Hoe vrij ben je?

[nubian]

Als je zelf macht
geeft aan andere
geef je zelf je vrijheid weg?

[exodus]

Ja. Wij geven onze macht weg aan regeringen die voor ons beslissen wat goed is en wat niet.

[Mitgard]

wat zou jij aan moeten vangen met die macht?
geef ze maar weg.
geen macht = geen verantwoordelijkheid = vrijheid

zo zie ik het.

[nubian]

Ergo...geen vrije wil?

[exodus]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Mitgard

wat zou jij aan moeten vangen met die macht?
geef ze maar weg.
geen macht = geen verantwoordelijkheid = vrijheid

zo zie ik het.

Vrijheid is net verantwoordelijkheid. Als je geen verantwoordelijkheid wil, wordt je een slaaf.

[nubian]

Iemand vroeg een van de
oude zenmeesters hem de weg naar
bevrijding te leren.

De zenmeester zei:
,Wie onderdrukt je?’.

De man die vrijheid zocht zei:
’Niemand onderdrukt mij’.

De zenmeester zei: ,
Waarom verlang je dan naar bevrijding?

prachig en zo simpel

[Bobke]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door nubian

Als je zelf macht
geeft aan andere
geef je zelf je vrijheid weg?

Als je zelf de keuze maak niet.

[Martini]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door nubian

Als je zelf macht
geeft aan andere
geef je zelf je vrijheid weg?

Hangt ervan af welke macht je aan de ander geeft natuurlijk. Als het geven van bepaalde macht aan een ander jou beperkt in je keuzemogelijkheden, dan geef je inderdaad vrijheid weg. Vrijheid is het hebben van keuzemogelijkheden.

[IlluSionS667]

Zeer interessant extract uit (de Engelse vertaling van) een tekst van Alain de Benoist over de concepten democratie en vrijheid in het oude Griekenland (die iets heel anders betekenden dan wat ze vandaag betekenen) :

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Alain De Benoist

Democracy in Athens meant first and foremost a community of citizens, that is, a community of people gathered in the ekkles�*a. Citizens were classified according to their membership in a deme—a grouping which had a territorial, social, and administrative significance. The term démos, which is of Doric origin, designates those who live in a given territory, with the territory constituting a place of origin and determining civic status. To some extent démos and ethnos coincide: democracy could not be conceived in relationship to the individual, but only in the relationship to the polis, that is to say, to the city in its capacity as an organized community. Slaves were excluded from voting not because they were slaves, but because they were not citizens. We seem shocked by this today, yet, after all, which democracy has ever given voting rights to non-citizens?

The notions of citizenship, liberty, or equality of political rights, as well as of popular sovereignty, were intimately interrelated. The most essential element in the notion of citizenship was someone's origin and heritage. Pericles was the “son of Xanthippus from the deme of Cholargus.” Beginning in 451 B.C., one had to be born of an Athenian mother and father in order to become a citizen. Defined by his heritage, the citizen (pol�*tes) is opposed to idiótes, the non-citizen—a designation that quickly took on a pejorative meaning (from the notion of the rootless individual one arrived at the notion of “idiot”). Citizenship as function derived thus from the notion of citizenship as status, which was the exclusive prerogative of birth. To be a citizen meant, in the fullest sense of the word, to have a homeland, that is, to have both a homeland and a history. One is born an Athenian—one does not become one (with rare exceptions). Furthermore, the Athenian tradition discouraged mixed marriages. Political equality, established by law, flowed from common origins that sanctioned it as well. Only birth conferred individual polite�*a.

Democracy was rooted in the concept of autochthonous citizenship, which intimately linked its exercise to the origins of those who exercised it. The Athenians in the fifth century celebrated themselves as “the autochthonous people of great Athens,” and it was within that founding myth that they placed the pivot of their democracy.

In Greek, as well as in Latin, liberty proceeds from someone's origin. Free man *(e)leudheros (Greek eleútheros), is primarily he who belongs to a certain “stock” (cf. in Latin the word liberi, “children”). “To be born of a good stock is to be free,” writes Emile Benveniste, “this is one and the same." Similarly, in the German language, the kinship between the words frei, “free,” and Freund, “friend,” indicates that in the beginning, liberty sanctioned mutual relationship. The Indo-European root *leudh-, from which derive simultaneously the Latin liber and the Greek eleútheros, also served to designate “people” in the sense of a national group (cf. Old Slavonic ljudú, “people”; German Leute, “people,” both of which derive from the root evoking the idea of “growth and development”).

The original meaning of the word “liberty” does not suggest at all “liberation”—in a sense of emancipation from collectivity. Instead, it implies inheritance—which alone confers liberty. Thus when the Greeks spoke of liberty, they did not have in mind the right to break away from the tutelage of the city or the right to rid themselves of the constraints to which each citizen was bound. Rather, what they had in mind was the right, but also the political capability, guaranteed by law, to participate in the life of the city, to vote in the assembly, to elect magistrates, etc. Liberty did not legitimize secession; instead, it sanctioned its very opposite: the bond which tied the person to his city. This was not liberty-autonomy, but a liberty-participation; it was not meant to reach beyond the community, but was practised solely in the framework of the polis. Liberty meant adherence. The “liberty” of an individual without heritage, i.e. of a deracinated individual, was completely devoid of any meaning.

If we therefore assume that liberty was directly linked to the notion of democracy, then it must be added that liberty meant first and foremost the liberty of the people, from which subsequently the liberty of citizens proceeds. In other words, only the liberty of the people (or of the city) can lay the foundations for the equality of political and individual rights, i.e., rights enjoyed by individuals in the capacity of citizens. Liberty presupposes independence as its first condition. Man lives in society, and therefore individual liberty cannot exist without collective liberty. Among the Greeks, individuals were free because (and in so far as) their city was free.