Internationaal recht en Irak

[TomB]

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, and 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President,

Recalling also its resolution 1382 (2001) of 29 November 2001 and its intention to implement it fully,

Recognizing the threat Iraq's noncompliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security,

Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to Resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area,

Further recalling that its resolution 687 (1991) imposed obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for achievement of its stated objective of restoring international peace and security in the area,

Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material,

Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), failed to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), and ultimately ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998,

Deploring the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, in spite of the Council's repeated demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization to UNSCOM, and the IAEA, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people,

Deploring also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant to resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in Iraq, and pursuant to resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1284 (1999) to return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third country nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by Iraq,

Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein,

Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions and recalling that the resolutions of the Council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance,

Recalling that the effective operation of UNMOVIC, as the successor organization to the Special Commission, and the IAEA is essential for the implementation of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions,

Noting the letter dated 16 September 2002 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary General is a necessary first step toward rectifying Iraq's continued failure to comply with relevant Council resolutions,

Noting further the letter dated 8 October 2002 from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq laying out the practical arrangements, as a follow-up to their meeting in Vienna, that are prerequisites for the resumption of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA, and expressing the gravest concern at the continued failure by the Government of Iraq to provide confirmation of the arrangements as laid out in that letter,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, Kuwait, and the neighbouring States,

Commending the Secretary General and members of the League of Arab States and its Secretary General for their efforts in this regard,

Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,


1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991);

2. Decides, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council;

3. Decides that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, sub-components, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material;

4. Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below;

5. Decides that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC's or the IAEA's choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates; further decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi government; and instructs UNMOVIC and requests the IAEA to resume inspections no later than 45 days following adoption of this resolution and to update the Council 60 days thereafter;

6. Endorses the 8 October 2002 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq, which is annexed hereto, and decides that the contents of the letter shall be binding upon Iraq;

7. Decides further that, in view of the prolonged interruption by Iraq of the presence of UNMOVIC and the IAEA and in order for them to accomplish the tasks set forth in this resolution and all previous relevant resolutions and notwithstanding prior understandings, the Council hereby establishes the following revised or additional authorities, which shall be binding upon Iraq, to facilitate their work in Iraq:


UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall determine the composition of their inspection teams and ensure that these teams are composed of the most qualified and experienced experts available;


All UNMOVIC and IAEA personnel shall enjoy the privileges and immunities, corresponding to those of experts on mission, provided in the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA;


UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have unrestricted rights of entry into and out of Iraq, the right to free, unrestricted, and immediate movement to and from inspection sites, and the right to inspect any sites and buildings, including immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to Presidential Sites equal to that at other sites, notwithstanding the provisions of resolution 1154 (1998);


UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to be provided by Iraq the names of all personnel currently and formerly associated with Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile programmes and the associated research, development, and production facilities;


Security of UNMOVIC and IAEA facilities shall be ensured by sufficient UN security guards;


UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to declare, for the purposes of freezing a site to be inspected, exclusion zones, including surrounding areas and transit corridors, in which Iraq will suspend ground and aerial movement so that nothing is changed in or taken out of a site being inspected;


UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the free and unrestricted use and landing of fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft, including manned and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles;


UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right at their sole discretion verifiably to remove, destroy, or render harmless all prohibited weapons, subsystems, components, records, materials, and other related items, and the right to impound or close any facilities or equipment for the production thereof; and


UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to free import and use of equipment or materials for inspections and to seize and export any equipment, materials, or documents taken during inspections, without search of UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or official or personal baggage;

8. Decides further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or the IAEA or of any Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution;

9. Requests the Secretary General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution, which is binding on Iraq; demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that notification its intention to comply fully with this resolution; and demands further that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA;

10. Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by reCommending sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected, the results of which shall be reported to the Council by UNMOVIC and the IAEA;

11. Directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution;

12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security;

13. Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations;

14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.


ANNEX

Text Of Blix/el-baradei Letter

United Nations Monitoring, Verification And Inspection Commission
The Executive Chairman

International Atomic Energy Agency
The Director General

__________________________________________________ ________________

8 October 2002

Dear General Al-Saadi,

During our recent meeting in Vienna, we discussed practical arrangements that are prerequisites for the resumption of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA. As you recall, at the end of our meeting in Vienna we agreed on a statement which listed some of the principal results achieved, particularly Iraq's acceptance of all the rights of inspection provided for in all of the relevant Security Council resolutions. This acceptance was stated to be without any conditions attached.

During our 3 October 2002 briefing to the Security Council, members of the Council suggested that we prepare a written document on all of the conclusions we reached in Vienna. This letter lists those conclusions and seeks your confirmation thereof. We shall report accordingly to the Security Council.

In the statement at the end of the meeting, it was clarified that UNMOVIC and the IAEA will be granted immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to sites, including what was termed "sensitive sites" in the past. As we noted, however, eight presidential sites have been the subject of special procedures under a Memorandum of Understanding of 1998. Should these sites be subject, as all other sites, to immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access, UNMOVIC and the IAEA would conduct inspections there with the same professionalism.

H.E. General Amir H. Al-Saadi
Advisor
Presidential Office
Baghdad
Iraq

We confirm our understanding that UNMOVIC and the IAEA have the right to determine the number of inspectors required for access to any particular site. This determination will be made on the basis of the size and complexity of the site being inspected. We also confirm that Iraq will be informed of the designation of additional sites, i.e. sites not declared by Iraq or previously inspected by either UNSCOM or the IAEA, through a Notification of Inspection (NIS) provided upon arrival of the inspectors at such sites.

Iraq will ensure that no proscribed material, equipment, records or other relevant items will be destroyed except in the presence of UNMOVIC and/or IAEA inspectors, as appropriate, and at their request.

UNMOVIC and the IAEA may conduct interviews with any person in Iraq whom they believe may have information relevant to their mandate. Iraq will facilitate such interviews. It is for UNMOVIC and the IAEA to choose the mode and location for interviews.

The National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) will, as in the past, serve as the Iraqi counterpart for the inspectors. The Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Centre (BOMVIC) will be maintained on the same premises and under the same conditions as was the former Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. The NMD will make available services as before, cost free, for the refurbishment of the premises.

The NMD will provide free of cost:


(a) escorts to facilitate access to sites to be inspected and communication with personnel to be interviewed;

(b) a hotline for BOMVIC which will be staffed by an English speaking person on a 24 hour a day/seven days a week basis;

(c) support in terms of personnel and ground transportation within the country, as requested; and

(d) assistance in the movement of materials and equipment at Inspectors' request (construction, excavation equipment, etc.).


NMD will also ensure that escorts are available in the event of inspections outside normal working hours, including at night and on holidays.

Regional UNMOVIC/IAEA offices may be established, for example, in Basra and Mosul, for the use of their inspectors. For this purpose, Iraq will provide, without cost, adequate office buildings, staff accommodation, and appropriate escort personnel.

UNMOVIC and the IAEA may use any type of voice or data transmission, including satellite and/or inland networks, with or without encryption capability. UNMOVIC and the IAEA may also install equipment in the field with the capability for transmission of data directly to the BOMVIC, New York and Vienna (e.g. sensors, surveillance cameras). This will be facilitated by Iraq and there will be no interference by Iraq with UNMOVIC or IAEA communications.

Iraq will provide, without cost, physical protection of all surveillance equipment, and construct antennae for remote transmission of data, at the request of UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Upon request by UNMOVIC through the NMD, Iraq will allocate frequencies for communications equipment.

Iraq will provide security for all UNMOVIC and IAEA personnel. Secure and suitable accommodations will be designated at normal rates by Iraq for these personnel. For their part, UNMOVIC and the IAEA will require that their staff not stay at any accommodation other than those identified in consultation with Iraq.

On the use of fixed-wing aircraft for transport of personnel and equipment and for inspection purposes, it was clarified that aircraft used by UNMOVIC and IAEA staff arriving in Baghdad may land at Saddam International Airport. The points of departure of incoming aircraft will be decided by UNMOVIC. The Rasheed airbase will continue to be used for UNMOVIC and IAEA helicopter operations. UNMOVIC and Iraq will establish air liaison offices at the airbase. At both Saddam International Airport and Rasheed airbase, Iraq will provide the necessary support premises and facilities. Aircraft fuel will be provided by Iraq, as before, free of charge.

On the wider issue of air operations in Iraq, both fixed-wing and rotary, Iraq will guarantee the safety of air operations in its air space outside the no-fly zones. With regard to air operations in the no-fly zones, Iraq will take all steps within its control to ensure the safety of such operations.

Helicopter flights may be used, as needed, during inspections and for technical activities, such as gamma detection, without limitation in all parts of Iraq and without any area excluded. Helicopters may also be used for medical evacuation.

On the question of aerial imagery, UNMOVIC may wish to resume the use of U-2 or Mirage overflights. The relevant practical arrangements would be similar to those implemented in the past.

As before, visas for all arriving staff will be issued at the point of entry on the basis of the UN Laissez-Passer or UN Certificate; no other entry or exit formalities will be required. The aircraft passenger manifest will be provided one hour in advance of the arrival of the aircraft in Baghdad. There will be no searching of UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or of official or personal baggage. UNMOVIC and the IAEA will ensure that their personnel respect the laws of Iraq restricting the export of certain items, for example, those related to Iraq's national cultural heritage. UNMOVIC and the IAEA may bring into, and remove from, Iraq all of the items and materials they require, including satellite phones and other equipment. With respect to samples, UNMOVIC and IAEA will, where feasible, split samples so that Iraq may receive a portion while another portion is kept for reference purposes. Where appropriate, the organizations will send the samples to more than one laboratory for analysis.

We would appreciate your confirmation of the above as a correct reflection of our talks in Vienna.

Naturally, we may need other practical arrangements when proceeding with inspections. We would expect in such matters, as with the above, Iraq's co-operation in all respect.

Yours sincerely,

Hans Blix
Executive Chairman
United Nations Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission

Mohamed El Baradei
Director General
International Atomic Energy Agency

r1441, gesanctioneerd door de VN, zegt zeer duidelijk dat Irak niet voldeed aan de voorwaarden van het staakt het vuren.

De VS hebben niet het staakt het vuren opgeheven, Irak heeft dat gedaan door niet te voldoen aan de voorwaarden, aldus de VN in r1441, die nota bene unaniem gestemd is.

Bovendien is het zo dat r678 aan lidstaten toelaat om 'all necessary means' te gebruiken om deze resolutie en alle anderen eraan gerelateerd te doen naleven.

Geloof ik dat Frankrijk en Rusland r687 braken door jet parts en wapens te leveren aan Irak? ja

Geloof ik dat Irak r687 brak door de inspecteurs weg te sturen en tegen te werken? ja

Geloof ik dat de VS de resoluties met de voeten trad? Gebaseerd op wat we hierboven lezen: No way.

Misschien hebt u andere verlichtende lectuur die mij van gedacht zal doen veranderen?

[Paulus de Boskabouter]

TomB, dit is dezelfde denkpiste die door de voorstanders van een oorlog gebruikt (misbruikt?) werd.
Straks meer .

[TomB]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Paulus de Boskabouter

TomB, dit is dezelfde denkpiste die door de voorstanders van een oorlog gebruikt (misbruikt?) werd.
Straks meer .

ok

[Paulus de Boskabouter]

Dit wordt een citaten discussie

In his press conference on March 6, President Bush was asked whether the United States would be seen as defiant of the United Nations if it launched a war against Iraq without explicit authorization from the Security Council. “As we head into the 21st century, when it comes to our security, we really don’t need anybody’s permission,” the President replied.

It’s hard to see this remark as anything other than a repudiation of the framework of international law governing the use of force, as set out in the United Nations Charter. But others in the U.S. administration are more circumspect. They argue that a war on Iraq would be authorized by existing Security Council resolutions, and that another resolution – while welcome – is not strictly necessary. Officials from the British government take the same line.

How convincing are these arguments? In the United States, there has been comparatively little public discussion about the existing U.N. resolutions, and how far they authorize an attack against Iraq under present circumstances. In Britain, by contrast, the legality of the prospective war is a live and urgent political question. On March 9, one of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s cabinet secretaries, Clare Short, warned that she would resign if he took the country into war without a further U.N. resolution. “I will not uphold a breach of international law,” she told a BBC interviewer.

According to the Financial Times, there is some speculation within the government that the country’s top law officer, Attorney-General Lord Goldsmith, might also resign if Britain joins a war without a new U.N. resolution. On March 7, The Guardian published a letter signed by several of Britain’s most prominent international law scholars that said, “On the basis of the information publicly available, there is no justification under international law for the use of military force against Iraq.”

One of these scholars is Vaughan Lowe, Chichele Professor of Public International Law at Oxford University. A few days ago, he spoke to the Crimes of War Project to outline his views on the legality of a war with Iraq in detail.

Resolution 1441 and the Use of Force

Lowe stated firmly, “It needs another Security Council resolution to authorize force.” Lowe argued that Resolution 1441 – which was passed unanimously by the Security Council last November – does not give up the Security Council’s control over the ultimate decision on whether force should be used.

Resolution 1441 makes the following points:

Iraq “has been and remains in material breach” of its obligations under previous Security Council resolutions.


The Security Council decides to afford Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations.”


The Security Council will convene immediately upon receipt of a report making clear that Iraq is still not complying with its obligations, “in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security.”


The Security Council recalls that it “has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.”


The Security Council “decides to remain seized of the matter.”
The resolution was carefully drafted to suggest that authorization to use force should rest on a simple determination of fact – e.g. whether Iraq was complying completely with its disarmament obligations. The implication is that, once it is clear that Iraq has not taken its “final chance,” “serious consequences” are likely to follow. In this context, the phrase “serious consequences” is clearly intended to suggest the possibility of the use of force.

But despite this, there is nothing in the resolution that gives anyone apart from the Security Council itself the right to decide when the final chance has been exhausted.

Moreover, Lowe argued, even if the Security Council were to agree that Iraq remained in material breach, there would still need to be a clear statement that the use of force was now authorized. The phrase in the resolution, "serious consequences," falls short of a clear and unambiguous statement that force may be used -- for instance it does not say that "all necessary means" may be taken to disarm Iraq. It hints that the use of force may be decided on – but it does not itself give authority for the use of force. According to Lowe, “There is no way in ordinary language that you can say that the language used in Resolution 1441 represents an authorization to use force.”

In other words, Lowe said, “It needs a Security Council resolution to authorize force, that is to say, it has to be plain from the next resolution that the Security Council itself is giving that authorization to use force. It’s not at all obvious to me that a resolution that makes a simple determination of material breach would do that.”

Lowe also argued that there remained another question – what objective the use of force was directed toward. Even an authorization to use military action to enforce previous U.N. resolutions might not give the United States and Britain the authority to depose Saddam Hussein and install a U.S. military governor in Iraq. Lowe pointed out that Resolution 1441 left the Security Council “seized of the matter” – diplomatic-speak for “asserting that it holds the reins over this activity.” Unless the Security Council explicitly authorized a policy of “regime change,” the Security Council would still remain nominally in charge of setting the limits of what the use of force was directed toward. The use of force might legally be limited to the disarmament of Iraq.

Do Earlier Resolutions Still Apply?

If Resolution 1441 is a weak basis for an attack against Iraq, what about the earlier resolutions passed by the Security Council? British and U.S. officials tend to base their arguments for the legitimacy of an attack on two resolutions from the time of the first Persian Gulf War in 1990-91: Resolution 678 (which authorized the use of force to push Iraqi forces out of Kuwait) and Resolution 687 (which declared a cease-fire, and imposed the inspection regime on Iraq).

Resolution 678 (passed November 29, 1990) authorized member states co-operating with Kuwait “to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660[demanding Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait] and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.”

Resolution 687 (passed April 3, 1991) declared a ceasefire, dependent on Iraq accepting the terms of the resolution, and said that the Security Council decided “to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area.”

According to Lowe, these resolutions “were creatures of their time.” Resolution 678 “was addressed to a particular situation at a particular time, and it authorized the states acting in coalition with Kuwait to take a certain action.” The problem to which it was addressed “was wrapped up with the ceasefire,” and “to say that any state that happened to be a member of that coalition ten years ago has for perpetuity the right to use force to restore peace in the Middle East, I think is just obviously absurd.”

It’s sometimes said that the ceasefire declared by Resolution 687 was conditional on Iraq fulfilling the conditions required of it. However a close reading of the text of the resolution makes clear that the ceasefire will come into effect if Iraq simply accepts the terms of the resolution; the resolution goes on to state that it is then up to the Security Council to “take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the current resolution.” This form of words, according to Lowe, signalled that the Security Council regarded the matter of Iraq “as being back under its control as far as the use of force is concerned.” No individual state or group of states acting outside the clear authorization of the Council retained the right to use force, even to punish Iraq for breaches of the resolution or to compel its compliance.

Of course, even without authorization from the Security Council, an attack on Iraq would be lawful if it was a matter of self-defence. Last year, it seemed as though the Bush administration might be preparing to present this justification for going to war, but it has not talked about it recently. The British government has not attempted to argue that an attack on Iraq could count as self-defence as envisaged in the United Nations Charter.

In conclusion, Lowe said that for the U.S. and Britain to attack Iraq without a further resolution would be not merely “ill-considered,” but would represent a move “outside the scope of legal controls that have been freely assumed and have underpinned the international order for the last half-century.”

[Paulus de Boskabouter]

Excuses dat ik het niet vertaald of mijn eigen standpunt bijgevoegd heb.
Maar 'k heb vandaag niet zo heel veel tijd.
Ik heb veel werk en natuurlijk ook !!

[TomB]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Paulus de Boskabouter

Dit wordt een citaten discussie

Best wel grappig hoe mijn eigen argumentatie na het lezen van 1441 punt voor punt weerlegd wordt in een artikel dat je van het web plukt. Ik ga terug wat opzoeken, hang in there.

[Paulus de Boskabouter]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door TomB

Best wel grappig hoe mijn eigen argumentatie na het lezen van 1441 punt voor punt weerlegd wordt in een artikel dat je van het web plukt. Ik ga terug wat opzoeken, hang in there.

Bwa, TomB, in deze materie moet je wel een andere bron raadplegen en ik pretendeer niet dat ik het zelf schrijf he.

[TomB]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Paulus de Boskabouter

Bwa, TomB, in deze materie moet je wel een andere bron raadplegen en ik pretendeer niet dat ik het zelf schrijf he.

Wel natuurlijk. Point is: Ik had mijn mening niet van het web geplukt, maar ze was al weerlegd voor ik ze gevormd had. Daarom is het best wel grappig.

[TomB]

Ik heb dat laatste nog eens goed doorgenomen en kom tot conclusie dat het een wel zeer grijze materie is.

[Bobke]

http://www.funforwards.com/flash/september02/saddam.swf

[TomB]

Nog eens naar boven.

[Paulus de Boskabouter]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door TomB

Nog eens naar boven.

ik vroeg mij al een tijdje af of je je al door de materie geworsteld had.

[TomB]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Paulus de Boskabouter

ik vroeg mij al een tijdje af of je je al door de materie geworsteld had.

Jazeker. Je eindigt uiteindelijk met de opinies van advocaten over de geest achter de wetgeving. Naar de letter is de wet nageleefd. Die opinies liggen ver uit elkaar. Until proven: Not guilty is de enige mogelijke conclusie.

[Paulus de Boskabouter]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door TomB

Jazeker. Je eindigt uiteindelijk met de opinies van advocaten over de geest achter de wetgeving. Naar de letter is de wet nageleefd. Die opinies liggen ver uit elkaar. Until proven: Not guilty is de enige mogelijke conclusie.

Verklaar dan de vraag om een nieuwe resolutie van de VS en het VK.

[TomB]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Paulus de Boskabouter

Verklaar dan de vraag om een nieuwe resolutie van de VS en het VK.

Om support te zoeken van meerdere allies in die oorlog. Als dat er niet van kwam hebben ze dat maar opgegeven. We hebben later geleerd waarom Frankrijk hun macht binnen de VN wilden misbruiken: Om te voorkomen dat hun illegale wapenleveringen zouden aan het licht komen.
Het wordt dringend tijd om Frankrijk terecht te wijzen.

[Paulus de Boskabouter]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door TomB

Om support te zoeken van meerdere allies in die oorlog. Als dat er niet van kwam hebben ze dat maar opgegeven. We hebben later geleerd waarom Frankrijk hun macht binnen de VN wilden misbruiken: Om te voorkomen dat hun illegale wapenleveringen zouden aan het licht komen.
Het wordt dringend tijd om Frankrijk terecht te wijzen.

Goed verklaar nu eens de niet-naleving van de resoluties tav Israel

[TomB]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Paulus de Boskabouter

Goed verklaar nu eens de niet-naleving van de resoluties tav Israel

Welke resolutie leeft de VS niet na?

[Kotsmos]

misschien bedoelt ie het niet aandringen op naleving ervan door Israël?

[Paulus de Boskabouter]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Kotsmos

misschien bedoelt ie het niet aandringen op naleving ervan door Israël?

TomB is toch wel een schattig tje hé

[Vlaamse Leeuw]

Israël is het land dat de meeste V.N.-resoluties tegen heeft en ze ook niet moet naleven. En dit dankzij de Amerikanen.