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Banneling
Geregistreerd: 22 mei 2003
Locatie: Brussel
Berichten: 49.496
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Iran? of misschien toch beter ook eens naar Pakistan kijken?
In plaats van zich kopzorgen voor te wenden over wat Iran ooit zou kunnen bereiken en ermee doen lijkt het beter eens te kijken wat Pakistan al heeft en welk het risico d�*�*r is:
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20071108/...JAoY_H6.IE1vAI
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Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Reuters
Pakistan political instability raises nuclear risk
By Kristin Roberts
Thu Nov 8, 5:16 PM ET
Pentagon officials say Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is secure in military hands, but some U.S. lawmakers and experts warn that nuclear material and designs could leak out if political instability persists.
Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, has concentrated control over the entire nuclear program.
But a decline in his support within the military amid the current political crisis raises a risk that control over the weapons could weaken. That could open the door to theft or sale of weapons material to extremist groups, some experts say.
Some weapons experts and U.S. officials still suspect Pakistan's military of at least knowing about the smuggling activities of Pakistan's A.Q. Khan network that sold weapons technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya.
"This is a country that's leaked nuclear weapons designs, centrifuges," said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security. "Two of its scientists talked to (Osama) bin Laden about how to make nuclear weapons in 2001."
"It's a system that's leaked very dangerous information," he said. "You have to worry about the integrity of the system in a period of growing instability."
A senior U.S. general this week said the Pentagon was worried about the security of Pakistan nuclear weapons after Musharraf declared a state of emergency on Saturday, prompting protests and arrests.
But on Thursday, other U.S. defense officials backpedaled, saying the weapons are under the military's full control. They said the Pakistani military was a responsible steward of the arsenal and would stay out of the current political conflict.
"From the Army's standpoint, from the military's standpoint, the confidence remains high," one U.S. military officer said.
"There has been no break in that control," the officer said about the Pakistani military's control over the weapons.
U.S. lawmakers, however, expressed more uncertainty about the security of the weapons.
Rep. Ellen Tauscher, a California Democrat on a congressional committee that oversees the U.S. military, said the United States lacked full knowledge of Pakistan's weapons.
"We need a lot more visibility on what's going on in Pakistan. Who does have that football? Who is next in line?," she said about Pakistan's nuclear weapons.
"I've learned that we don't have as strong a handle on it," said Tauscher, who has access to some U.S. intelligence as a member of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee.
Asked if she knew specific details of Pakistan's weapons, including their location and the chain of command over those weapons, she said, "I don't know, and I've asked the question a couple of different ways."
Sen. Joseph Biden of Delaware, a Democratic presidential hopeful and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said Pakistan was at real risk of becoming a failed state.
"I think it's very real," he said of that threat.
Still, global financial markets have largely failed to react to the political unrest in Pakistan this week. Market sources say they remain more concerned about uncertainty elsewhere, particularly in Iran, but note that could change quickly if the crisis deepens.
Copyright © 2007 Reuters Limited.
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Pentagon officials say Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is secure in military hands
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Is d�*t zo geruststellend?  Wie steunde de Taliban nu ook weer? Wie heeft nog altijd een aantal onopgeloste conflicten ?
https://www.cia.gov/library/publicat...pk.html#Issues
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Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door CIA Factbook
Disputes - international:
various talks and confidence-building measures cautiously have begun to defuse tensions over Kashmir, particularly since the October 2005 earthquake in the region; Kashmir nevertheless remains the site of the world's largest and most militarized territorial dispute with portions under the de facto administration of China (Aksai Chin), India (Jammu and Kashmir), and Pakistan (Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas); UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) has maintained a small group of peacekeepers since 1949; India does not recognize Pakistan's ceding historic Kashmir lands to China in 1964; India and Pakistan have maintained their 2004 cease fire in Kashmir and initiated discussions on defusing the armed stand-off in the Siachen glacier region; Pakistan protests India's fencing the highly militarized Line of Control and construction of the Baglihar Dam on the Chenab River in Jammu and Kashmir, which is part of the larger dispute on water sharing of the Indus River and its tributaries; to defuse tensions and prepare for discussions on a maritime boundary, India and Pakistan seek technical resolution of the disputed boundary in Sir Creek estuary at the mouth of the Rann of Kutch in the Arabian Sea; Pakistani maps continue to show the Junagadh claim in India's Gujarat State; by 2005, Pakistan, with UN assistance, repatriated 2.3 million Afghan refugees leaving slightly more than a million, many of whom remain at their own choosing; Pakistan has proposed and Afghanistan protests construction of a fence and laying of mines along portions of their porous border; Pakistan has sent troops into remote tribal areas to monitor and control the border with Afghanistan and to stem terrorist or other illegal activities
Refugees and internally displaced persons:
refugees (country of origin): 1,084,208 (Afghanistan)
IDPs: undetermined (government strikes on Islamic militants in South Waziristan), 34,000 (October 2005 earthquake; most of those displaced returned to their home villages in the spring of 2006) (2006)
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Federation of American Sientists:
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html
Citaat:
FAS | Nuke | Guide | Pakistan |||| Search | Join FAS
Pakistan Nuclear Weapons
A Brief History of Pakistan's Nuclear Program
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was established in 1972 by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who founded the program while he was Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, and later became President and Prime Minister. Shortly after the loss of East Pakistan in the 1971 war with India, Bhutto initiated the program with a meeting of physicists and engineers at Multan in January 1972.
India's 1974 testing of a nuclear "device" gave Pakistan's nuclear program new momentum. Through the late 1970s, Pakistan's program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan is a German-trained metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had acquired through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. Dr. Khan also reportedly brought with him stolen uranium enrichment technologies from Europe. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan's Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan's direction, Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities.
In 1985, Pakistan crossed the threshold of weapons-grade uranium production, and by 1986 it is thought to have produced enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Pakistan continued advancing its uranium enrichment program, and according to Pakistani sources, the nation acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear explosion in 1987.
Pakistan Nuclear Weapons - A Chronology
Nuclear Tests
On May 28, 1998 Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted five nuclear tests. The Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five nuclear tests conducted on May 28 generated a seismic signal of 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a total yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT). Dr. A.Q. Khan claimed that one device was a boosted fission device and that the other four were sub-kiloton nuclear devices.
On May 30, 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warhead with a reported yield of 12 kilotons. The tests were conducted at Balochistan, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six. It has also been claimed by Pakistani sources that at least one additional device, initially planned for detonation on 30 May 1998, remained emplaced underground ready for detonation.
Pakistani claims concerning the number and yields of their underground tests cannot be independently confirmed by seismic means, and several sources, such as the Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. Indian sources have also suggested that as few as two weapons were actually detonated, each with yields considerably lower than claimed by Pakistan. However, seismic data showed at least two and possibly a third, much smaller, test in the initial round of tests at the Ras Koh range. The single test on 30 May provided a clear seismic signal.
DEVICEDATEYIELD
[announced]YIELD
[estimated][boosted device?] 28 May 199825-36 kilotontotal 9-12 kilotonFission device28 May 199812 kilotonLow-yield device28 May 1998sub-kiloton--Low-yield device28 May 1998sub-kiloton--Low-yield device28 May 1998sub-kiloton--Fission device 30 May 199812 kiloton4-6 kilotonFission device not detonated12 kiloton--This table lists the nuclear tests that Pakistan claims to have carried out in May 1998 as well as the announced yields. Other sources have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. The Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory reports that the total seismic yield for the May 28th tests was 9-12 kilotons and that the yield for the May 30th tests was 4-6 kilotons.According to a preliminary analysis conducted at Los Alamos National Laboratory, material released into the atmosphere during an underground nuclear test by Pakistan in May 1998 contained low levels of weapons-grade plutonium. The significance of the Los Alamos finding was that Pakistan had either imported or produced plutonium undetected by the US intelligence community. But Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and other agencies later contested the accuracy of this finding.
These tests came slightly more than two weeks after India carried out five nuclear tests of its own on May 11 and 13 and after many warnings by Pakistani officials that they would respond to India.
Pakistan's nuclear tests were followed by the February 1999 Lahore Agreements between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Sharif. The agreements included confidence building measures such as advance notice of ballistic missile testing and a continuation of their unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing. But diplomatic advances made that year were undermined by Pakistan's incursion into Kargil. Under US diplomatic pressure, Prime Minister Sharif withdrew his troops, but lost power in October 1999 due to a military coup in which Gen. Pervez Musharraf took over.
Satellite Imagery of Pakistan's May 28 and May 30 nuclear testing sites
Nuclear Infrastructure
Pakistan's nuclear program is based primarily on highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is produced at the A. Q. Khan research laboratory at Kahuta, a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility. The Kahuta facility has been in operation since the early 1980s. By the early 1990s, Kahuta had an estimated 3,000 centrifuges in operation, and Pakistan continued its pursuit of expanded uranium enrichment capabilities.
In the 1990s Pakistan began to pursue plutonium production capabilities. With Chinese assistance, Pakistan built the 40 MWt (megawatt thermal) Khusab research reactor at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the reactor was operational. According to public statements made by US officials, this unsafeguarded heavy water reactor generates an estimated 8-10 kilotons of weapons grade plutonium per year, which is enough for one to two nuclear weapons. The reactor could also produce tritium if it were loaded with lithium-6. According to J. Cirincione of Carnegie, Khusab's plutonium production capacity could allow Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver with a ballistic missile.
Plutonium separation reportedly takes place at the New Labs reprocessing plant next to Pakistan's Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech) in Rawalpindi and at the larger Chasma nuclear power plant, neither of which are subject to IAEA inspection.
Nuclear Arsenal
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates that Pakistan has built 24-48 HEU-based nuclear warheads, and Carnegie reports that they have produced 585-800 kg of HEU, enough for 30-55 weapons. Pakistan's nuclear warheads are based on an implosion design that uses a solid core of highly enriched uranium and requires an estimated 15-20 kg of material per warhead. According to Carnegie, Pakistan has also produced a small but unknown quantity of weapons grade plutonium, which is sufficient for an estimated 3-5 nuclear weapons.
Pakistani authorities claim that their nuclear weapons are not assembled. They maintain that the fissile cores are stored separately from the non-nuclear explosives packages, and that the warheads are stored separately from the delivery systems. In a 2001 report, the Defense Department contends that "Islamabad's nuclear weapons are probably stored in component form" and that "Pakistan probably could assemble the weapons fairly quickly." However, no one has been able to ascertain the validity of Pakistan's assurances about their nuclear weapons security.
Pakistan's reliance primarily on HEU makes its fissile materials particularly vulnerable to diversion. HEU can be used in a relatively simple gun-barrel-type design, which could be within the means of non-state actors that intend to assemble a crude nuclear weapon.
The terrorist attacks on September 11th raised concerns about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. According to press reports, within two days of the attacks, Pakistan's military began relocating nuclear weapons components to six new secret locations. Shortly thereafter, Gen. Pervez Musharraf fired his intelligence chief and other officers and detained several suspected retired nuclear weapons scientists, in an attempt to root out extremist elements that posed a potential threat to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
Concerns have also been raised about Pakistan as a proliferant of nuclear materials and expertise. In November, 2002, shortly after North Korea admitted to pursuing a nuclear weapons program, the press reported allegations that Pakistan had provided assistance in the development of its uranium enrichment program in exchange for North Korean missile technologies.
Foreign Assistance
In the past, China played a major role in the development of Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure, especially when increasingly stringent export controls in western countries made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire materials and technology elsewhere. According to a 2001 Department of Defense report, China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and expertise and has provided critical assistance in the construction of Pakistan's nuclear facilities.
In the 1990s, China designed and supplied the heavy water Khusab reactor, which plays a key role in Pakistan's production of plutonium. A subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation also contributed to Pakistan's efforts to expand its uranium enrichment capabilities by providing 5,000 custom made ring magnets, which are a key component of the bearings that facilitate the high-speed rotation of centrifuges.
According to Anthony Cordesman of CSIS, China is also reported to have provided Pakistan with the design of one of its warheads, which is relatively sophisticated in design and lighter than U.S. and Soviet designed first generation warheads.
China also provided technical and material support in the completion of the Chasma nuclear power reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility, which was built in the mid 1990s. The project had been initiated as a cooperative program with France, but Pakistan's failure to sign the NPT and unwillingness to accept IAEA safeguards on its entire nuclear program caused France to terminate assistance.
According to the Defense Department report cited above, Pakistan has also acquired nuclear related and dual-use and equipment and materials from the Former Soviet Union and Western Europe.
Intermittent US Sanctions
On several occasions, under the authority of amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, the U.S. has imposed sanctions on Pakistan, cutting off economic and military aid as a result of its pursuit of nuclear weapons. However, the U.S. suspended sanctions each time developments in Afghanistan made Pakistan a strategically important "frontline state," such as the 1981 Soviet occupation and in the war on terrorism.
Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine
Several sources, such as Jane's Intelligence Review and Defense Department reports maintain that Pakistan's motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons program is to counter the threat posed by its principal rival, India, which has superior conventional forces and nuclear weapons.
Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the Defense Department report cited above, "Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Consequently, not all of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani officials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan's best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only after developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any connection with India's decision."
Pakistan does not abide by a no-first-use doctrine, as evidenced by President Pervez Musharraf's statements in May, 2002. Musharraf said that Pakistan did not want a conflict with India but that if it came to war between the nuclear-armed rivals, he would "respond with full might." These statements were interpreted to mean that if pressed by an overwhelming conventional attack from India, which has superior conventional forces, Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons.
Sources and Resources- UN Nuclear Chief Warns of Global Black Market Mohammed ElBaradei commenting on questions raised by the Khan confession, February 6, 2004.
- Abdul Qadeer Khan "Apologizes" for Transferring Nuclear Secrets Abroad, broadcast on Pakistani television, February 4, 2004.
- Documents Indicate A.Q. Khan Offered Nuclear Weapon Designs to Iraq in 1990: Did He Approach Other Countries? By David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, February 4, 2004
- Deadly Arsenals, chapter on Paksitan - by Joseph Cirincione, John B.Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar (Carnegie, June 2002). The chapter discusses Pakistan's WMD, missile and aircraft capabilities. It also presents the strategic context of the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan and the history of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, touching on foreign assistance from China and on-and-off US economic assistance.
- Proliferation: Threat and Response, Jan. 2001 - A Defense Department report on the status of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. It includes a brief historical background on the conflict between India and Pakistan as well as an assessment of their nuclear capabilities, chem/bio programs, ballistic missile programs and other means of delivery.
- ENHANCING NUCLEAR SECURITY IN THE COUNTER-TERRORISM STRUGGLE: India and Pakistan as a New Region for Cooperation - by Rose Gottemoeller, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 2002. This working paper explores possible cooperative programs that could enhance the security of Pakistan and India's nuclear arsenals, in order to prevent the diversion of dangerous materials into the hands of terrorists or rogue state leaders.
- "Pakistan's Nuclear Forces, 2001" from NRDC Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Jan/Feb 2002. A Two-page update on the state of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. It makes rough estimates of the number of nuclear weapons and the amount of fissile material in Pakistan's possession and touches on fissile material production capabilities. Also included is a brief discussion of delivery mechanisms such as aircraft and missiles.
- Monterey Institute Resource Page on India and Pakistan - last updated July 7, 2000. This page has many useful links to relevant maps, news articles and analytical pieces on India and Pakistan's nuclear programs.
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Pakistan resources
- Pakistan Nuclear Weapons - A Chronology - a timeline of the Pakistan's Nuclear Development program since 1965.
- "The Threat of Pakistani Nuclear Weapons" - a CSIS report by Anthony H. Cordesman (Last updated Nov. 2001). - This report tells the history of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and discusses China role in its development. It also lists recent US intelligence reports on Pakistan's activities.
- From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces: The Hard Choices Facing India and Pakistan - Gregory S. Jones. (Rand, 2000). "This issue paper describes the requirements for a nuclear deterrent force in general terms, discusses how the Indian-Pakistani nuclear relationship is affected by China, and then considers the specific decisions that still must be made in India and Pakistan."
- Pakistan Nuclear Update, 2001 - Wisconsin Project. This three-page document provides a brief summary of Pakistan's main nuclear sites and an update on developments in Pakistan's nuclear program.
- Securing Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal: Principles for Assistance - by David Albright, Kevin O'Neill and Corey Hinderstein, Oct. 4, 2001. An ISIS issue brief on the potential threats to the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
- The May 1998 India and Pakistan Nuclear Tests - by Terry C. Wallace, Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory (SASO), 1998. This technical paper provides a seismic analysis of India and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests. It concludes that Pakistan's May 28 tests had a seismic yield of 9-12 kt, and the May 30 test had a yield of 4-6 kt. An updated web page on this report can be found here
- Satellite Imagery of Pakistan's May 28 and May 30 nuclear testing sites, hosted on the Center for Monitoring Research Commercial Satellite Imagery Page
- "Pakistan's Nuclear Dilemma" - September 23 2001, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Transcripts from a Carnegie panel on developments in Pakistan in the aftermath of the Septempber 11th attacks. The panel included three speakers -- Shirin Tahir-Kheli, George Perkovich and Rose Gottemoeller-- and was moderated by Joseph Cirincione.
- Chapter on Pakistan, from Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998</U> by Rodney W. Jones, Mark G. McDonough, with Toby F. Dalton and Gregory D. Koblentz (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, July 1998). This chapter documents the history of Pakistan's nuclear program and tracks the development of its nuclear infrastructure. It also covers in detail the sanctions the US imposed on Pakistan in light of these developments, as well Pakistan's missile program.
- "U.S. Appears to be Losing Track of Pakistan's Nuclear Program" and "U.S. Now Believes Pakistan to use Khushab Plutonium in Bomb Program" By Mark Hibbs July, 1998. Two brief articles written in the aftermath of Paksistan's 1998 nuclear tests -- they discuss Pakistan's weapons grade uranium and plutonium production capacities and the implications for its nuclear arsenal.
- "U.S. Labs at Odds on Whether Pakistani Blast Used Plutonium," by Dana Priest Washington Post Sunday, January 17, 1999; Page A02. This article discusses the controversy over the preliminary analysis carried out by Los Alamos National Laboratory, which found that plutonium traces had been released into the atomosphere during Pakistan's May 30th underground nuclear test. Scientists at Lawrence Livermore National Labs contested the accuracy of this finding and alleged that Los Alamos had contaminated and then lost the air sample. At the time, Los Alamos' findings were highly controversial because they implied that Pakistan had obtained plutonium either though imports or indigenous production, and there was uncertainty about Pakistan's plutonium production capabilities. It is now public knowledge that Pakistan can produce and isolate plutonium at its Khusbab reactor and at the New Labs and Chasma separation facilities.
- NUCLEARISATION OF SOUTH ASIA AND ITS REGIONAL AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS Munir Ahmed Khan REGIONAL STUDIES Autumn 1998
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- PS, op de site staan tabellen die "verloren" gingen met copy/paste
Sprak iemand over Iran?
OOPS, j�*, Pakistan schijnt eerder weinig petroleum te hebben in vergelijking met Iran! (de CIA weet niets te vermelden):
https://www.cia.gov/library/publicat...s/pk.html#Econ
Deze wél:
http://www.indexmundi.com/pakistan/o..._reserves.html
Laatst gewijzigd door filosoof : 9 november 2007 om 03:37.
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30 september 2007, 22:17
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