'Chemical Ali' geëxecuteerd, wanneer Bush en zijn knecht Blair?

[atmosphere]

Natuurlijk kun je over het totale aantal slachtoffers niet zeggen dat het de schuld is van de Britten en Amerikanen alleen .

Je kunt dat wel zeggen over de slachtoffers van de Brits Amerikaanse bombardementen.

Tienduizend doden als gevolg van zeer zware bombardementen in stedelijk gebied is helemaal geen groot aantal , sterker nog dit aantal is zelfs zeer te noemen.

Berichtgeving vanuit het oorlogs gebied werd streng door de amerikanen geregisseerd. Het beeld dat toen naar voren kwam was zeer eenzijdig . Pas later kwamen de berichten over de slachtoffers naar buiten . U zit er in ieder geval behoorlijk naast wanneer u denkt dat er heel weinig slachtoffers vielen .
Ik ben geen conspiracy theorist , of anti-Amerikaans, maar dat betekend nog niet dat ik blind ben voor de negatieve gevolgen van de hele onderneming.

Het is geen enkel probleem om te onderbouwen wat ik hierover beweer.

[atmosphere]

Een willekeurige greep uit de database. De bronnen van deze cijfers zijn ook na te trekken.




Elf door bommen in Kerbala 27 Mar 2003- 27 maart 2003 -
28 Mar 2003 28 mar 2003

j006
Twenty-six by cluster bombs in Najaf Zesentwintig door clusterbommen in Najaf 27 Mar 2003- 27 maart 2003 -
28 Mar 2003 28 mar 2003

j004
Seven by air strikes in Alwya area, Baghdad Zeven door luchtaanvallen in het gebied Alwya, Bagdad 27 Mar 2003- 27 maart 2003 -
28 Mar 2003 28 mar 2003

x028
Two by UK air raids in Mosul Twee van de Britse luchtaanvallen in Mosul 27 Mar 2003 27 maart 2003

x054
Two by air strike in Rutbah Twee door luchtaanval in Rutbah 26 Mar 2003 26 mar 2003

21 by US air strikes in Baghdad 21 door Amerikaanse luchtaanvallen in Bagdad 26 Mar 2003 26 mar 2003


x020
Two by cruise missiles in Al-Shaab, Baghdad Twee van kruisraketten in Al-Shaab, Bagdad 26 Mar 2003 26 mar 2003

x037
Two by missiles in Ash Shatra Twee door raketten in Ash Shatra 25 Mar 2003 25 maart 2003

x017
Two killed in Nassiriya Twee gedood in Nassiriya 25 Mar 2003 25 maart 2003

x021
Five by air attack in northern Baghdad Vijf door luchtaanval in het noorden van Bagdad 24 Mar 2003 24 maart 2003

x012
Five by air attack in Al-Azamiyah, Baghdad Vijf door de lucht aanval in Al-Azamiyah, Bagdad 24 Mar 2003 24 maart 2003

x019
Ten by cluster bombs in Nassiriya Tien door clusterbommen in Nassiriya 23 Mar 2003 23 mar 2003

x016
30 by US air attacks in Babel province 30 van de Amerikaanse luchtaanvallen in de provincie Babel 23 Mar 2003 23 mar 2003

x015
14 by US air strikes in Basra 14 van de Amerikaanse luchtaanvallen in Basra 23 Mar 2003 23 mar 2003

x014
Ten by air attack in Karbala Tien door de lucht aanval in Karbala 23 Mar 2003 23 mar 2003

x013
3-8 killed in Najaf, Ninawa, Qadisiya and Salah ad Din 3-8 gedood in Najaf, Ninawa, Qadisiya en Salah ad-Din 23 Mar 2003 23 mar 2003

x011
Five by air attack in Al-Rutbah Vijf door de lucht aanval in Al-Rutbah 23 Mar 2003 23 mar 2003

x029
12 by US forces in Nassiriya 12 van de Amerikaanse troepen in Nassiriya 22 Mar 2003- 22 maart 2003 -
30 Mar 2003 30 maart 2003
d3473

x018
Four by missile strike in Mosul Vier door raketaanval in Mosul 22 Mar 2003 22 maart 2003

x010
4-5 by airstrikes in Tikrit 4-5 door luchtaanvallen in Tikrit 22 Mar 2003 22 maart 2003

j002
57-100 by US missile strikes in Khormal 57-100 door Amerikaanse raketaanvallen in Khormal 22 Mar 2003 22 maart 2003

j003
2-3 by US forces in Iman Anas, near Basra 2-3 door de Amerikaanse strijdkrachten in Iman Anas, in de buurt van Basra 22 Mar 2003 22 maart 2003

x008
50-77 by US bombardment in Basra 50-77 door de Amerikaanse bombardementen in Basra 22 Mar 2003 22 maart 2003

x009
0-3 by US airstrikes in Baghdad 0-3 door Amerikaanse luchtaanvallen in Bagdad

[Pericles]

En , bleef zijn kop aan de romp , want bij de verhanging van één van zijn spitsbroeders vloog die eraf gelijk het stopsel van een champagnefles ?

[Fallen Angel]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door grievous

Hieruit blijkt alleen uw gebrekkige kennis van moderne wapensystemen .

Mja telkens ze een "precisie" bom droppen in een stedelijk gebied blazen ze altijd een hele hoop onschuldige burgers op.

Veel geluk met het ontkennen van deze cijfers:


Feit is dat geregeld ook VS soldaten gedood worden door hun eigen "precisie" bombardementen.

[grievous]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door atmosphere

Natuurlijk kun je over het totale aantal slachtoffers niet zeggen dat het de schuld is van de Britten en Amerikanen alleen .

Je kunt dat wel zeggen over de slachtoffers van de Brits Amerikaanse bombardementen.

Tienduizend doden als gevolg van zeer zware bombardementen in stedelijk gebied is helemaal geen groot aantal , sterker nog dit aantal is zelfs zeer te noemen.

Berichtgeving vanuit het oorlogs gebied werd streng door de amerikanen geregisseerd. Het beeld dat toen naar voren kwam was zeer eenzijdig . Pas later kwamen de berichten over de slachtoffers naar buiten . U zit er in ieder geval behoorlijk naast wanneer u denkt dat er heel weinig slachtoffers vielen .
Ik ben geen conspiracy theorist , of anti-Amerikaans, maar dat betekend nog niet dat ik blind ben voor de negatieve gevolgen van de hele onderneming.

Het is geen enkel probleem om te onderbouwen wat ik hierover beweer.

Van zware bombardementen in stedelijk gebied was geen sprake.Zelfs met technologie van wo2 zou men moeilijk aan tienduizend doden geraken laat staan met precisietechnologie.

[grievous]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Fallen Angel

Mja telkens ze een "precisie" bom droppen in een stedelijk gebied blazen ze altijd een hele hoop onschuldige burgers op.

Veel geluk met het ontkennen van deze cijfers:
Bijlage 65492

Feit is dat geregeld ook VS soldaten gedood worden door hun eigen "precisie" bombardementen.

Met de gegeven tabel toont gij niets aan.In wo2 moest men een stad platleggen om een fabriek of ander puntdoel te raken.Nu kan men met precisiegeleide wapens de fabriek of ander puntdoel met een paar bommen uitschakelen.Dat is het fundamentele onderscheid.Veel minder bommen=veel minder collaterale schade.
Overigens hangt het soort gebruikte bom af van het soort doel en de locatie.
Gij kunt precisiegeide wapens ontkennen zoveel gij wilt. Het zal u niet baten.

[grievous]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door atmosphere

Een willekeurige greep uit de database. De bronnen van deze cijfers zijn ook na te trekken.




Elf door bommen in Kerbala 27 Mar 2003- 27 maart 2003 -
28 Mar 2003 28 mar 2003

j006
Twenty-six by cluster bombs in Najaf Zesentwintig door clusterbommen in Najaf 27 Mar 2003- 27 maart 2003 -
28 Mar 2003 28 mar 2003

j004
Seven by air strikes in Alwya area, Baghdad Zeven door luchtaanvallen in het gebied Alwya, Bagdad 27 Mar 2003- 27 maart 2003 -
28 Mar 2003 28 mar 2003

x028
Two by UK air raids in Mosul Twee van de Britse luchtaanvallen in Mosul 27 Mar 2003 27 maart 2003

x054
Two by air strike in Rutbah Twee door luchtaanval in Rutbah 26 Mar 2003 26 mar 2003

21 by US air strikes in Baghdad 21 door Amerikaanse luchtaanvallen in Bagdad 26 Mar 2003 26 mar 2003


x020
Two by cruise missiles in Al-Shaab, Baghdad Twee van kruisraketten in Al-Shaab, Bagdad 26 Mar 2003 26 mar 2003

x037
Two by missiles in Ash Shatra Twee door raketten in Ash Shatra 25 Mar 2003 25 maart 2003

x017
Two killed in Nassiriya Twee gedood in Nassiriya 25 Mar 2003 25 maart 2003

x021
Five by air attack in northern Baghdad Vijf door luchtaanval in het noorden van Bagdad 24 Mar 2003 24 maart 2003

x012
Five by air attack in Al-Azamiyah, Baghdad Vijf door de lucht aanval in Al-Azamiyah, Bagdad 24 Mar 2003 24 maart 2003

x019
Ten by cluster bombs in Nassiriya Tien door clusterbommen in Nassiriya 23 Mar 2003 23 mar 2003

x016
30 by US air attacks in Babel province 30 van de Amerikaanse luchtaanvallen in de provincie Babel 23 Mar 2003 23 mar 2003

x015
14 by US air strikes in Basra 14 van de Amerikaanse luchtaanvallen in Basra 23 Mar 2003 23 mar 2003

x014
Ten by air attack in Karbala Tien door de lucht aanval in Karbala 23 Mar 2003 23 mar 2003

x013
3-8 killed in Najaf, Ninawa, Qadisiya and Salah ad Din 3-8 gedood in Najaf, Ninawa, Qadisiya en Salah ad-Din 23 Mar 2003 23 mar 2003

x011
Five by air attack in Al-Rutbah Vijf door de lucht aanval in Al-Rutbah 23 Mar 2003 23 mar 2003

x029
12 by US forces in Nassiriya 12 van de Amerikaanse troepen in Nassiriya 22 Mar 2003- 22 maart 2003 -
30 Mar 2003 30 maart 2003
d3473

x018
Four by missile strike in Mosul Vier door raketaanval in Mosul 22 Mar 2003 22 maart 2003

x010
4-5 by airstrikes in Tikrit 4-5 door luchtaanvallen in Tikrit 22 Mar 2003 22 maart 2003

j002
57-100 by US missile strikes in Khormal 57-100 door Amerikaanse raketaanvallen in Khormal 22 Mar 2003 22 maart 2003

j003
2-3 by US forces in Iman Anas, near Basra 2-3 door de Amerikaanse strijdkrachten in Iman Anas, in de buurt van Basra 22 Mar 2003 22 maart 2003

x008
50-77 by US bombardment in Basra 50-77 door de Amerikaanse bombardementen in Basra 22 Mar 2003 22 maart 2003

x009
0-3 by US airstrikes in Baghdad 0-3 door Amerikaanse luchtaanvallen in Bagdad

Telekns zeer kleine aantallen wat logisch is gezien de inzet van precisiegeleide wapens.

[Fallen Angel]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door grievous

Met de gegeven tabel toont gij niets aan.In wo2 moest men een stad platleggen om een fabriek of ander puntdoel te raken.Nu kan men met precisiegeleide wapens de fabriek of ander puntdoel met een paar bommen uitschakelen.Dat is het fundamentele onderscheid.Veel minder bommen=veel minder collaterale schade.
Overigens hangt het soort gebruikte bom af van het soort doel en de locatie.
Gij kunt precisiegeide wapens ontkennen zoveel gij wilt. Het zal u niet baten.

Het lijkt mij vreemd dat u als armchair warrior nog nooit van een duikbommenwerper gehoord hebt. Getrainde duikbommenwerperpiloten in WOII konden bommen droppen binnen de radius van de huidige geleide "precisie" bommen. Enkel de opkomst van geleide projectielen heeft de duikbommenwerper overbodig gemaakt.

Het punt van de tapijtbombardementen in WOII was net dat: Een hele stad platleggen. Niet meer niet minder.

Dit vertelt trouwens het volledige verhaal:

http://cursor.org/stories/civpertons.htm

[grievous]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Fallen Angel

Het lijkt mij vreemd dat u als armchair warrior nog nooit van een duikbommenwerper gehoord hebt. Getrainde duikbommenwerperpiloten in WOII konden bommen droppen binnen de radius van de huidige geleide "precisie" bommen. Enkel de opkomst van geleide projectielen heeft de duikbommenwerper overbodig gemaakt.

Het punt van de tapijtbombardementen in WOII was net dat: Een hele stad platleggen. Niet meer niet minder.

Dit vertelt trouwens het volledige verhaal:

http://cursor.org/stories/civpertons.htm

Hieruit blijkt natuurlijk een extreem gebrek aan kennis.Die duikbommenwerpers hebben niet de radius om doelwitten op zeer lange afstand te gaan bestoken en zijn ook extreem kwetsbaar voor de luchtdoel artillerie in het daglicht.Ook de duitsers moesten uit noodzaak tot veel minder nauwkeurige nachtaanvallen op het VK overgaan.
Het is een historisch feit dat de VS probeerde precisie aanvallen uit te voeren bij daglicht hetgeen de juiste strategie was .Met de beperkte middelen van die tijd was de collaterale schade nog altijd relatief groot.Tegen Japan werkte dat niet om allerlei redenen en daarom werd tot tapijtbombardementen overgegaan.
De engelsen kozen altijd voor de nacht,ook als ze puntdoelwitten aanvielen en dan is de collaterale schade bijzonder groot.
Het stuk waarnaar link is zeer tendentieus.Men moet de doelen bestoken waar ze zijn met het soort bom dat het doel kan uitschakelen.Met precisiegeleide wapens blijft het aantal burgerdoden beperkt tot wat altijd onvermijdbaar is.Beter kan niet.En het aantal burgerdoden ligt in ieder geval altijd veel lager dan met de domme bommen van wo2.Al dat gezaag is dus ingegeven door een extreme anti-westerse ingesteldheid.Bij oorlogen waar westerse staten niet bij betrokken zijn,worden dergelijke commentaren niet gemaakt.
Een analyse van de luchtcampagne tegen Irak in 2003.
http://rds.yahoo.com/_ylt=A0geu9GTMr...ay-2003-CK.pdf

[atmosphere]

57-100 by US missile strikes in Khormal 22 Mar 2003
j003 2-3 by US forces in Iman Anas, near Basra 22 Mar 2003
x008 50-77 by US bombardment in Basra 22 Mar 2003
x009 0-3 by US airstrikes in Baghdad 21 Mar 2003-
22 Mar 2003
x079b-i 0-22 in Baghdad hospitals 20 Mar 2003-
9 Apr 2003
x096h-i 38 civilian deaths recorded in Tikrit hospitals 20 Mar 2003-
9 Apr 2003
x073 1482-2009 recorded by 19 Baghdad hospitals 20 Mar 2003-
9 Apr 2003
x057-i 216-345, three hospitals, Najaf 20 Mar 2003-
9 Apr 2003
x044 142-200 civilian deaths recorded in Basra 20 Mar 2003-
9 Apr 2003
j024 201 by US bombing in Basra 20 Mar 2003-
7 Apr 2003
j031 30 fleeing in cars, Tallil and Nasiriyah 20 Mar 2003-
6 Apr 2003
x038b 633 by US air and ground attacks in Nassiriya 20 Mar 2003-
6 Apr 2003
j020 22 by US air attacks in Mohammedia 20 Mar 2003-
3 Apr 2003
x038 226-240 by US air raids in Nassiriya

Natuurlijk vielen er relatief gezien weinig doden ,als we met WO2 gaan vergelijken. Maar de aanvallen op Irak waren zeer massaal waardoor je alsnog op die tienduizend komt.

[grievous]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door atmosphere

57-100 by US missile strikes in Khormal 22 Mar 2003
j003 2-3 by US forces in Iman Anas, near Basra 22 Mar 2003
x008 50-77 by US bombardment in Basra 22 Mar 2003
x009 0-3 by US airstrikes in Baghdad 21 Mar 2003-
22 Mar 2003
x079b-i 0-22 in Baghdad hospitals 20 Mar 2003-
9 Apr 2003
x096h-i 38 civilian deaths recorded in Tikrit hospitals 20 Mar 2003-
9 Apr 2003
x073 1482-2009 recorded by 19 Baghdad hospitals 20 Mar 2003-
9 Apr 2003
x057-i 216-345, three hospitals, Najaf 20 Mar 2003-
9 Apr 2003
x044 142-200 civilian deaths recorded in Basra 20 Mar 2003-
9 Apr 2003
j024 201 by US bombing in Basra 20 Mar 2003-
7 Apr 2003
j031 30 fleeing in cars, Tallil and Nasiriyah 20 Mar 2003-
6 Apr 2003
x038b 633 by US air and ground attacks in Nassiriya 20 Mar 2003-
6 Apr 2003
j020 22 by US air attacks in Mohammedia 20 Mar 2003-
3 Apr 2003
x038 226-240 by US air raids in Nassiriya

Natuurlijk vielen er relatief gezien weinig doden ,als we met WO2 gaan vergelijken. Maar de aanvallen op Irak waren zeer massaal waardoor je alsnog op die tienduizend komt.

Er waren aanvallen op puntdoelwitten met bijna uitsluitend precisiegeleide wapens gedurende een relatief korte periode en dus zijn er gegronde redenen om dat cijfer met een korrel zout te nemen.Tienduizend doden is schromelijk overdreven.Het valt trouwens op dat er ook slachtoffers van grondaanvallen vermeld worden.
Niet verwonderlijk blijkt uit een nazicht van uw bron dat het er volgens die bron een kleine zevenduizend waren door alle oorzaken tijdens de invasie(dus niet alleen luchtaanvallen).
Uw bewering van tienduizend door luchtaanvallen alleen tijdens de invasie klopt dus zelfs niet volgens uw eigen bron.Gij hebt het toaal van het eerste jaar genomen en dat op de luchtaanvallen gestoken tijdens de invasie.
Daarbij komt dat irakese militairen in burgerkleren vochtten hetgeen betekent dat het woord 'burger' ook niet per definitie gelijkgesteld kan worden met onschuldige burger.

[Fallen Angel]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door grievous

Hieruit blijkt natuurlijk een extreem gebrek aan kennis.Die duikbommenwerpers hebben niet de radius om doelwitten op zeer lange afstand te gaan bestoken en zijn ook extreem kwetsbaar voor de luchtdoel artillerie in het daglicht.Ook de duitsers moesten uit noodzaak tot veel minder nauwkeurige nachtaanvallen op het VK overgaan.
Het is een historisch feit dat de VS probeerde precisie aanvallen uit te voeren bij daglicht hetgeen de juiste strategie was .Met de beperkte middelen van die tijd was de collaterale schade nog altijd relatief groot.Tegen Japan werkte dat niet om allerlei redenen en daarom werd tot tapijtbombardementen overgegaan.

Voor puntdoelwitten die zeer zwaar bewapend waren gebruikte men altijd duikbommenwerpers:


Voor steden die men volledig plat wou leggen gebruikte men gewone bommenwerpers:


Iets anders beweren is hetzelfde als liegen.

[atmosphere]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door grievous

Er waren aanvallen op puntdoelwitten met bijna uitsluitend precisiegeleide wapens gedurende een relatief korte periode en dus zijn er gegronde redenen om dat cijfer met een korrel zout te nemen.Tienduizend doden is schromelijk overdreven.Het valt trouwens op dat er ook slachtoffers van grondaanvallen vermeld worden.
Niet verwonderlijk blijkt uit een nazicht van uw bron dat het er volgens die bron een kleine zevenduizend waren door alle oorzaken tijdens de invasie(dus niet alleen luchtaanvallen).
Uw bewering van tienduizend door luchtaanvallen alleen tijdens de invasie klopt dus zelfs niet volgens uw eigen bron.Gij hebt het toaal van het eerste jaar genomen en dat op de luchtaanvallen gestoken tijdens de invasie.
Daarbij komt dat irakese militairen in burgerkleren vochtten hetgeen betekent dat het woord 'burger' ook niet per definitie gelijkgesteld kan worden met onschuldige burger.

Daar komt nog eens bij dat je er vanuit kunt gaan dat niet alle doden geregistreert zijn !! Werkelijke aantallen liggen naar alle waarschijnlijkheid hoger .

Ik zal mijn stelling enigsinds aanpassen : 10.000 doden als direct gevolg van de amerikaanse invasie in de eerste fase van de oorlog.

Hoeveel slachtoffers zijn er volgens u dan gevallen ? U roept vanalles en speculeert maar komt niet met een alternatief .

[grievous]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Fallen Angel

Voor puntdoelwitten die zeer zwaar bewapend waren gebruikte men altijd duikbommenwerpers:


Voor steden die men volledig plat wou leggen gebruikte men gewone bommenwerpers:


Iets anders beweren is hetzelfde als liegen.

Gij verkiest te negeren dat de VS precisie aanvallen bij daglicht uitvoerde ofwel weet gij bitter weinig..
Duikbommenwerpers kwamen niet in aanmerking voor dergelijke diepe penetratie vluchten.Daarvoor hebt ge zware bommenwerpers nodig.

En klein tekstje over de amerikaanse daglicht aanvallen op militaire puntdoelen.
'Despite the support that Harris was offering Eaker, he was not convinced that the American’s plan of strategic daylight bombing was going to work against the formidable German Air Force. Since the war began, Great Britain had been bombing German cities in an effort to blast the German citizens into submission. They did this under the cover of darkness, which made the British bombers harder for the Luftwaffe pilots to engage and nearly invisible to the flak gunners on the ground. Bombing during daylight, Harris argued, would expose the American bombers to the full might of the Luftwaffe and cause unnecessarily high casualties. Harris’ suggestion to Eaker was to integrate the B-17s that were arriving from the states with the British heavy bomber squadrons. This would make faster use of the B-17s that were already arriving in theater and, at the same time, increase the number of bombers that the British could send against Germany every night.

Eaker was well aware of the British position but insisted to Harris that daylight operations against specific military targets would enable a ground invasion of the continent faster than the indiscriminate bombing of cities. Eaker was also worried that if he gave the first few bombers to the British to use for night operations, for which the American pilots were not trained, that soon the Eighth Bomber Command would be a subsidiary of British Bomber Command and he would lose any chance he had of implementing daylight bombing.

Another obstacle facing the 8th was the allocation of promised bombers to other countries and commands. At the same time that the 8th was being built, American aircraft were being shipped all over the world. Countries like Australia, Russia, China, and Great Britain were having their air force built on American planes and technology at the expense of the 8th Air Force. Even the U.S. Navy was doing its part in keeping aircraft from reaching the 8th. Besides asking for fighters and bombers to defend the fleet, the Navy was also asking for more cargo planes to be built instead of combat aircraft. As Hap Arnold later wrote:

When asked what solution they might have for getting greater production and making more planes available to the British, or for securing more air transports, the answer of the Navy representatives was, “Stop manufacturing B-17s at the Long Beach plant and build cargo planes.”…When Freeman asked what the Navy was able to give up or help, if the Army Air Forces stopped manufacturing B-17s, our Naval officers said, “Nothing - there is nothing the Navy could give that would help any.”…The Army Air Forces was expected to give everything to everybody.

Despite all of the early problems, the 8th received its first group of bombers, named the 97th Bomb Group, in July 1942. A month of intensive training followed, in which the pilots learned how to fly under the instrument conditions that were prevalent in England and the gunners practiced their accuracy against R.A.F. fighter planes. Just as it seemed everything was falling into place for the 8th, word came from Washington on a new operation that would once again stall the growth of the 8th.

Operation TORCH, the invasion of German-occupied North Africa, diverted two of the three inbound bomb groups to the Mediterranean and stripped Eaker of the one bomb group he had been training for the past month. Before he lost the 97th, however, he was going to use them for what they were brought oversees to do in the first place, drop bombs on Germany. On August 9th, the 97th was alerted for its first mission over German occupied territory.

Eaker was soon to discover an even more unforgiving adversary than the Germans or the policy makers in Washington, the English weather. The morning of August tenth found the airfield closed due to fog and subsequently the mission was cancelled. Over the next week, the dense fog stayed in the air keeping the heavy bombers on the ground. Finally, on August 17th, the weather cleared and the 97th launched twelve planes for a mission against the marshalling yards at Rouen, France. The bombers met very little fighter resistance and no flak on the way to the target. Eaker, flying in the lead aircraft, watched as most of the bombs dropped fell within the target area. A little over an hour later, all twelve bombers were safely on the ground in England.

The mission was a success, but no one was under the impression that all missions would be this easy or this successful. British Spitfires escorted the bombers the entire way to the target and back and they met no flak and very little Luftwaffe opposition. Until the number of bombers got larger, however, the Americans would have to be content with small scale attacks against relatively undefended targets. These easy missions would later come to be known as “milk runs”.

The next few months saw many changes for the 8th Air Force. In December of 1942, Tooey Spaatz was transferred to Africa to be in charge of the aerial portion of Operation TORCH and Eaker was given command of the entire 8th Air Force. Four new bomb groups arrived in England, and the pace of operations increased. Due to the lack of long-range fighter escort and still somewhat small numbers of bombers, however, the missions were aimed at targets on the coast or in the occupied countries. Not one bomb had been dropped on the mainland of Germany.

Because of this, the 8th faced near extinction during the early part of 1943. Churchill had convinced Roosevelt at the Casablanca conference that due to the lack of any major combat operations on the part of the Americans in the European theatre, that the 8th should finally be integrated with the British Bomber Command.5 Upon hearing this, Arnold had Eaker fly to Casablanca to meet with Churchill and plead for him to change his mind. Though still not totally won over on the concept of daylight bombing, Eaker was successful in convincing Churchill to grant the 8th more time.

One result of the Casablanca conference was the authorization for the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO). The CBO directed the joint effort of Great Britain and the United States to pave the way for the invasion of Europe through using each air force’s specific capabilities: the British bombing at night and the Americans during the day. At least on paper, the 8th finally had the support it needed from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

On his return to England a few days later, Eaker ordered the first mission against the German mainland, targeting the submarine construction yards at Vegesack. When they arrived over the target the bombers found it completely covered by clouds, so they moved to the secondary target, another port city named Wilhelmshaven. Although partially obscured by clouds, the bombers were still able to drop the first American bombs on German soil. The 8th Air Force had its first major victory.

Over the next few months, the 8th was sending more and more bombers on sorties over Germany as reinforcements arrived from the states. And also over the next few months, the Luftwaffe was getting better and better at shooting them down. Despite improvements that had been made both to the B-17 airframe (a gun in the nose to counter the increasing German head-on attacks) and the new “combat box” formation that provided each aircraft with maximum firepower coverage from all of the other aircraft in formation, bombers and crews were falling at an almost irreplaceable rate. The answer to this problem was developing a long-range fighter escort.

At this point in the war, British Spitfires and American P-47s and P-38s were escorting the bombers on their missions to Germany, but the combat radius of these planes was such that they had to turn around and go home just after crossing the German border, leaving the bombers unescorted for up to four hundred miles on some of the longer missions. The fact that the German FW-190s and ME-109s were more manoeuvrable than the Allied fighters and hence better in a dogfight rarely came in to play. The Germans would remain well out of range of the bomber formations until the Allied fighters had to turn for home, then ferociously attack until the bombers could make it back to the relative safety of fighter cover on the return trip to England.

Eaker had been trying for months to get external drop tanks fitted to the fighters that were already in theatre, but the tanks that were added either didn’t extend the range of the fighter far enough or resulted in poorer aerodynamic handling of the aircraft. All attempts at adding the tanks were eventually scrubbed, but a savoir in another form was soon on the way.

Under development at this time in the United States was the P-51 Mustang. The Mustang would have the combat range to escort the bombers all the way to the target and back home. It was also faster and more manoeuvrable than the German fighters. Eaker had petitioned Arnold repeatedly in 1943 to allocate P-51s to the Eighth to escort his bombers, but, as with the bombers a year ago, Arnold had to fight to get allotments over the Navy and other allies.6 Until Arnold could deliver some P-51s to the European theatre, the B-17s still had to fly and Germany still had to be bombed.

One of the focal points of the Allied bombing campaign was the destruction of ball bearing production facilities. The ball bearing was an integral part of the German war industry. The Ministry of Economic Warfare (M.E.W.), the British Cabinet agency that had been collecting information about potential targets in Germany since the beginning of the war, had named ball bearings as one of the top priorities due to their use in every German aircraft. This dependence was first learned when the British themselves faced a shortage early in the war after the Germans bombed one of their ball bearing plants causing a delay in aircraft production. Not only did the German fighters and bombers use a large number of bearings per aircraft, but ground equipment such as tanks and motor vehicles did as well. By destroying the ball bearing production plants, the Allies could, in effect, also be destroying the production capability of the factories that made military aircraft and vehicles. Ultimately, this would shorten the length of the war.'

[grievous]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door atmosphere

Daar komt nog eens bij dat je er vanuit kunt gaan dat niet alle doden geregistreert zijn !! Werkelijke aantallen liggen naar alle waarschijnlijkheid hoger .

Ik zal mijn stelling enigsinds aanpassen : 10.000 doden als direct gevolg van de amerikaanse invasie in de eerste fase van de oorlog.

Hoeveel slachtoffers zijn er volgens u dan gevallen ? U roept vanalles en speculeert maar komt niet met een alternatief .

Niemand weet hoeveel echte burgers gedood zijn,ook al omdat bij de gevechten weinig militairen in uniform vochtten.Overigens zijn aantallen ook onbelangrijk .Vast staat in ieder geval dat bijna uitsluitend precisiegeleide wapens gebruikt werden en dus niet meer burgers gedood werden dan altijd onvermijdelijk.

[atmosphere]

En dat zijn er al veel te veel in een relatief stabiel land welke geen bedreiging voor de VS vormde en waar geen gewapend conflict gaande was.

Waar was die hele onderneming nu eigenlijk goed voor ?
De totale kosten zullen richting de 1000 miljard gaan !

[Fallen Angel]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door grievous

Gij verkiest te negeren dat de VS precisie aanvallen bij daglicht uitvoerde ofwel weet gij bitter weinig..
Duikbommenwerpers kwamen niet in aanmerking voor dergelijke diepe penetratie vluchten.Daarvoor hebt ge zware bommenwerpers nodig.

En klein tekstje over de amerikaanse daglicht aanvallen op militaire puntdoelen.
'Despite the support that Harris was offering Eaker, he was not convinced that the American’s plan of strategic daylight bombing was going to work against the formidable German Air Force. Since the war began, Great Britain had been bombing German cities in an effort to blast the German citizens into submission. They did this under the cover of darkness, which made the British bombers harder for the Luftwaffe pilots to engage and nearly invisible to the flak gunners on the ground. Bombing during daylight, Harris argued, would expose the American bombers to the full might of the Luftwaffe and cause unnecessarily high casualties. Harris’ suggestion to Eaker was to integrate the B-17s that were arriving from the states with the British heavy bomber squadrons. This would make faster use of the B-17s that were already arriving in theater and, at the same time, increase the number of bombers that the British could send against Germany every night.

Eaker was well aware of the British position but insisted to Harris that daylight operations against specific military targets would enable a ground invasion of the continent faster than the indiscriminate bombing of cities. Eaker was also worried that if he gave the first few bombers to the British to use for night operations, for which the American pilots were not trained, that soon the Eighth Bomber Command would be a subsidiary of British Bomber Command and he would lose any chance he had of implementing daylight bombing.

Another obstacle facing the 8th was the allocation of promised bombers to other countries and commands. At the same time that the 8th was being built, American aircraft were being shipped all over the world. Countries like Australia, Russia, China, and Great Britain were having their air force built on American planes and technology at the expense of the 8th Air Force. Even the U.S. Navy was doing its part in keeping aircraft from reaching the 8th. Besides asking for fighters and bombers to defend the fleet, the Navy was also asking for more cargo planes to be built instead of combat aircraft. As Hap Arnold later wrote:

When asked what solution they might have for getting greater production and making more planes available to the British, or for securing more air transports, the answer of the Navy representatives was, “Stop manufacturing B-17s at the Long Beach plant and build cargo planes.”…When Freeman asked what the Navy was able to give up or help, if the Army Air Forces stopped manufacturing B-17s, our Naval officers said, “Nothing - there is nothing the Navy could give that would help any.”…The Army Air Forces was expected to give everything to everybody.

Despite all of the early problems, the 8th received its first group of bombers, named the 97th Bomb Group, in July 1942. A month of intensive training followed, in which the pilots learned how to fly under the instrument conditions that were prevalent in England and the gunners practiced their accuracy against R.A.F. fighter planes. Just as it seemed everything was falling into place for the 8th, word came from Washington on a new operation that would once again stall the growth of the 8th.

Operation TORCH, the invasion of German-occupied North Africa, diverted two of the three inbound bomb groups to the Mediterranean and stripped Eaker of the one bomb group he had been training for the past month. Before he lost the 97th, however, he was going to use them for what they were brought oversees to do in the first place, drop bombs on Germany. On August 9th, the 97th was alerted for its first mission over German occupied territory.

Eaker was soon to discover an even more unforgiving adversary than the Germans or the policy makers in Washington, the English weather. The morning of August tenth found the airfield closed due to fog and subsequently the mission was cancelled. Over the next week, the dense fog stayed in the air keeping the heavy bombers on the ground. Finally, on August 17th, the weather cleared and the 97th launched twelve planes for a mission against the marshalling yards at Rouen, France. The bombers met very little fighter resistance and no flak on the way to the target. Eaker, flying in the lead aircraft, watched as most of the bombs dropped fell within the target area. A little over an hour later, all twelve bombers were safely on the ground in England.

The mission was a success, but no one was under the impression that all missions would be this easy or this successful. British Spitfires escorted the bombers the entire way to the target and back and they met no flak and very little Luftwaffe opposition. Until the number of bombers got larger, however, the Americans would have to be content with small scale attacks against relatively undefended targets. These easy missions would later come to be known as “milk runs”.

The next few months saw many changes for the 8th Air Force. In December of 1942, Tooey Spaatz was transferred to Africa to be in charge of the aerial portion of Operation TORCH and Eaker was given command of the entire 8th Air Force. Four new bomb groups arrived in England, and the pace of operations increased. Due to the lack of long-range fighter escort and still somewhat small numbers of bombers, however, the missions were aimed at targets on the coast or in the occupied countries. Not one bomb had been dropped on the mainland of Germany.

Because of this, the 8th faced near extinction during the early part of 1943. Churchill had convinced Roosevelt at the Casablanca conference that due to the lack of any major combat operations on the part of the Americans in the European theatre, that the 8th should finally be integrated with the British Bomber Command.5 Upon hearing this, Arnold had Eaker fly to Casablanca to meet with Churchill and plead for him to change his mind. Though still not totally won over on the concept of daylight bombing, Eaker was successful in convincing Churchill to grant the 8th more time.

One result of the Casablanca conference was the authorization for the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO). The CBO directed the joint effort of Great Britain and the United States to pave the way for the invasion of Europe through using each air force’s specific capabilities: the British bombing at night and the Americans during the day. At least on paper, the 8th finally had the support it needed from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

On his return to England a few days later, Eaker ordered the first mission against the German mainland, targeting the submarine construction yards at Vegesack. When they arrived over the target the bombers found it completely covered by clouds, so they moved to the secondary target, another port city named Wilhelmshaven. Although partially obscured by clouds, the bombers were still able to drop the first American bombs on German soil. The 8th Air Force had its first major victory.

Over the next few months, the 8th was sending more and more bombers on sorties over Germany as reinforcements arrived from the states. And also over the next few months, the Luftwaffe was getting better and better at shooting them down. Despite improvements that had been made both to the B-17 airframe (a gun in the nose to counter the increasing German head-on attacks) and the new “combat box” formation that provided each aircraft with maximum firepower coverage from all of the other aircraft in formation, bombers and crews were falling at an almost irreplaceable rate. The answer to this problem was developing a long-range fighter escort.

At this point in the war, British Spitfires and American P-47s and P-38s were escorting the bombers on their missions to Germany, but the combat radius of these planes was such that they had to turn around and go home just after crossing the German border, leaving the bombers unescorted for up to four hundred miles on some of the longer missions. The fact that the German FW-190s and ME-109s were more manoeuvrable than the Allied fighters and hence better in a dogfight rarely came in to play. The Germans would remain well out of range of the bomber formations until the Allied fighters had to turn for home, then ferociously attack until the bombers could make it back to the relative safety of fighter cover on the return trip to England.

Eaker had been trying for months to get external drop tanks fitted to the fighters that were already in theatre, but the tanks that were added either didn’t extend the range of the fighter far enough or resulted in poorer aerodynamic handling of the aircraft. All attempts at adding the tanks were eventually scrubbed, but a savoir in another form was soon on the way.

Under development at this time in the United States was the P-51 Mustang. The Mustang would have the combat range to escort the bombers all the way to the target and back home. It was also faster and more manoeuvrable than the German fighters. Eaker had petitioned Arnold repeatedly in 1943 to allocate P-51s to the Eighth to escort his bombers, but, as with the bombers a year ago, Arnold had to fight to get allotments over the Navy and other allies.6 Until Arnold could deliver some P-51s to the European theatre, the B-17s still had to fly and Germany still had to be bombed.

One of the focal points of the Allied bombing campaign was the destruction of ball bearing production facilities. The ball bearing was an integral part of the German war industry. The Ministry of Economic Warfare (M.E.W.), the British Cabinet agency that had been collecting information about potential targets in Germany since the beginning of the war, had named ball bearings as one of the top priorities due to their use in every German aircraft. This dependence was first learned when the British themselves faced a shortage early in the war after the Germans bombed one of their ball bearing plants causing a delay in aircraft production. Not only did the German fighters and bombers use a large number of bearings per aircraft, but ground equipment such as tanks and motor vehicles did as well. By destroying the ball bearing production plants, the Allies could, in effect, also be destroying the production capability of the factories that made military aircraft and vehicles. Ultimately, this would shorten the length of the war.'

Leest gij uw eigen tekst wel. Het enige dat je hier doet is mijn punt bevestigen. De tapijtbombardementen zoals de London Blitz, Dresden en de atoombommen op Hiroshima en Nagasaki waren gericht tegen de burgers. Niet tegen militaire doelwitten.

De huidige "precisie" bombardementen zijn vandaag de dag ook meestal gericht op stedelijke omgevingen en burgerdoelwitten met alle onschuldige burgerdoden vandien.

[grievous]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door atmosphere

En dat zijn er al veel te veel in een relatief stabiel land welke geen bedreiging voor de VS vormde en waar geen gewapend conflict gaande was.

Waar was die hele onderneming nu eigenlijk goed voor ?
De totale kosten zullen richting de 1000 miljard gaan !

Niet teveel.Er waren goede rednen om saddam op te kuisen en de operatie was zeer kort.

[grievous]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Fallen Angel

Leest gij uw eigen tekst wel. Het enige dat je hier doet is mijn punt bevestigen. De tapijtbombardementen zoals de London Blitz, Dresden en de atoombommen op Hiroshima en Nagasaki waren gericht tegen de burgers. Niet tegen militaire doelwitten.

De huidige "precisie" bombardementen zijn vandaag de dag ook meestal gericht op stedelijke omgevingen en burgerdoelwitten met alle onschuldige burgerdoden vandien.

Larie en apekool.Gij VERKIEST het verschil in aanpak tussen de VS en het V.K te negeren omdat het in uw kraam niet past.De amerikanen geloofden in daglicht aanvallen tegen puntdoelen.Zij geloofden niet in de britse terreurbombardementen bij nacht. Met hun aanvallen tegen puntdoelen bij dag bereikten de amerikanen veel meer dan de britten ooit deden.
En gij verkiest ook de huidige precisie technologie te negeren omdat het weer in uw kraam niet past.Luchtaanvallen zijn gericht op welbepaalde doelen waar ze zich ook bevinden.Gij hebt rare opvattingen over oorlogsvoering.Het is geen spelletje.

[grievous]

Een tekst over de amerikaanse doctrine van precisie bombardementen.

'The pickle barrel story, often told and widely believed, served to reinforce the theory of daylight precision bombing, developed in the 1930s at the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field, Ala. The theory rejected the previously prevailing strategy of bombing broad areas, more or less indiscriminately, and focused on specific targets of military significance. As a side benefit, precision bombing would avoid civilian casualties and limit collateral damage.












A B-17 encounters flak on a raid over Ludwigshafen in 1944.



The Army Air Forces was the lone champion of daylight precision bombing. The Navy—for whom the Norden bombsight was originally developed—gave up on it in favor of dive bombing. The British, finding that they could not hit precision targets, relied on area bombing at night. Daylight precision bombing was conducted by various kinds of aircraft in World War II, but the real test of it was the long-range strategic bombing missions in Europe and Asia of AAF B-17s, B-24s, and B-29s.

The first experimental bombsights appeared in 1910, but early bombing techniques were rudimentary. Bombing in World War I was at times spectacular—as when Zeppelin airships and Gotha biplanes dropped bombs on London—but it was of little strategic importance. A US Air Service pamphlet in 1918 spoke of bombs hitting "in the vicinity" of the target.

Precision bombing did not come into its own until the 1930s, with the availability of high-quality bombsights from Norden and Sperry and the introduction of faster, longer-ranging bombers. The best Air Corps bombardiers achieved considerable success in good weather and against clearly marked targets, which were typically huge bull’s-eye circles painted on the ground.

Strategic bombardment was not yet an Air Corps mission. Development of long-range bombers had to be justified on the basis of coastal defense. However, the Tactical School theorists did not bother with such pretense. They saw strategic bombardment as the future of warfare. The special mission of the air arm, they said, was to attack the "enemy national structure," especially the "industrial web," which was vulnerable to the air arm but not to either of the other arms.

Committed to Precision

Daylight precision bombing became Air Force doctrine, inseparable from the push to obtain four-engine B-17 bombers in appreciable numbers. In 1940, Maj. Gen. Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, Chief of the Air Corps, declared, "The Air Corps is committed to a strategy of high-altitude precision bombing of military objectives."

The Air Corps regarded the bomber as its principal weapon. Furthermore—on the basis of very thin evidence—the Air Corps concluded that new bombers such as the B-17 and the B-24 flew too high and too fast for pursuit aircraft to catch them and that bombers could operate over enemy territory without fighter escort.

In 1941, the AAF plan to implement Rainbow 5, the basic Army-Navy war plan, was drafted by four officers who had been daylight precision ringleaders at the Tactical School: Lt. Col. Harold L. George, Lt. Col. Kenneth N. Walker, Maj. Haywood S. Hansell Jr., and Maj. Laurence S. Kuter. Air War Plans Division Plan No. 1 (AWPD-1) was straight out of the Maxwell playbook. It prescribed an emphasis on precision bombing against the German national infrastructure, industry—especially the aircraft industry—and the Luftwaffe.

The planners were not misled by pickle barrel assumptions. According to data from training and practice bombing, a heavy bomber at 20,000 feet had a 1.2 percent probability of hitting a 100-foot-square target. About 220 bombers would be required for 90 percent probability of destroying the target. AWPD-1 forecast a need for 251 combat groups to carry out the plan.

Bombing was a complicated proposition. Where the bomb hit was a function of the direction and speed of the airplane at the moment of release, the aerodynamics of the projectile, and the wind and atmospheric conditions while the bomb was in flight.

The bombardier looked through the telescope of the bombsight to find the target somewhere ahead, then made adjustments to compensate for the effects of wind drift and the speed of the airplane. He then fixed the target in the crosshairs, and flew the airplane to the automatically calculated release point by the link from his bombsight to the autopilot.












Here, Brig. Gen. Ira Eaker speaks with members of the media after the first World War II heavy bomber mission over Europe.



Historian Stephen L. McFarland has explained the geometry of it, using the example of a B-17 flying at 160 mph at 23,000 feet and dropping a 600-pound bomb. The bomb was released at a distance, measured on the ground, of 8,875 feet from the target. It was in flight for 38 seconds. If the speed calculated for the airplane was off by two mph and the altitude wrong by 25 feet, that made a difference of 115 feet in where the bomb would land.

The limited yield of the bombs added to the problem. A 500-pound bomb, standard for precision missions after 1943, had a lethal radius of only 60 to 90 feet. It dug a crater just two feet deep and nine feet wide. With bombing accuracy measured in hundreds of feet, it took a great many bombs to get the job done.

Such high ratios of ordnance expended to results achieved were not unusual in war, nor were they unique to AAF bombers in World War II. The Army fired 10,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition for each enemy soldier wounded and 50,000 rounds for each enemy killed. It took the Germans an average of 16,000 88 mm flak shells to bring down a single Allied heavy bomber.

Daylight precision bombing got off to a rocky start. When Eighth Air Force was set up in England in 1942, its methods were at odds with those of the Royal Air Force. Air Chief Marshal Arthur T. Harris, chief of Bomber Command, was the foremost advocate of "city busting," the night area bombing campaign that targeted the German population centers and workforce. He was supported in this by Prime Minister Winston Churchill and a national policy of "dehousing" the Germans.

Churchill wanted the Americans to join the British bombing program rather than instigate a different one of their own. He was prepared to put pressure on President Roosevelt to order the AAF to change its strategy but was talked out of it at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 by Maj. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, commander of Eighth Air Force. Eaker’s key point was the value of keeping the Germans under attack both day and night.

Eaker had other problems as well. He could not mount large bomber operations because his aircraft and aircrews were diverted to operations in North Africa and the creation of Fifteenth Air Force in Italy in 1943. More than half of his remaining resources were assigned to attacking German submarine pens—a high priority for the British—even though bombing had little effect on these hardened facilities.

Bombing accuracy was terrible. The average circular error in 1943 was 1,200 feet, meaning that only 16 percent of the bombs fell within 1,000 feet of the aiming point. "Rather than dropping bombs into pickle barrels, Eighth Air Force bombardiers were having trouble hitting the broad side of a barn," said historian McFarland.

The prewar prediction that fighters could not intercept bombers was wrong. The Luftwaffe and ground defenses took a heavy toll on bombers if they ventured without fighter escort deep into hostile territory. As the loss rate spiked to eight percent in early 1943, crews calculated their chances of surviving a 25-mission combat tour. On the Ploesti, Romania, mission in August 1943, losses were 30 percent and against Schweinfurt in October, 28 percent.

The Turning Point

Nobody tackled the accuracy and casualty problems with more initiative than Col. Curtis E. LeMay, commander of the 305th Bomb Group at Grafton-Underwood, Britain. He identified the best bombardiers, made them "lead bombardiers" for the formation, and had all of the aircraft drop their bombs when the lead bombardier did. LeMay also devised a staggered "combat box" formation, which gave the B-17 guns maximum fields of fire for mutual defensive support.

After Schweinfurt, the B-17s did not again fly deep into Germany until long-range P-38 and P-51 fighters were available to escort them. The best of the fighters by far was the P-51, which could escort bombers to their most distant targets. After 1943, all of the fighters, including the older P-47s, took advantage of disposable fuel tanks to extend their range.

Eaker did not have much in the way of strategic bombing results to show for his first two years. However, he said, "When our Eighth Air Force had but 200 bombers operating out of England in 1943, there were more than a million Germans standing at the anti-aircraft and fighter defenses on the West Wall to defend against them. And another million Germans were fire wardens or engaged in bomb damage repair."

The turning point came in early 1944. By then, Eaker had gone on to be commander in chief of Allied Air Forces in the Mediterranean. Maj. Gen. Jimmy Doolittle replaced him as commander of Eighth Air Force. Several things had changed.














A refinery at Ploesti burns as B-24s continue the air assault on Aug. 1, 1943.



Finally, there were enough bombers to put together large formations. Joint efforts by Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces put up a 750-bomber mission in January and a 1,000-bomber mission in February. AAF fighters coursed deep into Germany, and in a matter of months, they had virtually destroyed the Luftwaffe. When the D-Day invasion landed in June, the Germans were able to launch less than 100 sorties in defense of Normandy.

With fighter escorts and suppression of enemy air defenses, the aircrew loss rate declined in 1944 and 1945. For the bomber offensive as a whole, Eighth Air Force lost 4,182 aircraft from a total of 273,841 attacking, a rate of 1.5 percent. RAF’s Bomber Command aircraft loss rate for the same period was 2.5 percent. The 250,000 aircrew members who flew bomber missions in Eighth Air Force in World War II sustained 58,000 casualties—18,000 killed, 6,500 wounded, and 33,500 missing.

AAF bombing accuracy improved. By 1945, Eighth Air Force was operating at much lower altitudes and was putting up to 60 percent of its bombs within 1,000 feet of the aiming point, almost four times better than in the dark days of 1943. Radar bombing, adopted from the British, was an alternative when conditions did not permit visual delivery, but it was not a precision technique in any true sense of the word.

RAF Bomber Command continued its night area bombing. From 1942 on, 56 percent of its sorties were against cities. On some occasions, notably the bombing of Dresden in 1945, the AAF joined the British in bombing cities, but overall, less than four percent of US bombs in Europe were aimed at civilians. The main targets for the AAF were marshaling yards (27.4 percent of the bomb tonnage dropped), airfields (11.6 percent), oil installations (9.5 percent), and military installations (8.8 percent).

The US Strategic Bombing Survey found that "Allied airpower was decisive in the war in Western Europe." That conclusion is sometimes challenged, but the bombing had reduced German rail traffic, aviation fuel production, steel production, and other aspects of the wartime infrastructure by 50 to 90 percent. Millions of people were occupied in repairing the damage and replacing the goods destroyed by bombing. Nazi Armaments Minister Albert Speer said that the bombing created a "third front" and that "without this great drain on our manpower, logistics, and weapons, we might well have knocked Russia out of the war before your invasion of France."'