De nieuwe wereld orde

[exodus]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Turkje

Dat is NIET de bron van uw tekstje.

Maar alle aangehaalde feiten staan er wel in. Het tekstje is volledig correct.

[Pindar]

en iedereen die denkt dat de kerk ook maar iest met liefde te maken heeft
raad ik toch echt even deze boeken aan!:

[size=2]Crimes of Christianity
Crucifixion of the truth
Pagan origins of the Christ Myth
Christianity Unmasked
Past Shock:The origin of religion
Science and religion : What you Were Never Told

zullen wel op internet te vinden zijn weet zo gauw de auteurs even niet.

met vriendelijke groeten

Pindar
[/size]

[exodus]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Pindar

Trouwens als het je echt intresseert, ga dan eens vergelijken tussen
de propaganda van Hitler, en wat de Amerikaanse regering NU doet.
Je zult versteld staan van de overeenkomsten!

Inderdaad, het is op exachte dezelfde manier "the homeland under attack" en "we must terminate terrorism at once" etc... heel gebaseerd op Nazi leest. Het probleem is als mensen naar Hitler kijken ze de propaganda gemakkelijk zien, maar als men naar de gebeurtenissen heden ten dage kijkt ziet men het totaal niet.

[Pindar]

In the early 1940¥s, the IG Farben Chemical Company employed a Polish salesman who sold cyanide to the Nazis for use in Auschwitz. The same salesman also worked as a chemist in the manufacture of the poison gas. This same cyanide gas along with Zyklon B and malathion was used to exterminate millions of Jews and other groups.

After the war the salesman, fearing for his life, joined the Catholic Church and was ordained a priest in 1946. The salesman became Poland¥s youngest bishop in 1958.


met vriendelijke groeten

Pindar

[Turkje]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door exodus

Ik denk dat Pindar gemist is. Het was de vorige paus die nu dood is die dat gedaan heeft.... Paulus II.

Die heeft bij mijn weten enkel gewerkt in een Solvay fabriek, en nog altijd bij mijn weten is het niet Solvay die Zyklon B hebben geproduceerd (integendeel: dat was IG Farben via de bedrijven Degesch (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Schädlingsbekämpfung mbH) en Testa (Tesch und Stabenow, Internationale Gesellschaft für Schädlingsbekämpfung m.b.H.).

Maar ja, dat is waarschijnlijk de "mainstream" info en dus per definitie niet correct zeker...

[Turkje]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door exodus

Maar alle aangehaalde feiten staan er wel in.

En dat hebt u persoonlijk gecontroleerd? Dan zou ik graag eens zien op welke pagina's van die website u dat allemaal hebt gevonden...

Het tekstje is volledig correct.

Geef dan toch maar de bron ervan

[exodus]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Turkje

En dat hebt u persoonlijk gecontroleerd? Dan zou ik graag eens zien op welke pagina's van die website u dat allemaal hebt gevonden...



Geef dan toch maar de bron ervan

Ik ga het niet opnieuw zoeken. Het tekstje stond er zoals het was met niets extra bij. Daar heb je toch geen bron meer voor nodig. De feiten die aangehaald worden zijn te verifïeren in officële documenten die beschikbaar zijn.

[Turkje]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Pindar

In the early 1940¥s, the IG Farben Chemical Company employed a Polish salesman who sold cyanide to the Nazis for use in Auschwitz. The same salesman also worked as a chemist in the manufacture of the poison gas. This same cyanide gas along with Zyklon B and malathion was used to exterminate millions of Jews and other groups.

After the war the salesman, fearing for his life, joined the Catholic Church and was ordained a priest in 1946. The salesman became Poland¥s youngest bishop in 1958.

Jullie moeten toch DRINGEND eens leren de BRON van jullie copy-paste tekstjes te VERMELDEN. Ik kan evengoed Engelstalige tekstjes uit mijn duim zuigen en die "voor waar" hier neerplanten.

De bron dus graag.

PS: JP II was GEEN "salesman" bij het begin van de oorlog, wel een student.

PPS: wanneer Zyklon B wordt blootgesteld aan lucht, ontstaat er spontaan waterstofcyanide. Zyklon B is dus de "carrier" voor het cyanide gas. Uw tekst "the same cyanide gas, along with Zyklon B" klopt dus niet.

[Turkje]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door exodus

Ik ga het niet opnieuw zoeken.

Je bent dus bang dat het niet zal kloppen ?

Daar heb je toch geen bron meer voor nodig.

Als je iets copy-paste, zeker in DEZE DISCUSSIE, zou het VERPLICHT moeten zijn je bron te vermelden. Raar genoeg doe ik dat altijd, maar jij en PIndar zijn meesters in het copy-pasten "?* volonté". Dat maakt het wreed moeilijk om iets na te trekken. Kun je dat nu zelf niet begrijpen ?

De feiten die aangehaald worden zijn te verifïeren in officële documenten die beschikbaar zijn.

Probeer het maar eens

[filosoof]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Turkje

Dat is NIET de bron van uw tekstje.

wat vind je hiervan:
"
[size=2]The Project for the New American Century[/size][size=2] is a non-profit educational organization dedicated to a few fundamental propositions: that American leadership is good both for America and for the world; and that such leadership requires military strength, diplomatic energy and commitment to moral principle. [/size]

[size=2]The Project for the New American Century[/size][size=2] intends, through issue briefs, research papers, advocacy journalism, conferences, and seminars, to explain what American world leadership entails. It will also strive to rally support for a vigorous and principled policy of American international involvement and to stimulate useful public debate on foreign and defense policy and America's role in the world. [/size]


..strive to rally support for a vigorous and principled policy of American international involvement....useful public debate on foreign and defense policy and America's role in the world.
Is dat onduidelijk???[edit]
[size=1]Edit:[/size]

[size=1]After edit by filosoof on 24-08-2005 at 16:26
Reason:
--------------------------------

wat vind je hiervan:
"
[size=2]The Project for the New American Century[/size][size=2] is a non-profit educational organization dedicated to a few fundamental propositions: that American leadership is good both for America and for the world; and that such leadership requires military strength, diplomatic energy and commitment to moral principle. [/size]

[size=2]The Project for the New American Century[/size][size=2] intends, through issue briefs, research papers, advocacy journalism, conferences, and seminars, to explain what American world leadership entails. It will also strive to rally support for a vigorous and principled policy of American international involvement and to stimulate useful public debate on foreign and defense policy and America's role in the world. [/size]


..strive to rally support for a vigorous and principled policy of American international involvement....useful public debate on foreign and defense policy and America's role in the world.
Is dat onduidelijk???[/size]

[size=1]Before any edits, post was:
--------------------------------

wat vind je hiervan:
"
[font=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][size=2]The Project for the New American Century[/size][/font][font=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][size=2] is a non-profit educational organization dedicated to a few fundamental propositions: that American leadership is good both for America and for the world; and that such leadership requires military strength, diplomatic energy and commitment to moral principle. [/size][/font]

[font=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][size=2]The Project for the New American Century[/size][/font][font=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif][size=2] intends, through issue briefs, research papers, advocacy journalism, conferences, and seminars, to explain what American world leadership entails. It will also strive to rally support for a vigorous and principled policy of American international involvement and to stimulate useful public debate on foreign and defense policy and America's role in the world. [/size][/font]
[font=Arial][/font]
[font=Arial][/font]
[font=Arial]..strive to rally support for a vigorous and principled policy of American international involvement....useful public debate on foreign and defense policy and America's role in the world.[/font]
[font=Arial]Is dat onduidelijk?[/font]
[font=Arial][/font]
[font=Arial][/font][/size]

[/edit]

[exodus]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Turkje

Je bent dus bang dat het niet zal kloppen ?




Als je iets copy-paste, zeker in DEZE DISCUSSIE, zou het VERPLICHT moeten zijn je bron te vermelden. Raar genoeg doe ik dat altijd, maar jij en PIndar zijn meesters in het copy-pasten "?* volonté". Dat maakt het wreed moeilijk om iets na te trekken. Kun je dat nu zelf niet begrijpen ?



Probeer het maar eens

Pg 63 van Rebuilding America's defenses

Further, the process of transformation even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor. interests or that of its allies in space
or the “infosphere” will find it difficult to exert global political
leadership.

Het staat er open en bloot en de andere zaken zijn er ook te veriferen. Het is toch wel straf dat ze hun catastrophic and catalyzing event gehad hebben. Toeval hoor. De disbelievers gaan lekker verder

[Pindar]

Als je iets copy-paste, zeker in DEZE DISCUSSIE, zou het VERPLICHT moeten zijn je bron te vermelden. Raar genoeg doe ik dat altijd, maar jij en PIndar zijn meesters in het copy-pasten "?* volonté". Dat maakt het wreed moeilijk om iets na te trekken. Kun je dat nu zelf niet begrijpen ?

in principe vermeld ik mijn bronnen. Het is echter niet altijd copy paste
ik heb vanmiddag aardig wat zitten intikken! Dank U!



met vriendelijke groeten

Pindar

[Turkje]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door filosoof

Is dat onduidelijk???

Ik weet heus wel wat de PNAC is hoor

[Pindar]

Maar ja, dat is waarschijnlijk de "mainstream" info en dus per definitie niet correct zeker...

Inderdaad, en ik denk dat dat het grootste verschil is tussen de
believers en non-believers (wat een rot termen!)
maar goed.
De 'believers' vertrouwen de mainstream niet echt en de 'non-believers'
blijkbaar wel.
Maar als je je er in gaat verdiepen ga je volgens mij zien dat die
mainstream voor geen meter deugt.
Ik heb het ontdekt door alternatieve bronnen te gaan raadplegen en
toen was ik verbaasd dat wat er bekend was niet in de mainstream staat!
Of zelfs niet geleerd wordt op school.


met vriendelijke groeten

Pindar

[Pindar]

dit is weer wel copy/paste, veel leesplezier!



"Hello all …

I have been saying for some 15 years that we are being deceived by the Big Lie. The lie is soooo big that most people cannot comprehend that anyone would seek to manipulate the truth on such a scale. This is why the BIG lie is far more effective than the little one.

People can accept that a politician could be taking bribes for services rendered because is lying on a human scale, if you like. But when the lie involves elements in their own government and military conspiring with outside forces to orchestrate the horrific attacks of September 11th it’s all too much to absorb.

'They would never do that'. Well, ‘they’ would do that and are doing it almost daily. The Big Lie is one of their core techniques for mass manipulation of the global population. This is what Adolf Hitler wrote in his 1925 autobiography Mein Kampf:

"[i]n the big lie there is always a certain force of credibility; because the broad masses of a nation are always more easily corrupted in the deeper strata of their emotional nature than consciously or voluntarily; and thus in the primitive simplicity of their minds they more readily fall victims to the big lie than the small lie, since they themselves often tell small lies in little matters but would be ashamed to resort to large-scale falsehoods. It would never come into their heads to fabricate colossal untruths, and they would not believe that others could have the impudence to distort the truth so infamously. Even though the facts which prove this to be so may be brought clearly to their minds, they will still doubt and waver and will continue to think that there may be some other explanation. For the grossly impudent lie always leaves traces behind it, even after it has been nailed down, a fact which is known to all expert liars in this world and to all who conspire together in the art of lying. These people know only too well how to use falsehood for the basest purposes."

This is precisely what we have seen since 9/11 and with other engineered ‘terrorist’ attacks like the London bombings.

Alongside the Big Lie itself there needs to be the suppression of information that exposes the lie with the evidence of its deceit. Thus, Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Propaganda Minister, wrote:

"If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it. The lie can be maintained only for such time as the State can shield the people from the political, economic and/or military consequences of the lie. It thus becomes vitally important for the State to use all of its powers to repress dissent, for the truth is the mortal enemy of the lie, and thus by extension, the truth is the greatest enemy of the State."

Once again, this is the world we live in today – with the Internet their prime target. These mind and emotional manipulation techniques have been used throughout history to subjugate the people and bring them into line behind the mental and emotional retards who seek power and control as a mask for their own monumental fears and insecurity. Show me an ego and I'll show you a man or woman who is deeply insecure. One is just a mask for the other and the bigger the insecurity the bigger the mask necessary for camouflage. It can reach such a scale that it produces the Hitler’s, Himmlers, Stalins and Bushes, desperately frightened and insecure people hiding their little-boy vulnerabilities behind power over others.

The way the system is structured it brings the liars to the top. It has to because they are selling a cover-story to the people to hide the real agenda and their only option, therefore, is to lie. They can’t tell the truth – like ‘the forces controlling me were behind 9/11 because they wanted to frighten the people into giving their freedoms away.’ Or, ‘we are going to invade Iraq because it is part of a master plan to control the entire Middle East for the benefit of those who control me – we also want Iran, Syria and a list of others, too.’

Instead they LIE. They say that 19 Muslim terrorists did the impossible on 9/11 and so the war on terror was born – born of the BIG LIE. They invent ‘weapons of mass destruction’ for the excuse to invade Iraq knowing all along that they would not find them. Leaked British government documents have proved that the cover story for the Iraq invasion was a lie from the start and the same people who lied to us about that were the same people who have told us the official story of 9/11.

They lie all the time because they have to lie – the truth would out them in jail. So here are some of the stories this week that fall into the two familiar categories you will find in any BIG LIE dictatorship. (1) The lie to sell the cover story; (2) the efforts to suppress information that would expose the lie."

en geen bron, is e-mail die ik binnen kreeg.
doe er mee wat je wilt.


met vriendelijke groeten

Pindar

[Turkje]

@ exodus

Bon, nu gaan we dus eens zien wat je vroeger hebt gequote:

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door exodus

This document also mentions that public support would be very difficult to rally for these upcoming wars, and that a "Pearl Harbor Like Attack" would be very helpful. (1997- Now this is a public document, saying we need helpful Pearl Harbor attacks, that's motive, and practically admittance.

Hierbij wordt dus expliciet de link gemaakt tussen "upcoming wars" en het "wenselijk zijn" ("helpful") van een "Pearl Harbor Like Attack".

Nu gaan we eens even lezen wat de PNAC er zelf over zegt (ik breid je quote even uit om de context te schetsen):

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door exodus

Pg 63 van Rebuilding America's defenses

[i]V Creating Tommorow's Dominant Force /i]

Waarover gaat dit hoofdstuk? Het gaat over "To preserve American military preeminence in the coming decades, the DoD must move more agressively to experiment with new technologies and operational concepts, and seek to exploit the emerging revolution in military affairs". Het gaat dus niet over het voeren van oorlogen, maar over het investeren in nieuwe militaire technologieën. Het begin van dit hoofdstuk start met de spijtige vaststelling dat budgetten voor "military research and development has been reduced dramatically during the last decade".... Men maakt de vergelijking tussen de Reagan periode (20% naar R&D) en nu (8% naar R&D), "and even this reduced total is primarily for upgrades of current weapons". Dat vinden de PNAC rakkers blijkbaar niet zo leuk, en ze willen dus "transformation". Die "transformation" is echter niet evident: "The United States cannot declare a "strategic pause" while experimenting with new technologies"; ze moeten ook rekening houden met hun "allies" en "A transformation strategy that solely pursued capabilities of projecting force from the US, for example, and sacrificed towards basing and presence, would be ad odds with larger American policy goals and would trouble American allies".

En dan komt vlak daarachter de volgende zinsnede:

[i]Further, the process of transformation even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor.

Deze ganse uiteenzetting heb ik gedaan om er dus op te wijzen dat dit document zeer beschrijvend is en puur hypothetisch. Nergens komt er hier naar voor dat men een nieuw Pearl Harbor [i]wenst[i/], zoals wel wordt gesuggereerd in uw eerste quote, noch dat er aan dat Pearl Harbor een nieuwe oorlog wordt gekoppeld. Integendeel zelfs: het gaat om nieuwe militaire technieken, niet om nieuwe oorlogen.

Het bewijs dat ze trouwens nog veraf zitten van hetgeen ze willen bereiken vind je in de quote die je (waarschijnlijik onbewust) hebt meege-copy-paste:

"An America incapable of protecting its interests in ... the "infosphere" will find it difficult to exert global political leadership".


De vraag die ik me nu stel is: zijn de believers bereid deze nuances in rekening te brengen of niet? Of staat er volgens u (jullie) nog altijd dat "er een nieuwe pearl harbor moet komen om zo snel mogelijk oorlogje te gaan voeren" ?

[Pindar]

Jullie moeten toch DRINGEND eens leren de BRON van jullie copy-paste tekstjes te VERMELDEN. Ik kan evengoed Engelstalige tekstjes uit mijn duim zuigen en die "voor waar" hier neerplanten.

De bron dus graag.

PS: JP II was GEEN "salesman" bij het begin van de oorlog, wel een student.

Je hebt hier wel gelijk, Maar kan het iets minder denigrerend aub!
Zou mij meer uitnodigen, want ik ben wel voor hoor en wederhoor ja.

Hier is de bron: http://www.wiolawapress.com/nazipope.htm

in principe geef ik die altijd, maar ik ben ook maar een gewoon mens,
dus als je me er gewoon netjes op een respectvolle wijze op wijst is alles ok.

met vriendelijke groeten

Pindar

[filosoof]

eerder dit:http://www.sfu.ca/casr/ft-lagasse1.htm
[size=1]Canada-US Relations - Defence Partnership – July 2003[/size]
[size=2]NORAD, NorthCom, and the Binational Planning Group:
The Evolution of Canada–US Defence Relations – Part 1[/size]




[size=1]Philippe Lagassé holds a Master's degree from the War Studies Program at the Royal Military College, Kingston[/size]
[size=2]Continental Defence in the Wake of 11 September: A New Urgency

In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, defence of the North American continent returned to the forefront of American national security policy. The Bush Administration quickly formed a civilian-led, cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security. On the military side, on 17 April 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the American Unified Command Plan (UCP) was being updated to include a new regional command – Northern Command (NorthCom).

The new command was given responsibility for the continental United States, Canada, Mexico, portions of the Caribbean and the contiguous waters in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans up to 500 miles off the North American coastline. NorthCom's mandate is to "provide a necessary focus for [continental] aerospace, land and sea defenses, and critical support for [the] nation’s civil authorities in times of national need."

Rumsfeld boasted that the introduction of NorthCom – with all of North America as its geographic command – "is part of the greatest transformation of the Unified Command Plan since its inception in 1947."

NorthCom is a wholly American command. Inescapably, however, its presence will profoundly influence those other states included within its geographic area of responsibility. Canadian military and political leaders, mindful of historic and continuing military ties to the United States, have engaged in an increasing number
of debates regarding the significance of this singular
UCP revision. The formation of NorthCom has revived familiar disputes regarding the need to cooperate with the US in continental defence, weighed against the likely impact of such cooperation on our nation's sovereignty.

Implications for Canadian Defence Policy

What impact will the formation of NorthCom have on Canadian national security policy? To address this question, we need to review the history of the Canada–US continental defence relationship, paying special attention to Canadian concerns regarding sovereignty. Such a review will highlight lasting trends in the North American continental defence relationship.

To grasp the increasing priority given to continental defence within the United States military and political leadership since 11 September 2001, we need to examine the details of NorthCom’s structure and function. With this back- ground information in hand, we can evaluate NorthCom's likely influence on Canadian foreign and defence policy. It is predicted that, 'after NorthCom', the evolution of Canada's relationship with the US, and any future Canadian contributions to continental defence, will follow closely the pattern of historical experience.

Sovereignty and Ambiguity

How has Canada approached cooperative continental defence with the United States in the past? Despite concerns about its sovereignty, Canada has tended to embrace joint continental defence efforts with the United States. At the forefront of these efforts is the Canadian military, which has been remarkably successful in convincing their political masters of the necessity of binational cooperation in the defence of North America.

In 1982, reflecting on the importance assigned to the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), renowned Canadian diplomat John W. Holmes noted:[/size][size=-1]"NORAD, which seems a step in the continentalization of North American defence, can be regarded from another angle as a means of preserving a Canadian role and an appropriate degree of sovereignty in a situation in which, if there were no rules, the Americans would simply take over the defence of the continent." [/size]


[size=2]Defence Against Help

Typically characterized as a "defence against help" strategy, the reality described by Holmes characterizes the Canadian approach to continental defence for the better part of the 20th century. To be precise, since before the Second World War, Canada has continually chosen to forego a pure, but vulnerable, sovereignty. Instead, Canada has opted for a somewhat truncated, but better secured, sovereignty by cooperating in the defence of the continent with the United States. In truth, of all the trends in the Canada–US defence relationship, this sovereignty/security trade-off has been an ever-present, acceptable accommodation.

Speaking at Queen's University in August 1938, American President Franklin Roosevelt pledged that "the people of the United States will not stand by if domination of Canada is threatened by any other Empire." Replying within the week, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King declared that "enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea or air to the United States across Canada."

This 'Kingston Dispensation', as named by Michel Fortmann and David Haglund, reveals an early manifestation of Canada's sovereignty dilemma. Faced with an implicit suggestion that America would be willing to protect the continent alone if necessary, King realized that Canada had to bolster its own defences to alleviate its neighbour's concerns. While Canada and the United States did not establish any joint continental defence measures at this time, Canadian defence policy has nonetheless been influenced by American interests ever since. In fact, it was in Canada's interests to take account of America's sense of vulnerability.

Canada-US Permanent Joint Board on Defence

The Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) – formed in 1940 – continues to be the highest bilateral defence forum between Canada and the United States, providing both governments with senior military and diplomatic contact. Despite the success of the PJBD, however, the Second World War also alerted Canadian decision-makers to the need to be cautious in dealing with the United States. Early in the war, in an effort to build the Alaskan Highway, and man the Northeast Staging Route to Europe, the United States stationed a formidable number of its forces on Canadian soil.

Unsurprisingly, Canadian officials regarded this American presence with alarm. For instance, the Canadian High Commissioner in London, Vincent Massey, was unapologetic in his sentiment that "Canada has been too preoccupied with her own war effort to cope with the Americans who unfortunately, under the cover of the needs of war, are acting in the Northwest as if they owned the country." Luckily, before the war's end, Ottawa obtained guarantees of an American withdrawal. While Canadian officials did not question that these deployments had been made in good faith, the ease with which they had occurred signalled that concrete steps were needed to prevent a similar strain on Canadian sovereignty.[/size]
[size=2]en[/size]
[size=2][size=1]Canada-US Relations - Defence Partnership – July 2003[/size]

[size=2]NORAD, NorthCom, and the Binational Planning Group:
The Evolution of Canada–US Defence Relations – Part 1[/size]




[size=1]Philippe Lagassé holds a Master's degree from the War Studies Program at the Royal Military College, Kingston[/size][size=2]Continental Defence in the Wake of 11 September: A New Urgency

In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, defence of the North American continent returned to the forefront of American national security policy. The Bush Administration quickly formed a civilian-led, cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security. On the military side, on 17 April 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the American Unified Command Plan (UCP) was being updated to include a new regional command – Northern Command (NorthCom).

The new command was given responsibility for the continental United States, Canada, Mexico, portions of the Caribbean and the contiguous waters in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans up to 500 miles off the North American coastline. NorthCom's mandate is to "provide a necessary focus for [continental] aerospace, land and sea defenses, and critical support for [the] nation’s civil authorities in times of national need."

Rumsfeld boasted that the introduction of NorthCom – with all of North America as its geographic command – "is part of the greatest transformation of the Unified Command Plan since its inception in 1947."

NorthCom is a wholly American command. Inescapably, however, its presence will profoundly influence those other states included within its geographic area of responsibility. Canadian military and political leaders, mindful of historic and continuing military ties to the United States, have engaged in an increasing number
of debates regarding the significance of this singular
UCP revision. The formation of NorthCom has revived familiar disputes regarding the need to cooperate with the US in continental defence, weighed against the likely impact of such cooperation on our nation's sovereignty.

Implications for Canadian Defence Policy

What impact will the formation of NorthCom have on Canadian national security policy? To address this question, we need to review the history of the Canada–US continental defence relationship, paying special attention to Canadian concerns regarding sovereignty. Such a review will highlight lasting trends in the North American continental defence relationship.

To grasp the increasing priority given to continental defence within the United States military and political leadership since 11 September 2001, we need to examine the details of NorthCom’s structure and function. With this back- ground information in hand, we can evaluate NorthCom's likely influence on Canadian foreign and defence policy. It is predicted that, 'after NorthCom', the evolution of Canada's relationship with the US, and any future Canadian contributions to continental defence, will follow closely the pattern of historical experience.

Sovereignty and Ambiguity

How has Canada approached cooperative continental defence with the United States in the past? Despite concerns about its sovereignty, Canada has tended to embrace joint continental defence efforts with the United States. At the forefront of these efforts is the Canadian military, which has been remarkably successful in convincing their political masters of the necessity of binational cooperation in the defence of North America.

In 1982, reflecting on the importance assigned to the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), renowned Canadian diplomat John W. Holmes noted:[/size][/font] [font=Times, serif][size=-1]"NORAD, which seems a step in the continentalization of North American defence, can be regarded from another angle as a means of preserving a Canadian role and an appropriate degree of sovereignty in a situation in which, if there were no rules, the Americans would simply take over the defence of the continent." [/size]


[size=2]Defence Against Help

Typically characterized as a "defence against help" strategy, the reality described by Holmes characterizes the Canadian approach to continental defence for the better part of the 20th century. To be precise, since before the Second World War, Canada has continually chosen to forego a pure, but vulnerable, sovereignty. Instead, Canada has opted for a somewhat truncated, but better secured, sovereignty by cooperating in the defence of the continent with the United States. In truth, of all the trends in the Canada–US defence relationship, this sovereignty/security trade-off has been an ever-present, acceptable accommodation.

Speaking at Queen's University in August 1938, American President Franklin Roosevelt pledged that "the people of the United States will not stand by if domination of Canada is threatened by any other Empire." Replying within the week, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King declared that "enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea or air to the United States across Canada."

This 'Kingston Dispensation', as named by Michel Fortmann and David Haglund, reveals an early manifestation of Canada's sovereignty dilemma. Faced with an implicit suggestion that America would be willing to protect the continent alone if necessary, King realized that Canada had to bolster its own defences to alleviate its neighbour's concerns. While Canada and the United States did not establish any joint continental defence measures at this time, Canadian defence policy has nonetheless been influenced by American interests ever since. In fact, it was in Canada's interests to take account of America's sense of vulnerability.

Canada-US Permanent Joint Board on Defence

The Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) – formed in 1940 – continues to be the highest bilateral defence forum between Canada and the United States, providing both governments with senior military and diplomatic contact. Despite the success of the PJBD, however, the Second World War also alerted Canadian decision-makers to the need to be cautious in dealing with the United States. Early in the war, in an effort to build the Alaskan Highway, and man the Northeast Staging Route to Europe, the United States stationed a formidable number of its forces on Canadian soil.

Unsurprisingly, Canadian officials regarded this American presence with alarm. For instance, the Canadian High Commissioner in London, Vincent Massey, was unapologetic in his sentiment that "Canada has been too preoccupied with her own war effort to cope with the Americans who unfortunately, under the cover of the needs of war, are acting in the Northwest as if they owned the country." Luckily, before the war's end, Ottawa obtained guarantees of an American withdrawal. While Canadian officials did not question that these deployments had been made in good faith, the ease with which they had occurred signalled that concrete steps were needed to prevent a similar strain on Canadian sovereignty.


en
[size=1]Canada-US Relations - Defence Partnership – July 2003[/size]

[size=2]NORAD, NorthCom, and the Binational Planning Group:
The Evolution of Canada–US Defence Relations – Part 1[/size]



[size=1]Philippe Lagassé holds a Master's degree from the War Studies Program at the Royal Military College, Kingston[/size]
[size=2]Continental Defence in the Wake of 11 September: A New Urgency

In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, defence of the North American continent returned to the forefront of American national security policy. The Bush Administration quickly formed a civilian-led, cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security. On the military side, on 17 April 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that the American Unified Command Plan (UCP) was being updated to include a new regional command – Northern Command (NorthCom).

The new command was given responsibility for the continental United States, Canada, Mexico, portions of the Caribbean and the contiguous waters in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans up to 500 miles off the North American coastline. NorthCom's mandate is to "provide a necessary focus for [continental] aerospace, land and sea defenses, and critical support for [the] nation’s civil authorities in times of national need."

Rumsfeld boasted that the introduction of NorthCom – with all of North America as its geographic command – "is part of the greatest transformation of the Unified Command Plan since its inception in 1947."

NorthCom is a wholly American command. Inescapably, however, its presence will profoundly influence those other states included within its geographic area of responsibility. Canadian military and political leaders, mindful of historic and continuing military ties to the United States, have engaged in an increasing number
of debates regarding the significance of this singular
UCP revision. The formation of NorthCom has revived familiar disputes regarding the need to cooperate with the US in continental defence, weighed against the likely impact of such cooperation on our nation's sovereignty.

Implications for Canadian Defence Policy

What impact will the formation of NorthCom have on Canadian national security policy? To address this question, we need to review the history of the Canada–US continental defence relationship, paying special attention to Canadian concerns regarding sovereignty. Such a review will highlight lasting trends in the North American continental defence relationship.

To grasp the increasing priority given to continental defence within the United States military and political leadership since 11 September 2001, we need to examine the details of NorthCom’s structure and function. With this back- ground information in hand, we can evaluate NorthCom's likely influence on Canadian foreign and defence policy. It is predicted that, 'after NorthCom', the evolution of Canada's relationship with the US, and any future Canadian contributions to continental defence, will follow closely the pattern of historical experience.

Sovereignty and Ambiguity

How has Canada approached cooperative continental defence with the United States in the past? Despite concerns about its sovereignty, Canada has tended to embrace joint continental defence efforts with the United States. At the forefront of these efforts is the Canadian military, which has been remarkably successful in convincing their political masters of the necessity of binational cooperation in the defence of North America.

In 1982, reflecting on the importance assigned to the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), renowned Canadian diplomat John W. Holmes noted:[/size][size=-1]"NORAD, which seems a step in the continentalization of North American defence, can be regarded from another angle as a means of preserving a Canadian role and an appropriate degree of sovereignty in a situation in which, if there were no rules, the Americans would simply take over the defence of the continent." [/size]


[size=2]Defence Against Help

Typically characterized as a "defence against help" strategy, the reality described by Holmes characterizes the Canadian approach to continental defence for the better part of the 20th century. To be precise, since before the Second World War, Canada has continually chosen to forego a pure, but vulnerable, sovereignty. Instead, Canada has opted for a somewhat truncated, but better secured, sovereignty by cooperating in the defence of the continent with the United States. In truth, of all the trends in the Canada–US defence relationship, this sovereignty/security trade-off has been an ever-present, acceptable accommodation.

Speaking at Queen's University in August 1938, American President Franklin Roosevelt pledged that "the people of the United States will not stand by if domination of Canada is threatened by any other Empire." Replying within the week, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King declared that "enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea or air to the United States across Canada."

This 'Kingston Dispensation', as named by Michel Fortmann and David Haglund, reveals an early manifestation of Canada's sovereignty dilemma. Faced with an implicit suggestion that America would be willing to protect the continent alone if necessary, King realized that Canada had to bolster its own defences to alleviate its neighbour's concerns. While Canada and the United States did not establish any joint continental defence measures at this time, Canadian defence policy has nonetheless been influenced by American interests ever since. In fact, it was in Canada's interests to take account of America's sense of vulnerability.

Canada-US Permanent Joint Board on Defence

The Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) – formed in 1940 – continues to be the highest bilateral defence forum between Canada and the United States, providing both governments with senior military and diplomatic contact. Despite the success of the PJBD, however, the Second World War also alerted Canadian decision-makers to the need to be cautious in dealing with the United States. Early in the war, in an effort to build the Alaskan Highway, and man the Northeast Staging Route to Europe, the United States stationed a formidable number of its forces on Canadian soil.

Unsurprisingly, Canadian officials regarded this American presence with alarm. For instance, the Canadian High Commissioner in London, Vincent Massey, was unapologetic in his sentiment that "Canada has been too preoccupied with her own war effort to cope with the Americans who unfortunately, under the cover of the needs of war, are acting in the Northwest as if they owned the country." Luckily, before the war's end, Ottawa obtained guarantees of an American withdrawal. While Canadian officials did not question that these deployments had been made in good faith, the ease with which they had occurred signalled that concrete steps were needed to prevent a similar strain on Canadian sovereignty.
[/size][size=2][size=1]Canada-US Relations - Defence Partnership – July 2003[/size][/font]
http://www.sfu.ca/casr/ft-lagasse2.htm


[size=2]NORAD, NorthCom, and the Binational Planning Group:
The Evolution of Canada–US Defence Relations — Part 2
[/size][size=2]Canada-US Relations – Military Cooperation Committee (MCC)

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Canada and the United States expanded their formal military links at the operational level. The PJBD dealt primarily with political aspects of the defence relationship. A new body, the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), was instituted to manage joint military planning between American and Canadian forces.

Wary of surprise attacks after Pearl Harbor and concerned about the military power of an increasingly hostile Soviet Union, American and Canadian defence officials used the binational planning structure of the MCC to set up the first joint continental defence initiative in 1946. Known as the Basic Security Plan (BSP), the new arrangement included "a comprehensive continental air defence organization, cartography, air and surface surveillance to provide early warning of attack, anti-submarine and coastal defence, counter-lodgements plans, and a joint command structure."

The Canadian Department of External Affairs (DEA) objected to the fact that it was denied access to the BSP working group by reason of its purported secrecy. In spite of these reservations, the BSP was approved by both the United States and Canada. Whatever the misgivings of Canadian political leaders, the PJBD and the MCC established a precedent of formal relations between Canada and the United States, providing for the coordinated defence of the continent.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

In 1949, faced with Soviet brinksmanship over Berlin, and Moscow's refusal to grant promised self-determination to its Eastern European satellites, Canada, the United States and their European allies formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Canada and the United States were accorded their own Canada–US Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG) to oversee the defence of North America within the larger NATO structure.

In response to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Canada embarked on a rearmament program. A substantial portion of the Royal Canadian Navy’s 154 ships were assigned to NATO's Supreme Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). For the most part, the RCN performed anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and escort operations. These efforts inevitably led to close cooperation and joint exercises between the RCN and the United States Navy (USN). Both navies were permitted to operate within each other's territorial waters when pursuing Soviet submarines. Thus, for the sake of the maritime defence of North America, strong links were forged between the RCN and the USN.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

In 1949, another event helped to shape the course of North American continental defence: the detonation of an atomic weapon by the Soviet Union, coupled with their deployment of Tupolev Tu-4 Bull long-range bombers. The end of the American atomic monopoly imparted a new sense of urgency to continental defence. The US Secretary of State, declared that Canada had just become "a very important piece of real estate."

Washington was determined to beef up the defence of North American airspace. Drafted in 1952, National Security Council Memorandum 159 (NSC-159) explicitly stated: "The present continental defence programs are not now adequate either to prevent, neutralize or seriously deter the military or covert acts which the Soviet Union is capable of launching."

Pertaining to air defence in particular, NSC-159 was adamant that the new initiative needed to be binational:"[/size][size=-1]It seems clear ... that since the success of our distant early warning system and the consequent effective deployment of defensive measures, both military and civil, depend upon the speed with which Canadian cooperation might be brought into play ... Canadian agreement and participation on an adequate scale is essential to the speeding up of several of the highest priority programs." [/size][/font]




[size=2]Canada Contemplates the Erosion of its Sovereignty

American planners were eager to get on with this new undertaking, but the Canadian government of Louis St. Laurent was hesitant. At issue for the Prime Minister and his Minister of Defence, Brook Claxton, were the implied costs and sovereignty infringements of a continental air defence expansion. The St. Laurent Liberals had experienced first-hand the American presence in Canada during the Second World War. Any suggestion by the United States of grander defence mechanisms invoked images of American soldiers on Canadian soil – and a corresponding loss of sovereignty.

The Canadian military took a very different perspective. The Chiefs of Staff argued that American concerns and recommendations were legitimate and Canada's involvement was absolutely necessary. After the detonation of a massive thermonuclear device by the Soviet Union in 1953, Canadian military officials implored Claxton and St. Laurent to reconsider their cautious approach.

Ultimately, Claxton recognized that Washington's steadfastness left Ottawa with few options. The geography of North America – and the nature of Canada–US relations – were such that Canadian involvement in an improved continental air defence system was inevitable. Canadian political leaders reasoned that securing Canadian interests could be better achieved by negotiating a favourable regime structure with the United States. [/size][size=2]http://www.sfu.ca/casr/ft-lagasse3.htm[/size]
[size=2][size=1]Canada-US Relations - Defence Partnership – July 2003[/size]



[size=2]NORAD, NorthCom, and the Binational Planning Group:
The Evolution of Canada–US Defence Relations — Part 3[/size]

[size=2]Canada-US Relations – Military Study Group (MSG)

In 1953, a Canada–US Military Study Group (MSG) was formed. At Defence Minister Claxton's request, the MSG exposed officers of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) to detailed information about proposed radar installations. In turn, these officials provided the Canadian government with independent assessments of projected air defence infrastructures. When the June 1954 MSG report was released, the RCAF, which had been working closely with the United States Air Force (USAF) for most of a decade, supported and bolstered American arguments favouring the new binational early warning systems.

Specifically, the report stated that building a Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line in northern Canada was "necessary if the development of the Air Defense System is to be kept abreast of anticipated improvements in Soviet capabilities to attack by air the vital areas of Canada and the United States." Despite the fact that it would mean the return of American soldiers to Canadian soil – albeit in minimal numbers – the St. Laurent government agreed in September 1954 to build the DEW Line (which would be paid for by the United States). To address the sovereignty issues – not to mention national defence industry interests – Ottawa ensured that:

• DEW Line radar sites were to be chosen by both governments
• Canadian equipment was to be used to build them
• Canadian law would be applied on all the sites.

Beyond radar installations, both the RCAF and the USAF insisted that an integrated operational command was necessary to enhance the effectiveness of their collaborative efforts. Though the RCAF and USAF already had a measure of tactical cooperation, both services realized that such an ad hoc approach was insufficient in light of the capabilities of the Soviet Union. As long as the two air forces functioned independently at the operational level, a measure of efficiency was being sacrificed. From a military perspective, close operational coordination of air defence forces was a strategic necessity.

The Birth of NORAD

North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) 'stood-up' on 12 September 1957. It was, at that time, still an unsigned arrangement between Canada and the US. The formal agreement was officially signed on 12 May 1958 by representatives of the Conservative government under John Diefenbaker.

NORAD was structured to give each country a relatively equal representation despite their disproportionate financial and force contributions – the United States, of course, shouldered the greater burden of resource allocation. The organization was headed by an American Commander-in-Chief (CINCNORAD) and a Canadian Deputy. To reinforce the binational status of the command, CINCNORAD was to report to both Canadian and US military authorities.

As a key factor in the formation of NORAD, the sovereignty of each of the nations involved would be acknowledged by the retention of national command over respective military units. In addition, the selection of permanent stations, the maintenance of discipline, and the training, logistical support, and composition of national forces remained the separate responsibility of each of the Canadian and American governments.

NORAD Adjusts to the 1980s

Interest in continental air defence declined somewhat during the 1960s. But, in the late 1970s, new threats – such the cruise missile and stealth aircraft technology – rekindled the desire to maintain and strengthen continental air defence, in both the United States and Canada.

In 1981, NORAD was renamed North American Aerospace Defence Command. Then, in 1985, NORAD underwent a substantial modernization program:

• the aging DEW Line was replaced by a new North Warning System (NWS)
• US E-3 Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) were based in Canada
• 'Over-The-Horizon Backscatter' (OTH-B) radar filled in the 'dead areas'
• Canada assigned four squadrons of CF-18 Hornet interceptors to NORAD

Historical Trends – Overview

Canada and the United States have recognized that their security is inescapably intertwined. Geography and military logic compel them to participate in joint continental defence initiatives. At the same time, Canadian governments are careful to address the ongoing sovereignty dilemma. Even when radar sites were built in northern Canada, guarantees were obtained – a broad conception of Canadian sovereignty was respected. Similarly, when NORAD was negotiated, both countries retained their national command authority. Canada has cooperated with the United States out of necessity and has, at the same time, been able to maintain an acceptable degree of sovereignty.

[/size]http://www.sfu.ca/casr/ft-lagasse4.htm

[size=1]Canada-US Relations - Defence Partnership – July 2003[/size]



[size=2]NORAD, NorthCom, and the Binational Planning Group:
The Evolution of Canada–US Defence Relations — Part 4
[/size][size=2]A Deep-seated Sense of Vulnerability

The events of 11 September 2001 have engendered a deep-seated sense of vulnerability in the United States. After decades of being primarily concerned with external enemies, the United States now sees internal threats as its top national security priority. The United States had been moving towards bolstering the defence of its homeland in the late 1990s, but only the 2001 terrorist attacks could have conferred such a sense of urgency to homeland defence. Nothing better illustrates the gravity of the situation, from a military perspective, than the formation of Northern Command (NorthCom) by the US Department of Defense.

A Regional Command, NorthCom’s functions are twofold. First, NorthCom will assume the defence of the American homeland. This role requires that NorthCom "conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests in the assigned area of responsibility." Second, NorthCom will, "as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations." Both of these NorthCom missions have affected the structures, organization, and missions of the United States military, National Guard and Coast Guard.
[For more information, see background sidebar: Aid to Civil Authorities]

All Atlantic-Oriented Service Commands under NorthCom

NorthCom has been granted the authority to command forces from all services in times of need. Specifically, NorthCom will be permitted to utilize all "Atlantic-oriented" service commands for vital continental defence operations. In other words, in a crisis, the USN Atlantic Fleet, USAF Air Combat Command, Marine Forces Atlantic and US Army Forces Command may come under the direction of Combatant Commander NorthCom.

Although NorthCom is responsible for the defence of the continental United States, the air defence of North America remains NORAD's charge. Indeed, since 11 September, NORAD's role has expanded. Notably, NORAD has begun tracking North American air traffic in conjunction with the civil authorities – the US Federal Aviation Administration and Nav Canada.

This new responsibility resulted in a 'streamlining' of the Rules of Engagement, allowing for a more aggressive defence of North American airspace. (NORAD had been principally concerned with external aerospace threats and drug trafficking.) More importantly, in order to better coordinate their intertwined and mutually relevant tasks, NORAD and NorthCom were 'dual-hatted' – General Ralph E. Eberhart, Commander-in-Chief NORAD – was immediately given command of NorthCom upon its creation.

A Maritime Equivalent of NORAD?

Admiral Vernon E. Clark, Chief of Naval Operations (USN), has recommended the creation of a "maritime equivalent to NORAD ... established under the control of the Coast Guard with support from the Navy, other federal agencies and the private sector." Furthermore, "this capability must be coordinated with NorthCom." Recent statements by General Eberhart confirm that a "naval NORAD" linked to NorthCom is being considered by DoD.

American contemplation of a "naval NORAD," inevitably raised questions about Canadian collaboration. Despite the fact that NorthCom is a purely American command which does not, and will not, integrate any foreign forces into its configuration, geographic necessity demands that a successful completion of the NorthCom mission be undertaken in some form of collaboration with the United States' North American neighbours.

The United States has communicated a determined interest in securing Canadian cooperation in an expanded continental defence. As Paul Cellucci, the American ambassador to Canada, remarked on 10 September 2002: "We can't defend North America alone. Canada occupies a huge piece of territory here in North America and we need Canada's help in defending the air, the land and the sea." In response to American insistence, the Canadian government is following its traditional path – cautiously studying the options of new military arrangements with the United States and feeling unsettled, as always, by the possible impact on Canadian sovereignty.

[/size]

http://www.sfu.ca/casr/ft-lagasse5.htm
[size=1]Canada-US Relations - Defence Partnership – July 2003[/size]



[size=2]NORAD, NorthCom, and the Binational Planning Group:
The Evolution of Canada–US Defence Relations — Part 5
[/size][size=2]A Very Asymmetric Alliance

On the day of the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington, the Canadian government without hesitation offered assistance to the US government and the American people in their time of need. Nearly all civilian flights headed to American cities were diverted to Canadian airports, the entire Canadian Forces (CF) was put on a state of increased readiness, Canada's CF-18 fighters were mobilized through NORAD, and the CF's air- mobile Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) from 8 Wing in Trenton, Ontario, was prepared to deploy to the United States.

In the months that followed, Canada joined with the United States in its 'War on Terrorism', allying with American ground and naval forces in and around Afghanistan. In addition, the Chrétien government passed Bill C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act, and signed a Border Security Declaration with the US on 12 December 2001.

In light of these undertakings, the Canadian government has been unambiguous in expressing its continental solidarity with the United States. This is more than a simple expression of our close friendship with America. Canada's interest in bolstering North American defence stems from a lucid recognition that this horrifying trend, these suicidal terrorists – inflamed by a growing number of fundamentalist religious leaders and political extremists – poses a global threat.

The Binational Planning Group – the Beginnings of a "Naval NORAD"?

In 2002, the Department of National Defence (DND) initiated a Binational Planning Group to develop an "Enhanced Canada–US Security Cooperation" with the United States. Starting with a simple two-year mandate, the Planning Group will work alongside NorthCom and NORAD in Colorado Springs.

(Note: this group is not integrated into either command – it simply shares the same headquarters.) The Binational Planning Group aims to "improve current Canada–United States arrangements to defend against primarily maritime threats to the continent and respond to land-based attacks, should they occur."

The Canadian contingent is comprised of about twenty (20) CF officers, as well as representatives from the Canadian Office of Critical Protection and Emergency Preparedness. It is headed by Lieutenant-General Kenneth Pennie [at the time, also Deputy CINCNORAD]. He works with an American deputy who is in charge of the US contingent. The Binational Planning Group drafts joint Canada–US contingency plans to ensure cooperative "response[s] to national requests for military assistance in the event of threat, attack, or civil emergency in Canada or the U.S."

The chief goals of the Binational Planning Group are:
• to share maritime surveillance and intelligence
• to coordinate binational actions involving military and civil agencies
• to design and conduct joint training programs and exercises.

How would a "Naval NORAD" Evolve?

The Binational Planning Group is not yet a "naval NORAD". However, the intensified communications between the Canadian Navy and the USN may compel the Binational Planning Group to work toward more highly integrated operations. The USN and Canadian Navy have a long tradition of close cooperation and, more recently, have developed a growing 'interoperability'. Joint maritime continental defence would be a natural evolution of this close relationship.

Cooperation between the land forces of the two nations would be more politically difficult to achieve. Both governments want to allow transnational deployments in the event of nuclear, biological or chemical attacks. But, within Canada especially, this possibility is extremely controversial. If sent across the border, both Canadian and United States forces would be under the operational control of the host country. According to DND, this provision allows both Canada and the United States to continue to "exercise control of [their] respective sovereign territory and to command [their] national forces." DND insists that such cross-border missions would only occur "under conditions approved by both governments, on a case-by-case basis."

DND asserts that the real advantage of these new arrangements is that they will not require "the assignment of any new standing forces for the defence of the continent." True to form, the Canadian government hopes to improve continental defence without having to divert any of its sparse resources away from other DND priorities.

[Ed: The 1994 Defence White Paper states unequivocally that continental defence must be the number one priority of the Canadian Forces, because defence of the country is inseparable from defence of the continent.] [/size]
http://www.sfu.ca/casr/ft-lagasse6.htm
[size=1]Canada-US Relations - Defence Partnership – July 2003[/size]



[size=2]NORAD, NorthCom, and the Binational Planning Group:
The Evolution of Canada–US Defence Relations — Part 6
[/size][size=2]Reactions from the Canadian Public

Canadian reactions to this renewed interest in continental defence have been divided. On the one hand, Senator Colin Kenny, Chairman of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, has been a leading voice in Parliament supporting greater Canada–US continental defence collaboration.

Conversely, the likelihood of increased cooperation between Canadian and American forces has also invoked critical responses. When DND provided the press with details about the Binational Planning Group and its mandate, Canada's two national newspapers focused their attention on the possibility of American soldiers operating on Canadian soil. In The Globe and Mail, for instance, a headline read: "Deal would let U.S. troops operate in Canada." For its part, the National Post proclaimed: "Terror fight may bring U.S. troops here."

Canadian Armed Forces under US Command

Foremost among the academic detractors of further continental defence collaboration is Michael Byers of Duke University. In his May 2002 report, Canadian armed forces under U.S. command, Byers provides several cautionary warnings about Canadian involvement in an expanded joint continental defence with the United States.

Most prominent among his warnings are the degradation of Canadian sovereignty and undue American influence in the foreign and defence policies of Canada. For Byers, the notion of American operational control of Canadian forces – foreseen by the Binational Planning Group in the event of a cross-border aid to the civil power mission – is problematic.

To be precise, Byers believes that the line between operational control and national command is too easily blurred. In fact, in his estimation, the distinction between operational control and command is merely an exercise in semantics. With respect to the conduct of Canadian foreign policy, Byers contends that the United States might also use the force requirements of continental defence to prevent Canada from engaging in unilateral endeavours which go against American policy aspirations, such as an airlift to Cuba. In opposing greater Canada–US defence cooperation, therefore, Byers and the Canadian press are revisiting sovereignty apprehensions that have plagued Canadian participation in continental defence since World War II.

Defence Against Help

Ultimately, in light of Canada's traditional response to continental defence, the arguments of Byers and other fervent Canadian nationalists will be acknowledged, but will go unheeded. Concerns about Canadian sovereignty and independence have always given ground (to some degree) to geographic, political, and military imperatives – a contiguous land mass, the long-standing Canada–US defence relationship, the "defence against help" argument, and the presence of a common threat to our western heritage.

In fact, Canada and the United States have cooperated in defending the continent since the Basic Security Plan of 1946. Through the years, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that the threats to Canadian sovereignty resulting from military cooperation with the United States have been exaggerated. In addition, as with any long-term agreement between two nations, the compromise of sovereignty goes both ways. (Canadian soldiers could just as easily find themselves on American soil.)

The US and Canadian Navies have been allowed to operate in each other's waters and to share data since the fifties. Successive Canadian governments have been keenly aware that, if they do not participate in the defence of North America, they run the risk of having the United States shoulder the burden alone. Thus Canada would surrender the final claim that any nation can make for its own sovereignty: self-defence.

Arguably, then, the true menace to Canadian sovereignty is not collaboration with the United States in defence of the continent, but rather, the turning away from such collaboration. The threat posed by terrorists and criminal organizations is perceived, both by DND and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, as being as much a Canadian concern as an American one. The present Canadian [Chrétien] government has chosen to participate in the "War on Terrorism". The future prime minister [Paul Martin] is likely to reach a similar conclusion.

If these non-state enemies are worth pursuing across the globe, surely they merit the effort required to defend against them at home.

Conclusion

There can be no doubt that NorthCom and the increased American interest in continental defence have had, and will have, a noticeable impact on Canadian national security policy. In many ways, the current Binational Planning Group represents an evolution of the principles of the Basic Security Plan (BSP) of 1946.

Both came about due to the emergence of a common threat and the recognition – on the part of both Canada and the United States – that North America cannot be effectively defended by either nation alone. Both agreements recognized the need to cooperate on land, and at sea.

Not unexpectedly, both initiatives also raised concerns about Canadian sovereignty. For its part, the BSP survived the scrutiny of guarded sovereignists. Thus far, the Binational Planning Group appears to have done the same, though it is subject to review after its initial two-year mandate by both the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

A final point of consideration relates to the possible expansion or enlargement of the Binational Planning Group. It is noteworthy to recall that the 1953 Military Study Group (MSG), a planning group similar to the current one, evolved into the creation of NORAD. This evolution from an ad hoc planning group to a formal, long-standing defence agreement between the two countries occurred in spite of early misgivings by the St. Laurent government.

At present, senior military officials in the United States are already suggesting the formation of a "naval NORAD." Since the Binational Planning Group is examining enhanced maritime and coastal defence cooperation, it is possible that a joint maritime command could emerge to fulfill this task. NorthCom's close relations with the Binational Planning Group could lead to a North American version of NATO's Allied Command Europe (ACE). Its mission would be to conduct binational land, sea, and air defence, as well as provide aid to the civil power operations on the continent.

As long as the United States is committed to defending the North American continent, Canada will be compelled to work with its neighbour – or face exclusion from those key decisions related to its own territorial defence. NorthCom is an exclusively American command, but it will likely have a far-reaching impact, embracing the entire continent.
Philippe Lagassé holds a Master's degree from the War Studies Program at the Royal Military College, Kingston. In Fall 2003, he will become a PhD student in Political Science at Carleton University, Ottawa.

A full, unedited version of this paper was originally published (with footnotes)
by the Canadian Military Journal (CMJ) in their Spring 2003[/size][/size][/size][/size]


Kom nu nog eens vertellellen dat de NWO een uitvinding, hersenschim is: militair bestaat ze dus duidelijk, tekst + links[/size]

[filosoof]

Lees verder deze link eens aandachtig en volledig(!!), en kom d?*n vertellen dat de NWO een hersenschim is: militair bestaat ze dus wel degelijk al (denk ook bovendien maar aan de A-bommen die opgeslagen zijn in Kleine Broghel) :
http://www.sfu.ca/casr/ft-lagasse1.htm

[filosoof]

de ongelovigen wilden teksten en links nu hebben jullie er...