7 opinies over 9/11

[Wisord]

Een dergelijke stap vooruit van de Verenigde Staten zou niet mogelijk geweest zijn zonder de aanslagen van 11 september 2001 die de Amerikaanse geheime diensten klaarblijkelijk niet hebben proberen te verijdelen terwijl ze op de hoogte waren van de voorbereiding ervan. De slachtoffers van de Twin Towers waren inderdaad tegenover de wereld de ideologische rechtvaardiging die nodig was om de ontplooiing van de Amerikaanse militaire aanwezigheid op de planeet te rechtvaardigen. Op binnenlands vlak waren zij ook een middel dat het Vietnamsyndroom moest elimineren, dat wil zeggen het verzet onder de Amerikaanse arbeidersklasse om zich regelrecht op te offeren voor imperialistische avonturen van de Verenigde Staten.

Heel deze situatie bevat de mogelijkheid van een ontwikkelingsspiraal die aan elke controle ontsnapt en die de Verenigde Staten dwingt steeds meer tussen te komen om hun gezag op te leggen, maar waarbij telkens meer krachten paraat staan om te vechten voor hun eigen belangen en daarbij dat gezag te ondermijnen. Dat geldt zeker ook in het geval van de voornaamste rivalen van de Verenigde Staten. En inderdaad, de ongekende escalatie door de Verenigde Staten om hun leiderschap te behouden gaat vergezeld van een al even ongezien verzet daartegen door dezelfde imperialistische rivalen.

De spanningen hebben een dergelijk niveau bereikt dat ze niet meer verborgen kunnen blijven. Er zijn geen grenzen aan de chaos die deze dynamiek kan veroorzaken. De planeet kan daardoor onherstelbare schade oplopen die het uiteindelijk onmogelijk maakt dat het kapitalisme overstegen wordt door een kommunistische maatschappij. Een dergelijk vooruitzicht omvat echter niet de mogelijkheid van een rechtstreekse militaire confrontatie tussen sommige van die mogendheden aan de ene kant en de Verenigde Staten aan de andere. “Gefrustreerd door hun militaire inferioriteit en door sociale en politieke factoren die een rechtstreekse confrontatie met de Verenigde Staten onmogelijk maken, zullen de andere grote mogendheden hun pogingen tot verzet tegen het gezag van de Verenigde Staten verdubbelen met de middelen die zij ter beschikking hebben: oorlogen via andere landen, diplomatieke intriges, enz..

De sociale factor die al die mogendheden, de Verenigde Staten daarbij inbegrepen, gemeen hebben is het feit dat in elk van die landen een proletariaat bestaat dat niet klaar staat, op het niveau van zijn uitbuiting of wat betreft het offeren van zijn leven, om de gevolgen van een totale oorlog te dragen. In die zin vormt het proletariaat, ook in de zeer moeilijke situatie die het kent sinds het begin van de jaren 1990, een rem op de oorlog. Alleen het proletariaat vormt de enige hoop voor de mensheid, omdat het als enige in staat is om zich door zijn strijd in deze maatschappij in ontbinding te doen gelden als de kracht die draagster is van een alternatief voor de kapitalistische barbarij.

[Dixie]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Piero

Ik vergelijk dit met de vliegtuig crash in de Bijlmer bij Amsterdam. Daar was het complete vliegtuig nog aanwezig. Dat vloog waarschijnlijk veel langzamer dan het vliegtuig op het Pentagon, maar verklaart dat alles?

gelieve geen appelen met peren te vergelijken aub wat ontken je nu eigenlijk aan het pentagon zeg dat eens!

[Dixie]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door 420yeahbaby

Dat heeft men wel!
Waarschijnlijk ging het om dit paspoort: http://911research.wtc7.net/disinfo/.../passport.html

Het mag dan wel misinformation zijn, het is getoond geweest op tv.

op vtm of vrt lul niet het paspoort is nooit getoont live op tv op 9/11 ...
pas dagen later kwam het terecht bij de fbi en werd er (dan nog foute) melding van gemaakt

[Dixie]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Wisord

Een dergelijke stap vooruit van de Verenigde Staten zou niet mogelijk geweest zijn zonder de aanslagen van 11 september 2001 die de Amerikaanse geheime diensten klaarblijkelijk niet hebben proberen te verijdelen terwijl ze op de hoogte waren van de voorbereiding ervan.

waarom hier nog iets plaatsen als het door 'believers' toch niet word bekeken pff vermoeiend

allee nog eentje dan...

June 26, 2001: US, Russia, and Regional Powers Cooperate to Oust Taliban An Indian magazine reports more details of the cooperative efforts of the US, India, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran against the Taliban regime: “India and Iran will ‘facilitate’ US and Russian plans for ‘limited military action’ against the Taliban if the contemplated tough new economic sanctions don’t bend Afghanistan’s fundamentalist regime.” Earlier in the month, Russian President Vladimir Putin told a meeting of the Confederation of Independent States that military action against the Taliban may happen, possibly with Russian involvement using bases and forces from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as well.

[atmosphere]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Micele

Uit de "gecachte" link van ABC-News:

Weer dezelfde fout, uw tekst is niet afkomstig van ABC nieuws maar weer van de site 9/11research die er een eigen leugenachtige draai aangeeft .

Dezelfde site heeft ook teksten uit een computerspel gebruikt als zijnde 'officiële informatie' over de scramble tijden en dergelijke .

Alhoewel ze maanden de tijd hadden de terroristen ruim vóór 9/11 op te pakken, gebeurde er niets door FBI en CIA; ze (CIA) hadden nochtans en nogmaals ~ 20 augustus 2001 4 namen van zeer verdachte -*reeds gekende*-terroristen - die een aanslag gingen plegen - van de Mossad nog een bevestigd-gekregen (*terroristen en helpers aan de aanslag in Jemen, USS Cole*)

Er zijn zo veel waarschuwingen geweest voor 9/11, en over verschillende mogelijke toekomstige gebeurtenissen . U doet net of men een lijst met namen had + datum plaats en tijd van de aanslagen. En dan het volgende , '

Op verdenking waarvan hadden de terroristen voor 9/11 dan opgepakt moeten worden ??

[Zeikstraal]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door atmosphere

U doet net of men een lijst met namen had + datum plaats en tijd van de aanslagen. [/b]

Lijst met namen zeker en vast. Den datum zal niet veel schelen

[atmosphere]

U heeft er kennelijk geen idee van hoe veel waarschuwingen er daar binnen komen . Die lijst met namen bevat echt niet netjes alleen de namen van de 9/11 terorristen , het gaat om honderden mogelijke verdachten . Ga dan maar eens verbanden zoeken.

En nog maals , op basis waarvan ga je die mensen oppakken?

Pas achteraf word duidelijk welke waarschuwingen betrekking hadden op 9/11 en welke meldingen er niets mee te maken hadden. Bovendien zal meer als de helft van de informatie niet eens kloppen .

[Micele]

http://www.historycommons.org/timeli...ine&startpos=0

Complete 911 Timeline
Page 1 of 4 (318 events)
previous | 1, 2, 3, 4 | next

4 long pages...
vanaf Able Danger wordt het interessant.

http://www.summeroftruth.org/atta.html

German press reports on CIA surveillance of the "Hamburg Cell" and Mossad observation of Atta in Florida

Oct. 5, 2002

This week two articles in the German press reported new details about the alleged surveillance of Mohamed Atta and his accomplices in Florida by the Israeli "Art Students" spy ring. In the following, I present translations of both stories. They seem very exciting at first glance, but I must warn that the headlines are more spectacular than the bulk of either article, nearly all of which should be well-known to the versed researcher of 9/11 oddities.

[ ..... ]

Mr. Shehhi and Mr. Atta traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 to train at a Qaeda camp with several other Sept. 11 plotters. And after returning to Germany, Mr. Shehhi made an ominous reference to the World Trade Center to a Hamburg librarian, saying: "There will be thousands of dead. You will all think of me," German authorities said.

Soon after, Mr. Shehhi, Mr. Atta and another plotter, Ziad al-Jarrah, began e-mailing several dozen American flight schools from Germany to inquire about enrollment, and they arrived in the United States later in 2000 to begin flight training.

Copyright 2004 The New York Times

Veel leesplezier.

[Zeikstraal]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door atmosphere

U heeft er kennelijk geen idee van hoe veel waarschuwingen er daar binnen komen . Die lijst met namen bevat echt niet netjes alleen de namen van de 9/11 terorristen , het gaat om honderden mogelijke verdachten . Ga dan maar eens verbanden zoeken.

En nog maals , op basis waarvan ga je die mensen oppakken?

Pas achteraf word duidelijk welke waarschuwingen betrekking hadden op 9/11 en welke meldingen er niets mee te maken hadden. Bovendien zal meer als de helft van de informatie niet eens kloppen .

Op basis van wat pakken ze ze nu op? En in andere landen, opblazen? Maak jezelf maar wat wijs, mij niet gelaten.

[Micele]

En nog maals , op basis waarvan ga je die mensen oppakken?

Alle aanslagen die voordien gepleegd zijn, ook aan medeplichtigheid.
De laatste vóór 9/11 was de USS Cole in Jemen 12 oct 2000, dacht ik

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Cole_bombing

Zelfs de eenvoudigste procedures werden niet opgevolgd:

December 11, 1999: Watch List Importance Is Stressed but Procedures Are Not Followed

The CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center sends a cable reminding all its personnel about various reporting obligations. The cable clearly states that it is important to share information so suspected members of US-designated terrorist groups can be placed on watch lists. The US keeps a number of watch lists; the most important one, TIPOFF, contains about 61,000 names of suspected terrorists by 9/11. [Los Angeles Times, 9/22/2002; Knight Ridder, 1/27/2004] The list is checked whenever someone enters or leaves the US “The threshold for adding a name to TIPOFF is low,” and even a “reasonable suspicion” that a person is connected with a US-designated terrorist group warrants being added to the database. [US Congress, 9/20/2002] Within a month, two future hijackers, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, will be identified as al-Qaeda operatives (see December 29, 1999), but the cable’s instructions will not be followed for them. The CIA will initially tell the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry that no such guidelines existed, and CIA Director Tenet will fail to mention the cable in his testimony to the Inquiry. [New York Times, 5/15/2003; US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 157 ]
Entity Tags: 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency, Nawaf Alhazmi, TIPOFF, George J. Tenet, Khalid Almihdhar
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

December 29, 1999: NSA Tells CIA about Planned Al-Qaeda Summit Involving Future Hijackers The NSA, monitoring a telephone in an al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen (see Late August 1998 and Late 1998-Early 2002), has listened in on phone calls revealing that hijackers Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salem Alhazmi are to attend an important al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia in January 2000 (see Shortly Before December 29, 1999). Almihdhar’s full name was mentioned, as well as the first names of hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Salem Alhazmi. On this day, the NSA shares this information with the CIA’s Alec Station bin Laden unit. Other US intelligence agencies, including FBI headquarters and the FBI’s New York field office, are told as well. Although Khalid Almihdhar’s full name was mentioned in one call, the NSA only passes on his first name. Also, the NSA has already learned from monitoring the Yemen hub that Nawaf’s last name is Alhazmi and that he is long-time friends with Almihdhar (see Early 1999). However, they either don’t look this up in their records or don’t pass it on to any other agency. [9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004, pp. 6 ; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 239 ; Wright, 2006, pp. 310] An NSA analyst makes a comment that is shared between US intelligence agencies, “Salem may be Nawaf’s younger brother.” This turns out to be correct. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 ; 9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004, pp. 6 ] A CIA officer will later tell the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry that information from the Africa embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998) was reviewed in late 1999 during a worldwide effort to disrupt millennium attack plots (see December 15-31, 1999) and “a kind of tuning fork… buzzed when two [of the hijackers] reportedly planning a trip to [Malaysia] were linked indirectly to what appeared to be a support element… involved with the Africa bombers.” [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 ] The fact that they are connected to the Yemen communication hub already indicates some importance within al-Qaeda. It is learned they are connected to the embassy bombings in some way (see October 4, 2001 and Late 1999). [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 ; 9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004, pp. 6 ] The NSA report about them on this day is entitled, “Activities of Bin Laden Associates,” showing the clear knowledge of their ties to bin Laden. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 502; Vanity Fair, 11/2004] The CIA will track Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi to the Malaysia summit (see January 2-5, 2000 and January 5-8, 2000).
Entity Tags: Salem Alhazmi, Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI New York Field Office, Khalid Almihdhar, FBI Headquarters, Al-Qaeda, Alec Station, Central Intelligence Agency, Ahmed al-Hada, National Security Agency, Nawaf Alhazmi
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

January 2-5, 2000: CIA Learns 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Has US Visa as He Is Tracked to Al-Qaeda Summit
A photocopy of Nawaf Alhazmi’s passport. No image of Khalid Almihdhar’s passport has been released, but it would have looked similar to this one. [Source: FBI]The CIA is aware that hijacker Khalid Almihdhar is staying at a highly monitored al-Qaeda communication hub (see Late 1998-Early 2002) and is planning to travel to an al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia. He is closely watched as leaves the hub and flies from Sana’a, Yemen, to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on his way to Malaysia. Agents from eight CIA offices and six friendly foreign intelligence services are all asked to help track him, in the hopes he will lead them to bigger al-Qaeda figures. [Stern, 8/13/2003; 9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004, pp. 6 ] The CIA and local authorities are running an operation to track militants transiting Dubai airport (see 1999), and United Arab Emirates officials secretly make copies of his passport as he is passing through it, immediately reporting this to the CIA. [Bamford, 2004, pp. 224] Another account suggests CIA agents break into Almihdhar’s Dubai hotel room and photocopy the passport there. Either way, the information is immediately faxed to Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit. [Wright, 2006, pp. 311] The CIA not only learns his full name, but also discovers the vital fact that he has a multiple entry visa to the US that is valid from April 1999 to April 2000. But even though the CIA now knows about this US visa which indicates he plans to go to New York City, they do not place him on a terror watch list and they fail to tell the FBI about the visa. [Bamford, 2004, pp. 224; 9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004, pp. 6 ]
Entity Tags: United Arab Emirates, Nawaf Alhazmi, Alec Station, Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda

January 5-8, 2000:
Al-Qaeda Summit in Malaysia Discusses 9/11 and Cole Plots; CIA Has Malaysians Monitor It

Attendees of the Malaysian summit. Top row, from left: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Middle row, from left: Khallad bin Attash, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Hambali. Bottom row, from left: Yazid Sufaat, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Fahad Al-Quso. [Source: FBI]

About a dozen of bin Laden’s trusted followers hold a secret, “top-level al-Qaeda summit” in the city of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. [CNN, 8/30/2002; San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/27/2002] Plans for the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000) and the 9/11 attacks are discussed. [USA Today, 2/12/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002] At the request of the CIA, the Malaysian Secret Service monitors the summit and then passes the information on to the US (see January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After). Attendees of the summit are said to include:
Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar - The CIA and FBI will later miss many opportunities to foil the 9/11 plot through Alhazmi and Almihdhar and the knowledge of their presence at this summit. The CIA already knows many details about these two by the time the summit begins (see January 2-4, 2000), and tracked Almihdhar as he traveled to it (see January 2-5, 2000).
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed - Mohammed is sometimes referred to as “KSM,” a top al-Qaeda leader and the alleged “mastermind” of the 9/11 attacks. The US has known KSM is an Islamic militant since the exposure of Operation Bojinka in January 1995 (see January 6, 1995), and knows what he looks like. US officials have stated that they only realized the summit was important in the summer of 2001, but the presence of KSM should have proved the its importance. [Los Angeles Times, 2/2/2002] Although the possible presence of KSM at this summit is highly disputed by US officials, one counterterrorism expert will testify before the 9/11 Commission in 2003 that he has access to transcripts of KSM’s interrogations since his capture, and that KSM has admitted leading this summit and told the attendees about a planes as weapons plot targeting the US (see July 9, 2003). [Newsweek, 7/9/2003; New York Post, 7/10/2003] Many other media reports identify him there as well. [Independent, 6/6/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002; CNN, 11/7/2002; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 10/29/2003] For instance, according to Newsweek, “Mohammed’s presence would make the intelligence failure of the CIA even greater. It would mean the agency literally watched as the 9/11 scheme was hatched—and had photographs of the attack’s mastermind… doing the plotting.” [Newsweek, 7/9/2003]
Hambali - An Indonesian militant known as Hambali, or Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin [BBC, 8/15/2003] , was heavily involved in the Bojinka plot, an early version of the 9/11 plot (see January 6, 1995 and June 1994). [CNN, 3/14/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002] The FBI was aware of who he was and his connections to the Bojinka plot at least by 1999 and identified a photograph of him by that time (see May 23, 1999). He will be arrested by Thai authorities in August 2003 (see August 12, 2003). [CNN, 8/14/2003; CBS News, 8/15/2003] Malaysian officials recognize Hambali from summit surveillance photos, as he is a long-time Malaysian resident. But the US does not tell them of his Bojinka connections so they will not know to arrest him after the summit is over (see Shortly After January 8, 2000). [New Straits Times, 2/10/2002]
Yazid Sufaat - Sufaat is a Malaysian who owned the condominium where the summit was held. [New York Times, 1/31/2002; Newsweek, 6/2/2002] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through Sufaat’s presence at this summit is later missed in September 2000 (see September-October 2000). Sufaat will travel to Afghanistan in June 2001 and be arrested by Malaysian authorities when he returns to Malaysia in late 2001. [Australian, 12/24/2002] Malaysian officials also recognize Sufaat from summit surveillance photos, as he is a long-time Malaysian resident (see Shortly After January 8, 2000). [New Straits Times, 2/10/2002]
Fahad Al-Quso - Al-Quso, a top al-Qaeda operative [Newsweek, 9/20/2001] , will be arrested by Yemeni authorities in December 2000 (see Late October-Late November 2000), but the FBI will not be given a chance to fully interrogate him before 9/11. He will escape from prison in 2003. [CNN, 5/15/2003]
Tawfiq bin Attash - Better known by his alias “Khallad,” Bin Attash, a “trusted member of bin Laden’s inner circle,” was in charge of bin Laden’s bodyguards, and served as bin Laden’s personal intermediary at least for the USS Cole bombing. [Newsweek, 9/20/2001] He is also thought to be a “mastermind” of that attack. Attash is reportedly planning to be one of the hijackers, but will be unable to get a US visa. [9/11 Commission, 6/16/2004, pp. 8] US intelligence had been aware of his identity as early as 1995. [US Congress, 9/18/2002] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through bin Attash’s presence at this summit will later be missed in January 2001 (see January 4, 2001). Bin Attash had been previously arrested in Yemen for suspected terror ties, but let go (see Summer 1999). [Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12/1/2002] He will be captured in Pakistan by the US in April 2003 (see April 29, 2003).
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri - Al-Nashiri is one of al-Qaeda’s top field commanders and operates out of Malaysia while 9/11 is being prepared. [Los Angeles Times, 10/10/2001; Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 188; Graham and Nussbaum, 2004, pp. 59] He was involved in an arms smuggling plot (see 1997) and the East African embassy bombings (see August 22-25 1998), in which his cousin was martyred (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). He also organized the attack against the USS The Sullivans (see January 3, 2000), and will be involved in the attacks against the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000) and the Limburg (see October 6, 2002). He will be arrested in the United Arab Emirates in November 2002. An al-Qaeda operative had identified a photo of al-Nashiri for the FBI in late 1998 (see August 22-25 1998). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 152-3] (Note: in the sources al-Nashiri is referred to by two of his aliases: Muhammad Omar al-Harazi and Al Safani). [CNN, 12/11/2000; Central Intelligence Agency, 9/6/2006]
Ramzi bin al-Shibh - Investigators believe he wanted to be the twentieth hijacker. His presence at the summit may not have been realized until after 9/11, despite the fact that US intelligence had a picture of him next to bin Attash, and had video footage of him. [Newsweek, 11/26/2001; Washington Post, 7/14/2002; Time, 9/15/2002; Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002; CNN, 11/7/2002] German police have credit card receipts indicating bin al-Shibh is in Malaysia at the same time. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002] Ulrich Kersten, director of Germany’s federal anticrime agency, the Bundeskriminalamt, will later say, “There are indications that Ramzi bin al-Shibh was in Kuala Lumpur for the meeting.” [New York Times, 8/24/2002] Another account noting he was photographed at the summit further notes that he entered and left Thailand three times in the first three weeks of January 2000. [Los Angeles Times, 10/17/2001] Anonymous Malaysian officials claim he is there, but US officials deny it. [Associated Press, 9/20/2002] One account says he is recognized at the time of the summit, which makes it hard to understand why he is not tracked back to Germany and the Hamburg cell with Mohamed Atta and other hijackers. [Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 10/1/2002] Another opportunity to expose the 9/11 plot through bin al-Shibh’s presence at this summit will be missed in June. It appears bin al-Shibh and Almihdhar are directly involved in the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 (see Around September 15-16 and October 10-21, 2000). [Guardian, 10/15/2001; Washington Post, 7/14/2002; Newsweek, 9/4/2002]
Ahmad Hikmat Shakir - A suspected al-Qaeda agent of Iraqi nationality, Shakir is a greeter at Kuala Lumpur airport. He meets Almihdhar there and travels with him to the apartment where the summit is held. [Associated Press, 10/2/2002; Newsweek, 10/7/2002; Australian, 12/24/2002; Knight Ridder, 6/12/2004] After 9/11, he will be linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Bojinka plot. Jordan will arrest him and let him go after the US says they don’t want to take custody of him (see September 17, 2001).
Salem Alhazmi - Alhazmi, a 9/11 hijacker and brother of Nawaf Alhazmi, is possibly at the summit, although very few accounts mention it. [Australian, 12/24/2002] US intelligence intercepts from before the summit indicate that he at least had plans to attend. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 51 ]
Abu Bara al Taizi - A Yemeni al-Qaeda agent, he is reportedly meant to be one of the 9/11 hijackers, but will be unable to enter the US due to greater scrutiny for Yemenis. [9/11 Commission, 6/16/2004, pp. 8]
Mohamed al-Khatani - A Saudi, he allegedly will confess to attending the summit while being held in the US Guantanamo prison (see July 2002). He apparently will unsuccessfully attempt to enter the US in August 2001 to join the 9/11 plot (see August 4, 2001). However, al-Khatani will later recant his testimony and say he lied to avoid torture (see October 26, 2006).
Others - Unnamed members of the Egyptian-based Islamic Jihad are also said to have been at the summit. [Cox News Service, 10/21/2001] Islamic Jihad merged with al-Qaeda in February 1998. [ABC News, 11/17/2001] However, according to the Wall Street Journal, bin Attash and al-Quso are suspected of being Islamic Jihad members at one point, so this may just be a reference to them. [Wall Street Journal, 10/8/2001]
Entity Tags: Ulrich Kersten, Fahad al-Quso, Al-Qaeda, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Abu Bara al Taizi, Hambali, Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, Islamic Jihad, Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Tawfiq bin Attash, Yazid Sufaat, Khalid Almihdhar, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Salem Alhazmi, Mohamed al-Khatani, Nawaf Alhazmi, Malaysian Secret Service
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000: CIA Bin Laden Unit Blocks Notification to FBI about Hijacker Almihdhar’s US Visa
Victims’ family members Lorie Van Auken (right) and Kristen Breitweiser (left) are shocked to learn Tom Wilshire blocked a cable to the FBI about Khalid Almihdhar’s visa. [Source: Banded Artists]Doug Miller, an FBI agent assigned to Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, reads CIA cables reporting that 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar has a US visa and drafts a cable to the FBI to inform it of this. The CIA obtained the information through a tap on Almihdhar’s phone in Yemen (see December 29, 1999) and by monitoring him as he passed through Dubai (see January 2-5, 2000) on his way to an al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see January 5-8, 2000).
Draft Cable - Miller writes that Almihdhar has a US visa (see April 3-7, 1999) and that the visa application states his destination is New York and he intends to stay for three months. The draft cable mentions the tap on Almihdhar’s phone, his planned travel to Malaysia, and the links between his phone and the 1998 East African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998 and October 4, 2001). It also says that the CIA has obtained photographs of Almihdhar and these will be sent separately. Miller asks the FBI for feedback resulting from an FBI investigation.
Blocked - A CIA officer known as “Michelle” accesses Miller’s draft about an hour after he writes it. The cable is then blocked on the orders of the station’s deputy chief, Tom Wilshire, as a few hours after Miller drafts the cable Michelle attaches a message to it saying, “pls hold off on [cable] for now per [Tom Wilshire].” [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 240 ] Miller is also told, “This is not a matter for the FBI.” [Wright, 2006, pp. 311]
'No Reason to Kill the Message' - Author James Bamford will later comment: “A potential terrorist and member of al-Qaeda was heading for the US, the FBI’s jurisdiction—its turf—and he [Miller] was putting the FBI on notice so it could take action. There was no reason to kill the message.” [Bamford, 2008, pp. 19] Miller will later say he has no “rational answer” as to why the cable was blocked, but will speculate that Alec Station officers were annoyed he had encroached on their territory. [Congressional Quarterly, 10/1/2008] Michelle drafts a cable falsely saying that the information about Almihdhar’s visa has been shared with the FBI (see Around 7:00 p.m. January 5, 2000) and there will be a discussion the next day about whether the cable should be sent (see January 6, 2000). The Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General will later call the failure to pass the information to the FBI a “significant failure” but will be unable to determine why the information was not passed on. [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 250 ] The 9/11 Commission will know of the incident, but will relegate it to an endnote in its final report, omitting Wilshire’s role entirely. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 502] The CIA inspector general will falsely claim that the cable is not sent, “[a]pparently because it was in the wrong format or needed editing.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 6/2005, pp. xv ]
Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Doug Miller, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, ’Michelle’, 9/11 Commission, Tom Wilshire, Alec Station, Office of the Inspector General (CIA)
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Early 2000-Summer 2001: NSA Intercepts Communications between Hijackers in US and Al-Qaeda Communications Hub While the 9/11 hijackers are in the US, the NSA intercepts several calls between them and an al-Qaeda communications hub in Sana’a, Yemen, run by Ahmed al-Hada, who is hijacker Khalid Almihdhar’s father-in-law (see August 4-25, 1998).
Summary of Calls -
The first calls are made by Almihdhar and are intercepted during the spring and summer of 2000 (see Spring-Summer 2000).
More calls are made by hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi after the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000 (see Mid-October 2000-Summer 2001).
The final call from the US is intercepted just a few weeks before 9/11 (see (August 2001)).
The NSA intercepted the hijackers’ calls outside the US before this (see Early 1999 and December 29, 1999) and continues to do so in 2000 (see Summer 2000) after Almihdhar returns to Yemen (see June 10, 2000 and (Mid-June-Mid-July 2000)).
Calls' Content - Some of the calls may only contain non-operational information, as they are reportedly between Almihdhar and his wife. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 222; Suskind, 2006, pp. 94; Wright, 2006, pp. 343] However, the calls are also used to relay messages to the 9/11 hijackers. [Embassy of Yemen (Washington), 2/13/2002; MSNBC, 2/14/2002; MSNBC, 5/2005]
Agencies' Roles - The CIA is the lead agency monitoring the communications hub. It has planted bugs inside it and is wiretapping all calls (see Late August 1998). Intercepts of calls to and from the hub are a major plank of the US intelligence community’s effort to fight al-Qaeda. Also involved is the FBI, which is using phone records to plot these calls on a map (see Late 1998-Early 2002). Some of the calls intercepted by US intelligence come from Osama bin Laden’s satellite phone in Afghanistan (see August 4-25, 1998 and Late August 1998). After 9/11, counterterrorism officials will say that the number was one of the hottest targets being monitored by the NSA and was an “intelligence bonanza.” [Los Angeles Times, 12/21/2005; Wright, 2006, pp. 343]
Importance of Failure - Also after 9/11, counterterrorism officials will agree that the failure to follow leads to the US from this number was a huge missed opportunity to stop the 9/11 plot. For instance, FBI agent Kenneth Maxwell will say: “Two al-Qaeda guys living in California—are you kidding me? We would have been on them like white on snow: physical surveillance, electronic surveillance, a special unit devoted entirely to them.” [MSNBC, 7/21/2004; New Yorker, 7/10/2006 ]
Discussed after 9/11 - The failure to roll up the plot based on these communications intercepts will be discussed following 9/11 (see Summer 2002-Summer 2004 and March 15, 2004 and After).
Entity Tags: Ahmed al-Hada, Central Intelligence Agency, Khalid Almihdhar, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Nawaf Alhazmi, Kenneth Maxwell, Hoda al-Hada
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

Spring-Summer 2000: Calls between 9/11 Hijacker in San Diego and Al-Qaeda Communications Hub Intercepted by NSA Around eight calls made by hijacker Khalid Almihdhar from San Diego to an al-Qaeda communications hub in Sana’a, Yemen, run by his father-in-law Ahmed al-Hada are intercepted by the NSA. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. xii, 16-17, 157 ; Los Angeles Times, 12/21/2005; Wright, 2006, pp. 343; New Yorker, 7/10/2006 ] At least one of the calls is made from a phone registered to hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi in their San Diego apartment. [US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 251 ] Other calls are made from a mobile phone registered to Alhazmi. [McDermott, 2005, pp. 296] Calls may also be made from the communications hub to the US. [MSNBC, 7/21/2004]
Dates of Calls - One of the calls takes place days after they move into their San Diego apartment in February (see January 15-February 2000). [MSNBC, 7/21/2004] Another is on March 20, 2000 and lasts 16 minutes. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 10/2001, pp. 57 ; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 251 ]
Intercepted by NSA - Although NSA analysts pick up Almihdhar’s first name, “Khalid,” they do not connect it to his second name, even though the NSA has been intercepting communications to and from the hub involving him throughout 1999 (see Early 1999 and December 29, 1999) and he is on the NSA watch list at this point (see Mid-January 2000). [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. xii, 16, 157 ; US News and World Report, 3/15/2004] Some, or perhaps all, of these calls are between Almihdhar and his wife, who lives at the communications hub and reportedly gives birth to a daughter in early 2000 while Almihdhar is in the US. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 222; Suskind, 2006, pp. 94; Wright, 2006, pp. 343; New Yorker, 7/10/2006 ] However, the NSA analysts suspect that Khalid is part of an “operational cadre.” [US News and World Report, 3/15/2004]
Dissemination and Content - According to the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, the NSA disseminates some of this information to the FBI, CIA, and other agencies, but not all of it, as it apparently does not meet reporting thresholds. It is unclear why it does not meet such thresholds, although some sources will suggest Almihdhar was just talking to his wife. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 157 ; US News and World Report, 3/15/2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 222; Suskind, 2006, pp. 94] Another source suggests operational information was passed on during the calls (see Early 2000-Summer 2001). However, two FBI agents who worked on al-Qaeda cases relating to Yemen, Dan Coleman and Ali Soufan, will later claim that they and other senior counterterrorism officials only learn about these calls after 9/11. [Los Angeles Times, 12/21/2005; Suskind, 2006, pp. 94; New Yorker, 7/10/2006 ]
Significance - Author Lawrence Wright will comment: “You know, this is the key. The NSA is all over this phone. And everybody, you know, that has any connection with it is drawing links from that phone. Now imagine eight lines from Yemen to San Diego. How obvious would it be that al-Qaeda is in America[?]” [Federal News Service, 10/5/2006]
Other Calls - The NSA also intercepts various other communications between the hijackers and the communications hub (see Early 2000-Summer 2001).
Entity Tags: Ahmed al-Hada, Al-Qaeda, Salem Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, National Security Agency, Osama bin Laden, Lawrence Wright, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

April 24, 2000: KSM and Other Al-Qaeda Figures Put on New US Domestic ‘No-Fly’ List TIPOFF is a US no-fly list of individuals who should be detained if they attempt to leave or enter the US. There are about 60,000 names on this list by 9/11 (see December 11, 1999). Apparently there had been no prohibition of travel inside the US, but on this day an FAA security directive puts six names on a newly created domestic no-fly list. All six are said to be associates of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef, including his uncle, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM). On August 28, 2001, six more names will be added to this list. Apparently all 12 names are associated with al-Qaeda or other Islamic extremist groups. 9/11 Commissioner Bob Kerrey will later note the discrepancy of the 60,000-name list with the 12-name list and comment, “seems to me, particularly with what was going on at the time, that some effort would have been made to make—to produce a larger list than [only 12 names].” [9/11 Commission, 1/27/2004] The FAA’s chief of security in 2001, Cathal Flynn, will later say that he was “unaware of the TIPOFF list” until after the September 11 attacks. 9/11 Commissioner Slade Gorton will say that this admission is “stunning, just unbeleivable,” and an “example of absolute incompetence” at the FAA. Other FAA officials will say they are aware of the larger list, but do not make much use of it. [Shenon, 2008, pp. 115] On the day of 9/11, two of the 9/11 hijackers will be on the 60,000-name TIPOFF list but not the 12-name domestic list, so airport security does not know to stop them from boarding the planes they hijack that day (see August 23, 2001).
Entity Tags: TIPOFF, Slade Gorton, Cathal Flynn, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Bob Kerrey, Al-Qaeda, Ramzi Yousef
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

(Mid-June-Mid-July 2000): Almihdhar Stays in Yemen House Monitored by US Intelligence When hijacker Khalid Almihdhar leaves the US in June (see June 10, 2000), he flies to Frankfurt, Germany, and then to Oman in the Middle East. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 135 ] From there he returns to his family’s home in Sana’a, Yemen. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 237] His wife and children live at an al-Qaeda communications hub that is run by his father in law, Ahmed al-Hada. The hub is being monitored by the NSA and CIA. Phone calls to and from the hub, including ones made by Almihdhar and other hijackers, are intercepted, rooms in the building are bugged, and spy satellites record visitors (see Late August 1998, Late 1998-Early 2002, and Early 2000-Summer 2001). Based on information gained from monitoring this house, the CIA and local intelligence services mounted a major operation against Almihdhar, other hijackers, and several more al-Qaeda operatives in December 1999 and January 2000, when they were followed around the Middle East and South Asia and monitored during an al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia (see December 29, 1999, January 2-5, 2000, and January 5-8, 2000). So presumably US intelligence should have been aware of this visit to the hub and who Almihdhar was, but what exactly was known and who may have known it has not been made public.
Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Ahmed al-Hada
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

February 9-21, 2001: NSA Supposedly Mapped, Disrupted, and Monitored Bin Laden’s Network In a series of articles for UPI, journalist Richard Sale reveals many details about the NSA’s electronic surveillance of al-Qaeda. “The United States has scored notable successes in an information war against the organization of terrorist suspect Osama bin Laden. US hackers have gone into foreign bank accounts and deleted or transferred money and jammed or blocked the group’s cell or satellite phones.” It is also mentioned that “Bin Laden is surrounded by US listening posts.” The articles discuss the extent to which the NSA’s Echelon satellite network is monitoring al-Qaeda, and even seems to make an oblique reference to monitoring the al-Qaeda safe house in Yemen that enabled the NSA to discover valuable information on hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar (see December 29, 1999). The articles also reveal that since 1995, bin Laden tried to protect his communications with a “full suite of tools,” but “codes were broken.” An expert adds that “you don’t use your highest level of secure communications all the time. It’s too burdensome, and it exposes it to other types of exploitation.” The articles also imply that Echelon is used in illegal ways. An anonymous former senior US intelligence official says, “This isn’t about legality. This is about trying to protect American lives.” [United Press International, 2/9/2001; United Press International, 2/13/2001; United Press International, 2/21/2001] While bin Laden’s communications were certainly thoroughly monitored before 9/11 (see November 1996-Late August 1998), no evidence has come to light since 9/11 that the US was hacking into bank accounts or jamming signals.
Entity Tags: Nawaf Alhazmi, Echelon, Khalid Almihdhar, National Security Agency, Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

April 1, 2001-September 10, 2001: Nearly Half of FAA’s Daily Intelligence Summaries Mention Bin Laden or Al-Qaeda; No Action is Taken In 2005 (see February 10, 2005), it will be revealed that of the FAA’s 105 daily intelligence summaries between these dates, 52 mention bin Laden, al-Qaeda, or both. Most of the mentions are “in regard to overseas threats.” None of the warnings specifically predict something similar to the 9/11 attacks, but five of them mention al-Qaeda’s training for hijackings and two reports concern suicide operations unconnected to aviation. [Associated Press, 2/11/2005] One of the warnings mentions air defense measures being taken in Genoa, Italy, for the July 2001 G-8 summit to protect from a possible air attack by terrorists (see July 20-22, 2001). However, the New Jersey Star-Ledger is virtually the only newspaper in the US to report this fact. [New Jersey Star-Ledger, 2/11/2005] Despite all these warnings, the FAA fails to take any extra security measures. They do not expand the use of in-flight air marshals or tighten airport screening for weapons. A proposed rule to improve passenger screening and other security measures ordered by Congress in 1996 has held up and is still not in effect by 9/11. The 9/11 Commission’s report on these FAA warnings released in 2005 (see February 10, 2005) will conclude that FAA officials were more concerned with reducing airline congestion, lessening delays, and easing air carriers’ financial problems than preventing a hijacking. [Associated Press, 2/11/2005] The FAA also makes no effort to expand its list of terror suspects, which includes only a dozen names by 9/11 (see April 24, 2000). The former head of the FAA’s civil aviation security branch later says he wasn’t even aware of TIPOFF, the government’s main watch list, which included the names of two 9/11 hijackers before 9/11. Nor is there any evidence that a senior FAA working group responsible for security ever meets in 2001 to discuss “the high threat period that summer.” [New York Times, 2/10/2005]
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11 Commission, US Congress, Al-Qaeda
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline

June 13, 2001: 9/11 Hijacker Almihdhar Obtains US Visa Despite Incorrect Passport and Lies on Application, even though US Intelligence Knows He Is an Al-Qaeda Operative 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar obtains a second US visa from the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. His passport, which was issued two weeks previously (see June 1, 2001), lacks an expiry date, but contains an indicator of possible terrorist affiliation used by the Saudi authorities to track suspected radicals (see November 2, 2007). His application form is incomplete, as it lists his occupation as “businessman,” but does not give his employer’s name and address.
Lies on Application Form - The form, which is submitted through the Visa Express program (see May 2001) meaning he is not interviewed, contains two lies: he says he has never received an American visa or traveled to the US, whereas he received a visa in 1999 (see April 3-7, 1999) and traveled to the US on it in 2000 (see January 15, 2000). As Almihdhar’s first visa was also issued by the Jeddah consulate, through which the CIA sent radical Arabs to the US for training during the Soviet-Afghan war (see September 1987-March 1989), consular officials could discover he is lying, but information about prior visas issuances is not automatically displayed to them. At least eleven of the 15 visas issued to the hijackers in Jeddah are issued by the same consular officer, but it is unclear whether this visa is issued by that officer or another one.
Known Terrorist - By this time several intelligence agencies are aware that Almihdhar is an al-Qaeda operative; for example, the CIA (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000), NSA (see December 29, 1999), FBI (see January 5-6, 2000), a US army intelligence program (see January-February 2000), the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate (see 1997), Malaysian Special Branch (see January 5-8, 2000), and an intelligence service in the United Arab Emirates (see January 2-5, 2000)).
Parallels to Case of Blind Sheikh - Almihdhar re-enters the US on the visa three weeks later (see July 4, 2001). The 9/11 Commission will find that the series of missteps preceding the issuance of visas to Almihdhar and the other 9/11 hijackers has some “eerie parallels” to the “series of exceptional failures” that led to US visas being issued to Blind Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman (see December 15, 1986-1989 and July 1990). [9/11 Commission, 8/21/2004, pp. 24-27, 33, 49 ]
Entity Tags: Khalid Almihdhar, US Consulate, Jedda, Saudi Arabia Office
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

July 23, 2001: KSM, Using False Name but Real Photo, Is Given US Visa
The photograph of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed on his 2001 US visa application. [Source: 9/11 Commission]Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) is granted a visa to enter the US, despite being under a federal terrorism indictment, having a $2 million reward on his head, and being one of only a dozen people in the world on a US domestic no-fly list (see April 24, 2000). There is no evidence that he actually uses his visa to travel to the US. Investigators speculate that he may have considered a trip to shepherd some aspect of the 9/11 plot. He applied for the visa using a Saudi passport and an alias (Abdulrahman al Ghamdi), but the photo he submitted is really of him. He uses the new, controversial Visa Express program that allows Saudis to apply for US visas without having to appear in person at any point during the application process (see May 2001). [Los Angeles Times, 1/27/2004] Just a month earlier, the CIA passed a warning to all US intelligence agencies, certain military commanders, and parts of the Justice and Treasury Departments saying that Mohammed may be attempting to enter the US (see June 12, 2001). However, either this warning isn’t given to immigration officials or else they fail to notice his application. [Los Angeles Times, 1/27/2004]
Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, US Department of the Treasury, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

August 23, 2001: Hijackers Alhazmi and Almihdhar Are Finally Added to Terrorist Watch List



The CIA cable watchlisting Alhazmi, Almihdhar, and two others (the sections mentioning Shakir and bin Attash are blacked out). [Source: FBI] (click image to enlarge)

Thanks to the request of Margaret Gillespie, an FBI analyst assigned to the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center, the CIA sends a cable to the State Department, INS, Customs Service, and FBI requesting that “bin Laden-related individuals” Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, and Salah Saeed Mohammed bin Yousaf (an alias for Khallad bin Attash) be put on the terrorism watch list. All four individuals had attended the January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia. The cable mostly focuses on Almihdhar, briefly outlining his attendance at the Malaysia summit (see January 5-8, 2000) and his subsequent travel to the US in January 2000 and July 2001. Since March 2000, if not earlier, the CIA has had good reason to believe Alhazmi and Almihdhar were al-Qaeda operatives living in the US, but apparently did nothing and told no other agency about it until now. The hijackers are not located in time, and both die in the 9/11 attacks. FBI agents later state that if they been told about Alhazmi and Almihdhar sooner, “There’s no question we could have tied all 19 hijackers together” given the frequent contact between these two and the other hijackers. [Newsweek, 6/2/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 538; US Department of Justice, 11/2004, pp. 32-36, 302] However, in what the Washington Post calls a “critical omission,” the FAA, the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and the FBI’s Financial Review Group are not notified. The two latter organizations have the power to tap into private credit card and bank data, and claim they could have readily found Alhazmi and Almihdhar, given the frequency the two used credit cards. [Washington Post, 7/25/2003] Furthermore, counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke and his Counterterrorism Security Group are not told about these two operatives before 9/11 either. [Newsweek, 3/24/2004] The CIA later claims the request was labeled “immediate,” the second most urgent category (the highest is reserved for things like declarations of war). [Los Angeles Times, 10/28/2001] The FBI denies that it was marked “immediate” and other agencies treated the request as a routine matter. [Los Angeles Times, 10/18/2001; US Congress, 9/20/2002] The State Department places all four men on the watch list the next day. [US Congress, 7/24/2003 ] However, this watch list, named TIPOFF, checks their names only if they use international flights. There is another watch list barring suspected terrorists from flying domestically. On 9/11, it contains only 12 names, including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and other al-Qaeda figures, and some names are added as late as August 28, 2001. But none of these four men are added to this domestic list before 9/11.(see April 24, 2000). [9/11 Commission, 1/26/2004]
Entity Tags: TIPOFF, Khalid Almihdhar, Margaret Gillespie, Richard A. Clarke, Immigration and Naturalization Service, US Department of State, US Customs Service, Tawfiq bin Attash, Nawaf Alhazmi, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Federal Aviation Administration, Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, Central Intelligence Agency, Counterterrorism and Security Group, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline

August 25-27, 2001: Alhazmi and Almihdhar Buy 9/11 Plane Tickets Despite Presence on Watch List Hijacker Khalid Almihdhar buys his 9/11 plane ticket on-line using a credit card; hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi does the same two days later, and also buys a ticket for his brother Salem (see August 25-September 5, 2001). Both men were put on a terrorist watch list on August 23 (see August 23, 2001), but the watch list only means they will be stopped if trying to enter or leave the US. There is another watch list that applies to domestic flights that some of their associates are on, but they are only placed on the international watch list (see April 24, 2000). Procedures are in place for law enforcement agencies to share watch list information with airlines and airports and such sharing is common, but the FAA and the airlines are not notified about this case, so the purchases raise no red flags. [Los Angeles Times, 9/20/2001; US Congress, 9/26/2002] An official later states that had the FAA been properly warned, “they should have been picked up in the reservation process.” [Washington Post, 10/2/2002] On September 4 and 5, 2001, an FBI agent will attempt to find Alhazmi and Almihdhar in the US, but will fail to conduct a simple credit card check that should have revealed these purchases (see September 4-5, 2001).
Entity Tags: Salem Alhazmi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Federal Aviation Administration
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, 9/11 Timeline


en lbnl:

January-February 2000: Secret Military Unit Identifies Al-Qaeda ‘Brooklyn’ Cell; Mohamed Atta Is Member


A blurry photograph of a 2005 reconstruction of the pre-9/11 Able Danger chart showing Mohamed Atta and others. [Source: C-SPAN]

A US Army intelligence program called Able Danger identifies five al-Qaeda terrorist cells; one of them has connections to Brooklyn, New York and will become informally known as the “Brooklyn” cell by the Able Danger team. This cell includes 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta, and three other 9/11 hijackers: Marwan Alshehhi, Khalid Almihdhar, and Nawaf Alhazmi. According to a former intelligence officer who claims he worked closely with Able Danger, the link to Brooklyn is not based upon any firm evidence, but computer analysis that established patterns in links between the four men. “[T]he software put them all together in Brooklyn.” [New York Times, 8/9/2005; Washington Times, 8/22/2005; Fox News, 8/23/2005; Government Security News, 9/2005] However, that does not necessarily imply them being physically present in Brooklyn. A lawyer later representing members of Able Danger states, “At no time did Able Danger identify Mohamed Atta as being physically present in the United States.” Furthermore, “No information obtained at the time would have led anyone to believe criminal activity had taken place or that any specific terrorist activities were being planned.” [CNN, 9/21/2005; US Congress, 9/21/2005] James D. Smith, a contractor working with the unit, discovers Mohamed Atta’s link to al-Qaeda. [WTOP Radio 103.5 (Washington), 9/1/2005] Smith has been using advanced computer software and analysing individuals who are going between mosques. He has made a link between Mohamed Atta and Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, ringleader of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. [Fox News, 8/28/2005; Government Security News, 9/2005] Atta is said to have some unspecified connection to the Al Farouq mosque in Brooklyn, a hotbed of anti-American sentiment once frequented by Abdul-Rahman, which also contained the notorious Al-Kifah Refugee Center. [Times Herald (Norristown), 9/22/2005] Smith obtained Atta’s name and photograph through a private researcher in California who was paid to gather the information from contacts in the Middle East. [New York Times, 8/22/2005] Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer claims the photo is not the well-known menacing Florida driver’s license photo of Atta. “This is an older, more grainy photo we had of him. It was not the best picture in the world.” It is said to contain several names or aliases for Atta underneath it. [Jerry Doyle Show, 9/20/2005; Chicago Tribune, 9/28/2005] LIWA analysts supporting Able Danger make a chart, which Shaffer describes in a radio interview as, “A chart probably about a 2x3 which had essentially five clusters around the center point which was bin Laden and his leadership.” [Savage Nation, 9/16/2005] The 9/11 Commission later claims that Atta only enters the United States for the first time several months later, in June 2000 (see June 3, 2000). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 224] However, investigations in the months after 9/11 find that Mohamed Atta and another of the hijackers rented rooms in Brooklyn around this time (see Spring 2000). Other newspaper accounts have the CIA monitoring Atta starting in January 2000, while he is living in Germany (see January-May 2000). Atta, Alshehhi, Almihdhar, Alhazmi and other hijackers have connections to associates of Sheikh Abdul-Rahman (see Early 2000-September 10, 2001).
Entity Tags: Al-Kifah Refugee Center, El Farouq, Al-Qaeda, Khalid Almihdhar, Mohamed Atta, Nawaf Alhazmi, Omar Abdul-Rahman, Al Farouq Mosque, Able Danger, Marwan Alshehhi
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Key Warnings, Warning Signs, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, Able Danger, Al-Kifah/MAK

[Antoon]

Zijn er wel forumleden die zo'n ellenlange berichten lezen?

[Micele]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Antoon

Zijn er wel forumleden die zo'n ellenlange berichten lezen?

Als ze eerlijkheidshalve meer willen onderzoeken, ja.

Maar als het te-ver-van-hun-bed is, neen.

Het is alleszins heel duidelijk - voor wie het doorgelezen heeft - dat het Pentagon en de CIA alles deden om de "zwaarverdachte terroristen" (ondanks 52 warnings - incl Mossad warning augustus 2001 -) , ttz de 5 tot 9 gekende namen, absoluut geheim te houden voor de FBI, en alles zijn slordig beloop liet gaan, er werd helemaal niet nagehaakt bij FAA of andere instanties of ze hun stoffige regeltjes wel juist konden interpreteren én uitvoerden, het was duidelijk dat 9/11 moest lukken zonder pottenkijkers.
En moest er een (hoog) ambtenaarke te ijverig worden, werd hem wel verteld dat het niet zo nodig moest, of dat het zijn verantwoordlijkheid niet was, of dat iemand anders dat wel zou regelen...

Dus niet op de Domestic Fly list zetten, alhoewel die 5 namen hun vliegopleidingen deden in de USA, en al langer in de USA verbleven... visa verblijfsvergunning én werkvergunning (CIA was van alles op de hoogte). Daardoor werden later hun docs ook venietigd (1) (privacy-wet)...

Èn zeker al geen aanhoudingsbevelen uitvaardigen voor de FBI, want zeker die 5 namen moesten absoluut beschermd worden en mochten zeker niet opgepakt worden. (Able Danger video)

En wat er voor een bericht lekte(?) van 2 namen (alibimatig voor de schijn ?) voor die ene FBI agent ? welke agent ? waarom zò kort voor 9/11 ?

On September 4 and 5, 2001, an FBI agent will attempt to find Alhazmi and Almihdhar in the US, but will fail to conduct a simple credit card check that should have revealed these purchases (see September 4-5, 2001)

pas 4-5 sept 2001 ? dat het simpele mislukt, lijkt toch logisch ...

Alles onder het geheimhoudende mom van speciaal diepteonderzoek naar de "echte masterminds"... of door andere achterpoortjes (1)+(2) , tja...

(1) Privacywet-achterpoortjes geïnterpreteerd om docs te vernietigen...

http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/20/20981/1.html
....
Wenn aber Dokumente von Able Danger in großer Zahl vernichtet wurden, ist die vergebliche Suche eigentlich kaum erstaunlich. *Das Pentagon hat die Vernichtung von Dokumenten inzwischen bestätigt. Dies sei streng nach Vorschrift aufgrund von Datenschutzrichtlinien erfolgt, da es hier auch um "US-Personen" oder um Menschen, die sich etwa mit einer Arbeitserlaubnis in der USA aufhalten, gegangen sei.

Zwaarverdachte gezochte terroristen die zelfmoordaanslagen wilden doen en vliegopleidingen volgden in de USA en daar maanden tot jaren verbleven, zijn plots gewoon privé-mensen met een verblijfvergunning met werks"toestemming"...

*Bevestiging van de vernietiging van docs door Pentagon:
http://cryptome.org/dod090105.htm

Voor diegene die niet willen lezen, 6 minuutjes opletten a.u.b.,
Wat is Able Danger:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ii3dcpaUuXk
(2)... Able Danger dossier: 2,5 Terrabyte data vernietigd...

(enorme) DOOFPOT.

[Micele]

vervolg... kort na 9/11 hoefde CIA/Pentagon en Able Danger hun papiertjes maar bij elkaar te leggen en de 19 terroristen werden snel "geboren", DNA-stalen welke ? totaal overbodig... het moest plots heel snel gaan...
Ik denk rond de 26 sept hadden Justitie en FBI... tiens ?... alle 19 -stoffelijke- daders met mooie foto´s al wereldkundig gemaakt.
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/auslan...159852,00.html

Tiens, 17 7-stemmers het loopt op. ; toch ca. 45 % 5-6-7 stemmers

CIA wist van niets, USAF wist van niets...

Op welke doelen zouden het de kapers gemunt hebben ?
Was USAF klaar de kapers snel te onderscheppen ?

http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aanslag_op_het_WTC_in_1993

lees maar de eerste alinea´s... (doc is van 6 aug 2001)

[illwill]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Micele

Als ze eerlijkheidshalve meer willen onderzoeken, ja.

Maar als het te-ver-van-hun-bed is, neen.

Stop nu eens met het woord "onderzoeken" te gebruiken. Er is hier geen kat op dit forum welke aan onderzoek doet ivm 9/11. Er zijn enkel personen die wat googelen ok.

[Micele]

vervolg 2:

Wanneer smelt staal:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tIx2CVRxRXg

En wanneer kon "de plaatsing" gebeuren ?:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHJHAp49Lh8

Peer reviewed bewijs van nano-thermiet in het puin van WTC:

http://www.bentham-open.org/pages/co...001/7TOCPJ.SGM

Active Thermitic Material Discovered in Dust from the 9/11 World Trade Center Catastrophe
pp.7-31 (25) Authors: Niels H. Harrit, Jeffrey Farrer, Steven E. Jones, Kevin R. Ryan, Frank M. Legge, Daniel Farnsworth, Gregg Roberts, James R. Gourley, Bradley R. Larsen
doi: 10.2174/1874412500902010007
Abstract

We have discovered distinctive red/gray chips in all the samples we have studied of the dust produced by the destruction of the World Trade Center. Examination of four of these samples, collected from separate sites, is reported in this paper. These red/gray chips show marked similarities in all four samples. One sample was collected by a Manhattan resident about ten minutes after the collapse of the second WTC Tower, two the next day, and a fourth about a week later. The properties of these chips were analyzed using optical microscopy, scanning electron microscopy (SEM), X-ray energy dispersive spectroscopy (XEDS), and differential scanning calorimetry (DSC). The red material contains grains approximately 100 nm across which are largely iron oxide, while aluminum is contained in tiny plate-like structures. Separation of components using methyl ethyl ketone demonstrated that elemental aluminum is present. The iron oxide and aluminum are intimately mixed in the red material. When ignited in a DSC device the chips exhibit large but narrow exotherms occurring at approximately 430 °C, far below the normal ignition temperature for conventional thermite. Numerous iron-rich spheres are clearly observed in the residue following the ignition of these peculiar red/gray chips. The red portion of these chips is found to be an unreacted thermitic material and highly energetic.

Keywords: JScanning electron microscopy, X-ray energy dispersive spectroscopy, Differential scanning calorimetry, DSC analysis, World Trade Center, WTC dust, 9/11, Iron-rich microspheres, Thermite, Super-thermite, Energetic nanocomposites, Nano-thermite

Affiliation: Department of Chemistry, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, DK-2100, Denmark.

Voor eventuele klachten of gevonden fouten moet ge bij de Professor Niels Harrit , een expert in de nanochemie zijn, hij is een van de auteurs van dit wetenschappellijk onderzoek, van de Universiteit in Kopenhagen, hier vind je de Website van het Instituut:
http://cmm.nbi.ku.dk/

netjes samengevat:
Thermitic Pyrotechnics in the WTC Made Simple: Three Points of Active Thermitic Material Discovered in Dust from the 9/11 World Trade Center Catastrophe that Anyone Can Understand

[parcifal]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Micele

vervolg 2:
Peer reviewed bewijs van nano-thermiet in het puin van WTC:

2 vragen toch wel daarbij :

1. Waarom denk je dat ze deze paper uitgerekend in het 'Bentham open journal' hebben gepubliceerd.
Daar gaat je peer review. Fail 1.

2. Wat doe je met deze opmerking :

In practice, the red layer of the wafers identified by the researchers contains exactly the same elements that we now know were present in the corrosion-resistant coating used during the construction of the World Trade Center, including the organic base constituted by linseed oil and alkyd resin

Volledige uiteenzetting : http://11-settembre.blogspot.com/200...laimed-in.html

Daar gaat je bewijs. Fail 2.

[Antoon]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door illwill

Stop nu eens met het woord "onderzoeken" te gebruiken. Er is hier geen kat op dit forum welke aan onderzoek doet ivm 9/11. Er zijn enkel personen die wat googelen ok.

nagel op de kop.

[Micele]

Oh, wat is het heel stil... ze fluisteren nog wat onzinnige woordjes...

[Big Slick]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door parcifal

2 vragen toch wel daarbij :

1. Waarom denk je dat ze deze paper uitgerekend in het 'Bentham open journal' hebben gepubliceerd.
Daar gaat je peer review. Fail 1.

2. Wat doe je met deze opmerking :


Volledige uiteenzetting : http://11-settembre.blogspot.com/200...laimed-in.html

Daar gaat je bewijs. Fail 2.

Heb zonet je link even doorgenomen.
Zo ga jij te werk.
Er wordt door iemand een paper gepost dat de officiele versie in vraag stelt.
Uw reactie: de site is een conpiracysite, de auteur is wegens beroep niet geplaatst om hierover te oordelen, etc...
Echter, wanneer het paper betreft als deze, welke de "conspiracytheorie" moet debunken, dan is er voor u helemaal geen probleem om die man te geloven.
Dus zeg eens: Who' the fuck is Enrico Manieri?
En waarom zouden we nu aan zijn theorie méér geloof moeten hechten, dan aan die van Jones of anderen?
Welk is uw motivatie om deze man's woorden hoger in te schatten dan die van Jones en z'n Deense collega?
Want in weze komt hij niet verder dan:
"Active Thermitic Material" claimed in Ground Zero dust may not be thermitic at all"
Het zou dus kunnen, (geen enkele zekerheid) dat het gevonden materiaal geen thermiet was.
En dan een hoop gelul over dat het produkt waarmee het staal behandeld was toevallig ook rood van kleur was. Tja.
Anyway, eens te meer blijkt dat je kritiekloos alles slikt wat in UW versie past.
Bij Enrico Manieri stel je helemaal niet de vragen, die je stelt bij auteurs van de andere kant.
Ik zal even het taalgebruik dat uw gewoonte is, ter hand nemen.
Als jij denkt dat je met één flutartikeltje van een onbenullige Italiaan bewezen hebt dat Jones en z'n collega's ernaast zitten, wel dan heb je ook gefaald.

[Big Slick]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Antoon

nagel op de kop.

Antoon, heb jij onderzoek gedaan ivm Global Warming?