Schepen
Geregistreerd: 21 augustus 2005
Berichten: 495
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Citaat:
Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door BigF
Voor mij niet, maar ik kan wel begrijpen dat zulke mensen er ook niet op zitten te wachten dat Jan en Alleman ineens beslissingsbevoegdheid krijgt. Nogal wiedes, zij willen vertegenwoordigd worden en laten de beslissingen over aan een verkozene terwijl de rest ineens de beslissingen van die verkozene teniet kan gaan doen. Ik ben heus niet de enige die meer vertrouwen heeft in een parlementair (niet alle) dan in pakweg zijn buren.
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Direct Democracy: New Approaches To Old Questions
http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~matsusak/Pap...ual_Review.pdf
[size=1]Ook in bv Annual Review of Political Science[/size]
[size=1]Vol. 7: 463-482 (Volume publication date May 2004)[/size]
[size=2]
Citaat:
[/size][size=2]Until recently, direct democracy scholarship was primarily descriptive or normative. Much of it sought to highlight the processes’ shortcomings. We describe new research that examines direct democracy from a more scientific perspective. We organize the discussion around four “old” questions that have long been at the heart of the direct democracy debate: Are voters competent? What role does money play? How does direct democracy affect policy? Does direct democracy benefit the many or the few? We find that recent breakthroughs in theory and empirical analysis paint a comparatively positive picture of the initiative and referendum. For example, voters are more competent (1), and the relationship between money and power in direct democracy is less nefarious (2), than many observers allege. More new studies show that the mere presence of direct democracy induces sitting legislatures to govern more effectively. [size=2][/size]
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[/size][size=2]
Citaat:
[/size][size=2]Voters are more competent than many observers allege.[/size]
[size=2]
...In one of the fi[/size][size=2]rst direct empirical examinations of this phenomenon, Lupia (1994) demonstrated that voters can use simple pieces of information as substitutes for the detailed information that political surveys show them to lack... [size=2]...The data showed respondents sorting themselves into three categories. The [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]rst category contained voters who knew neither the answers to the detailed questions about the propositions nor the insurance industry[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s preferences. The second category contained [/size][size=2]“[/size][size=2]model citizens[/size][size=2]”—[/size][size=2]voters who consistently gave correct answers to detailed questions about the initiatives and who knew the insurance industry[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s preferences. The third category contained respondents who could not answer questions about the propositions[/size][size=2]’ [/size][size=2]details but, like the model citizens, knew the insurance industry[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s preferences. The study[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s central [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]nding is that voters in the second and third categories voted in very similar ways, whereas voters in the [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]rst category voted quite differently. Voters in the third category voted as if they were model citizens. Such evidence supports the claim that voters with apparently low levels of political information can use information shortcuts to emulate the voting behavior they would have exhibited if they were as informed as the best-informed persons in the survey.[/size][/size]
... [size=2][size=2]In a more expansive empirical analysis, spanning many states and elections, Bowler & Donovan (1998, p. 168 ) reveal that although voters are not [/size][size=2]“[/size][size=2]fully [/size][size=2]informed[/size][size=2]” [/size][size=2]about the details of most of the initiatives and referendums on which they vote, many of these voters [/size][size=2]appear able to [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]gure out what they are for and against in ways that make sense in terms of their underlying values and interests. Failing that, others appear to use a strategy of voting [/size][size=2]no [/size][size=2]when information is lacking or when worries about general state conditions are greatest. Just as legislators do, these voters make choices purposefully, using available information.[/size][size=2]”...[/size][/size]
[size=2][size=2][size=2]...New theoretical research (e.g., Lupia&McCubbins 1998 ) examines conditions under which voters who use information shortcuts cast the same votes they would have cast if they were better informed ... [/size][/size][/size][size=2][size=2][size=2]...[size=2]Theoretical models built from such premises (Lupia & McCubbins 1998, Ch. 3[/size][size=2]5) and associated laboratory experiments (Lupia & McCubbins 1998, Ch. 6[/size]8 )[size=2] show that voters need not know many details of a ballot measure in order to vote as if they did. If voters have access to reliable advisers, then they can vote competently despite not knowing many details about the choice at hand. Indeed, voters have an incentive to seek advice from people who are credible and to avoid information providers who provide vague or misleading reports. But how do they do this? Theory shows that political institutions can do some of the work for them. If these institutions generate the forces that clarify others[/size][size=2]’ [/size][size=2]incentives in the eyes of voters (e.g., truth-in-advertising laws, perjury penalties, or incentives to be known as trustworthy, each of which can minimize the range of false statements made about a particular initiative), then voters can do a much better job of choosing good advisers. Therefore, voters can be competent while lacking information about those who provide them with information. Seen in this light, the requirements for voter competence in direct democracy can be quite minimal....[/size][/size][/size][/size]
[size=2][size=2]...Research speci[/size][size=2]cally devoted to questions of voter competence in direct democracy is a relatively new phenomenon, but much of the theory and evidence produced by political scientists so far reveal that common stereotypes about voter incompetence rely on shaky theoretical and empirical foundations.
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[/size][/size][edit]
[size=1] Edit:[/size] [size=1]After edit by Vrijheid on 02-10-2005 at 16:44
Reason:
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Citaat:
Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door BigF
Voor mij niet, maar ik kan wel begrijpen dat zulke mensen er ook niet op zitten te wachten dat Jan en Alleman ineens beslissingsbevoegdheid krijgt. Nogal wiedes, zij willen vertegenwoordigd worden en laten de beslissingen over aan een verkozene terwijl de rest ineens de beslissingen van die verkozene teniet kan gaan doen. Ik ben heus niet de enige die meer vertrouwen heeft in een parlementair (niet alle) dan in pakweg zijn buren.
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Direct Democracy: New Approaches To Old Questions
http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~matsusak/Pap...ual_Review.pdf
[size=1]Ook in bv Annual Review of Political Science[/size]
[size=1]Vol. 7: 463-482 (Volume publication date May 2004)[/size]
[size=2]
Citaat:
[/size][size=2]Until recently, direct democracy scholarship was primarily descriptive or normative. Much of it sought to highlight the processes’ shortcomings. We describe new research that examines direct democracy from a more scientific perspective. We organize the discussion around four “old” questions that have long been at the heart of the direct democracy debate: Are voters competent? What role does money play? How does direct democracy affect policy? Does direct democracy benefit the many or the few? We find that recent breakthroughs in theory and empirical analysis paint a comparatively positive picture of the initiative and referendum. For example, voters are more competent (1), and the relationship between money and power in direct democracy is less nefarious (2), than many observers allege. More new studies show that the mere presence of direct democracy induces sitting legislatures to govern more effectively. [size=2][/size]
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[/size][size=2]
Citaat:
[/size][size=2]Voters are more competent than many observers allege.[/size]
[size=2]
...In one of the fi[/size][size=2]rst direct empirical examinations of this phenomenon, Lupia (1994) demonstrated that voters can use simple pieces of information as substitutes for the detailed information that political surveys show them to lack... [size=2]...The data showed respondents sorting themselves into three categories. The [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]rst category contained voters who knew neither the answers to the detailed questions about the propositions nor the insurance industry[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s preferences. The second category contained [/size][size=2]“[/size][size=2]model citizens[/size][size=2]”—[/size][size=2]voters who consistently gave correct answers to detailed questions about the initiatives and who knew the insurance industry[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s preferences. The third category contained respondents who could not answer questions about the propositions[/size][size=2]’ [/size][size=2]details but, like the model citizens, knew the insurance industry[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s preferences. The study[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s central [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]nding is that voters in the second and third categories voted in very similar ways, whereas voters in the [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]rst category voted quite differently. Voters in the third category voted as if they were model citizens. Such evidence supports the claim that voters with apparently low levels of political information can use information shortcuts to emulate the voting behavior they would have exhibited if they were as informed as the best-informed persons in the survey.[/size][/size]
... [size=2][size=2]In a more expansive empirical analysis, spanning many states and elections, Bowler & Donovan (1998, p. 168 ) reveal that although voters are not [/size][size=2]“[/size][size=2]fully [/size][size=2]informed[/size][size=2]” [/size][size=2]about the details of most of the initiatives and referendums on which they vote, many of these voters [/size][size=2]appear able to [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]gure out what they are for and against in ways that make sense in terms of their underlying values and interests. Failing that, others appear to use a strategy of voting [/size][size=2]no [/size][size=2]when information is lacking or when worries about general state conditions are greatest. Just as legislators do, these voters make choices purposefully, using available information.[/size][size=2]”...[/size][/size]
[size=2][size=2][size=2]...New theoretical research (e.g., Lupia&McCubbins 1998 ) examines conditions under which voters who use information shortcuts cast the same votes they would have cast if they were better informed ... [/size][/size][/size][size=2][size=2][size=2]...[size=2]Theoretical models built from such premises (Lupia & McCubbins 1998, Ch. 3[/size][size=2]5) and associated laboratory experiments (Lupia & McCubbins 1998, Ch. 6[/size]8 )[size=2] show that voters need not know many details of a ballot measure in order to vote as if they did. If voters have access to reliable advisers, then they can vote competently despite not knowing many details about the choice at hand. Indeed, voters have an incentive to seek advice from people who are credible and to avoid information providers who provide vague or misleading reports. But how do they do this? Theory shows that political institutions can do some of the work for them. If these institutions generate the forces that clarify others[/size][size=2]’ [/size][size=2]incentives in the eyes of voters (e.g., truth-in-advertising laws, perjury penalties, or incentives to be known as trustworthy, each of which can minimize the range of false statements made about a particular initiative), then voters can do a much better job of choosing good advisers. Therefore, voters can be competent while lacking information about those who provide them with information. Seen in this light, the requirements for voter competence in direct democracy can be quite minimal....[/size][/size][/size][/size]
[size=2][size=2]...Research speci[/size][size=2]cally devoted to questions of voter competence in direct democracy is a relatively new phenomenon, but much of the theory and evidence produced by political scientists so far reveal that common stereotypes about voter incompetence rely on shaky theoretical and empirical foundations.
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[size=1] Edit:[/size] [size=1]After edit by Vrijheid on 02-10-2005 at 16:30
Reason:
--------------------------------
Citaat:
Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door BigF
Voor mij niet, maar ik kan wel begrijpen dat zulke mensen er ook niet op zitten te wachten dat Jan en Alleman ineens beslissingsbevoegdheid krijgt. Nogal wiedes, zij willen vertegenwoordigd worden en laten de beslissingen over aan een verkozene terwijl de rest ineens de beslissingen van die verkozene teniet kan gaan doen. Ik ben heus niet de enige die meer vertrouwen heeft in een parlementair (niet alle) dan in pakweg zijn buren.
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Direct Democracy: New Approaches To Old Questions
http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~matsusak/Pap...ual_Review.pdf
[size=2]
Citaat:
[/size][size=2]Until recently, direct democracy scholarship was primarily descriptive or normative. Much of it sought to highlight the processes’ shortcomings. We describe new research that examines direct democracy from a more scientific perspective. We organize the discussion around four “old” questions that have long been at the heart of the direct democracy debate: Are voters competent? What role does money play? How does direct democracy affect policy? Does direct democracy benefit the many or the few? We find that recent breakthroughs in theory and empirical analysis paint a comparatively positive picture of the initiative and referendum. For example, voters are more competent (1), and the relationship between money and power in direct democracy is less nefarious (2), than many observers allege. More new studies show that the mere presence of direct democracy induces sitting legislatures to govern more effectively. [size=2][/size]
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[/size][size=2]
Citaat:
[/size][size=2]Voters are more competent than many observers allege.[/size]
[size=2]
...In one of the fi[/size][size=2]rst direct empirical examinations of this phenomenon, Lupia (1994) demonstrated that voters can use simple pieces of information as substitutes for the detailed information that political surveys show them to lack... [size=2]...The data showed respondents sorting themselves into three categories. The [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]rst category contained voters who knew neither the answers to the detailed questions about the propositions nor the insurance industry[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s preferences. The second category contained [/size][size=2]“[/size][size=2]model citizens[/size][size=2]”—[/size][size=2]voters who consistently gave correct answers to detailed questions about the initiatives and who knew the insurance industry[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s preferences. The third category contained respondents who could not answer questions about the propositions[/size][size=2]’ [/size][size=2]details but, like the model citizens, knew the insurance industry[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s preferences. The study[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s central [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]nding is that voters in the second and third categories voted in very similar ways, whereas voters in the [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]rst category voted quite differently. Voters in the third category voted as if they were model citizens. Such evidence supports the claim that voters with apparently low levels of political information can use information shortcuts to emulate the voting behavior they would have exhibited if they were as informed as the best-informed persons in the survey.[/size][/size]
... [size=2][size=2]In a more expansive empirical analysis, spanning many states and elections, Bowler & Donovan (1998, p. 168 ) reveal that although voters are not [/size][size=2]“[/size][size=2]fully [/size][size=2]informed[/size][size=2]” [/size][size=2]about the details of most of the initiatives and referendums on which they vote, many of these voters [/size][size=2]appear able to [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]gure out what they are for and against in ways that make sense in terms of their underlying values and interests. Failing that, others appear to use a strategy of voting [/size][size=2]no [/size][size=2]when information is lacking or when worries about general state conditions are greatest. Just as legislators do, these voters make choices purposefully, using available information.[/size][size=2]”...[/size][/size]
[size=2][size=2][size=2]...New theoretical research (e.g., Lupia&McCubbins 1998 ) examines conditions under which voters who use information shortcuts cast the same votes they would have cast if they were better informed ... [/size][/size][/size][size=2][size=2][size=2]...[size=2]Theoretical models built from such premises (Lupia & McCubbins 1998, Ch. 3[/size][size=2]5) and associated laboratory experiments (Lupia & McCubbins 1998, Ch. 6[/size]8 )[size=2] show that voters need not know many details of a ballot measure in order to vote as if they did. If voters have access to reliable advisers, then they can vote competently despite not knowing many details about the choice at hand. Indeed, voters have an incentive to seek advice from people who are credible and to avoid information providers who provide vague or misleading reports. But how do they do this? Theory shows that political institutions can do some of the work for them. If these institutions generate the forces that clarify others[/size][size=2]’ [/size][size=2]incentives in the eyes of voters (e.g., truth-in-advertising laws, perjury penalties, or incentives to be known as trustworthy, each of which can minimize the range of false statements made about a particular initiative), then voters can do a much better job of choosing good advisers. Therefore, voters can be competent while lacking information about those who provide them with information. Seen in this light, the requirements for voter competence in direct democracy can be quite minimal....[/size][/size][/size][/size]
[size=2][size=2]...Research speci[/size][size=2]cally devoted to questions of voter competence in direct democracy is a relatively new phenomenon, but much of the theory and evidence produced by political scientists so far reveal that common stereotypes about voter incompetence rely on shaky theoretical and empirical foundations.
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[/size][/size][/size] |
[size=1] Edit:[/size] [size=1]After edit by Vrijheid on 02-10-2005 at 16:29
Reason:
--------------------------------
Citaat:
Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door BigF
Voor mij niet, maar ik kan wel begrijpen dat zulke mensen er ook niet op zitten te wachten dat Jan en Alleman ineens beslissingsbevoegdheid krijgt. Nogal wiedes, zij willen vertegenwoordigd worden en laten de beslissingen over aan een verkozene terwijl de rest ineens de beslissingen van die verkozene teniet kan gaan doen. Ik ben heus niet de enige die meer vertrouwen heeft in een parlementair (niet alle) dan in pakweg zijn buren.
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Direct Democracy: New Approaches To Old Questions
http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~matsusak/Pap...ual_Review.pdf
[size=2]
Citaat:
[/size][size=2]Until recently, direct democracy scholarship was primarily descriptive or normative. Much of it sought to highlight the processes’ shortcomings. We describe new research that examines direct democracy from a more scientific perspective. We organize the discussion around four “old” questions that have long been at the heart of the direct democracy debate: Are voters competent? What role does money play? How does direct democracy affect policy? Does direct democracy benefit the many or the few? We find that recent breakthroughs in theory and empirical analysis paint a comparatively positive picture of the initiative and referendum. For example, voters are more competent (1), and the relationship between money and power in direct democracy is less nefarious (2), than many observers allege. More new studies show that the mere presence of direct democracy induces sitting legislatures to govern more effectively. [size=2][/size]
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[/size][size=2]
Citaat:
[/size][size=2]Voters are more competent than many observers allege.[/size]
[size=2]
...In one of the fi[/size][size=2]rst direct empirical examinations of this phenomenon, Lupia (1994) demonstrated that voters can use simple pieces of information as substitutes for the detailed information that political surveys show them to lack... [size=2]...The data showed respondents sorting themselves into three categories. The [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]rst category contained voters who knew neither the answers to the detailed questions about the propositions nor the insurance industry[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s preferences. The second category contained [/size][size=2]“[/size][size=2]model citizens[/size][size=2]”—[/size][size=2]voters who consistently gave correct answers to detailed questions about the initiatives and who knew the insurance industry[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s preferences. The third category contained respondents who could not answer questions about the propositions[/size][size=2]’ [/size][size=2]details but, like the model citizens, knew the insurance industry[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s preferences. The study[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s central [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]nding is that voters in the second and third categories voted in very similar ways, whereas voters in the [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]rst category voted quite differently. Voters in the third category voted as if they were model citizens. Such evidence supports the claim that voters with apparently low levels of political information can use information shortcuts to emulate the voting behavior they would have exhibited if they were as informed as the best-informed persons in the survey.[/size][/size]
... [size=2][size=2]In a more expansive empirical analysis, spanning many states and elections, Bowler & Donovan (1998, p. 168 ) reveal that although voters are not [/size][size=2]“[/size][size=2]fully [/size][size=2]informed[/size][size=2]” [/size][size=2]about the details of most of the initiatives and referendums on which they vote, many of these voters [/size][size=2]appear able to [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]gure out what they are for and against in ways that make sense in terms of their underlying values and interests. Failing that, others appear to use a strategy of voting [/size][size=2]no [/size][size=2]when information is lacking or when worries about general state conditions are greatest. Just as legislators do, these voters make choices purposefully, using available information.[/size][size=2]”...[/size][/size]
[size=2][size=2][size=2]...New theoretical research (e.g., Lupia&McCubbins 1998 ) examines conditions under which voters who use information shortcuts cast the same votes they would have cast if they were better informed ... [/size][/size][/size][size=2][size=2][size=2]...[size=2]Theoretical models built from such premises (Lupia & McCubbins 1998, Ch. 3[/size][size=2]5) and associated laboratory experiments (Lupia & McCubbins 1998, Ch. 6[/size]8 )[size=2] show that voters need not know many details of a ballot measure in order to vote as if they did. If voters have access to reliable advisers, then they can vote competently despite not knowing many details about the choice at hand. Indeed, voters have an incentive to seek advice from people who are credible and to avoid information providers who provide vague or misleading reports. But how do they do this? Theory shows that political institutions can do some of the work for them. If these institutions generate the forces that clarify others[/size][size=2]’ [/size][size=2]incentives in the eyes of voters (e.g., truth-in-advertising laws, perjury penalties, or incentives to be known as trustworthy, each of which can minimize the range of false statements made about a particular initiative), then voters can do a much better job of choosing good advisers. Therefore, voters can be competent while lacking information about those who provide them with information. Seen in this light, the requirements for voter competence in direct democracy can be quite minimal....[/size][/size][/size][/size]
[size=2][size=2]...Research speci[/size][size=2]cally devoted to questions of voter competence in direct democracy is a relatively new phenomenon, but much of the theory and evidence produced by political scientists so far reveal that common stereotypes about voter incompetence rely on shaky theoretical and empirical foundations.
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[size=1]Before any edits, post was:
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Citaat:
Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door BigF
Voor mij niet, maar ik kan wel begrijpen dat zulke mensen er ook niet op zitten te wachten dat Jan en Alleman ineens beslissingsbevoegdheid krijgt. Nogal wiedes, zij willen vertegenwoordigd worden en laten de beslissingen over aan een verkozene terwijl de rest ineens de beslissingen van die verkozene teniet kan gaan doen. Ik ben heus niet de enige die meer vertrouwen heeft in een parlementair (niet alle) dan in pakweg zijn buren.
|
Direct Democracy: New Approaches To Old Questions
http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~matsusak/Pap...ual_Review.pdf
[size=2]
Citaat:
[/size][size=2]Until recently, direct democracy scholarship was primarily descriptive or normative. Much of it sought to highlight the processes’ shortcomings. We describe new research that examines direct democracy from a more scientific perspective. We organize the discussion around four “old” questions that have long been at the heart of the direct democracy debate: Are voters competent? What role does money play? How does direct democracy affect policy? Does direct democracy benefit the many or the few? We find that recent breakthroughs in theory and empirical analysis paint a comparatively positive picture of the initiative and referendum. For example, voters are more competent (1), and the relationship between money and power in direct democracy is less nefarious (2), than many observers allege. More new studies show that the mere presence of direct democracy induces sitting legislatures to govern more effectively. [size=2][/size]
|
[/size][size=2]
Citaat:
[/size][size=2]Voters are more competent than many observers allege.[/size]
[size=2]
...In one of the fi[/size][size=2]rst direct empirical examinations of this phenomenon, Lupia (1994) demonstrated that voters can use simple pieces of information as substitutes for the detailed information that political surveys show them to lack... [size=2]...The data showed respondents sorting themselves into three categories. The [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]rst category contained voters who knew neither the answers to the detailed questions about the propositions nor the insurance industry[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s preferences. The second category contained [/size][size=2]“[/size][size=2]model citizens[/size][size=2]”—[/size][size=2]voters who consistently gave correct answers to detailed questions about the initiatives and who knew the insurance industry[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s preferences. The third category contained respondents who could not answer questions about the propositions[/size][size=2]’ [/size][size=2]details but, like the model citizens, knew the insurance industry[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s preferences. The study[/size][size=2]’[/size][size=2]s central [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]nding is that voters in the second and third categories voted in very similar ways, whereas voters in the [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]rst category voted quite differently. Voters in the third category voted as if they were model citizens. Such evidence supports the claim that voters with apparently low levels of political information can use information shortcuts to emulate the voting behavior they would have exhibited if they were as informed as the best-informed persons in the survey.[/size][/size]
... [size=2][size=2]In a more expansive empirical analysis, spanning many states and elections, Bowler & Donovan (1998, p. 168 ) reveal that although voters are not [/size][size=2]“[/size][size=2]fully [/size][size=2]informed[/size][size=2]” [/size][size=2]about the details of most of the initiatives and referendums on which they vote, many of these voters [/size][size=2]appear able to [/size][size=2]fi[/size][size=2]gure out what they are for and against in ways that make sense in terms of their underlying values and interests. Failing that, others appear to use a strategy of voting [/size][size=2]no [/size][size=2]when information is lacking or when worries about general state conditions are greatest. Just as legislators do, these voters make choices purposefully, using available information.[/size][size=2]”...[/size][/size]
[size=2][size=2][size=2]...New theoretical research (e.g., Lupia&McCubbins 1998 ) examines conditions under which voters who use information shortcuts cast the same votes they would have cast if they were better informed ... [/size][/size][/size][size=2][size=2][size=2]...[size=2]Theoretical models built from such premises (Lupia & McCubbins 1998, Ch. 3[/size][size=2]5) and associated laboratory experiments (Lupia & McCubbins 1998, Ch. 6[/size]8 )[size=2] show that voters need not know many details of a ballot measure in order to vote as if they did. If voters have access to reliable advisers, then they can vote competently despite not knowing many details about the choice at hand. Indeed, voters have an incentive to seek advice from people who are credible and to avoid information providers who provide vague or misleading reports. But how do they do this? Theory shows that political institutions can do some of the work for them. If these institutions generate the forces that clarify others[/size][size=2]’ [/size][size=2]incentives in the eyes of voters (e.g., truth-in-advertising laws, perjury penalties, or incentives to be known as trustworthy, each of which can minimize the range of false statements made about a particular initiative), then voters can do a much better job of choosing good advisers. Therefore, voters can be competent while lacking information about those who provide them with information. Seen in this light, the requirements for voter competence in direct democracy can be quite minimal....[/size][/size][/size][/size]
[size=2][size=2]...Research speci[/size][size=2]cally devoted to questions of voter competence in direct democracy is a relatively newphenomenon, but much of the theory and evidence produced by political scientists so far reveal that common stereotypes about voter incompetence rely on shaky theoretical and empirical foundations.
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__________________
"Freedom comprises of more than the abscence of boundaries en burden, because one feels still imprisonned when one doesn't percieve options and possibilities. Therefore, freedom is often the opposite of being unattached."
"Matter doesn't matter, only interactions matter"
Me & my autism
Laatst gewijzigd door Vrijheid : 2 oktober 2005 om 15:44.
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