 1991 and had no active programs at the time of the invasion, but that they intended to resume production if the Iraq sanctions were lifted.[56] Although some degraded remnants of misplaced or abandoned chemical weapons from before 1991 were found, they were not the weapons which had been the one of the main arguments for the invasion.[57]

Some US officials also accused Iraqi President Saddam Hussein of harboring and supporting al-Qaeda,[58] but no evidence of a meaningful connection was ever found.[59][60] Other proclaimed reasons for the invasion included Iraq's financial support for the families of Palestinian suicide bombers,[61] Iraqi government human rights abuses,[62] and an effort to spread democracy to the country.[63][64]

On March 16, 2003 the US government advised the UN inspectors to leave their unfinished work and exit from Iraq.[65] On March 20[66] the US led coalition conducted a surprise attack on Iraq without declaring war.[67] The invasion led to an occupation and the eventual capture of President Hussein, who was later tried in an Iraqi court of law and executed by the new Iraqi government. Violence against coalition forces and among various sectarian groups soon led to the Iraqi insurgency, strife between many Sunni and Shia Iraqi groups, and the emergence of a new faction of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.[68][69]

In June 2008, U.S. Department of Defense officials claimed security and economic indicators began to show signs of improvement in what they hailed as significant and fragile gains.[70] Iraq was fifth on the 2008 Failed States Index,[71] and sixth on the 2009 list.[72] As public opinion favoring troop withdrawals increased and as Iraqi forces began to take responsibility for security, member nations of the Coalition withdrew their forces.[73][74] In late 2008, the U.S. and Iraqi governments approved a Status of Forces Agreement effective through January 1, 2012.[75] The Iraqi Parliament also ratified a Strategic Framework Agreement with the U.S.,[76] aimed at ensuring cooperation in constitutional rights, threat deterrence, education,[77] energy development, and other areas.[78]

In late February 2009, newly elected U.S. President Barack Obama announced an 18-month withdrawal window for combat forces, with approximately 50,000 troops remaining in the country "to advise and train Iraqi security forces and to provide intelligence and surveillance".[79][80] General Ray Odierno, the top U.S. military commander in Iraq, said he believes all U.S. troops will be out of the country by the end of 2011,[81] while UK forces ended combat operations on April 30, 2009.[82] Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has said he supports the accelerated pullout of U.S. forces.[83] In a speech at the Oval Office on 31 August 2010 Obama declared "the American combat mission in Iraq has ended. Operation Iraqi Freedom is over, and the Iraqi people now have lead responsibility for the security of their country."[84][85][86] Beginning September 1, 2010, the American operational name for its involvement in Iraq changed from "Operation Iraqi Freedom" to "Operation New Dawn". The remaining 50,000 U.S. troops were designated as "advise and assist brigades" assigned to non-combat operations while retaining the ability to revert to combat operations as necessary. Two combat aviation brigades also remain in Iraq.[87] In September 2010, the Associated Press issued an internal memo reminding its reporters that "combat in Iraq is not over", and "U.S. troops remain involved in combat operations alongside Iraqi forces, although U.S. officials say the American combat mission has formally ended."[88][89]

On October 21, 2011, President Obama announced that all U.S. troops and trainers would leave Iraq by the end of the year, bringing the U.S. mission in Iraq to an end.[90] On December 15, 2011, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta officially declared the Iraq War over, at a flag lowering ceremony in Baghdad.[91] The last U.S. troops left Iraqi territory on December 18, 2011 at 4:27 UTC.[92]
Contents

1 Background
1.1 Iraq disarmament crisis and pre-war intelligence
1.1.1 UN weapons inspections resume
1.2 Alleged weapons of mass destruction
1.2.1 Yellowcake uranium
1.2.1.1 Poison gas
1.2.1.2 Biological weapons
1.2.1.3 Result
1.2.2 Preparations for Iraq war
1.2.3 Opposition to invasion
1.3 Invasion
1.3.1 Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraq Survey Group
1.4 Post-invasion phase
1.4.1 Capturing former government leaders
1.5 2004: Insurgency expands
1.6 2005: Elections and transitional government
1.7 2006: Civil war and permanent Iraqi government
1.7.1 Iraq Study Group report and Hussein's execution
1.8 2007: U.S. troops surge
1.8.1 Planned troop reduction
1.8.2 Effects of the surge on security
1.8.3 Political developments
1.8.4 Tensions with Iran
1.8.5 Tensions with Turkey
1.8.6 Blackwater private security controversy
1.9 2008: Civil war continues
1.9.1 Spring offensives on Shia militias
1.9.2 Congressional testimony
1.9.3 Iraqi security forces rearm
1.9.4 Status of forces agreement
1.10 2009: Coalition redeployment
1.10.1 Transfer of Green Zone
1.10.2 Provincial elections
1.10.3 Exit strategy announcement
1.10.4 Sixth anniversary protests
1.10.5 Coalition forces withdraw
1.10.6 Iraq awards oil contracts
1.11 2010: U.S. drawdown and Operation New Dawn
1.11.1 Iraqi security forces transition towards self reliance
1.11.2 UN lifts restrictions on Iraq
1.12 2011: Endgame
1.13 Post U.S. withdrawal
2 Casualty estimates
3 Criticism and cost
3.1 Financial cost
4 Humanitarian crises
5 Human rights abuses
5.1 Iraqi government
5.2 Coalition forces and private contractors
5.3 Insurgent groups
6 Public opinion on the war
6.1 International opinion
6.2 Iraqi opinion
7 Relation to the U.S. Global War on Terrorism
8 Iranian involvement
9 Popular culture
10 See also
11 References
12 Further reading
13 External links

[C2C]

Enfin, Maddox, we kunnen moeilijk een lijst aanleggen, daar heeft forum.politics.be niet voldoende bandbreedte voor. Zo'n server huren kost ook geld hé.

[maddox]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door C2C

Enfin, Maddox, we kunnen moeilijk een lijst aanleggen, daar heeft forum.politics.be niet voldoende bandbreedte voor. Zo'n server huren kost ook geld hé.

Uw lijst is zeer uitgebreid, ik zie echter maar een paar "catastrofes" en zeer veel ongevallen.
Het is duidelijk dat het een pro communistische lijst is.

Het Karatsjajmeer, en de grote ontploffing van Kysthym staan er niet bij.

Als we een soortgelijke lijst van eenderd welke vorm van industrie zouden aanleggen, dan gaat die nog veel uitgebreider zijn.

[peter1962]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Fallen Angel

Explosielassen wordt enkel toegepast om twee platen van verschillend metaal aan elkaar te lassen. Ik kan mij niet direct praktische toepassingen daarvoor voorstellen. Ik weet alleen dat het bestaat.

PS: thermietlassen bestaat ook nog

Men gebruikt dat voor de bouw van boten, een stalen casco met daarop een aluminium opbouw. De verbinding is dan met Triclad. http://www.alumip.com/English/Produc...nt.asp?pid=252