"Kaper 11/9 levend terug gevonden ?"

[exodus]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door illwill

Toch heel eigenaardig dat al die dingen altijd zo slecht van kwaliteit zijn é. Geef me trouwens eens de volledige file waar die avator van gemaakt is. Dergelijk klein beeldje moet geknipt zijn é. Graag een link naar de volledige.

Die kwaliteit is zo laag in mijn avater omdat het een GIF animatie is, het kan niet beter. Hier kan je een beter overzicht hebben.
Vanuit verschillende hoeken:
http://www.thewebfairy.com/911/letsr...een%20High.wmv

Dit is bewijs dat zegt dat dit niet door terroristen met kartonsnijders kan komen, en geen veronderstelling.
Er zijn er nog met betere kwaliteit zoals in films over 9/11 en op dvd's van CNN over 9/11. Dit is minder omdat het voor het web is. Ik zag het op 11 september laatst ook in het nieuws van vrt. Je kon het zelfs zien aan de gewone snelheid, heel even. Dit is niet getrukeerd.

Let er ook op het onbekende object onderaan het vliegtuig, en hoe die flash perfect in het verlengde van dat object ligt.

[illwill]

http://www.serendipity.li/wot/north_tower.htm

Deze is ook grappig.

Gewoon effe blijven kijken naar dat kleine filmpje aan de rechterkant waar het vliegtuig in de toren gaat vliegen. Net op het laatste zie je gewoonweg een wit bolletje op het scherm verschijnen. Leuk gedaan hoor, lol. Het bolletje overlapt zelfs het vliegtuig, lol.

[exodus]

Kijk naar mijn bovenste post, dit is geen klein wit bolletje.

[Pico della Mirandola]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door exodus

Inderdaad Pico , wedereom een interessante post. Spijtig genoeg moet deze informatie herhaald worden en ik denk dat het is omdat men het niet kan geloven. Ik heb hier al veel gelach gezien om de zogezegde conspiracy theories, maar als ik denk dat zij willen geloven dat vadertje Bush hun zal beschermen tegen Osama Bin Laden moet ik ook eens zeggen: LOL!

Ziehier het vervolg het vervolg van de timeline (tot 9/11/2001) van vorige post.
Ik wil hierbij nog eens duidelijk stellen dat onderstaande informatie allemaal komt
uit officiële persberichten. Deze time-line bewijst onomstotelijk dat
a) de regering op de hoogte was van wat er te gebeuren stond
b) FBI en CIA meerdere malen de kans hebben gehad de potentiële kapers te arresteren
c) C. Rice en andere getuigen onder eed valse verklaringen hebben afgelegd voor de Commissie
d) er al lang voor 9/11 concrete planne waren voor een invasie van Afghanistan zowel als in Irak.
e) BinLaden en bepaalde leden van z’n organisatie beschermingen genoten van zowel CIA als FBI
Lees en trek zelf jullie conclusies.




March 5, 2001
Paul O'Neill, Bush's Treasury Secretary at this time, later recalls that the most important topic of the Bush Administration in its early months is regime change in Iraq (see also January 31, 2001 (B)). Planning at this time envisions peacekeeping troops, war crimes tribunals, and even divvying up Iraq's oil wealth. One document from around February 2001 is titled, “Plan for post-Saddam Iraq.” Another Pentagon document from this date is titled, “Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield contracts.” It includes a map of potential areas for exploration in Iraq. [CBS 1/11/04]


March 7, 2001
The Russian Permanent Mission at the United Nations secretly submits “an unprecedentedly detailed report” to the UN Security Council about bin Laden, his whereabouts, details of his al-Qaeda network, Afghan drug running, and Taliban connections in Pakistan. The report provides “a listing of all bin Laden's bases, his government contacts and foreign advisors,” and enough information to potentially kill him. The US fails to act. Alex Standish, the editor of the highly respected Jane's Intelligence Review, concludes that the attacks of 9/11 were less of an American intelligence failure and more the result of “a political decision not to act against bin Laden.” [Jane's Intelligence Review 10/5/01]


March 8, 2001
The United Nations and the European Union direct their members to freeze the assets of some al-Qaeda leaders, including Sa'd Al-Sharif, bin Laden's brother-in-law and the head of his finances, but the US does not do so (see UN list). Their assets are finally frozen by the US after 9/11 (see October 12, 2001). [Guardian, 10/13/01 (B)] The US for a time claims that Sa'd Al-Sharif helped fund the 9/11 attacks, but the situation is highly confused and his role is doubtful (see September 24, 2001-December 26, 2002).


March 26, 2001
The Washington Post reports on a major improvements of the CIA's intelligence gathering capability “in recent years.” A new program called Oasis uses “automated speech recognition” technology to turn audio feeds into formatted, searchable text. It can distinguish one voice from another and differentiates “speaker 1” from “speaker 2” in transcripts. Software called Fluent performs “cross lingual” searches, even translating difficult languages like Chinese and Japanese (apparently such software is much better than similar publicly available software) as well as automatically assessing their importance. There's also software that can turn a suspect's “life story into a three-dimensional diagram of linked phone calls, bank deposits and plane trips,” and other software to efficiently and quickly process vast amounts of video, audio and written data. [Washington Post 3/26/01] However, the government will later report that a number of messages about the 9/11 attacks, such as one stating “tomorrow is the zero hour” weren't translated until after 9/11 because analysts were “too swamped.” [ABC News, 6/7/02]


April 2001 (D)
A report commissioned by former US Secretary of State James Baker and the Council on Foreign Relations entitled “Strategic Energy Policy Challenges For The 21st Century” is submitted to Vice President Cheney this month. “The report is linked to a veritable who's who of US hawks, oilmen and corporate bigwigs.” The report says the “central dilemma” for the US administration is that “the American people continue to demand plentiful and cheap energy without sacrifice or inconvenience.” It warns that the US is running out of oil, with a painful end to cheap fuel already in sight. It argues that “the United States remains a prisoner of its energy dilemma,” and that one of the “consequences” of this is a “need for military intervention” to secure its oil supply. It argues that Iraq needs to be overthrown so the US can control its oil. [Sunday Herald 10/5/02; Sydney Morning Herald 12/26/02] In what may be a reference to a pipeline through Afghanistan, the report suggests the US should “Investigate whether any changes to US policy would quickly facilitate higher exports of oil from the Caspian Basin region… the exports from some oil discoveries in the Caspian Basin could be hastened if a secure, economical export route could be identified swiftly” (see also September 2000 and Spring 2001). [Strategic Energy Policy Challenges For The 21st Century, 4/01]


Spring 2001
The Sydney Morning Herald later reports, “The months preceding September 11 [see] a shifting of the US military's focus … Over several months beginning in April [2001] a series of military and governmental policy documents [are] released that [seek] to legitimize the use of US military force” “in the pursuit of oil and gas.” Michael Klare, an international security expert and author of Resource Wars, says the military has increasingly come to “define resource security as their primary mission.” An article in the Army War College's journal by Jeffrey Record, a former staff member of the Senate armed services committee, argues for the legitimacy of “shooting in the Persian Gulf on behalf of lower gas prices.” He also “advocate[s] the acceptability of presidential subterfuge in the promotion of a conflict” and “explicitly urge[s] painting over the US's actual reasons for warfare with a nobly high-minded veneer, seeing such as a necessity for mobilizing public support for a conflict.” In April, Tommy Franks, the commander of US forces in the Persian Gulf/South Asia area, testifies to Congress in April that his command's key mission is “access to [the region's] energy resources.” The next month US Central Command begins planning for war with Afghanistan, plans that are later used in the real war (see May 2001 (F)). [Sydney Morning Herald, 12/26/02] Other little noticed but influential documents reflect similar thinking (see September 2000 and April 2001 (D)



Spring 2001 (B)
A US Customs Service investigation finds evidence that Nabil al-Marabh (see 1989-May 2000, May 30, 2000-September 11, 2001 and January 2001-September 11, 2001) has funneled money to hijackers Ahmed Alghamdi and Satam Al Suqami. [Cox News, 10/16/01, ABC 7, 1/31/02] By summer, Customs uncovers a series of financial transactions between al-Marabh and al-Qaeda agent Raed Hijazi. [New York Times 9/21/01; AP 11/17/01] It is later reported that “some of the 11 hijackers who passed through” Britain in spring 2001 on their way to the US (see April 23-June 29, 2001) “should have been instantly ‘red-flagged’ by British intelligence. One was Ahmed Alghamdi” because of his connection to Raed Hijazi (see January-June 2001). [Sunday Herald, 9/30/01] Despite all of these al-Qaeda connections and more, the US later decides al-Marabh is not a terrorist and deports him to Syria (see September 19, 2001-September 3, 2002, Late 2002, and January 2004). A Congressional 9/11 inquiry later concludes that US intelligence “possessed no intelligence or law enforcement information” before 9/11 on any of the hijackers except for Khalid Almihdhar and Salem and Nawaf Alhazmi. The inquiry suggests the other hijackers may have been selected “because they did not have previously established ties to terrorist organizations.” [Senate Intelligence Committee 9/20/02]


April 1, 2001
Hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi is stopped by an Oklahoma policeman for speeding. His license information is run through a computer to check if there are any warrants for his arrest. There are none; he is issued a ticket and sent on his way. The CIA has known Alhazmi is a terrorist and possibly living in the US since March 2000 (see March 5, 2000), but has failed to share this knowledge with other agencies. [Daily Oklahoman, 1/20/02, Newsweek, 6/2/02] He also has been in the country illegally since January 2001, but this also doesn't raise any flags. [Congressional Intelligence Committee 9/20/02]


April 2001
NORAD is planning to conduct a training exercise named Positive Force. Some Special Operations personnel trained to think like terrorists unsuccessfully propose adding a scenario simulating “an event having a terrorist group hijack a commercial airliner and fly it into the Pentagon.” Military higher-ups and White House officials reject the exercise as either “too unrealistic” or too disconnected to the original intent of the exercise. The proposal comes shortly before the exercise, which takes place this month. [Boston Herald 4/14/04; Guardian 4/15/04; Washington Post 4/14/04 (G); New York Times 4/14/04]

April 12-September 7, 2001
At least six hijackers get more than one Florida driver's license. They get the second license simply by filling out change of address forms.
1. Waleed Alshehri: first license May 4, duplicate May 5.
2. Marwan Alshehhi: first license, April 12, duplicate in June.
3. Ziad Jarrah: first license May 2, duplicate July 10.
4. Ahmed Alhaznawi: first license July 10, duplicate September 7.
5. Hamza Alghamdi: first license June 27, two duplicates, the second in August.
6. the sixth man with a Florida duplicate is not named. [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01]
Additionally, some hijackers got licenses in multiple states. For instance, Nawaf Alhazmi had licenses from California, New York, and Florida at the same time, apparently all in the same name. [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01, Newsday, 9/21/01, Daily Oklahoman, 1/20/02] [South Florida Sun-Sentinel 9/28/01]


April 23, 2001
A Global Hawk plane flies 22 hours from the US to Australia without pilot or passengers. A Global Hawk manager says, “The aircraft essentially flies itself, right from takeoff, right through to landing, and even taxiing off the runway”(see 1998 (D)and September 25, 2001). [ITN 4/24/01]


April 23-June 29, 2001
The 13 hijackers commonly known as the “muscle” first arrive in the US. The muscle provides the brute force meant to control the hijacked passengers and protect the pilots. [Washington Post, 9/30/01] According to FBI Director Mueller, they all pass through Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and their travel was probably coordinated from abroad by Khalid Almihdhar. [Congressional Intelligence Committee 9/26/02] But some information contradicts their official arrival dates:
• April 23: Waleed Alshehri and Satam Al Suqami arrive in Orlando, Florida. Suqami in fact arrived before February 2001 (see February 2001). Alshehri was leasing a house near Washington in 1999 and 2000 with Ahmed Alghamdi (see 1999 (H)). He also lived with Ahmed Alghamdi in Florida for seven months in 1997. [Telegraph, 9/20/01] Alshehri appears quite Americanized in the summer of 2001, frequently talking with an apartment mate about football and baseball, even identifying himself a fan of the Florida Marlins baseball team. [AP 9/21/01]
• May 2: Majed Moqed and Ahmed Alghamdi arrive in Washington. Both actually arrived by mid-March 2001 (see Mid-March 2001). Ahmed Alghamdi was living with Waleed Alshehri near Washington until July 2000 (see 1999 (H)). He also lived with Waleed Alshehri in Florida for seven months in 1997. [Telegraph 9/20/01]
• May 28: Mohand Alshehri, Hamza Alghamdi, and Ahmed Alnami arrive in Miami, Florida. Both Mohand Alshehri and Hamza Alghamdi arrived by January 2001 (see January 2001 (B)).
• June 8: Ahmed Alhaznawi and Wail Alshehri arrive in Miami, Florida.
• June 27: Fayez Banihammad and Saeed Alghamdi arrive in Orlando, Florida.
• June 29: Salem Alhazmi and Abdulaziz Alomari arrive in New York. Alhazmi in fact arrived before February 2001 (see February 2001).
After entering the US (perhaps reentering for some), the hijackers arriving at Miami and Orlando airports settle in the Fort Lauderdale, Florida, area along with Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, and Ziad Jarrah. The hijackers, arriving in New York and Virginia, settle in the Paterson, New Jersey, area along with Nawaf Alhazmi and Hani Hanjour. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/26/02] Note that the FBI's early conclusion that 11 of these muscle men “did not know they were on a suicide mission,” [Observer 10/14/01] is contradicted by video confessions made by all of them in Afghanistan (see March 2001), and CIA Director Tenet later says they “probably were told little more than that they were headed for a suicide mission inside the United States.” [CIA Director Tenet Testimony 6/18/02] They didn't know the exact details of the 9/11 plot until shortly before the attack. [CBS 10/9/02]



April 24, 2001
The first lines of the declassified Northwoods document.
James Bamford's book Body of Secrets reveals a secret US government plan named Operation Northwoods. All details of the plan come from declassified military documents. [AP, 4/24/01, Baltimore Sun, 4/24/01, ABC News, 5/1/01, Washington Post, 4/26/01] The heads of the US military, all five Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposed in a 1962 memo to commit terrorist acts against Americans and blame Cuba to create a pretext for invasion. Says one document, “We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington…. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of indignation.” In March 1962, Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented the Operation Northwoods plan to President John Kennedy and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. The plan was rejected. Lemnitzer then sought to destroy all evidence of the plan. [Baltimore Sun, 4/24/01, ABC News, 5/1/01] Lemnitzer is replaced a few months later, but the Joint Chiefs continue to plan “pretext” operations at least through 1963. [ABC News, 5/1/01] One suggestion in the plan is to create a remote-controlled drone duplicate of a real civilian aircraft. The real aircraft would be loaded with “selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases,” and then take off with the drone duplicate simultaneously taking off near by. The aircraft with passengers would secretly land at a US military base while the drone continues along the other plane's flight path. The drone would then be destroyed over Cuba in a way that places the blame on Cuban fighter aircraft. [Harper's, 7/1/01] Bamford says, “Here we are, 40 years afterward, and it's only now coming out. You just wonder what is going to be exposed 40 years from now.” [Insight, 7/30/01] Some 9/11 skeptics later claim that the 9/11 attacks could have been orchestrated by elements of the US government, and see Northwoods as an example of how top US officials could hatch such a plot. [Oakland Tribune 3/27/04]


April 26, 2001
Atta is stopped at a random inspection near Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and given a citation for having no driver's license. He fails to show up for his May 28 court hearing a warrant is issued for his arrest on June 4. After this, he flies all over the US using his real name, and even flies to Spain and back in July (see July 8-19, 2001) and is never stopped or questioned. The police never try to find him. [Wall Street Journal 10/16/01; Australian Broadcasting Corp. 11/12/01]





April 30, 2001
The Bush administration finally has its first Deputy Secretary-level meeting on terrorism (see January 25, 2001). [Time, 8/4/02] According to counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, he advocates that the Northern Alliance needs to be supported in the war against the Taliban (see April 6, 2001) and the Predator drone flights need to resume over Afghanistan so bin Laden can be targeted (see January 10, 2001-September 4, 2001). Assistant Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz says the focus on al-Qaeda is wrong. He states, “I just don't understand why we are beginning by talking about this one man bin Laden,” and “Who cares about a little terrorist in Afghanistan?” Wolfowitz insists the focus should be Iraqi-sponsored terrorism instead. He claims the 1993 attack on the WTC must have been done with help from Iraq, and rejects the CIA's assertion that there has been no Iraqi-sponsored terrorism against the US since 1993. A spokesman for Wolfowitz later calls Clarke's account a “fabrication.” [Newsweek 3/22/04] Wolfowitz repeats these sentiments after 9/11 and tries to argue that the US should attack Iraq (see September 12, 2001 (F)). Assistant Secretary of State Richard Armitage agrees with Clarke that al-Qaeda is an important threat. Deputy National Security Advisor Steve Hadley, chairing the meeting, brokers a compromise between Wolfowitz and the others. The group agrees to hold additional meetings focusing on al-Qaeda first (see Early June 2001 (B) and June 27-July 16, 2001), but then later look at other terrorism, including any Iraqi terrorism. [Against All Enemies, by Richard Clarke, 3/04, p. 30, pp. 231-232] Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff I. Lewis Libby and Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin also attend the hour long meeting. [Time 8/4/02] May 2001 (D)


May 2000
Secretary of State Powell gives $43 million in aid to Afghanistan's Taliban government, purportedly to assist hungry farmers who are starving since the destruction of their opium crop in January on orders of the Taliban. [Los Angeles Times, 5/22/01] This follows $113 million given by the US in 2000 for humanitarian aid. [State Department Fact Sheet 12/11/01] A Newsday editorial notes that the Taliban “are a decidedly odd choice for an outright gift… Why are we sending these people money—so much that Washington is, in effect, the biggest donor of aid to the Taliban regime?”


May 2001 (B)
US intelligence obtains information that al-Qaeda is planning to infiltrate the US from Canada and carry out a terrorist operation using high explosives. The report doesn't say exactly where inside the US, or when, or how an attack might occur. Two months later, the information is shared with the FBI, the INS, US Customs Service, and the State Department, and told to Bush in August (see August 6, 2001). [Senate Intelligence Committee 9/18/02; Washington Post 9/19/02 (B)]


May 2001 (G)
Vice President Cheney's national energy plan is publicly released. It calls for expanded oil and gas drilling on public land and easing regulatory barriers to building nuclear power plants. [AP, 12/9/02] There are several interesting points, little noticed at the time. It suggests that the US cannot depend exclusively on traditional sources of supply to provide the growing amount of oil that it needs. It will also have to obtain substantial supplies from new sources, such as the Caspian states, Russia, and Africa. It also notes that the US cannot rely on market forces alone to gain access to these added supplies, but will also require a significant effort on the part of government officials to overcome foreign resistance to the outward reach of American energy companies. [Japan Today, 4/30/02] The plan was largely decided through Cheney's secretive Energy Task Force. Both before and after this, Cheney and other Task Force officials meet with Enron executives, including a meeting a month and a half before Enron declares bankruptcy (see December 2, 2001). Two separate lawsuits are later filed to reveal details of how the government's energy policy was formed and if Enron or other players may have influenced it, but so far the Bush Administration has resisted all efforts to release these documents (see October 17, 2002 and February 7, 2003 (B)). [AP 12/9/02] At the very least, it's known that Enron executives met with the Commerce Secretary about its troubled Dabhol power plant in 2001 (see November 1993). [New York Times, 2/21/02]

May 10, 2001
Attorney General Ashcroft sends a letter to department heads telling them the Justice Department's new agenda. He cites seven goals, but counterterrorism is not one of them. Yet just one day earlier he testifies before Congress and says of counterterrorism, “The Department of Justice has no higher priority.” [New York Times 2/28/02] Dale Watson, head of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, recalls nearly falling out of his chair when he sees counterterrorism not mentioned as a goal. [9/11 Commission Report, 4/13/04] In August, a strategic plan is distributed listing the same seven goals and 36 objectives. Thirteen objectives are highlighted, but the single objective relating to counterterrorism is not highlighted. [New York Times 2/28/02]


May 29, 2001
A European Union committee investigating the Echelon spy surveillance network advises all people using e-mail to encrypt their e-mails if they want to avoid being spied on by Echelon. Echelon can sift through up to 90% of all internet traffic, as well as monitor phone conversations, mobile phone calls, fax transmissions, net browsing history, satellite transmissions and so on. Even encryption may not help much—the BBC suggests that “it is likely that the intelligence agencies can crack open most commercially available encryption software.” [BBC, 5/29/01, ]


May 30, 2001
Two Yemeni men are detained after guards see them taking photos at 26 Federal Plaza in New York City. They are questioned by INS agents and let go. A few days later their confiscated film is developed. It shows photos of security checkpoints, police posts and surveillance cameras of federal buildings, including the FBI's counterterrorism office. The two men are later interviewed by the FBI and determined not to be terrorists. However, they had taken the pictures on behalf of a third person living in Indiana. By the time the FBI looks for him, he has fled the country and his documentation is found to be based on a false alias. In 2004 it is reported that it is still unknown if the third man is a terrorist or not. The famous briefing given to President Bush in early August 2001 (see August 6, 2001) mentions the incident, warning that the FBI is investigating “suspicious activity in this country consistent with the preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.” When Bush's briefing is released in 2004, a White House fact sheet fails to mention the still missing third man. [New York Post 7/1/01; New York Post 9/16/01; Washington Post 5/16/04]


Early June 2001
UPI reporters interview the reclusive Taliban leader Mullah Omar. He says the Taliban would like to resolve the bin Laden issue, so there can be “an easing and then lifting of UN sanctions that are strangling and killing the people of [Afghanistan]”(see November 14, 1999 and January 19, 2001). The reporters also note, “Saudi Arabia and the [United Arab Emirates] secretly fund the Taliban government by paying Pakistan for its logistical support to Afghanistan. Despite Pakistan's official denials, Taliban is entirely dependent on Pakistani aid. This was verified on the ground by UPI. Everything from bottled water to oil, gasoline and aviation fuel, and from telephone equipment to military supplies, comes from Pakistan. ” [UPI 6/14/01]


June 2001 (J)
Enron's power plant in Dabhol, India, is shut down. The failure of the $3 billion plant, Enron's largest investment, contributes to Enron's bankruptcy later in the year (see December 2, 2001). Earlier in the year, India stopped paying its bill for the energy from the plant, because energy from the plant cost three times the usual rates. [New York Times, 3/20/01] Enron had hoped to feed the plant with cheap Central Asian gas, but this hope was dashed when a gas pipeline through Afghanistan was not completed (see June 1998 (B). The larger part of the plant is still only 90 percent complete when construction stops at about this time. [New York Times, 3/20/01] It is known that Vice President Cheney lobbies the leader of India's main opposition party about the plant this month. [New York Times, 2/21/02] A lawsuit is in motion to get additional government documents released that could reveal what else the US did to support this plant (see October 17, 2002 and February 7, 2003 (B)). Enron may eventually restart the plant (see October 18, 2002 (B)).


June 2001
German intelligence warns the CIA, Britain's MI6, and Israel's Mossad that Middle Eastern terrorists are planning to hijack commercial aircraft to use as weapons to attack “American and Israeli symbols, which stand out.” A later article quotes unnamed German intelligence sources who state the information was coming from Echelon surveillance technology, and that British intelligence had access to the same warnings. However, there were other informational sources, including specific information and hints given to, but not reported by, Western and Near Eastern news media six months before 9/11. [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9/11/01, Washington Post, 9/14/01, Fox News, 5/17/02]


June 2001 (I)
US intelligence learns that 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is interested in “sending terrorists to the United States” and planning to assist their activities once they arrive. The 9/11 Congressional inquiry says the significance of this is not understood at the time, and data collection efforts are not subsequently “targeted on information about [Mohammed] that might have helped understand al-Qaeda's plans and intentions.” [Committee Findings, 12/11/02, Los Angeles Times, 12/12/02, USA Today, 12/12/02] The FBI has a $2 million reward for Mohammed at the time (see Mid-1996-September 11, 2001) That summer, the NSA intercepts phone calls between Mohammed and Mohamed Atta, but apparently fails to pay attention (see Summer 2001), and on September 10, 2001, the US monitors a call from Atta to Mohammed in which Atta gets final approval for the 9/11 attacks, but this also doesn't lead to action (see September 10, 2001 (F)). In mid-2002, it is reported that “officials believe that given the warning signals available to the FBI in the summer of 2001, investigators correctly concentrated on the [USS] Cole investigation, rather than turning their attention to the possibility of a domestic attack.” [New York Times 6/9/02]



June 2001 (E)
Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke asks for a transfer to start a new national program on cyber security. His request is granted, and he is to change jobs in early October 2001. He does make the change despite the 9/11 attacks. He claims that he tells National Security Advisor Rice and her deputy Steve Hadley, “Perhaps I have become too close to the terrorism issue. I have worked it for ten years and to me it seems like a very important issue, but maybe I'm becoming like Captain Ahab with bin Laden as the White Whale. Maybe you need someone less obsessive about it.” [White House 10/9/01] He later claims, “My view was that this administration, while it listened to me, either didn't believe me that there was an urgent problem or was unprepared to act as though there were an urgent problem. And I thought, if the administration doesn't believe its national coordinator for counterterrorism when he says there's an urgent problem, and if it's unprepared to act as though there's an urgent problem, then probably I should get another job.” [New York Times 3/24/04]


June-July 2001
Terrorist threat reports, already high (see April-May 2001), surge even higher. President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and national security aides are given briefing papers with headlines such as “Bin Laden Threats Are Real” and “Bin Laden Planning High Profile Attacks.” The exact contents of these briefings remain classified, but according to the 9/11 Commission they consistently predict upcoming attacks that will occur “on a catastrophic level, indicating that they would cause the world to be in turmoil, consisting of possible multiple — but not necessarily simultaneous—attacks.” CIA Director Tenet later recalls that by late July the warnings coming in could not get any worse. He feels that Bush and other officials grasp the urgency of what they are being told. [9/11 Commission Report 4/13/04 (B)] But Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin later states that he feels a great tension, peaking these months, between the Bush administration's need to understand terrorism issues and his sense of great urgency. McLaughlin and others are frustrated when inexperienced Bush officials question the validity of certain intelligence findings. Two unnamed, veteran counterterrorism center officers deeply involved in bin Laden issues are so worried about an impending disaster that they consider resigning and going public with their concerns. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/04 (C)] Dale Watson, head of counterterrorism at the FBI, wishes he had “500 analysts looking at Osama bin Laden threat information instead of two.” [9/11 Commission Report 4/13/04 (B)]


June 3, 2001
This is one of only two dates that Bush's national security leadership meets formally to discuss terrorism (see also September 4, 2001 (C)). This group, made up of the National Security Adviser, CIA Director, Defense Secretary, Secretary of State, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, met around 100 times before 9/11 to discuss a variety of topics, but apparently rarely terrorism. In wake of these reports, the White House “aggressively defended the level of attention, given only scattered hints of al-Qaeda activity.” This lack of discussion stands in sharp contrast to the Clinton administration and public comments by the Bush administration. [Time, 8/4/02] Bush said in February 2001: “I will put a high priority on detecting and responding to terrorism on our soil.” A few weeks earlier, Tenet had told Congress, “The threat from terrorism is real, it is immediate, and it is evolving.” [AP 6/28/02]
June 4, 2001
At some point in 2000, three men claiming to be Afghans but using Pakistani passports enter the Cayman Islands, possibly illegally. [Miami Herald, 9/20/01] In late 2000, Cayman and British investigators begin a yearlong probe of these men which lasts until 9/11. [Los Angeles Times 9/20/01] They are overheard discussing hijacking attacks in New York City. On this day, they are taken into custody, questioned and released some time later. This information is forwarded to US intelligence. [Fox News, 5/17/02] In late August, a letter to a Cayman radio station will allege these same men are agents of bin Laden “organizing a major terrorist act against the US via an airline or airlines”(see August 29, 2001).


June 9, 2001
Robert Wright, an FBI agent who spent ten years investigating terrorist funding (see October 1998), writes a memo that slams the FBI. He states, “Knowing what I know, I can confidently say that until the investigative responsibilities for terrorism are transferred from the FBI, I will not feel safe… The FBI has proven for the past decade it cannot identify and prevent acts of terrorism against the United States and its citizens at home and abroad. Even worse, there is virtually no effort on the part of the FBI's International Terrorism Unit to neutralize known and suspected international terrorists living in the United States.”[Cybercast News Service, 5/30/02] He claims “FBI was merely gathering intelligence so they would know who to arrest when a terrorist attack occurred” rather than actually trying to stop the attacks. [UPI 5/30/02] Wright's shocking allegations are largely ignored when they first become public a year later. He is asked on CNN's Crossfire, one of the few outlets to cover the story at all, “Mr. Wright, your charges against the FBI are really more disturbing, more serious, than [Coleen] Rowley's [(see August 28, 2001 (D))]. Why is it, do you think, that you have been ignored by the media, ignored by the congressional committees, and no attention has been paid to your allegations?” The Village Voice says the problem is partly because he went to the FBI and asked permission to speak publicly instead of going straight to the media as Rowley did. The FBI put severe limits on what details Wright can divulge. He is now suing them (see also May 30, 2002). [Village Voice 6/19/02]


June 11, 2001
CIA analyst and FBI analyst travel to New York and meet with FBI officials at FBI headquarters about the USS Cole investigation. The CIA analyst has already showed photographs from the al-Qaeda Malaysia meeting attended by hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi (see January 5-8, 2000), to the FBI analyst, but failed to explain what he knows about them (see May 15, 2001). The CIA analyst now shows the same photos to the additional FBI agents. He wants to know if the FBI agents can identify anyone in the photos for a different case he's working on. “The FBI agents recognized the men from the Cole investigation, but when they asked the CIA what they knew about the men, they were told that they didn't have clearance to share that information. It ended up in a shouting match. ” [ABC News, 8/16/02] The CIA analyst later admits that at the time he knows Almihdhar had a US visa (see April 3-7, 1999), that Alhazmi had traveled to the US (see March 5, 2000), that al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash had been recognized in one of the photos (see January 4, 2001), and that Alhazmi was known to be an experienced terrorist. But he doesn't tell any of this to any FBI agent. He doesn't let them keep copies of the photos either. [Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] He promises them more information later, but the FBI agents don't receive more information until after 9/11. [Congressional Inquiry, 9/20/02] Two days after this meeting, Almihdhar has no trouble getting a new multiple reentry US visa. [US News and World Report 12/12/01; Congressional Inquiry 9/20/02] CIA Director Tenet later claims, “Almihdhar was not who they were talking about in this meeting.” When Senator Carl Levin (D) reads the following to Tenet, “The CIA analyst who attended the New York meeting acknowledged to the joint inquiry staff that he had seen the information regarding Almihdhar's US visa and Alhazmi's travel to the United States but he stated that he would not share information outside of the CIA unless he had authority to do so,” Tenet claims that he talked to the same analyst and was told something completely different. [New York Times 10/17/02]

June 12, 2001


Diaa Mohsen, left and Mohamed Malik, right, caught on an undercover video. A portrait of Mohamed Malik on the right.
Operation Diamondback, a sting operation uncovering an attempt to buy weapons illegally for the Taliban, bin Laden, and others, ends with a number of arrests. An Egyptian named Diaa Mohsen and a Pakistani named Mohammed Malik are arrested and accused of attempting to buy Stinger missiles, nuclear weapon components, and other sophisticated military weaponry for the Pakistani ISI. [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 8/23/01, Washington Post, 8/2/02 (B)] Malik appears to have had links to important Pakistani officials and Kashmiri terrorists, and Mohsen claims a connection to a man “who is very connected to the Taliban” and funded by bin Laden. [Washington Post, 8/2/02 (B), MSNBC, 8/2/02] Some other ISI agents came to Florida on several occasions to negotiate, but they escaped being arrested. They wanted to partially pay in heroin. One mentioned that the WTC would be destroyed (see July 14, 1999and Early August 2001). These ISI agents said some of their purchases would go to the Taliban in Afghanistan and/or terrorists associated with bin Laden. [New York Times 6/16/01; Washington Post 8/2/02 (B); MSNBC 8/2/02] Both Malik and Mohsen lived in Jersey City, New Jersey. [Jersey Journal, 6/20/01] A number of the people held by the US after 9/11, including possible al-Qaeda members Syed Gul Mohammad Shah and Mohammed Azmath (see September 11, 2001 (K)) are from the same Jersey City neighborhood. [New York Post 9/23/01] Mohsen pleads guilty after 9/11, “But remarkably, even though [he was] apparently willing to supply America's enemies with sophisticated weapons, even nuclear weapons technology, Mohsen was sentenced to just 30 months in prison.” [MSNBC, 8/2/02] Malik's case appears to have been dropped, and reporters find him working in a store in Florida less than a year after the trial ended. [MSNBC 8/2/02] Malik's court files remain completely sealed, and in Mohsen's court case, prosecutors “removed references to Pakistan from public filings because of diplomatic concerns.” [Washington Post 8/2/02 (B)] Also arrested are Kevin Ingram and Walter Kapij. Ingram pleads guilty to laundering $350,000 and is sentenced to 18 months in prison. [AP, 12/1/01] Ingram was a former senior investment banker with Deutschebank, but resigned in January 1999 after his division suffered costly losses. [Jersey Journal, 6/20/01] Walter Kapij, a pilot with a minor role in the plot, is given the longest sentence, 33 months in prison. [Palm Beach Post, 1/12/02] Informant Randy Glass plays a key role in the sting, and has thirteen felony fraud charges against him reduced as a result, serving only seven months in prison. Federal agents involved in the case later express puzzlement that Washington higher-ups didn't make the case a higher priority, pointing out that bin Laden could have gotten a nuclear bomb if the deal was for real. Agents on the case complain that the FBI didn't make the case a counter-terrorism matter, which would have improved bureaucratic backing and opened access to FBI information and US intelligence from around the world. [Washington Post, 8/2/02 (B), MSNBC, 8/2/02] Federal agents frequently couldn't get prosecutors to approve wiretaps. [Cox News, 8/2/02] Glass says, “Wouldn't you think that there should have been a wire tap on Diaa [Mohsen]'s phone and Malik's phone?” [WPBF Channel 25, 8/5/02] An FBI supervisor in Miami refused to front money for the sting, forcing agents to use money from US Customs and even Glass's own money to help keep the sting going. [Cox News 8/2/02]

June 27, 2001
The Wall Street Journal reports that Pakistan and India are discussing jointly building a gas pipeline from Central Asian gas fields through Iran. This would circumvent the difficulties of building the pipeline through Afghanistan. [Wall Street Journal, 6/27/01] Iran has been secretly supporting the Northern Alliance to keep Afghanistan divided so no pipelines could be put through it (see December 20, 1999). Presumably the US government would be opposed to this, since much of its support for Afghanistan pipelines has been to prevent them from going through Iran (see Early 1998).


Late September-Early October 2001
According to a later Mirror article, leaders of Pakistan's two Islamic parties negotiate bin Laden's extradition to Pakistan to stand trial for the 9/11 attacks. Bin Laden would be held under house arrest in Peshawar and would face an international tribunal, which would decide whether to try him or hand him over to the US. According to reports in Pakistan (and the Telegraph), this plan has both bin Laden's approval and that of Taliban leader Mullah Omar. However, the plan is vetoed by Pakistan's president Musharraf who says he “could not guarantee bin Laden's safety.” But it appears the US did not want the deal: a US official later says that “casting our objectives too narrowly”risked “a premature collapse of the international effort [to overthrow the Taliban] if by some lucky chance Mr. bin Laden was captured.” [Mirror 7/8/02]



Late June 2001
White House National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Richard Clarke, gives a direct warning to the FAA to increase security measures in light of an impending terrorist attack. The FAA refuses to take such measures. [New
Summer 2001 (D)
Egyptian investigators track down a close associate of bin Laden named Ahmed al-Khadir, wanted for bombing the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad in 1995. Egyptians surround the safe house in Pakistan where al-Khadir is hiding. They notify the ISI to help arrest him, and the ISI promises swift action. Instead, a car sent by the ISI filled with Taliban and having diplomatic plates arrives, grabs al-Khadir and drives him to safety in Afghanistan. Time magazine later brings up the incident to show the strong ties between the ISI and both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. [Time 5/6/02] Yorker 1/14/02]




Summer 2001 (E)
Supposedly, by this time there are only fourteen fighter planes on active alert to defend the continental US (and six more defending Canada and Alaska). [Bergen Record 12/5/03] But in the months before 9/11, rather than increase the number, the Pentagon was planning to reduce the number still further. Just after 9/11, the Los Angeles Times reported, “While defense officials say a decision had not yet been made, a reduction in air defenses had been gaining currency in recent months among task forces assigned by [Defense Secretary] Rumsfeld to put together recommendations for a reassessment of the military.” By comparison, in the Cold War atmosphere of the 1950s, the US had thousands of fighters on alert throughout the US. [Los Angeles Times, 9/15/01 (B)] As late as 1998, there were 175 fighters on alert status. [Bergen Record 12/5/03] Also during this time, FAA officials try to dispense with “primary” radars altogether, so that if a plane were to turn its transponder off, no radar could see it. NORAD rejects the proposal

July 2001
The CIA hears an individual who had recently been in Afghanistan say, “Everyone is talking about an impending attack.” [Senate Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02, Washington Post, 9/19/02] The Telegraph later reports that “the idea of an attack on a skyscraper was discussed among [bin Laden's] supporters in Kabul.” At some unspecified point before 9/11, a neighbor in Kabul saw diagrams showing a skyscraper attack in a house known as a “nerve center” for al-Qaeda activity. [Telegraph, 11/16/01] US soldiers will later find forged visas, altered passports, listings of Florida flight schools and registration papers for a flight simulator in al-Qaeda houses in Afghanistan. [New York Times, 12/6/01] Bin Laden bodyguard later claims that in May 2001 he hears bin Laden tell people in Afghanistan that the US would be hit with a terrorist attack, and thousands would die. [Guardian 11/28/01] CIA Director Tenet later claims that the 9/11 plot was “in the heads of three or four people.” [USA Today 2/7/02]


July 4, 2001
Hijacker Khalid Almihdhar reenters the US. The CIA and FBI have recently been showing interest in him (see May 15, 2001 and June 11, 2001), but have still failed to place him on a terrorist watch list. Had he been placed on a watch list by this date, he would have been stopped and possibly detained as he tried to enter the US. He enters on a new US visa obtained in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on June 13, 2001 (see also May 2001 (H)). [Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] The FBI notes he returns just days after the last of the hijacker “muscle” has entered the US (see April 23-June 29, 2001), and speculate he returns because his job in bringing them over is finished. [Congressional Inquiry 7/24/03]

Juli 4-14, 2001
Bin Laden, America's most wanted criminal with a $5 million bounty on his head, supposedly receives lifesaving treatment for renal failure from American surgeon specialist Dr. Callaway at the American hospital in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. He is possibly accompanied by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri (who is said to be bin Laden's personal physician, al-Qaeda's second-in-command, and leader of Egypt's Islamic Jihad), plus several bodyguards. Callaway supposedly treated bin Laden in 1996 and 1998, also in Dubai. Callaway later refuses to answer any questions on this matter. [Le Figaro 10/31/01; Agence France-Presse 11/1/01; London Times 11/01/01] During his stay, bin Laden is visited by “several members of his family and Saudi personalities,” including Prince Turki al Faisal, then head of Saudi intelligence, as well as two CIA officers (see also July 12, 2001). [Guardian, 11/1/01] [FTW] The explosive story is widely reported in Europe, but barely at all in the US (possibly only by UPI [UPI, 11/1/01]). French terrorism expert Antoine Sfeir says the story of this meeting has been verified and is not surprising: It “is nothing extraordinary. Bin Laden maintained contacts with the CIA up to 1998. These contacts have not ceased since bin Laden settled in Afghanistan. Up to the last moment, CIA agents hoped that bin Laden would return to the fold of the US, as was the case before 1989.” [Le Figaro 11/1/01]

Juli 10; 2001
FBI agent Ken Williams.
Phoenix, Arizona, FBI agent Ken Williams sends a memorandum warning about suspicious activities involving a group of Middle Eastern men taking flight training lessons in Arizona. The memo is titled: “Zakaria Mustapha Soubra; IT-OTHER (Islamic Army of the Caucasus),” because it focuses on Zakaria Soubra, a Lebanese flight student in Prescott, Arizona, and his connection with a terror group in Chechnya that has ties to al-Qaeda. It is subtitled: “Osama bin Laden and Al-Muhjiroun supporters attending civil aviation universities/colleges in Arizona.” [Fortune 5/22/02; Arizona Republic 7/24/03] The memo is based on an investigation Williams had begun the year before (see April 17, 2000), but had trouble pursuing because of the low priority the Arizona FBI office gave terror investigations (see 1994 (C)). In the memo, Williams does the following:
1. Names nine other suspect students from Pakistan, India, Kenya, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, in addition to Soubra. [Die Zeit, 10/1/02] Hijacker Hani Hanjour, attending flight school in Arizona in early 2001, is not mentioned in the memo, but one of his acquaintances is (see 1997-July 2001). Another person on the list is later arrested in Pakistan in 2002 with al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida (see March 28, 2002). [Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03, Washington Post, 7/25/03 (C)]
2. Notes he interviewed some of these students, and heard some of them make hostile comments about the US. He also noticed they were suspiciously well informed about security measures at US airports. [Die Zeit 10/1/02]
3. Notes an increasing, “inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest” taking flight lessons in Arizona. [Die Zeit 10/1/02; Congressional Inquiry 7/24/03]
4. Suspects that some of the 10 people he's investigated are connected to al-Qaeda. [Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] He discovered that one of them was communicating through an intermediary with Abu Zubaida. [San Jose Mercury News 5/23/02] Potentially this is the same member of the list mentioned above who is later captured with Abu Zubaida.
5. Discovers connections between several of the students and a radical group called Al-Muhajiroun. [San Jose Mercury News, 5/23/02] This group supported bin Laden, and issued a fatwa, or call to arms, that included airports on a list of acceptable terror targets. [AP 5/22/02] Soubra, the main focus of the memo, is a member of Al-Muhajiroun and an outspoken radical, but he is later cleared of any ties to terrorism. [Los Angeles Times, 10/28/01 (C)]
6. Warns of a possible “effort by Osama bin Laden to send students to the US to attend civil aviation universities and colleges”[Fortune, 5/22/02], so they can later hijack aircraft. [Die Zeit 10/1/02]
7. Recommends, “The FBI should accumulate a listing of civil aviation universities/colleges around the country. FBI field offices with these types of schools in their area should establish appropriate liaison. FBI [headquarters] should discuss this matter with other elements of the US intelligence community and task the community for any information that supports Phoenix's suspicions.” [Arizona Republic 7/24/03] In fact, the FBI has already done this, but because of poor FBI communications, Williams is not aware of the report (see 1999 (L)).
8. Recommends the FBI ask the State Department to provide visa data on flight school students from Middle Eastern countries so the bureau can track them more easily. [New York Times, 5/4/02]
The memo is e-mailed to six people at FBI headquarters in the bin Laden and radical fundamentalist units, and to two people in the FBI New York field office. [Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] He also shares some concerns with the CIA. [San Jose Mercury News 5/23/02] But the memo is merely marked “routine,” not “urgent.” It is generally ignored, not shared with other FBI offices, and the recommendations are not taken. One colleague in New York replies at the time that the memo is “speculative and not very significant.” [Die Zeit, 10/1/02, Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] Williams also was unaware of many FBI investigations and leads that could have given weight to his memo (see 1998 (F), May 18, 1998, After May 15, 1998, 1999 (L), September 1999 (E), January-February 2001). Authorities later claim Williams was only pursuing a hunch, but one familiar with classified information says, “This was not a vague hunch. He was doing a case on these guys.” [San Jose Mercury News 5/23/02]


July 12, 2001
While in Dubai, United Arab Emirates to receive lifesaving medical treatment (see July 4-14, 2001), Bin Laden supposedly meets with CIA agent Larry Mitchell in the Dubai hospital on this day, and possibly others. Mitchell reportedly lives in Dubai as an Arab specialist under the cover of being a consular agent. The CIA, the Dubai hospital and even bin Laden deny the story. Le Figaro and Radio France International stand by it. [Le Figaro 10/31/01; Radio France International 11/1/01; Reuters 11/10/01] The Guardian claims that the two news organizations that broke the story, Le Figaro and Radio France International, got their information from French intelligence, “which is keen to reveal the ambiguous role of the CIA, and to restrain Washington from extending the war to Iraq and elsewhere.” The Guardian adds that during his stay bin Laden is also visited by a second CIA officer. [Guardian, 11/1/01] On July 15, Larry Mitchell supposedly returns to CIA headquarters to report on his meeting with bin Laden. [Radio France International, 11/1/01]


July 12, 2001 (B)
On July 5, the CIA briefs Attorney General Ashcroft on the al-Qaeda threat, warning that a significant terrorist attack is imminent, and a strike could occur at any time. [9/11 Commission Report, 4/13/04 (B)] On this day, acting FBI Director Tom Pickard briefs Attorney General Ashcroft about the terror threat inside the US. Pickard later swears under oath that Ashcroft tells him, “he did not want to hear about this anymore.” Ashcroft, also under oath, later categorically denies the allegation, saying, “I did never speak to him saying that I didn't want to hear about terrorism.” However, Ruben Garcia, head of the Criminal Division, and another senior FBI official corroborate Pickard's account. Ashcroft's account is supported by his top aide, but another official Ashcroft's office claimed would also support Ashcroft's account says he can't remember what happened. Pickard briefs Ashcroft on terrorism four more times that summer, but he never mentions al-Qaeda to Ashcroft again before 9/11. [MSNBC, 6/22/04] Pickard later makes an appeal to Ashcroft for more counterterrorism funding; Ashcroft rejects the appeal on September 10, 2001. [9/11 Commission Report, 4/13/04] Picard later says, “Before September 11th, I couldn't get half an hour on terrorism with Ashcroft. He was only interested in three things: guns, drugs, and civil rights.”





July 16, 2001
British spy agencies send a report to British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other top officials warning that al-Qaeda is in “the final stages” of preparing a terrorist attack in the West. The prediction is “based on intelligence gleaned not just from MI6 and GCHQ but also from US agencies, including the CIA and the National Security Agency,” which cooperate with the British. “The contents of the July 16 warning would have been passed to the Americans, Whitehall sources confirmed.” The report states there is “an acute awareness” that the attack is “a very serious threat.” [London Times, 6/14/02] This information could be from or in addition to a warning based on surveillance of al-Qaeda prisoner Khalid al-Fawwaz (see August 21, 2001). [Fox News 5/17/02]


July 16, 2001 (B)
A Village Voice reporter is told by a New York taxi driver, “You know, I am leaving the country and going home to Egypt sometime in late August or September. I have gotten e-mails from people I know saying that Osama bin Laden has planned big terrorist attacks for New York and Washington for that time. It will not be safe here then.” He does in fact return to Egypt for that time period. The FBI isn't told about this lead until after 9/11. He is later interrogated by the FBI and released. He claims what he knew was known by many. [Village Voice 9/25/02 (B)]




July 21, 2001
Three American officials, Tom Simons (former US Ambassador to Pakistan), Karl Inderfurth (former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs) and Lee Coldren (former State Department expert on South Asia) meet with Pakistani and Russian intelligence officers in a Berlin hotel. [Salon, 8/16/02] It is the third of a series of back-channel conferences called “brainstorming on Afghanistan.” Taliban representatives sat in on previous meetings, but boycotted this one due to worsening tensions. However, the Pakistani ISI relays information from the meeting to the Taliban. [Guardian, 9/22/01] At the meeting, former US State Department official Lee Coldren passes on a message from Bush officials. He later says, “I think there was some discussion of the fact that the United States was so disgusted with the Taliban that they might be considering some military action.” [Guardian, 9/26/01] Accounts vary, but former Pakistani Foreign Secretary Niaz Naik later says he is told by senior American officials at the meeting that military action to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan is planned to “take place before the snows started falling in Afghanistan, by the middle of October at the latest.” The goal is to kill or capture both bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar, topple the Taliban regime and install a transitional government of moderate Afghans in its place. Uzbekistan and Russia would also participate (see also December 19, 2000, March 15, 2001 and June 26, 2001). Naik also says “it was doubtful that Washington would drop its plan even if bin Laden were to be surrendered immediately by the Taliban.” [BBC, 9/18/01] One specific threat made at this meeting is that the Taliban can choose between “carpets of bombs” —an invasion— or “carpets of gold” —the pipeline. [Bin Laden: The Forbidden Truth] Niaz Naik says Tom Simons made the “carpets”statement. Simons claims: “It's possible that a mischievous American participant, after several drinks, may have thought it smart to evoke gold carpets and carpet bombs. Even Americans can't resist the temptation to be mischievous.” Naik and the American participants deny that the pipeline was an issue at the meeting. [Salon 8/16/02]


July 26, 2001
CBS News reports that Attorney General Ashcroft has stopped flying commercial airlines due to a threat assessment, but “neither the FBI nor the Justice Department … would identify [to CBS] what the threat was, when it was detected or who made it.” [CBS, 7/26/01] FTW “Ashcroft demonstrated an amazing lack of curiosity when asked if he knew anything about the threat. ‘Frankly, I don't,’ he told reporters.” [San Francisco Chronicle 6/3/02] It is later reported that he stopped flying in July based on threat assessments made on May 8 and June 19. In May 2002 its claimed the threat assessment had nothing to do with al-Qaeda, but Ashcroft walked out of his office rather than answer questions about it. [AP, 5/16/02] The San Francisco Chronicle concludes, “The FBI obviously knew something was in the wind … The FBI did advise Ashcroft to stay off commercial aircraft. The rest of us just had to take our chances.” [San Francisco Chronicle, 6/3/02] CBS's Dan Rather later says of this warning: “Why wasn't it shared with the public at large?” [Washington Post 5/27/02]


Late summer 2001
Jordanian intelligence (the GID) makes a communications intercept deemed so important that King Abdullah's men relay it to Washington, probably through the CIA station in Amman. To make doubly sure the message gets through it is passed through an Arab intermediary to a German intelligence agent. The message states that a major attack, code named The Big Wedding, is planned inside the US and that aircraft will be used. “When it became clear that the information was embarrassing to Bush Administration officials and congressmen who at first denied that there had been any such warnings before September 11, senior Jordanian officials backed away from their earlier confirmations.” Christian Science Monitor calls the story “confidently authenticated” even though Jordan has backed away from it. [International Herald Tribune, 5/21/02, ]

Late July 2001
David Schippers, noted conservative Chicago lawyer and the House Judiciary Committee's chief investigator in the Clinton impeachment trial, claims two days after 9/11 that he had tried to warn federal authorities about plans to strike buildings in lower Manhattan. Schippers says, “I was trying to get people to listen to me because I had heard that the terrorists had set up a three-pronged attack:” an American airplane, the bombing of a federal building in the heartland and a massive attack in lower Manhattan. He tries contacting Attorney General John Ashcroft, the White House, and even the House managers with whom he had worked, but nobody returns his phone calls. “People thought I was crazy. What I was doing was I was calling everybody I knew telling them that this has happened,” he says. “I'm telling you the more I see of the stuff that's coming out, if the FBI had even been awake they would have seen it.” He also claims to know of ignored warnings about the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and evidence that Middle Easterners were connected with that attack. [Indianapolis Star, 5/18/02] Other mainstream sources have apparently shied away from Schippers' story, but he has added details in an interview on the partisan Alex Jones Show. He claims that it is FBI agents in Chicago and Minnesota who first contact him and tell him that a terrorist attack is going to occur in lower Manhattan. A group of these agents now want to testify about what they know, but want legal protection from government retribution. [Alex Jones Show 10/10/01]

August-October 2001
British intelligence asks India for legal assistance in catching Saeed Sheikh sometime during August 2001. Saeed has been openly living in Pakistan since 1999 and has even traveled to Britain at least twice during that time (see January 1, 2000-September 11, 2001), despite having kidnapped Britons and Americans (see June 1993-October 1994). [London Times, 4/21/02, Vanity Fair, 8/02] According to the Indian media, informants in Germany tell the internal security service there that Saeed helped fund hijacker Mohamed Atta (see Early August 2001 (D)). [Frontline, 10/6/01] On September 23, it is revealed that the British have asked India for help in finding Saeed, but it isn't explained why. [London Times, 9/23/01] His role in training the hijackers and financing the 9/11 attacks soon becomes public knowledge, though some elements are disputed (see September 24, 2001-December 26, 2002). [Telegraph, 9/30/01, CNN, 10/6/01, CNN, 10/8/01] The Gulf News claims that the US freezes the assets of Pakistani terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad on October 12, 2001 because it has established links between Saeed Sheikh and 9/11 (see October 12, 2001). [Gulf News 10/11/01] However, in October, an Indian magazine notes, “Curiously, there seems to have been little international pressure on Pakistan to hand [Saeed] over” [Frontline, 10/6/01], and the US doesn't formally ask Pakistan for help to find Saeed until January 2002 (see November 2001-February 5, 2002).


August 2001 (I)
The US receives intelligence that bin Laden's right-hand man, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is receiving medical treatment at a clinic in San'a, Yemen. However, the Bush administration rejects a plan to capture him, as officials are not 100 percent sure the patient is al-Zawahiri. Officials later regret the missed opportunity. [ABC News 2/20/02]


August 2001
Randy Glass, a former con artist turned government informant, later claims that he contacts the staff of Senator Bob Graham and Representative Robert Wexler at this time and warns them of a plan to attack the WTC, but his warnings are ignored. [Palm Beach Post 10/17/02] Glass also tells the media at this time that his recently concluded informant work has “far greater ramifications than have so far been revealed,” and “potentially, thousands of lives [are] at risk.” [South Florida Sun-Sentinel 8/7/01] Glass was a key informant in a sting operation involving ISI agents trying to illegally purchase sophisticated US military weaponry in return for cash and heroin (see June 12, 2001). He claims that in 1999, one ISI agent named Rajaa Gulum Abbas pointed to the WTC and said, “Those towers are coming down”(see July 14, 1999). [Palm Beach Post 10/17/02] Most details remain sealed, but Glass points out that his sentencing document dated June 15, 2001, lists threats against the World Trade Center and Americans. [WPBF Channel 25 8/5/02] Florida State Senator Ron Klein, who had dealings with Glass before 9/11, says he is surprised it took so many months for the US to listen to Glass: “Shame on us.” [Palm Beach Post, 10/17/02] Senator Graham acknowledges that his office had contact with Glass before 9/11, and was told about a WTC attack: “I was concerned about that and a dozen other pieces of information which emanated from the summer of 2001.” But Graham later says he personally was unaware of Glass's information until after 9/11. [Palm Beach Post 10/17/02] In October 2002, Glass testifies under oath before a private session of the Congressional 9/11 inquiry. He states, “I told [the inquiry] I have specific evidence, and I can document it.” [Palm Beach Post, 10/17/02]


August 2001



A Raytheon 727 lands in New Mexico in August, 2001.
The US company Raytheon lands a 727 six times in a military base in New Mexico without any pilots on board. This is done to test equipment making future hijackings more difficult, by allowing ground control to take over the flying of a hijacked plane. [AP 10/2/01 (C); Der Spiegel 10/28/01] Several Raytheon employees with possible ties to this remote control technology program appear to have been on the hijacked 9/11 flight (see September 25, 2001). However, most media reports after 9/11 suggest such technology is currently impossible. For instance, the Observer quotes an expert who says “the technology is pretty much there” but still untried. [Observer 9/16/01] An aviation-security expert at Jane's Defence Weekly says this type of technology belongs “in the realms of science fiction.” [Financial Times, 9/18/01 (B), Economist, 9/20/01] Even Bush appears to deny the technology current exists. He gives a speech after 9/11 in which he mentions that the government would give grants to research “new technology, probably far in the future, allowing air traffic controllers to land distressed planes by remote control.” [New York Times 9/28/01]


August 2001 (B)
At least six 9/11 hijackers, including all of those that boarded Flight 77, live in Laurel, Maryland from about this time. They reportedly include Hani Hanjour, Majed Moqed, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi and Salem Alhazmi (though also see Early September 2001). Laurel, Maryland is home to a Muslim cleric named Moataz Al-Hallak who teaches at a local Islamic school and has been linked to bin Laden. He has testified three times before a grand jury investigating bin Laden. NSA expert James Bamford later states, “the terrorist cell that eventually took over the airliner that crashed into the Pentagon ended up living, working, planning and developing all their activities in Laurel, Maryland, which happens to be the home of the NSA. So they were actually living alongside NSA employees as they were plotting all these things.” [Washington Post 9/19/01; BBC 6/21/02]


Early August 2001 (B)
AP later reports that the “CIA had developed general information a month before the attacks that heightened concerns that bin Laden and his followers were increasingly determined to strike on US soil.” A CIA official affirmed that: “There was something specific in early August that said to us that [bin Laden] was determined in striking on US soil.” A major excuse given since 9/11 is that the Bush administration was focused on overseas attacks, and didn't expect a domestic attack (for instance see May 16, 2002 (B)). [AP 10/3/01]


August 2, 2001
Christina Rocca, the Director of Asian Affairs at the State Department, secretly meets the Taliban ambassador in Islamabad, apparently in a last ditch attempt to secure a pipeline deal. Rocca was previously in charge of contacts with Islamic guerrilla groups at the CIA, and oversaw the delivery of Stinger missiles to Afghan mujaheddin in the 1980s. [Irish Times, 11/19/01, Salon, 2/8/02, Bin Laden: The Forbidden Truth] [FTW


August 4, 2001
President Bush sends a letter to Pakistani President Musharraf, warning him about supporting the Taliban. However, the tone is similar to past requests dating to the Clinton administration. There had been some discussion that US policy toward Pakistan should change. For instance, At the end of June, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke “urged that the United States think about what it would do after the next attack, and then take that position with Pakistan now, before the attack.” Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage later acknowledges that a new approach to Pakistan had not yet been implemented by 9/11. [9/11 Commission Report 3/24/04]




August 6, 2001


President Bush receives a classified intelligence briefing at his Crawford, Texas ranch indicating that bin Laden might be planning to hijack commercial airliners. The memo read to him is titled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US.” The entire memo focuses on the possibility of terrorist attacks inside the US.[Newsweek, 5/27/02, New York Times, 5/15/02] A page and a half of the contents are released after National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice testifies to the 9/11 Commission [Washington Post, 4/10/04]. The 9/11 Congressional inquiry call it “a closely held intelligence report for senior government officials” presented in early August 2001. Rice testifies that the memo is mostly historic regarding bin Laden's previous activities and she says it contains no specific information that would have prevented an attack. The memo, as released, includes at least the following information:
1. Bin Laden has wanted to conduct attacks inside the US since 1997.
2. “Members of al-Qaeda, including some US citizens, [have] resided in or travelled to the US for years and the group apparently maintain[s] a support structure” in the US.
3. A discussion of the arrest of Ahmed Ressam (see December 14, 1999) and the 1998 US embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998).
4. Uncorroborated information obtained in 1998 that bin Laden wants to hijack airplanes to gain the release of US-held extremists such as Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman (see July 1990).
5. Information acquired in May 2001 indicating al-Qaeda is planning to infiltrate the US from Canada and attack the US using high explosives (see May 2001 (B)).
6. “FBI judgments about patterns of activity consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks.”
7. The number of on-going bin Laden-related investigations. [Senate Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02, Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03]
Incredibly, the New York Times later reports that Bush “[breaks] off from work early and [spends] most of the day fishing” (see also August 4-30, 2001). [New York Times 5/25/02] The existence of this memo is kept secret, until it is leaked in May 2002, causing a storm of controversy (see May 15, 2002). National Security Advisor Rice gives an inaccurate description of the memo, claiming it is only one and a half pages long (other accounts state it is 11 and a half pages instead of the usual two or three). [Newsweek 5/27/02; New York Times 5/15/02; Die Zeit 10/1/02] She falsely claims, “It was an analytic report that talked about [bin Laden]'s methods of operation, talked about what he had done historically, in 1997, in 1998…. I want to reiterate, it was not a warning. There was no specific time, place, or method mentioned.” [White House 5/16/02]



August 7, 2001
One day after Bush receives a Presidential Daily Briefing entitled, “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US” (see August 6, 2001), a version of the same material is given to other top government officials. But this Senior Executive Intelligence Brief or SEIB, doesn't the most important information from Bush's briefing. It doesn't mention that there are 70 FBI investigations into possible al-Qaeda activity, doesn't mention a May 2001 threat of US-based explosives attacks (see May 2001 (B)), and doesn't mention FBI concerns about recent casing of buildings in New York City (see May 30, 2001). Typically, this type of memo “goes to scores of Cabinet-agency officials from the assistant secretary level up and doesn't include raw intelligence or sensitive information about ongoing law enforcement matters,” according to the Associated Press. Some members of Congress express concern that policy makers were given an incomplete view of the terrorist threat. [AP 4/13/04 (B)]


August 13-15, 2001
Zacarias Moussaoui trains at the Pan Am International Flight School in Minneapolis, Minnesota, where he pays $8,300 ($1500 by credit card and the remainder in cash) to use a Boeing 474 Model 400 aircraft simulator. After just one day of training most of the staff is suspicious that he's a terrorist. They discuss “how much fuel [is] on board a 747-400 and how much damage that could cause if it hit[s] anything.” They call the FBI with their concerns later that day. [New York Times, 2/8/02, Senate Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02] They are suspicious because:
1. In contrast to all the other students at this high-level flight school, he has no aviation background, little previous training and no pilot's license. [ Senate Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02]
2. He wants to fly a 747 not because he plans to be a pilot, but as an “ego boosting thing.” [New York Times, 10/18/02] Yet within hours of his arrival, it is clear he “was not some affluent joy-rider.” [New York Times, 2/8/02]
3. He is “extremely” interested in the operation of the plane's doors and control panel. [Senate Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02] He also is very keen on learning the protocol for communicating with the flight tower despite having no plans to actually become a pilot. [New York Times, 2/8/02]
4. He is evasive and belligerent when asked about his background. When an instructor, who notes from his records that Moussaoui is from France, attempts to greet him in French, Moussaoui appears not to understand, saying that he had spent very little time in France and that he is from the Middle East. The instructor considers it odd that Moussaoui did not specify the Middle Eastern country. [Minneapolis St. Paul Star Tribune, 12/21/01; Washington Post, 1/2/02]
5. He tells a flight instructor he is not a Muslim, but the instructor senses he is lying, badly, about it. [New Yorker, 9/30/02]
6. He says he would “love” to fly a simulated flight from London to New York, raising fears he has plans to hijack such a flight. [Senate Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02] His original e-mail to the flight school similarly stated he wanted to be good enough to fly from London to New York. [New York Times, 2/8/02]
7. He pays for thousands of dollars in expenses from a large wad of cash. [New York Times, 2/8/02]
8. He seemed to be trying to pack a large amount of training in a short period of time for no apparent reason. [New York Times, 2/8/02]
9. He mostly practices flying in the air, not taking off or landing (although note that reports claiming he didn't want to take off or land at all appear to be an exaggeration). [New York Times, 2/8/02, Slate, 5/21/02, Minneapolis St. Paul Star Tribune, 12/21/01, New York Times, 5/22/02]
Failing to get much initial interest from the FBI, the flight instructor tells the FBI agents, “Do you realize how serious this is? This man wants training on a 747. A 747 fully loaded with fuel could be used as a weapon!” [New York Times 2/8/02]



August 19, 2001
The New York Times reports that counter-terrorism expert John O'Neill is under investigation for an incident involving a missing briefcase. [New York Times, 8/19/01] In July 2000, he misplaced a briefcase containing important classified information, but it was found a couple of hours later still unlocked and untouched. Why such a trivial issue would come up over a year later and be published in the New York Times seemed entirely due to politics. Says the New Yorker, “The leak seemed to be timed to destroy O'Neill's chance of being confirmed for [an] NSC job,” and force him into retirement. A high-ranking colleague says the leak was “somebody being pretty vicious to John.” [New Yorker, 1/14/02] John O'Neill suspects the article was orchestrated by his enemy Tom Pickard, then interim director of the FBI. [PBS Frontline, 10/3/02 (B)] The New Yorker later speculates that with the retirement of FBI Director Freeh in June, it appears O'Neill lost his friends in high places, and the new FBI Director wanted him replaced with a Bush ally. [New Yorker, 1/14/02] O'Neill quits a few days later (see August 22, 2001 (B)).


August 21, 2001



Left to right: Khalid al-Fawwaz, Adel Abdel Bary and Ibrahim Ediarous.
Walid Arkeh, a Jordanian serving time in a Florida prison, is interviewed by FBI agents after warning the government of an impending terrorist attack. He had been in a British jail from September 2000 to July 2001, and while there had befriended three inmates, Khalid al-Fawwaz, Adel Abdel Bary and Ibrahim Eidarous. US prosecutors charge that “the three men ran a London storefront that served as a cover for al-Qaeda operations and acted as a conduit for communications between bin Laden and his network.” [Orlando Sentinel, 10/30/02] Al-Fawwaz was bin Laden's press agent in London, and bin Laden had called him over 200 times before al-Fawwaz was arrested in 1998. [Financial Times, 11/29/01 (B), Sunday Times, 3/24/02] The other two had worked in the same office as al-Fawwaz. All three have been indicted as co-conspirators with bin Laden in the 1998 US embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998). Arkeh tells the FBI that he had learned from these three that “something big was going to happen in New York City,” and that they had called the 1993 attack on the WTC “unfinished business.” Tampa FBI agents determine that he had associated with these al-Qaeda agents, but nonetheless they don't believe him. According to Arkeh, one agent responds to his “something big”warning by saying: “Is that all you have? That's old news.” The agents fail to learn more from him. On September 9, concerned that time is running out, a fellow prisoner tried to arrange a meeting, but nothing happens before 9/11. The Tampa FBI agents have a second interview with him hours after the 9/11 attacks, but even long after 9/11 they claim he cannot be believed. On January 6, 2002, the Tampa FBI issued a statement: “The information [was] vetted to FBI New York, the Acting Special Agent in Charge of the Tampa Division and the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Florida. All agreed the information provided by this individual was vague and unsubstantiated… Mr. Arkeh did not provide information that had any bearing on the FBI preventing September 11. ” [Orlando Sentinel, 1/6/02, Orlando Sentinel, 10/30/02]


August 23, 2001
According to German newspapers, the Mossad gives the CIA a list of terrorists living in the US and say that they appear to be planning to carry out an attack in the near future. It is unknown if these are the 19 9/11 hijackers or if the number is a coincidence. However, four names on the list are known and are names of the 9/11 hijackers: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, and Mohamed Atta. [Die Zeit 10/1/02; Der Spiegel 10/1/02; BBC 10/2/02; Ha'aretz 10/3/02] The Mossad appears to have learned about this through its “art student” spy ring (see for instance, March 5, 2002). Yet apparently this warning and list are not treated as particularly urgent by the CIA and also not passed on to the FBI. It's not clear if this warning influenced the adding of Alhazmi and Almihdhar to a terrorism watch list on this same day, and if so, why only those two. [Der Spiegel 10/1/02] Israel has denied that there were any Mossad agents in the US. [Ha'aretz, 10/3/02] The US has denied knowing about Atta before 9/11, despite other media reports to the contrary (see January-May 2000)


August 23-27, 2001
In the wake of the French intelligence report on Zacarias Moussaoui (see August 22, 2001), FBI agents in Minnesota are “in a frenzy” and “absolutely convinced he [is] planning to do something with a plane.” One agent writes notes speculating Moussaoui might “fly something into the World Trade Center.” [Newsweek, 5/20/02] Minnesota FBI agents become “desperate to search the computer lap top” and “conduct a more thorough search of his personal effects,” especially since Moussaoui acted as if he was hiding something important in the laptop when arrested. [Time, 5/21/02, Time, 5/27/02] FTW They decide to apply for a search warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). “FISA allows the FBI to carry out wiretaps and searches that would otherwise be unconstitutional” because “the goal is to gather intelligence, not evidence.” [Washington Post, 11/4/01] Standards to get a warrant through FISA are so low that out of 10,000 requests over more than 20 years, not a single one was turned down. When the FBI didn't have a strong enough case, it appears it simply lied to FISA. In May 2002, the FISA court complained that the FBI had lied in at least 75 warrant cases during the Clinton administration, once even by the FBI Director. [New York Times, 8/27/02] However, as FBI agent Coleen Rowley later puts it, FBI headquarters “almost inexplicably, throw[s] up roadblocks” and undermines their efforts. Headquarters personnel bring up “almost ridiculous questions in their apparent efforts to undermine the probable cause.” One Minneapolis agent's e-mail says FBI headquarters is “setting this up for failure.” That turns out to be correct (see August 28, 2001 (D)). [Time 5/21/02; Time 5/27/02]


August 23, 2001 (D)
The FBI begins a search for hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar in response to a CIA cable about them (see August 23, 2001 (C)). The FBI later claims that they responded aggressively. An internal review after 9/11 found that “everything was done that could have been done” to find them. [Los Angeles Times 10/28/01] However, even aside from a failed attempt to start a criminal investigation (see August 28, 2001), the search is halfhearted at best. As the Wall Street Journal later explains, the search “consisted of little more than entering their names in a nationwide law enforcement database that would have triggered red flags if they were taken into custody for some other reason.” [Wall Street Journal, 9/17/01] A national motor vehicle index is checked, but a speeding ticket issued to Alhazmi the previous April is not detected. [Daily Oklahoman, 1/20/02, Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] Nor is a recorded interaction between Alhazmi and local police in Fairfax, Virginia in May that could have led investigators to Alhazmi's East Coast apartment. [San Diego Union-Tribune,9/27/02] Even though the two were known to have entered the US through Los Angeles, drivers' license records in California are not checked. The FBI also fails to check national credit card or bank account databases, and car registration. All of these would had positive results. Alhazmi's name was even in the 2000-2001 San Diego phone book, listing the address where he and Almihdhar may have been living off and on until about September 9, 2001 (see Early February-Summer 2000 and Early September 2001). [Newsweek 6/2/02; South Florida Sun-Sentinel 9/28/01; Los Angeles Times 10/28/01]


August 23 or 24, 2001
CIA Director Tenet and CIA senior staff are briefed about the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui (see August 15, 2001) in a briefing entitled “Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly.” However, apparently others such as President Bush and the White House counterterrorism group are not told about Moussaoui until after the 9/11 attacks begin. Even the acting director of the FBI is not told, despite the fact that it was lower level FBI officials who made the arrest and tried to pass on the information. Tenet later maintains there was no reason to alert President Bush or to share information about Moussaoui during an early September 2001 Cabinet-level meeting on terrorism (see September 4, 2001 (C)), saying, “All I can tell you is, it wasn't the appropriate place. I just can't take you any farther than that.” [Washington Post 4/17/04]


August 24, 2001 (B)
Hijacker Khalid Almihdhar buys his 9/11 plane ticket on-line using a credit card; Nawaf Alhazmi does the same the next day. [Congressional Inquiry, 9/26/02] Both men are put on a terrorist watch list this same day (see August 23, 2001 (C)), but the watch list only means they will be stopped if trying to enter or leave the US. Procedures are in place for law enforcement agencies to share watch list information with airlines and airports and such sharing is common, but the FAA and the airlines are not notified about this case, so the purchases raise no red flags. [Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01 (C)] An official later states that had the FAA been properly warned, “they should have been picked up in the reservation process.” [Washington Post 10/2/02]


Late August 2001 (D)
French intelligence gives a general terrorist warning to the US; apparently its contents echo an Israeli warning from earlier in the month (see August 8-15, 2001). [Fox News 5/17/02]


August 28, 2001
A report is sent to the FBI's New York office recommending that an investigation be launched “to determine if [Khalid] Almihdhar is still in the United States.” The New York office tries to convince FBI headquarters to open a criminal investigation, but are immediately turned down. The reason given is a “wall” between criminal and intelligence work—Almihdhar could not be tied to the USS Cole investigation without the inclusion of sensitive intelligence information. [Congressional Inquiry, 9/20/02] So instead of a criminal case, the New York office opens an “intelligence case”, excluding all the “criminal case” investigators from the search. [FBI Agent Testimony, 9/20/02] One FBI agent expresses his frustration in an e-mail the next day, saying, “Whatever has happened to this—someday someone will die—and wall or not—the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain ‘problems.’ Let's hope the [FBI's] National Security Law Unit will stand behind their decisions then, especially since the biggest threat to us now, UBL [Usama bin Laden], is getting the most ‘protection.’ ” [New York Times 9/21/02; FBI Agent Testimony 9/20/02]

August 28, 2001 (C)
Hijacker Atta is able to buy his flight ticket, despite being wanted by police for driving without a license (see April 26, 2001) and violating visa regulations. He should have been wanted for sabotaging a stalled aircraft (see December 26, 2000) as well, [Australian Broadcasting Corp. 11/12/01]
August 28-30, 2001
Senator Bob Graham (D), Representative Porter Goss (R) and Senator John Kyl (R) travel to Pakistan and meet with President Musharraf. They reportedly discuss various security issues, including the possible extradition of bin Laden. They also meet with Abdul Salam Zaeef, the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan. Zaeef apparently tells them that the Taliban want to solve the issue of bin Laden through negotiations with the US. Pakistan says it wants to stay out of the bin Laden issue. All three are meeting with ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed in Washington at the time of the 9/11 attacks (see September 11, 2001 (H)). Mahmood gave $100,000 to hijacker Mohamed Atta (see October 7, 2001). [AFP, 8/28/01, Salon, 9/14/01]

September 4-11, 2001
ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed visits Washington for the second time (see April 4, 2000). On September 10, a Pakistani newspaper reports on his trip so far. It says his visit has “triggered speculation about the agenda of his mysterious meetings at the Pentagon and National Security Council” as well as meetings with CIA Director Tenet, unspecified officials at the White House and the Pentagon, and his “most important meeting” with Mark Grossman, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The article suggests that “of course, Osama bin Laden” could be the focus of some discussions. Prophetically, the article adds, “What added interest to his visit is the history of such visits. Last time [his] predecessor was [in Washington], the domestic [Pakistani] politics turned topsy-turvy within days.” [The News, 9/10/01] This is a reference to the Musharraf coup just after a ISI Director's visit (see October 12, 1999). Mahmood is meeting in Washington when the 9/11 attacks begin (see September 11, 2001 (H)), and extends his stay until September 16 (see September 11-16, 2001).




September 4, 2001 (B)
FBI headquarters dispatches a message to the entire US intelligence community about the Zacarias Moussaoui investigation. According to a later Congressional inquiry, the message notes “that Moussaoui was being held in custody but [it doesn't] describe any particular threat that the FBI thought he posed, for example, whether he might be connected to a larger plot. [It also does] not recommend that the addressees take any action or look for any additional indicators of a terrorist attack, nor [does] it provide any analysis of a possible hijacking threat or provide any specific warnings.” [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/24/02] The FAA is also given the warning, but the FAA decides not to issue a security alert to the nation's airports. An FAA spokesman says, “He was in jail and there was no evidence he was connected to other people.” [New York Post, 5/21/02] This is in sharp contrast to an internal CIA warning sent out earlier based on even less information (see August 24, 2001), which stated Moussaoui might be “involved in a larger plot to target airlines traveling from Europe to the US.” [Senate Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02] It turns out that prior to this point terrorist Ahmed Ressam (see December 14, 1999) had started cooperating with investigators. He had trained with Moussaoui in Afghanistan and willingly shared this information after 9/11. The FBI dispatch, with its notable lack of urgency and details, failed to prompt the agents in Seattle holding Ressam to ask him about Moussaoui. Had the connection between these two been learned before 9/11, presumably the search warrant for Moussaoui would have been approved and the 9/11 plot might have unraveled. [Sunday Times 2/3/02]




September 6-10, 2001
Suspicious trading occurs on American and United, the two airlines used in the 9/11 attacks. “Between 6 and 7 September, The Chicago Board Options Exchange saw purchases of 4,744 put option contracts [a speculation that the stock will go down] in UAL versus 396 call options—where a speculator bets on a price rising. Holders of the put options would have netted a profit of $5 million once the carrier's share price dived after September 11. On 10 September, more trading in Chicago saw the purchase of 4,516 put options in American Airlines, the other airline involved in the hijackings. This compares with a mere 748 call options in American purchased that day. Investigators cannot help but notice that no other airlines saw such trading in their put options.” One analyst says: “I saw put-call numbers higher than I've ever seen in 10 years of following the markets, particularly the options markets.” [Associated Press, 9/18/01, San Francisco Chronicle, 9/19/01] “To the embarrassment of investigators, it has also emerged that the firm used to buy many of the ‘put’ options … on United Airlines stock was headed until 1998 by ‘Buzzy’ Krongard, now executive director of the CIA.” Krongard was chairman of Alex Brown Inc., which was bought by Deutsche Bank. “His last post before resigning to take his senior role in the CIA was to head Bankers Trust—Alex Brown's private client business, dealing with the accounts and investments of wealthy customers around the world.” [Independent, 10/14/01]


September 6-10, 2001 (B)
The Chicago Board Options Exchange sees suspicious trading on Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley, two of the largest WTC tenants. An average of 3,053 put options in Merrill Lynch are bought between September 6-10, compared to an average of 252 in the previous week. Merrill Lynch, another WTC tenant, see 12,215 put options bought between September 7-10, when the previous days had seen averages of 252 contracts a day. [Independent, 10/14/01] Dylan Ratigan of Bloomberg Business News: “This would be one of the most extraordinary coincidences in the history of mankind if it was a coincidence.” [ABC News, 9/20/01]

September 6, 2001
Antoinette DiLorenzo, teaching English to a class of Pakistani immigrants, asks a student gazing out the window, “What are you looking at?” The student points towards the WTC, and says: “Do you see those two buildings? They won't be standing there next week.” At the time, nothing was thought of it, but on September 13 the FBI interviews all the people in the classroom and confirms the event. The FBI later places the boy's family under surveillance but apparently are unable to find a connection to the 9/11 plot. An MSNBC reporter later sets out to disprove this “urban myth,” but to his surprise finds all the details of the story are confirmed. The fact that the family are recent immigrants from Pakistan might mean the information came from Pakistan. [MSNBC, 10/12/01] Supposedly, on November 9, 2001, the same student says there will be a plane crash on November 12. On that day, American Airlines Flight 587 crashes on takeoff from New York, killing 260 people. Investigators believe it was an accident. One official at the school says many Arab-American students have come forward with their own stories about having prior knowledge before 9/11: “Kids are telling us that the attacks didn't surprise them. This was a nicely protected little secret that circulated in the community around here.” [Insight 9/10/02]




September 7, 2001 (D)
One of the first and most frequently told stories about the hijackers is their visit to Shuckums, a sports bar in Hollywood, Florida on this day. What's particularly interesting about this story is how it has changed over time. In the original story, first reported on September 12 [AP, 9/12/01 (E)], Atta, Marwan Alshehhi and an unidentified man come into the restaurant already drunk. “They were wasted,” says bartender Patricia Idrissi, who directs them to a nearby Chinese restaurant. [St. Petersburg Times, 9/27/01] Later they return and drink—Atta having five vodka and orange juices, and Alshehhi five rum and Cokes. [Time, 9/24/01] Says manager Tony Amos: “The guy Mohamed was drunk, his voice was slurred and he had a thick accent.”Idrissi says they argue about the bill, and when she asks if there was a problem, “Mohamed said he worked for American Airlines and he could pay his bill.” [AP, 9/12/01 (E)] This story was widely reported through much of September (for instance, see [New York Times, 9/13/01 (E), Sunday Herald, 9/16/01, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/15/01, Miami Herald, 9/22/01, Newsweek, 9/17/01, Time, 9/24/01]). But starting on September 15, a second story appears. [Toronto Star, 9/15/01] It's the same as the first, except Atta is playing video games and drinking cranberry juice instead of vodka, and Alshehhi is the one who argues over the bill and pays. After some coexistence, the second story seems to have become predominant in later September (for instance, see [Washington Post, 9/16/01 (C), Washington Post, 9/22/01, Los Angeles Times, 9/27/01, St. Petersburg Times, 9/27/01, Australian Broadcasting Corp., 11/12/01, Sunday Times, 2/3/02]).

September 9, 2001 (E)
Hijacker Ziad Jarrah is stopped in Maryland for speeding, ticketed and released. No red flags show up when his name is run through the computer by the state police. However, he already had been questioned in United Arab Emirates at the request of the CIA for “suspected involvement in terrorist activities”(see January 30, 2001). Baltimore's mayor has criticized the CIA for not informing them that Jarrah was on the CIA's watch list. [Chicago Tribune 12/14/01; AP 12/14/01] The CIA calls the whole story “flatly untrue.” [CNN 8/1/02]

September 9, 2001 (C)
It is later reported that on this day, bin Laden calls his stepmother and says, “In two days, you're going to hear big news and you're not going to hear from me for a while.” US officials later tell CNN that “in recent years they've been able to monitor some of bin Laden's telephone communications with his [step]mother. Bin Laden at the time was using a satellite telephone, and the signals were intercepted and sometimes recorded.” [New York Times 10/2/01] Stepmother Al-Khalifa bin Laden, who raised Osama bin Laden after his natural mother died, was apparently waiting in Damascus, Syria, to meet Osama there, so he called to cancel the meeting. [Sunday Herald, 10/7/01] They had met periodically in recent years (see Spring 1998, Spring 2000 (C) and February 26, 2001). Before 9/11, to impress important visitors, NSA analysts would occasionally play audio tapes of bin Laden talking to his stepmother. The next day government officials say about the call, “I would view those reports with skepticism.” [CNN 10/2/01]



September 10, 2001 (I)
According to CBS News, in the afternoon before the attack, “alarm bells were sounding over unusual trading in the US stock options market.”It has been documented that the CIA, the Mossad and many other intelligence agencies monitor stock trading in real time using highly advanced programs such as Promis. Both the FBI and the Justice Department have confirmed the use of such programs for US intelligence gathering through at least this summer. This would confirm that CIA should have had additional advance warning of imminent attacks against American and United Airlines planes. [CBS, 9/19/01] There are even allegations that bin Laden was able to get a copy of Promis. [Fox News, 10/16/01]


September 10, 2001 (M)
US officials later admit American agents had infiltrated al-Qaeda cells in the US, though how many and how long they had been in al-Qaeda remains a mystery. On this day, electronic intercepts connected to these undercover agents hear messages such as: “Watch the news” and “Tomorrow will be a great day for us.” As to why this didn't lead to boosted security or warnings the next day, officials call these leads “needles in a haystack.” What other leads may have come from this prior to this day are not revealed. [USA Today, 6/4/02] At least until February 2002, the official story was that the “CIA failed to penetrate al-Qaeda with a single agent.” [ABC News, 2/18/02]



September 10, 2001 (L)
At least two messages in Arabic are intercepted by the NSA. One states “The match is about to begin” (bin Laden apparently uses football metaphors in many messages) and the other states “Tomorrow is zero hour.” Later reports [Reuters, 9/9/02] translate the first message as “The match begins tomorrow.” They were sent between someone in Saudi Arabia and someone in Afghanistan. The NSA claims that they weren't translated until September 12, and that even if they were translated in time, “they gave no clues that authorities could have acted on.” [ABC News, 6/7/02, Reuters, 6/19/02] These turn out to be only two of about 30 pre-9/11 communications from suspected al-Qaeda operatives or other militants referring to an imminent event. An anonymous official says of these messages, including the “Tomorrow is zero hour” message, “You can't dismiss any of them, but it doesn't tell you tomorrow is the day.” [Reuters, 9/9/02] There is a later attempt to explain them away by suggesting they refer to the killing of Afghani opposition leader Ahmed Shah Massoud the day before (see September 9, 2001). [Reuters, 10/17/02]

[Pico della Mirandola]

Blijkbaar is dit forum niet echt voorzien op lange posts. Bij het plaatsen van de 2 lange timelines kreeg ik steeds het bericht; Fatal error: Maximum execution time of 3O seconds exceededin /home/politics/web/forum.politics.be/includes/functions.php on line 1507. Ik krijg ook hetzelfde bericht als ik m'n eigen posts wil nakijken.
Kan iemand aub verifiëren dat de 2 timelines(eentje hierboven en de andere op de vorige pag.) wel degelijk gepost zijn?? Ik zie ze wel op mijn pc, maar ik zag niet mijn naam staan wanneer ik terugkeerde, maar die van de vorige poster.

[straddle]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Pico della Mirandola

Blijkbaar is dit forum niet echt voorzien op lange posts. Bij het plaatsen van de 2 lange timelines kreeg ik steeds het bericht; Fatal error: Maximum execution time of 3O seconds exceededin /home/politics/web/forum.politics.be/includes/functions.php on line 1507. Ik krijg ook hetzelfde bericht als ik m'n eigen posts wil nakijken.
Kan iemand aub verifiëren dat de 2 timelines(eentje hierboven en de andere op de vorige pag.) wel degelijk gepost zijn?? Ik zie ze wel op mijn pc, maar ik zag niet mijn naam staan wanneer ik terugkeerde, maar die van de vorige poster.

Dat vraag je best aan de moderatie of dien je op te zoeken in de handleiding ergens op het forum...

Persoonlijk denk ik dat je postings echt TE LANG zijn, zeker om te lezen: je kan altijd een link plaatsen naar die lange teksten. Indien je posting te lang is, wordt hij bovendien toch niet gelezen, en "stopt" hij de draad omdat de meesten afhaken bij te lange berichten.........

[Chipie]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Pico della Mirandola

Blijkbaar is dit forum niet echt voorzien op lange posts. Bij het plaatsen van de 2 lange timelines kreeg ik steeds het bericht; Fatal error: Maximum execution time of 3O seconds exceededin /home/politics/web/forum.politics.be/includes/functions.php on line 1507. Ik krijg ook hetzelfde bericht als ik m'n eigen posts wil nakijken.
Kan iemand aub verifiëren dat de 2 timelines(eentje hierboven en de andere op de vorige pag.) wel degelijk gepost zijn?? Ik zie ze wel op mijn pc, maar ik zag niet mijn naam staan wanneer ik terugkeerde, maar die van de vorige poster.

Steve,
Heeft U nog altijd problemen met uw nieuwe notebook?

[Funghus]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Pico della Mirandola

Blijkbaar is dit forum niet echt voorzien op lange posts. Bij het plaatsen van de 2 lange timelines kreeg ik steeds het bericht; Fatal error: Maximum execution time of 3O seconds exceededin /home/politics/web/forum.politics.be/includes/functions.php on line 1507. Ik krijg ook hetzelfde bericht als ik m'n eigen posts wil nakijken.
Kan iemand aub verifiëren dat de 2 timelines(eentje hierboven en de andere op de vorige pag.) wel degelijk gepost zijn?? Ik zie ze wel op mijn pc, maar ik zag niet mijn naam staan wanneer ik terugkeerde, maar die van de vorige poster.

Pico, je posts bevatten een zee/oceaan aan info. Misschien proberen te knippen tot kortere samenhangende hoofdstukjes die je wel afzonderlijk kan plaatsen. Dat leest gemakkelijker.

Ik denk dat het geen kwaad kan om het hier te plaatsen, omdat websites komen en gaan tegenwoordig...

[illwill]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door Pico della Mirandola

Ziehier het vervolg het vervolg van de timeline (tot 9/11/2001) van vorige post.
Ik wil hierbij nog eens duidelijk stellen dat onderstaande informatie allemaal komt
uit officiële persberichten. Deze time-line bewijst onomstotelijk dat
a) de regering op de hoogte was van wat er te gebeuren stond
b) FBI en CIA meerdere malen de kans hebben gehad de potentiële kapers te arresteren
c) C. Rice en andere getuigen onder eed valse verklaringen hebben afgelegd voor de Commissie
d) er al lang voor 9/11 concrete planne waren voor een invasie van Afghanistan zowel als in Irak.
e) BinLaden en bepaalde leden van z’n organisatie beschermingen genoten van zowel CIA als FBI
Lees en trek zelf jullie conclusies.




March 5, 2001
Paul O'Neill, Bush's Treasury Secretary at this time, later recalls that the most important topic of the Bush Administration in its early months is regime change in Iraq (see also January 31, 2001 (B)). Planning at this time envisions peacekeeping troops, war crimes tribunals, and even divvying up Iraq's oil wealth. One document from around February 2001 is titled, “Plan for post-Saddam Iraq.” Another Pentagon document from this date is titled, “Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield contracts.” It includes a map of potential areas for exploration in Iraq. [CBS 1/11/04]


March 7, 2001
The Russian Permanent Mission at the United Nations secretly submits “an unprecedentedly detailed report” to the UN Security Council about bin Laden, his whereabouts, details of his al-Qaeda network, Afghan drug running, and Taliban connections in Pakistan. The report provides “a listing of all bin Laden's bases, his government contacts and foreign advisors,” and enough information to potentially kill him. The US fails to act. Alex Standish, the editor of the highly respected Jane's Intelligence Review, concludes that the attacks of 9/11 were less of an American intelligence failure and more the result of “a political decision not to act against bin Laden.” [Jane's Intelligence Review 10/5/01]


March 8, 2001
The United Nations and the European Union direct their members to freeze the assets of some al-Qaeda leaders, including Sa'd Al-Sharif, bin Laden's brother-in-law and the head of his finances, but the US does not do so (see UN list). Their assets are finally frozen by the US after 9/11 (see October 12, 2001). [Guardian, 10/13/01 (B)] The US for a time claims that Sa'd Al-Sharif helped fund the 9/11 attacks, but the situation is highly confused and his role is doubtful (see September 24, 2001-December 26, 2002).


March 26, 2001
The Washington Post reports on a major improvements of the CIA's intelligence gathering capability “in recent years.” A new program called Oasis uses “automated speech recognition” technology to turn audio feeds into formatted, searchable text. It can distinguish one voice from another and differentiates “speaker 1” from “speaker 2” in transcripts. Software called Fluent performs “cross lingual” searches, even translating difficult languages like Chinese and Japanese (apparently such software is much better than similar publicly available software) as well as automatically assessing their importance. There's also software that can turn a suspect's “life story into a three-dimensional diagram of linked phone calls, bank deposits and plane trips,” and other software to efficiently and quickly process vast amounts of video, audio and written data. [Washington Post 3/26/01] However, the government will later report that a number of messages about the 9/11 attacks, such as one stating “tomorrow is the zero hour” weren't translated until after 9/11 because analysts were “too swamped.” [ABC News, 6/7/02]


April 2001 (D)
A report commissioned by former US Secretary of State James Baker and the Council on Foreign Relations entitled “Strategic Energy Policy Challenges For The 21st Century” is submitted to Vice President Cheney this month. “The report is linked to a veritable who's who of US hawks, oilmen and corporate bigwigs.” The report says the “central dilemma” for the US administration is that “the American people continue to demand plentiful and cheap energy without sacrifice or inconvenience.” It warns that the US is running out of oil, with a painful end to cheap fuel already in sight. It argues that “the United States remains a prisoner of its energy dilemma,” and that one of the “consequences” of this is a “need for military intervention” to secure its oil supply. It argues that Iraq needs to be overthrown so the US can control its oil. [Sunday Herald 10/5/02; Sydney Morning Herald 12/26/02] In what may be a reference to a pipeline through Afghanistan, the report suggests the US should “Investigate whether any changes to US policy would quickly facilitate higher exports of oil from the Caspian Basin region… the exports from some oil discoveries in the Caspian Basin could be hastened if a secure, economical export route could be identified swiftly” (see also September 2000 and Spring 2001). [Strategic Energy Policy Challenges For The 21st Century, 4/01]


Spring 2001
The Sydney Morning Herald later reports, “The months preceding September 11 [see] a shifting of the US military's focus … Over several months beginning in April [2001] a series of military and governmental policy documents [are] released that [seek] to legitimize the use of US military force” “in the pursuit of oil and gas.” Michael Klare, an international security expert and author of Resource Wars, says the military has increasingly come to “define resource security as their primary mission.” An article in the Army War College's journal by Jeffrey Record, a former staff member of the Senate armed services committee, argues for the legitimacy of “shooting in the Persian Gulf on behalf of lower gas prices.” He also “advocate[s] the acceptability of presidential subterfuge in the promotion of a conflict” and “explicitly urge[s] painting over the US's actual reasons for warfare with a nobly high-minded veneer, seeing such as a necessity for mobilizing public support for a conflict.” In April, Tommy Franks, the commander of US forces in the Persian Gulf/South Asia area, testifies to Congress in April that his command's key mission is “access to [the region's] energy resources.” The next month US Central Command begins planning for war with Afghanistan, plans that are later used in the real war (see May 2001 (F)). [Sydney Morning Herald, 12/26/02] Other little noticed but influential documents reflect similar thinking (see September 2000 and April 2001 (D)



Spring 2001 (B)
A US Customs Service investigation finds evidence that Nabil al-Marabh (see 1989-May 2000, May 30, 2000-September 11, 2001 and January 2001-September 11, 2001) has funneled money to hijackers Ahmed Alghamdi and Satam Al Suqami. [Cox News, 10/16/01, ABC 7, 1/31/02] By summer, Customs uncovers a series of financial transactions between al-Marabh and al-Qaeda agent Raed Hijazi. [New York Times 9/21/01; AP 11/17/01] It is later reported that “some of the 11 hijackers who passed through” Britain in spring 2001 on their way to the US (see April 23-June 29, 2001) “should have been instantly ‘red-flagged’ by British intelligence. One was Ahmed Alghamdi” because of his connection to Raed Hijazi (see January-June 2001). [Sunday Herald, 9/30/01] Despite all of these al-Qaeda connections and more, the US later decides al-Marabh is not a terrorist and deports him to Syria (see September 19, 2001-September 3, 2002, Late 2002, and January 2004). A Congressional 9/11 inquiry later concludes that US intelligence “possessed no intelligence or law enforcement information” before 9/11 on any of the hijackers except for Khalid Almihdhar and Salem and Nawaf Alhazmi. The inquiry suggests the other hijackers may have been selected “because they did not have previously established ties to terrorist organizations.” [Senate Intelligence Committee 9/20/02]


April 1, 2001
Hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi is stopped by an Oklahoma policeman for speeding. His license information is run through a computer to check if there are any warrants for his arrest. There are none; he is issued a ticket and sent on his way. The CIA has known Alhazmi is a terrorist and possibly living in the US since March 2000 (see March 5, 2000), but has failed to share this knowledge with other agencies. [Daily Oklahoman, 1/20/02, Newsweek, 6/2/02] He also has been in the country illegally since January 2001, but this also doesn't raise any flags. [Congressional Intelligence Committee 9/20/02]


April 2001
NORAD is planning to conduct a training exercise named Positive Force. Some Special Operations personnel trained to think like terrorists unsuccessfully propose adding a scenario simulating “an event having a terrorist group hijack a commercial airliner and fly it into the Pentagon.” Military higher-ups and White House officials reject the exercise as either “too unrealistic” or too disconnected to the original intent of the exercise. The proposal comes shortly before the exercise, which takes place this month. [Boston Herald 4/14/04; Guardian 4/15/04; Washington Post 4/14/04 (G); New York Times 4/14/04]

April 12-September 7, 2001
At least six hijackers get more than one Florida driver's license. They get the second license simply by filling out change of address forms.
1. Waleed Alshehri: first license May 4, duplicate May 5.
2. Marwan Alshehhi: first license, April 12, duplicate in June.
3. Ziad Jarrah: first license May 2, duplicate July 10.
4. Ahmed Alhaznawi: first license July 10, duplicate September 7.
5. Hamza Alghamdi: first license June 27, two duplicates, the second in August.
6. the sixth man with a Florida duplicate is not named. [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01]
Additionally, some hijackers got licenses in multiple states. For instance, Nawaf Alhazmi had licenses from California, New York, and Florida at the same time, apparently all in the same name. [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01, Newsday, 9/21/01, Daily Oklahoman, 1/20/02] [South Florida Sun-Sentinel 9/28/01]


April 23, 2001
A Global Hawk plane flies 22 hours from the US to Australia without pilot or passengers. A Global Hawk manager says, “The aircraft essentially flies itself, right from takeoff, right through to landing, and even taxiing off the runway”(see 1998 (D)and September 25, 2001). [ITN 4/24/01]


April 23-June 29, 2001
The 13 hijackers commonly known as the “muscle” first arrive in the US. The muscle provides the brute force meant to control the hijacked passengers and protect the pilots. [Washington Post, 9/30/01] According to FBI Director Mueller, they all pass through Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and their travel was probably coordinated from abroad by Khalid Almihdhar. [Congressional Intelligence Committee 9/26/02] But some information contradicts their official arrival dates:
• April 23: Waleed Alshehri and Satam Al Suqami arrive in Orlando, Florida. Suqami in fact arrived before February 2001 (see February 2001). Alshehri was leasing a house near Washington in 1999 and 2000 with Ahmed Alghamdi (see 1999 (H)). He also lived with Ahmed Alghamdi in Florida for seven months in 1997. [Telegraph, 9/20/01] Alshehri appears quite Americanized in the summer of 2001, frequently talking with an apartment mate about football and baseball, even identifying himself a fan of the Florida Marlins baseball team. [AP 9/21/01]
• May 2: Majed Moqed and Ahmed Alghamdi arrive in Washington. Both actually arrived by mid-March 2001 (see Mid-March 2001). Ahmed Alghamdi was living with Waleed Alshehri near Washington until July 2000 (see 1999 (H)). He also lived with Waleed Alshehri in Florida for seven months in 1997. [Telegraph 9/20/01]
• May 28: Mohand Alshehri, Hamza Alghamdi, and Ahmed Alnami arrive in Miami, Florida. Both Mohand Alshehri and Hamza Alghamdi arrived by January 2001 (see January 2001 (B)).
• June 8: Ahmed Alhaznawi and Wail Alshehri arrive in Miami, Florida.
• June 27: Fayez Banihammad and Saeed Alghamdi arrive in Orlando, Florida.
• June 29: Salem Alhazmi and Abdulaziz Alomari arrive in New York. Alhazmi in fact arrived before February 2001 (see February 2001).
After entering the US (perhaps reentering for some), the hijackers arriving at Miami and Orlando airports settle in the Fort Lauderdale, Florida, area along with Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, and Ziad Jarrah. The hijackers, arriving in New York and Virginia, settle in the Paterson, New Jersey, area along with Nawaf Alhazmi and Hani Hanjour. [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/26/02] Note that the FBI's early conclusion that 11 of these muscle men “did not know they were on a suicide mission,” [Observer 10/14/01] is contradicted by video confessions made by all of them in Afghanistan (see March 2001), and CIA Director Tenet later says they “probably were told little more than that they were headed for a suicide mission inside the United States.” [CIA Director Tenet Testimony 6/18/02] They didn't know the exact details of the 9/11 plot until shortly before the attack. [CBS 10/9/02]



April 24, 2001
The first lines of the declassified Northwoods document.
James Bamford's book Body of Secrets reveals a secret US government plan named Operation Northwoods. All details of the plan come from declassified military documents. [AP, 4/24/01, Baltimore Sun, 4/24/01, ABC News, 5/1/01, Washington Post, 4/26/01] The heads of the US military, all five Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposed in a 1962 memo to commit terrorist acts against Americans and blame Cuba to create a pretext for invasion. Says one document, “We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington…. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of indignation.” In March 1962, Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented the Operation Northwoods plan to President John Kennedy and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. The plan was rejected. Lemnitzer then sought to destroy all evidence of the plan. [Baltimore Sun, 4/24/01, ABC News, 5/1/01] Lemnitzer is replaced a few months later, but the Joint Chiefs continue to plan “pretext” operations at least through 1963. [ABC News, 5/1/01] One suggestion in the plan is to create a remote-controlled drone duplicate of a real civilian aircraft. The real aircraft would be loaded with “selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases,” and then take off with the drone duplicate simultaneously taking off near by. The aircraft with passengers would secretly land at a US military base while the drone continues along the other plane's flight path. The drone would then be destroyed over Cuba in a way that places the blame on Cuban fighter aircraft. [Harper's, 7/1/01] Bamford says, “Here we are, 40 years afterward, and it's only now coming out. You just wonder what is going to be exposed 40 years from now.” [Insight, 7/30/01] Some 9/11 skeptics later claim that the 9/11 attacks could have been orchestrated by elements of the US government, and see Northwoods as an example of how top US officials could hatch such a plot. [Oakland Tribune 3/27/04]


April 26, 2001
Atta is stopped at a random inspection near Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and given a citation for having no driver's license. He fails to show up for his May 28 court hearing a warrant is issued for his arrest on June 4. After this, he flies all over the US using his real name, and even flies to Spain and back in July (see July 8-19, 2001) and is never stopped or questioned. The police never try to find him. [Wall Street Journal 10/16/01; Australian Broadcasting Corp. 11/12/01]





April 30, 2001
The Bush administration finally has its first Deputy Secretary-level meeting on terrorism (see January 25, 2001). [Time, 8/4/02] According to counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke, he advocates that the Northern Alliance needs to be supported in the war against the Taliban (see April 6, 2001) and the Predator drone flights need to resume over Afghanistan so bin Laden can be targeted (see January 10, 2001-September 4, 2001). Assistant Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz says the focus on al-Qaeda is wrong. He states, “I just don't understand why we are beginning by talking about this one man bin Laden,” and “Who cares about a little terrorist in Afghanistan?” Wolfowitz insists the focus should be Iraqi-sponsored terrorism instead. He claims the 1993 attack on the WTC must have been done with help from Iraq, and rejects the CIA's assertion that there has been no Iraqi-sponsored terrorism against the US since 1993. A spokesman for Wolfowitz later calls Clarke's account a “fabrication.” [Newsweek 3/22/04] Wolfowitz repeats these sentiments after 9/11 and tries to argue that the US should attack Iraq (see September 12, 2001 (F)). Assistant Secretary of State Richard Armitage agrees with Clarke that al-Qaeda is an important threat. Deputy National Security Advisor Steve Hadley, chairing the meeting, brokers a compromise between Wolfowitz and the others. The group agrees to hold additional meetings focusing on al-Qaeda first (see Early June 2001 (B) and June 27-July 16, 2001), but then later look at other terrorism, including any Iraqi terrorism. [Against All Enemies, by Richard Clarke, 3/04, p. 30, pp. 231-232] Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff I. Lewis Libby and Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin also attend the hour long meeting. [Time 8/4/02] May 2001 (D)


May 2000
Secretary of State Powell gives $43 million in aid to Afghanistan's Taliban government, purportedly to assist hungry farmers who are starving since the destruction of their opium crop in January on orders of the Taliban. [Los Angeles Times, 5/22/01] This follows $113 million given by the US in 2000 for humanitarian aid. [State Department Fact Sheet 12/11/01] A Newsday editorial notes that the Taliban “are a decidedly odd choice for an outright gift… Why are we sending these people money—so much that Washington is, in effect, the biggest donor of aid to the Taliban regime?”


May 2001 (B)
US intelligence obtains information that al-Qaeda is planning to infiltrate the US from Canada and carry out a terrorist operation using high explosives. The report doesn't say exactly where inside the US, or when, or how an attack might occur. Two months later, the information is shared with the FBI, the INS, US Customs Service, and the State Department, and told to Bush in August (see August 6, 2001). [Senate Intelligence Committee 9/18/02; Washington Post 9/19/02 (B)]


May 2001 (G)
Vice President Cheney's national energy plan is publicly released. It calls for expanded oil and gas drilling on public land and easing regulatory barriers to building nuclear power plants. [AP, 12/9/02] There are several interesting points, little noticed at the time. It suggests that the US cannot depend exclusively on traditional sources of supply to provide the growing amount of oil that it needs. It will also have to obtain substantial supplies from new sources, such as the Caspian states, Russia, and Africa. It also notes that the US cannot rely on market forces alone to gain access to these added supplies, but will also require a significant effort on the part of government officials to overcome foreign resistance to the outward reach of American energy companies. [Japan Today, 4/30/02] The plan was largely decided through Cheney's secretive Energy Task Force. Both before and after this, Cheney and other Task Force officials meet with Enron executives, including a meeting a month and a half before Enron declares bankruptcy (see December 2, 2001). Two separate lawsuits are later filed to reveal details of how the government's energy policy was formed and if Enron or other players may have influenced it, but so far the Bush Administration has resisted all efforts to release these documents (see October 17, 2002 and February 7, 2003 (B)). [AP 12/9/02] At the very least, it's known that Enron executives met with the Commerce Secretary about its troubled Dabhol power plant in 2001 (see November 1993). [New York Times, 2/21/02]

May 10, 2001
Attorney General Ashcroft sends a letter to department heads telling them the Justice Department's new agenda. He cites seven goals, but counterterrorism is not one of them. Yet just one day earlier he testifies before Congress and says of counterterrorism, “The Department of Justice has no higher priority.” [New York Times 2/28/02] Dale Watson, head of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, recalls nearly falling out of his chair when he sees counterterrorism not mentioned as a goal. [9/11 Commission Report, 4/13/04] In August, a strategic plan is distributed listing the same seven goals and 36 objectives. Thirteen objectives are highlighted, but the single objective relating to counterterrorism is not highlighted. [New York Times 2/28/02]


May 29, 2001
A European Union committee investigating the Echelon spy surveillance network advises all people using e-mail to encrypt their e-mails if they want to avoid being spied on by Echelon. Echelon can sift through up to 90% of all internet traffic, as well as monitor phone conversations, mobile phone calls, fax transmissions, net browsing history, satellite transmissions and so on. Even encryption may not help much—the BBC suggests that “it is likely that the intelligence agencies can crack open most commercially available encryption software.” [BBC, 5/29/01, ]


May 30, 2001
Two Yemeni men are detained after guards see them taking photos at 26 Federal Plaza in New York City. They are questioned by INS agents and let go. A few days later their confiscated film is developed. It shows photos of security checkpoints, police posts and surveillance cameras of federal buildings, including the FBI's counterterrorism office. The two men are later interviewed by the FBI and determined not to be terrorists. However, they had taken the pictures on behalf of a third person living in Indiana. By the time the FBI looks for him, he has fled the country and his documentation is found to be based on a false alias. In 2004 it is reported that it is still unknown if the third man is a terrorist or not. The famous briefing given to President Bush in early August 2001 (see August 6, 2001) mentions the incident, warning that the FBI is investigating “suspicious activity in this country consistent with the preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.” When Bush's briefing is released in 2004, a White House fact sheet fails to mention the still missing third man. [New York Post 7/1/01; New York Post 9/16/01; Washington Post 5/16/04]


Early June 2001
UPI reporters interview the reclusive Taliban leader Mullah Omar. He says the Taliban would like to resolve the bin Laden issue, so there can be “an easing and then lifting of UN sanctions that are strangling and killing the people of [Afghanistan]”(see November 14, 1999 and January 19, 2001). The reporters also note, “Saudi Arabia and the [United Arab Emirates] secretly fund the Taliban government by paying Pakistan for its logistical support to Afghanistan. Despite Pakistan's official denials, Taliban is entirely dependent on Pakistani aid. This was verified on the ground by UPI. Everything from bottled water to oil, gasoline and aviation fuel, and from telephone equipment to military supplies, comes from Pakistan. ” [UPI 6/14/01]


June 2001 (J)
Enron's power plant in Dabhol, India, is shut down. The failure of the $3 billion plant, Enron's largest investment, contributes to Enron's bankruptcy later in the year (see December 2, 2001). Earlier in the year, India stopped paying its bill for the energy from the plant, because energy from the plant cost three times the usual rates. [New York Times, 3/20/01] Enron had hoped to feed the plant with cheap Central Asian gas, but this hope was dashed when a gas pipeline through Afghanistan was not completed (see June 1998 (B). The larger part of the plant is still only 90 percent complete when construction stops at about this time. [New York Times, 3/20/01] It is known that Vice President Cheney lobbies the leader of India's main opposition party about the plant this month. [New York Times, 2/21/02] A lawsuit is in motion to get additional government documents released that could reveal what else the US did to support this plant (see October 17, 2002 and February 7, 2003 (B)). Enron may eventually restart the plant (see October 18, 2002 (B)).


June 2001
German intelligence warns the CIA, Britain's MI6, and Israel's Mossad that Middle Eastern terrorists are planning to hijack commercial aircraft to use as weapons to attack “American and Israeli symbols, which stand out.” A later article quotes unnamed German intelligence sources who state the information was coming from Echelon surveillance technology, and that British intelligence had access to the same warnings. However, there were other informational sources, including specific information and hints given to, but not reported by, Western and Near Eastern news media six months before 9/11. [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9/11/01, Washington Post, 9/14/01, Fox News, 5/17/02]


June 2001 (I)
US intelligence learns that 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is interested in “sending terrorists to the United States” and planning to assist their activities once they arrive. The 9/11 Congressional inquiry says the significance of this is not understood at the time, and data collection efforts are not subsequently “targeted on information about [Mohammed] that might have helped understand al-Qaeda's plans and intentions.” [Committee Findings, 12/11/02, Los Angeles Times, 12/12/02, USA Today, 12/12/02] The FBI has a $2 million reward for Mohammed at the time (see Mid-1996-September 11, 2001) That summer, the NSA intercepts phone calls between Mohammed and Mohamed Atta, but apparently fails to pay attention (see Summer 2001), and on September 10, 2001, the US monitors a call from Atta to Mohammed in which Atta gets final approval for the 9/11 attacks, but this also doesn't lead to action (see September 10, 2001 (F)). In mid-2002, it is reported that “officials believe that given the warning signals available to the FBI in the summer of 2001, investigators correctly concentrated on the [USS] Cole investigation, rather than turning their attention to the possibility of a domestic attack.” [New York Times 6/9/02]



June 2001 (E)
Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke asks for a transfer to start a new national program on cyber security. His request is granted, and he is to change jobs in early October 2001. He does make the change despite the 9/11 attacks. He claims that he tells National Security Advisor Rice and her deputy Steve Hadley, “Perhaps I have become too close to the terrorism issue. I have worked it for ten years and to me it seems like a very important issue, but maybe I'm becoming like Captain Ahab with bin Laden as the White Whale. Maybe you need someone less obsessive about it.” [White House 10/9/01] He later claims, “My view was that this administration, while it listened to me, either didn't believe me that there was an urgent problem or was unprepared to act as though there were an urgent problem. And I thought, if the administration doesn't believe its national coordinator for counterterrorism when he says there's an urgent problem, and if it's unprepared to act as though there's an urgent problem, then probably I should get another job.” [New York Times 3/24/04]


June-July 2001
Terrorist threat reports, already high (see April-May 2001), surge even higher. President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and national security aides are given briefing papers with headlines such as “Bin Laden Threats Are Real” and “Bin Laden Planning High Profile Attacks.” The exact contents of these briefings remain classified, but according to the 9/11 Commission they consistently predict upcoming attacks that will occur “on a catastrophic level, indicating that they would cause the world to be in turmoil, consisting of possible multiple — but not necessarily simultaneous—attacks.” CIA Director Tenet later recalls that by late July the warnings coming in could not get any worse. He feels that Bush and other officials grasp the urgency of what they are being told. [9/11 Commission Report 4/13/04 (B)] But Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin later states that he feels a great tension, peaking these months, between the Bush administration's need to understand terrorism issues and his sense of great urgency. McLaughlin and others are frustrated when inexperienced Bush officials question the validity of certain intelligence findings. Two unnamed, veteran counterterrorism center officers deeply involved in bin Laden issues are so worried about an impending disaster that they consider resigning and going public with their concerns. [9/11 Commission, 3/24/04 (C)] Dale Watson, head of counterterrorism at the FBI, wishes he had “500 analysts looking at Osama bin Laden threat information instead of two.” [9/11 Commission Report 4/13/04 (B)]


June 3, 2001
This is one of only two dates that Bush's national security leadership meets formally to discuss terrorism (see also September 4, 2001 (C)). This group, made up of the National Security Adviser, CIA Director, Defense Secretary, Secretary of State, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, met around 100 times before 9/11 to discuss a variety of topics, but apparently rarely terrorism. In wake of these reports, the White House “aggressively defended the level of attention, given only scattered hints of al-Qaeda activity.” This lack of discussion stands in sharp contrast to the Clinton administration and public comments by the Bush administration. [Time, 8/4/02] Bush said in February 2001: “I will put a high priority on detecting and responding to terrorism on our soil.” A few weeks earlier, Tenet had told Congress, “The threat from terrorism is real, it is immediate, and it is evolving.” [AP 6/28/02]
June 4, 2001
At some point in 2000, three men claiming to be Afghans but using Pakistani passports enter the Cayman Islands, possibly illegally. [Miami Herald, 9/20/01] In late 2000, Cayman and British investigators begin a yearlong probe of these men which lasts until 9/11. [Los Angeles Times 9/20/01] They are overheard discussing hijacking attacks in New York City. On this day, they are taken into custody, questioned and released some time later. This information is forwarded to US intelligence. [Fox News, 5/17/02] In late August, a letter to a Cayman radio station will allege these same men are agents of bin Laden “organizing a major terrorist act against the US via an airline or airlines”(see August 29, 2001).


June 9, 2001
Robert Wright, an FBI agent who spent ten years investigating terrorist funding (see October 1998), writes a memo that slams the FBI. He states, “Knowing what I know, I can confidently say that until the investigative responsibilities for terrorism are transferred from the FBI, I will not feel safe… The FBI has proven for the past decade it cannot identify and prevent acts of terrorism against the United States and its citizens at home and abroad. Even worse, there is virtually no effort on the part of the FBI's International Terrorism Unit to neutralize known and suspected international terrorists living in the United States.”[Cybercast News Service, 5/30/02] He claims “FBI was merely gathering intelligence so they would know who to arrest when a terrorist attack occurred” rather than actually trying to stop the attacks. [UPI 5/30/02] Wright's shocking allegations are largely ignored when they first become public a year later. He is asked on CNN's Crossfire, one of the few outlets to cover the story at all, “Mr. Wright, your charges against the FBI are really more disturbing, more serious, than [Coleen] Rowley's [(see August 28, 2001 (D))]. Why is it, do you think, that you have been ignored by the media, ignored by the congressional committees, and no attention has been paid to your allegations?” The Village Voice says the problem is partly because he went to the FBI and asked permission to speak publicly instead of going straight to the media as Rowley did. The FBI put severe limits on what details Wright can divulge. He is now suing them (see also May 30, 2002). [Village Voice 6/19/02]


June 11, 2001
CIA analyst and FBI analyst travel to New York and meet with FBI officials at FBI headquarters about the USS Cole investigation. The CIA analyst has already showed photographs from the al-Qaeda Malaysia meeting attended by hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi (see January 5-8, 2000), to the FBI analyst, but failed to explain what he knows about them (see May 15, 2001). The CIA analyst now shows the same photos to the additional FBI agents. He wants to know if the FBI agents can identify anyone in the photos for a different case he's working on. “The FBI agents recognized the men from the Cole investigation, but when they asked the CIA what they knew about the men, they were told that they didn't have clearance to share that information. It ended up in a shouting match. ” [ABC News, 8/16/02] The CIA analyst later admits that at the time he knows Almihdhar had a US visa (see April 3-7, 1999), that Alhazmi had traveled to the US (see March 5, 2000), that al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash had been recognized in one of the photos (see January 4, 2001), and that Alhazmi was known to be an experienced terrorist. But he doesn't tell any of this to any FBI agent. He doesn't let them keep copies of the photos either. [Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] He promises them more information later, but the FBI agents don't receive more information until after 9/11. [Congressional Inquiry, 9/20/02] Two days after this meeting, Almihdhar has no trouble getting a new multiple reentry US visa. [US News and World Report 12/12/01; Congressional Inquiry 9/20/02] CIA Director Tenet later claims, “Almihdhar was not who they were talking about in this meeting.” When Senator Carl Levin (D) reads the following to Tenet, “The CIA analyst who attended the New York meeting acknowledged to the joint inquiry staff that he had seen the information regarding Almihdhar's US visa and Alhazmi's travel to the United States but he stated that he would not share information outside of the CIA unless he had authority to do so,” Tenet claims that he talked to the same analyst and was told something completely different. [New York Times 10/17/02]

June 12, 2001


Diaa Mohsen, left and Mohamed Malik, right, caught on an undercover video. A portrait of Mohamed Malik on the right.
Operation Diamondback, a sting operation uncovering an attempt to buy weapons illegally for the Taliban, bin Laden, and others, ends with a number of arrests. An Egyptian named Diaa Mohsen and a Pakistani named Mohammed Malik are arrested and accused of attempting to buy Stinger missiles, nuclear weapon components, and other sophisticated military weaponry for the Pakistani ISI. [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 8/23/01, Washington Post, 8/2/02 (B)] Malik appears to have had links to important Pakistani officials and Kashmiri terrorists, and Mohsen claims a connection to a man “who is very connected to the Taliban” and funded by bin Laden. [Washington Post, 8/2/02 (B), MSNBC, 8/2/02] Some other ISI agents came to Florida on several occasions to negotiate, but they escaped being arrested. They wanted to partially pay in heroin. One mentioned that the WTC would be destroyed (see July 14, 1999and Early August 2001). These ISI agents said some of their purchases would go to the Taliban in Afghanistan and/or terrorists associated with bin Laden. [New York Times 6/16/01; Washington Post 8/2/02 (B); MSNBC 8/2/02] Both Malik and Mohsen lived in Jersey City, New Jersey. [Jersey Journal, 6/20/01] A number of the people held by the US after 9/11, including possible al-Qaeda members Syed Gul Mohammad Shah and Mohammed Azmath (see September 11, 2001 (K)) are from the same Jersey City neighborhood. [New York Post 9/23/01] Mohsen pleads guilty after 9/11, “But remarkably, even though [he was] apparently willing to supply America's enemies with sophisticated weapons, even nuclear weapons technology, Mohsen was sentenced to just 30 months in prison.” [MSNBC, 8/2/02] Malik's case appears to have been dropped, and reporters find him working in a store in Florida less than a year after the trial ended. [MSNBC 8/2/02] Malik's court files remain completely sealed, and in Mohsen's court case, prosecutors “removed references to Pakistan from public filings because of diplomatic concerns.” [Washington Post 8/2/02 (B)] Also arrested are Kevin Ingram and Walter Kapij. Ingram pleads guilty to laundering $350,000 and is sentenced to 18 months in prison. [AP, 12/1/01] Ingram was a former senior investment banker with Deutschebank, but resigned in January 1999 after his division suffered costly losses. [Jersey Journal, 6/20/01] Walter Kapij, a pilot with a minor role in the plot, is given the longest sentence, 33 months in prison. [Palm Beach Post, 1/12/02] Informant Randy Glass plays a key role in the sting, and has thirteen felony fraud charges against him reduced as a result, serving only seven months in prison. Federal agents involved in the case later express puzzlement that Washington higher-ups didn't make the case a higher priority, pointing out that bin Laden could have gotten a nuclear bomb if the deal was for real. Agents on the case complain that the FBI didn't make the case a counter-terrorism matter, which would have improved bureaucratic backing and opened access to FBI information and US intelligence from around the world. [Washington Post, 8/2/02 (B), MSNBC, 8/2/02] Federal agents frequently couldn't get prosecutors to approve wiretaps. [Cox News, 8/2/02] Glass says, “Wouldn't you think that there should have been a wire tap on Diaa [Mohsen]'s phone and Malik's phone?” [WPBF Channel 25, 8/5/02] An FBI supervisor in Miami refused to front money for the sting, forcing agents to use money from US Customs and even Glass's own money to help keep the sting going. [Cox News 8/2/02]

June 27, 2001
The Wall Street Journal reports that Pakistan and India are discussing jointly building a gas pipeline from Central Asian gas fields through Iran. This would circumvent the difficulties of building the pipeline through Afghanistan. [Wall Street Journal, 6/27/01] Iran has been secretly supporting the Northern Alliance to keep Afghanistan divided so no pipelines could be put through it (see December 20, 1999). Presumably the US government would be opposed to this, since much of its support for Afghanistan pipelines has been to prevent them from going through Iran (see Early 1998).


Late September-Early October 2001
According to a later Mirror article, leaders of Pakistan's two Islamic parties negotiate bin Laden's extradition to Pakistan to stand trial for the 9/11 attacks. Bin Laden would be held under house arrest in Peshawar and would face an international tribunal, which would decide whether to try him or hand him over to the US. According to reports in Pakistan (and the Telegraph), this plan has both bin Laden's approval and that of Taliban leader Mullah Omar. However, the plan is vetoed by Pakistan's president Musharraf who says he “could not guarantee bin Laden's safety.” But it appears the US did not want the deal: a US official later says that “casting our objectives too narrowly”risked “a premature collapse of the international effort [to overthrow the Taliban] if by some lucky chance Mr. bin Laden was captured.” [Mirror 7/8/02]



Late June 2001
White House National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Richard Clarke, gives a direct warning to the FAA to increase security measures in light of an impending terrorist attack. The FAA refuses to take such measures. [New
Summer 2001 (D)
Egyptian investigators track down a close associate of bin Laden named Ahmed al-Khadir, wanted for bombing the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad in 1995. Egyptians surround the safe house in Pakistan where al-Khadir is hiding. They notify the ISI to help arrest him, and the ISI promises swift action. Instead, a car sent by the ISI filled with Taliban and having diplomatic plates arrives, grabs al-Khadir and drives him to safety in Afghanistan. Time magazine later brings up the incident to show the strong ties between the ISI and both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. [Time 5/6/02] Yorker 1/14/02]




Summer 2001 (E)
Supposedly, by this time there are only fourteen fighter planes on active alert to defend the continental US (and six more defending Canada and Alaska). [Bergen Record 12/5/03] But in the months before 9/11, rather than increase the number, the Pentagon was planning to reduce the number still further. Just after 9/11, the Los Angeles Times reported, “While defense officials say a decision had not yet been made, a reduction in air defenses had been gaining currency in recent months among task forces assigned by [Defense Secretary] Rumsfeld to put together recommendations for a reassessment of the military.” By comparison, in the Cold War atmosphere of the 1950s, the US had thousands of fighters on alert throughout the US. [Los Angeles Times, 9/15/01 (B)] As late as 1998, there were 175 fighters on alert status. [Bergen Record 12/5/03] Also during this time, FAA officials try to dispense with “primary” radars altogether, so that if a plane were to turn its transponder off, no radar could see it. NORAD rejects the proposal

July 2001
The CIA hears an individual who had recently been in Afghanistan say, “Everyone is talking about an impending attack.” [Senate Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02, Washington Post, 9/19/02] The Telegraph later reports that “the idea of an attack on a skyscraper was discussed among [bin Laden's] supporters in Kabul.” At some unspecified point before 9/11, a neighbor in Kabul saw diagrams showing a skyscraper attack in a house known as a “nerve center” for al-Qaeda activity. [Telegraph, 11/16/01] US soldiers will later find forged visas, altered passports, listings of Florida flight schools and registration papers for a flight simulator in al-Qaeda houses in Afghanistan. [New York Times, 12/6/01] Bin Laden bodyguard later claims that in May 2001 he hears bin Laden tell people in Afghanistan that the US would be hit with a terrorist attack, and thousands would die. [Guardian 11/28/01] CIA Director Tenet later claims that the 9/11 plot was “in the heads of three or four people.” [USA Today 2/7/02]


July 4, 2001
Hijacker Khalid Almihdhar reenters the US. The CIA and FBI have recently been showing interest in him (see May 15, 2001 and June 11, 2001), but have still failed to place him on a terrorist watch list. Had he been placed on a watch list by this date, he would have been stopped and possibly detained as he tried to enter the US. He enters on a new US visa obtained in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on June 13, 2001 (see also May 2001 (H)). [Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] The FBI notes he returns just days after the last of the hijacker “muscle” has entered the US (see April 23-June 29, 2001), and speculate he returns because his job in bringing them over is finished. [Congressional Inquiry 7/24/03]

Juli 4-14, 2001
Bin Laden, America's most wanted criminal with a $5 million bounty on his head, supposedly receives lifesaving treatment for renal failure from American surgeon specialist Dr. Callaway at the American hospital in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. He is possibly accompanied by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri (who is said to be bin Laden's personal physician, al-Qaeda's second-in-command, and leader of Egypt's Islamic Jihad), plus several bodyguards. Callaway supposedly treated bin Laden in 1996 and 1998, also in Dubai. Callaway later refuses to answer any questions on this matter. [Le Figaro 10/31/01; Agence France-Presse 11/1/01; London Times 11/01/01] During his stay, bin Laden is visited by “several members of his family and Saudi personalities,” including Prince Turki al Faisal, then head of Saudi intelligence, as well as two CIA officers (see also July 12, 2001). [Guardian, 11/1/01] [FTW] The explosive story is widely reported in Europe, but barely at all in the US (possibly only by UPI [UPI, 11/1/01]). French terrorism expert Antoine Sfeir says the story of this meeting has been verified and is not surprising: It “is nothing extraordinary. Bin Laden maintained contacts with the CIA up to 1998. These contacts have not ceased since bin Laden settled in Afghanistan. Up to the last moment, CIA agents hoped that bin Laden would return to the fold of the US, as was the case before 1989.” [Le Figaro 11/1/01]

Juli 10; 2001
FBI agent Ken Williams.
Phoenix, Arizona, FBI agent Ken Williams sends a memorandum warning about suspicious activities involving a group of Middle Eastern men taking flight training lessons in Arizona. The memo is titled: “Zakaria Mustapha Soubra; IT-OTHER (Islamic Army of the Caucasus),” because it focuses on Zakaria Soubra, a Lebanese flight student in Prescott, Arizona, and his connection with a terror group in Chechnya that has ties to al-Qaeda. It is subtitled: “Osama bin Laden and Al-Muhjiroun supporters attending civil aviation universities/colleges in Arizona.” [Fortune 5/22/02; Arizona Republic 7/24/03] The memo is based on an investigation Williams had begun the year before (see April 17, 2000), but had trouble pursuing because of the low priority the Arizona FBI office gave terror investigations (see 1994 (C)). In the memo, Williams does the following:
1. Names nine other suspect students from Pakistan, India, Kenya, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, in addition to Soubra. [Die Zeit, 10/1/02] Hijacker Hani Hanjour, attending flight school in Arizona in early 2001, is not mentioned in the memo, but one of his acquaintances is (see 1997-July 2001). Another person on the list is later arrested in Pakistan in 2002 with al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida (see March 28, 2002). [Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03, Washington Post, 7/25/03 (C)]
2. Notes he interviewed some of these students, and heard some of them make hostile comments about the US. He also noticed they were suspiciously well informed about security measures at US airports. [Die Zeit 10/1/02]
3. Notes an increasing, “inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest” taking flight lessons in Arizona. [Die Zeit 10/1/02; Congressional Inquiry 7/24/03]
4. Suspects that some of the 10 people he's investigated are connected to al-Qaeda. [Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] He discovered that one of them was communicating through an intermediary with Abu Zubaida. [San Jose Mercury News 5/23/02] Potentially this is the same member of the list mentioned above who is later captured with Abu Zubaida.
5. Discovers connections between several of the students and a radical group called Al-Muhajiroun. [San Jose Mercury News, 5/23/02] This group supported bin Laden, and issued a fatwa, or call to arms, that included airports on a list of acceptable terror targets. [AP 5/22/02] Soubra, the main focus of the memo, is a member of Al-Muhajiroun and an outspoken radical, but he is later cleared of any ties to terrorism. [Los Angeles Times, 10/28/01 (C)]
6. Warns of a possible “effort by Osama bin Laden to send students to the US to attend civil aviation universities and colleges”[Fortune, 5/22/02], so they can later hijack aircraft. [Die Zeit 10/1/02]
7. Recommends, “The FBI should accumulate a listing of civil aviation universities/colleges around the country. FBI field offices with these types of schools in their area should establish appropriate liaison. FBI [headquarters] should discuss this matter with other elements of the US intelligence community and task the community for any information that supports Phoenix's suspicions.” [Arizona Republic 7/24/03] In fact, the FBI has already done this, but because of poor FBI communications, Williams is not aware of the report (see 1999 (L)).
8. Recommends the FBI ask the State Department to provide visa data on flight school students from Middle Eastern countries so the bureau can track them more easily. [New York Times, 5/4/02]
The memo is e-mailed to six people at FBI headquarters in the bin Laden and radical fundamentalist units, and to two people in the FBI New York field office. [Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] He also shares some concerns with the CIA. [San Jose Mercury News 5/23/02] But the memo is merely marked “routine,” not “urgent.” It is generally ignored, not shared with other FBI offices, and the recommendations are not taken. One colleague in New York replies at the time that the memo is “speculative and not very significant.” [Die Zeit, 10/1/02, Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] Williams also was unaware of many FBI investigations and leads that could have given weight to his memo (see 1998 (F), May 18, 1998, After May 15, 1998, 1999 (L), September 1999 (E), January-February 2001). Authorities later claim Williams was only pursuing a hunch, but one familiar with classified information says, “This was not a vague hunch. He was doing a case on these guys.” [San Jose Mercury News 5/23/02]


July 12, 2001
While in Dubai, United Arab Emirates to receive lifesaving medical treatment (see July 4-14, 2001), Bin Laden supposedly meets with CIA agent Larry Mitchell in the Dubai hospital on this day, and possibly others. Mitchell reportedly lives in Dubai as an Arab specialist under the cover of being a consular agent. The CIA, the Dubai hospital and even bin Laden deny the story. Le Figaro and Radio France International stand by it. [Le Figaro 10/31/01; Radio France International 11/1/01; Reuters 11/10/01] The Guardian claims that the two news organizations that broke the story, Le Figaro and Radio France International, got their information from French intelligence, “which is keen to reveal the ambiguous role of the CIA, and to restrain Washington from extending the war to Iraq and elsewhere.” The Guardian adds that during his stay bin Laden is also visited by a second CIA officer. [Guardian, 11/1/01] On July 15, Larry Mitchell supposedly returns to CIA headquarters to report on his meeting with bin Laden. [Radio France International, 11/1/01]


July 12, 2001 (B)
On July 5, the CIA briefs Attorney General Ashcroft on the al-Qaeda threat, warning that a significant terrorist attack is imminent, and a strike could occur at any time. [9/11 Commission Report, 4/13/04 (B)] On this day, acting FBI Director Tom Pickard briefs Attorney General Ashcroft about the terror threat inside the US. Pickard later swears under oath that Ashcroft tells him, “he did not want to hear about this anymore.” Ashcroft, also under oath, later categorically denies the allegation, saying, “I did never speak to him saying that I didn't want to hear about terrorism.” However, Ruben Garcia, head of the Criminal Division, and another senior FBI official corroborate Pickard's account. Ashcroft's account is supported by his top aide, but another official Ashcroft's office claimed would also support Ashcroft's account says he can't remember what happened. Pickard briefs Ashcroft on terrorism four more times that summer, but he never mentions al-Qaeda to Ashcroft again before 9/11. [MSNBC, 6/22/04] Pickard later makes an appeal to Ashcroft for more counterterrorism funding; Ashcroft rejects the appeal on September 10, 2001. [9/11 Commission Report, 4/13/04] Picard later says, “Before September 11th, I couldn't get half an hour on terrorism with Ashcroft. He was only interested in three things: guns, drugs, and civil rights.”





July 16, 2001
British spy agencies send a report to British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other top officials warning that al-Qaeda is in “the final stages” of preparing a terrorist attack in the West. The prediction is “based on intelligence gleaned not just from MI6 and GCHQ but also from US agencies, including the CIA and the National Security Agency,” which cooperate with the British. “The contents of the July 16 warning would have been passed to the Americans, Whitehall sources confirmed.” The report states there is “an acute awareness” that the attack is “a very serious threat.” [London Times, 6/14/02] This information could be from or in addition to a warning based on surveillance of al-Qaeda prisoner Khalid al-Fawwaz (see August 21, 2001). [Fox News 5/17/02]


July 16, 2001 (B)
A Village Voice reporter is told by a New York taxi driver, “You know, I am leaving the country and going home to Egypt sometime in late August or September. I have gotten e-mails from people I know saying that Osama bin Laden has planned big terrorist attacks for New York and Washington for that time. It will not be safe here then.” He does in fact return to Egypt for that time period. The FBI isn't told about this lead until after 9/11. He is later interrogated by the FBI and released. He claims what he knew was known by many. [Village Voice 9/25/02 (B)]




July 21, 2001
Three American officials, Tom Simons (former US Ambassador to Pakistan), Karl Inderfurth (former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs) and Lee Coldren (former State Department expert on South Asia) meet with Pakistani and Russian intelligence officers in a Berlin hotel. [Salon, 8/16/02] It is the third of a series of back-channel conferences called “brainstorming on Afghanistan.” Taliban representatives sat in on previous meetings, but boycotted this one due to worsening tensions. However, the Pakistani ISI relays information from the meeting to the Taliban. [Guardian, 9/22/01] At the meeting, former US State Department official Lee Coldren passes on a message from Bush officials. He later says, “I think there was some discussion of the fact that the United States was so disgusted with the Taliban that they might be considering some military action.” [Guardian, 9/26/01] Accounts vary, but former Pakistani Foreign Secretary Niaz Naik later says he is told by senior American officials at the meeting that military action to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan is planned to “take place before the snows started falling in Afghanistan, by the middle of October at the latest.” The goal is to kill or capture both bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar, topple the Taliban regime and install a transitional government of moderate Afghans in its place. Uzbekistan and Russia would also participate (see also December 19, 2000, March 15, 2001 and June 26, 2001). Naik also says “it was doubtful that Washington would drop its plan even if bin Laden were to be surrendered immediately by the Taliban.” [BBC, 9/18/01] One specific threat made at this meeting is that the Taliban can choose between “carpets of bombs” —an invasion— or “carpets of gold” —the pipeline. [Bin Laden: The Forbidden Truth] Niaz Naik says Tom Simons made the “carpets”statement. Simons claims: “It's possible that a mischievous American participant, after several drinks, may have thought it smart to evoke gold carpets and carpet bombs. Even Americans can't resist the temptation to be mischievous.” Naik and the American participants deny that the pipeline was an issue at the meeting. [Salon 8/16/02]


July 26, 2001
CBS News reports that Attorney General Ashcroft has stopped flying commercial airlines due to a threat assessment, but “neither the FBI nor the Justice Department … would identify [to CBS] what the threat was, when it was detected or who made it.” [CBS, 7/26/01] FTW “Ashcroft demonstrated an amazing lack of curiosity when asked if he knew anything about the threat. ‘Frankly, I don't,’ he told reporters.” [San Francisco Chronicle 6/3/02] It is later reported that he stopped flying in July based on threat assessments made on May 8 and June 19. In May 2002 its claimed the threat assessment had nothing to do with al-Qaeda, but Ashcroft walked out of his office rather than answer questions about it. [AP, 5/16/02] The San Francisco Chronicle concludes, “The FBI obviously knew something was in the wind … The FBI did advise Ashcroft to stay off commercial aircraft. The rest of us just had to take our chances.” [San Francisco Chronicle, 6/3/02] CBS's Dan Rather later says of this warning: “Why wasn't it shared with the public at large?” [Washington Post 5/27/02]


Late summer 2001
Jordanian intelligence (the GID) makes a communications intercept deemed so important that King Abdullah's men relay it to Washington, probably through the CIA station in Amman. To make doubly sure the message gets through it is passed through an Arab intermediary to a German intelligence agent. The message states that a major attack, code named The Big Wedding, is planned inside the US and that aircraft will be used. “When it became clear that the information was embarrassing to Bush Administration officials and congressmen who at first denied that there had been any such warnings before September 11, senior Jordanian officials backed away from their earlier confirmations.” Christian Science Monitor calls the story “confidently authenticated” even though Jordan has backed away from it. [International Herald Tribune, 5/21/02, ]

Late July 2001
David Schippers, noted conservative Chicago lawyer and the House Judiciary Committee's chief investigator in the Clinton impeachment trial, claims two days after 9/11 that he had tried to warn federal authorities about plans to strike buildings in lower Manhattan. Schippers says, “I was trying to get people to listen to me because I had heard that the terrorists had set up a three-pronged attack:” an American airplane, the bombing of a federal building in the heartland and a massive attack in lower Manhattan. He tries contacting Attorney General John Ashcroft, the White House, and even the House managers with whom he had worked, but nobody returns his phone calls. “People thought I was crazy. What I was doing was I was calling everybody I knew telling them that this has happened,” he says. “I'm telling you the more I see of the stuff that's coming out, if the FBI had even been awake they would have seen it.” He also claims to know of ignored warnings about the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and evidence that Middle Easterners were connected with that attack. [Indianapolis Star, 5/18/02] Other mainstream sources have apparently shied away from Schippers' story, but he has added details in an interview on the partisan Alex Jones Show. He claims that it is FBI agents in Chicago and Minnesota who first contact him and tell him that a terrorist attack is going to occur in lower Manhattan. A group of these agents now want to testify about what they know, but want legal protection from government retribution. [Alex Jones Show 10/10/01]

August-October 2001
British intelligence asks India for legal assistance in catching Saeed Sheikh sometime during August 2001. Saeed has been openly living in Pakistan since 1999 and has even traveled to Britain at least twice during that time (see January 1, 2000-September 11, 2001), despite having kidnapped Britons and Americans (see June 1993-October 1994). [London Times, 4/21/02, Vanity Fair, 8/02] According to the Indian media, informants in Germany tell the internal security service there that Saeed helped fund hijacker Mohamed Atta (see Early August 2001 (D)). [Frontline, 10/6/01] On September 23, it is revealed that the British have asked India for help in finding Saeed, but it isn't explained why. [London Times, 9/23/01] His role in training the hijackers and financing the 9/11 attacks soon becomes public knowledge, though some elements are disputed (see September 24, 2001-December 26, 2002). [Telegraph, 9/30/01, CNN, 10/6/01, CNN, 10/8/01] The Gulf News claims that the US freezes the assets of Pakistani terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad on October 12, 2001 because it has established links between Saeed Sheikh and 9/11 (see October 12, 2001). [Gulf News 10/11/01] However, in October, an Indian magazine notes, “Curiously, there seems to have been little international pressure on Pakistan to hand [Saeed] over” [Frontline, 10/6/01], and the US doesn't formally ask Pakistan for help to find Saeed until January 2002 (see November 2001-February 5, 2002).


August 2001 (I)
The US receives intelligence that bin Laden's right-hand man, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is receiving medical treatment at a clinic in San'a, Yemen. However, the Bush administration rejects a plan to capture him, as officials are not 100 percent sure the patient is al-Zawahiri. Officials later regret the missed opportunity. [ABC News 2/20/02]


August 2001
Randy Glass, a former con artist turned government informant, later claims that he contacts the staff of Senator Bob Graham and Representative Robert Wexler at this time and warns them of a plan to attack the WTC, but his warnings are ignored. [Palm Beach Post 10/17/02] Glass also tells the media at this time that his recently concluded informant work has “far greater ramifications than have so far been revealed,” and “potentially, thousands of lives [are] at risk.” [South Florida Sun-Sentinel 8/7/01] Glass was a key informant in a sting operation involving ISI agents trying to illegally purchase sophisticated US military weaponry in return for cash and heroin (see June 12, 2001). He claims that in 1999, one ISI agent named Rajaa Gulum Abbas pointed to the WTC and said, “Those towers are coming down”(see July 14, 1999). [Palm Beach Post 10/17/02] Most details remain sealed, but Glass points out that his sentencing document dated June 15, 2001, lists threats against the World Trade Center and Americans. [WPBF Channel 25 8/5/02] Florida State Senator Ron Klein, who had dealings with Glass before 9/11, says he is surprised it took so many months for the US to listen to Glass: “Shame on us.” [Palm Beach Post, 10/17/02] Senator Graham acknowledges that his office had contact with Glass before 9/11, and was told about a WTC attack: “I was concerned about that and a dozen other pieces of information which emanated from the summer of 2001.” But Graham later says he personally was unaware of Glass's information until after 9/11. [Palm Beach Post 10/17/02] In October 2002, Glass testifies under oath before a private session of the Congressional 9/11 inquiry. He states, “I told [the inquiry] I have specific evidence, and I can document it.” [Palm Beach Post, 10/17/02]


August 2001



A Raytheon 727 lands in New Mexico in August, 2001.
The US company Raytheon lands a 727 six times in a military base in New Mexico without any pilots on board. This is done to test equipment making future hijackings more difficult, by allowing ground control to take over the flying of a hijacked plane. [AP 10/2/01 (C); Der Spiegel 10/28/01] Several Raytheon employees with possible ties to this remote control technology program appear to have been on the hijacked 9/11 flight (see September 25, 2001). However, most media reports after 9/11 suggest such technology is currently impossible. For instance, the Observer quotes an expert who says “the technology is pretty much there” but still untried. [Observer 9/16/01] An aviation-security expert at Jane's Defence Weekly says this type of technology belongs “in the realms of science fiction.” [Financial Times, 9/18/01 (B), Economist, 9/20/01] Even Bush appears to deny the technology current exists. He gives a speech after 9/11 in which he mentions that the government would give grants to research “new technology, probably far in the future, allowing air traffic controllers to land distressed planes by remote control.” [New York Times 9/28/01]


August 2001 (B)
At least six 9/11 hijackers, including all of those that boarded Flight 77, live in Laurel, Maryland from about this time. They reportedly include Hani Hanjour, Majed Moqed, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi and Salem Alhazmi (though also see Early September 2001). Laurel, Maryland is home to a Muslim cleric named Moataz Al-Hallak who teaches at a local Islamic school and has been linked to bin Laden. He has testified three times before a grand jury investigating bin Laden. NSA expert James Bamford later states, “the terrorist cell that eventually took over the airliner that crashed into the Pentagon ended up living, working, planning and developing all their activities in Laurel, Maryland, which happens to be the home of the NSA. So they were actually living alongside NSA employees as they were plotting all these things.” [Washington Post 9/19/01; BBC 6/21/02]


Early August 2001 (B)
AP later reports that the “CIA had developed general information a month before the attacks that heightened concerns that bin Laden and his followers were increasingly determined to strike on US soil.” A CIA official affirmed that: “There was something specific in early August that said to us that [bin Laden] was determined in striking on US soil.” A major excuse given since 9/11 is that the Bush administration was focused on overseas attacks, and didn't expect a domestic attack (for instance see May 16, 2002 (B)). [AP 10/3/01]


August 2, 2001
Christina Rocca, the Director of Asian Affairs at the State Department, secretly meets the Taliban ambassador in Islamabad, apparently in a last ditch attempt to secure a pipeline deal. Rocca was previously in charge of contacts with Islamic guerrilla groups at the CIA, and oversaw the delivery of Stinger missiles to Afghan mujaheddin in the 1980s. [Irish Times, 11/19/01, Salon, 2/8/02, Bin Laden: The Forbidden Truth] [FTW


August 4, 2001
President Bush sends a letter to Pakistani President Musharraf, warning him about supporting the Taliban. However, the tone is similar to past requests dating to the Clinton administration. There had been some discussion that US policy toward Pakistan should change. For instance, At the end of June, counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke “urged that the United States think about what it would do after the next attack, and then take that position with Pakistan now, before the attack.” Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage later acknowledges that a new approach to Pakistan had not yet been implemented by 9/11. [9/11 Commission Report 3/24/04]




August 6, 2001


President Bush receives a classified intelligence briefing at his Crawford, Texas ranch indicating that bin Laden might be planning to hijack commercial airliners. The memo read to him is titled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US.” The entire memo focuses on the possibility of terrorist attacks inside the US.[Newsweek, 5/27/02, New York Times, 5/15/02] A page and a half of the contents are released after National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice testifies to the 9/11 Commission [Washington Post, 4/10/04]. The 9/11 Congressional inquiry call it “a closely held intelligence report for senior government officials” presented in early August 2001. Rice testifies that the memo is mostly historic regarding bin Laden's previous activities and she says it contains no specific information that would have prevented an attack. The memo, as released, includes at least the following information:
1. Bin Laden has wanted to conduct attacks inside the US since 1997.
2. “Members of al-Qaeda, including some US citizens, [have] resided in or travelled to the US for years and the group apparently maintain[s] a support structure” in the US.
3. A discussion of the arrest of Ahmed Ressam (see December 14, 1999) and the 1998 US embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998).
4. Uncorroborated information obtained in 1998 that bin Laden wants to hijack airplanes to gain the release of US-held extremists such as Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman (see July 1990).
5. Information acquired in May 2001 indicating al-Qaeda is planning to infiltrate the US from Canada and attack the US using high explosives (see May 2001 (B)).
6. “FBI judgments about patterns of activity consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks.”
7. The number of on-going bin Laden-related investigations. [Senate Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02, Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03]
Incredibly, the New York Times later reports that Bush “[breaks] off from work early and [spends] most of the day fishing” (see also August 4-30, 2001). [New York Times 5/25/02] The existence of this memo is kept secret, until it is leaked in May 2002, causing a storm of controversy (see May 15, 2002). National Security Advisor Rice gives an inaccurate description of the memo, claiming it is only one and a half pages long (other accounts state it is 11 and a half pages instead of the usual two or three). [Newsweek 5/27/02; New York Times 5/15/02; Die Zeit 10/1/02] She falsely claims, “It was an analytic report that talked about [bin Laden]'s methods of operation, talked about what he had done historically, in 1997, in 1998…. I want to reiterate, it was not a warning. There was no specific time, place, or method mentioned.” [White House 5/16/02]



August 7, 2001
One day after Bush receives a Presidential Daily Briefing entitled, “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US” (see August 6, 2001), a version of the same material is given to other top government officials. But this Senior Executive Intelligence Brief or SEIB, doesn't the most important information from Bush's briefing. It doesn't mention that there are 70 FBI investigations into possible al-Qaeda activity, doesn't mention a May 2001 threat of US-based explosives attacks (see May 2001 (B)), and doesn't mention FBI concerns about recent casing of buildings in New York City (see May 30, 2001). Typically, this type of memo “goes to scores of Cabinet-agency officials from the assistant secretary level up and doesn't include raw intelligence or sensitive information about ongoing law enforcement matters,” according to the Associated Press. Some members of Congress express concern that policy makers were given an incomplete view of the terrorist threat. [AP 4/13/04 (B)]


August 13-15, 2001
Zacarias Moussaoui trains at the Pan Am International Flight School in Minneapolis, Minnesota, where he pays $8,300 ($1500 by credit card and the remainder in cash) to use a Boeing 474 Model 400 aircraft simulator. After just one day of training most of the staff is suspicious that he's a terrorist. They discuss “how much fuel [is] on board a 747-400 and how much damage that could cause if it hit[s] anything.” They call the FBI with their concerns later that day. [New York Times, 2/8/02, Senate Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02] They are suspicious because:
1. In contrast to all the other students at this high-level flight school, he has no aviation background, little previous training and no pilot's license. [ Senate Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02]
2. He wants to fly a 747 not because he plans to be a pilot, but as an “ego boosting thing.” [New York Times, 10/18/02] Yet within hours of his arrival, it is clear he “was not some affluent joy-rider.” [New York Times, 2/8/02]
3. He is “extremely” interested in the operation of the plane's doors and control panel. [Senate Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02] He also is very keen on learning the protocol for communicating with the flight tower despite having no plans to actually become a pilot. [New York Times, 2/8/02]
4. He is evasive and belligerent when asked about his background. When an instructor, who notes from his records that Moussaoui is from France, attempts to greet him in French, Moussaoui appears not to understand, saying that he had spent very little time in France and that he is from the Middle East. The instructor considers it odd that Moussaoui did not specify the Middle Eastern country. [Minneapolis St. Paul Star Tribune, 12/21/01; Washington Post, 1/2/02]
5. He tells a flight instructor he is not a Muslim, but the instructor senses he is lying, badly, about it. [New Yorker, 9/30/02]
6. He says he would “love” to fly a simulated flight from London to New York, raising fears he has plans to hijack such a flight. [Senate Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02] His original e-mail to the flight school similarly stated he wanted to be good enough to fly from London to New York. [New York Times, 2/8/02]
7. He pays for thousands of dollars in expenses from a large wad of cash. [New York Times, 2/8/02]
8. He seemed to be trying to pack a large amount of training in a short period of time for no apparent reason. [New York Times, 2/8/02]
9. He mostly practices flying in the air, not taking off or landing (although note that reports claiming he didn't want to take off or land at all appear to be an exaggeration). [New York Times, 2/8/02, Slate, 5/21/02, Minneapolis St. Paul Star Tribune, 12/21/01, New York Times, 5/22/02]
Failing to get much initial interest from the FBI, the flight instructor tells the FBI agents, “Do you realize how serious this is? This man wants training on a 747. A 747 fully loaded with fuel could be used as a weapon!” [New York Times 2/8/02]



August 19, 2001
The New York Times reports that counter-terrorism expert John O'Neill is under investigation for an incident involving a missing briefcase. [New York Times, 8/19/01] In July 2000, he misplaced a briefcase containing important classified information, but it was found a couple of hours later still unlocked and untouched. Why such a trivial issue would come up over a year later and be published in the New York Times seemed entirely due to politics. Says the New Yorker, “The leak seemed to be timed to destroy O'Neill's chance of being confirmed for [an] NSC job,” and force him into retirement. A high-ranking colleague says the leak was “somebody being pretty vicious to John.” [New Yorker, 1/14/02] John O'Neill suspects the article was orchestrated by his enemy Tom Pickard, then interim director of the FBI. [PBS Frontline, 10/3/02 (B)] The New Yorker later speculates that with the retirement of FBI Director Freeh in June, it appears O'Neill lost his friends in high places, and the new FBI Director wanted him replaced with a Bush ally. [New Yorker, 1/14/02] O'Neill quits a few days later (see August 22, 2001 (B)).


August 21, 2001



Left to right: Khalid al-Fawwaz, Adel Abdel Bary and Ibrahim Ediarous.
Walid Arkeh, a Jordanian serving time in a Florida prison, is interviewed by FBI agents after warning the government of an impending terrorist attack. He had been in a British jail from September 2000 to July 2001, and while there had befriended three inmates, Khalid al-Fawwaz, Adel Abdel Bary and Ibrahim Eidarous. US prosecutors charge that “the three men ran a London storefront that served as a cover for al-Qaeda operations and acted as a conduit for communications between bin Laden and his network.” [Orlando Sentinel, 10/30/02] Al-Fawwaz was bin Laden's press agent in London, and bin Laden had called him over 200 times before al-Fawwaz was arrested in 1998. [Financial Times, 11/29/01 (B), Sunday Times, 3/24/02] The other two had worked in the same office as al-Fawwaz. All three have been indicted as co-conspirators with bin Laden in the 1998 US embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998). Arkeh tells the FBI that he had learned from these three that “something big was going to happen in New York City,” and that they had called the 1993 attack on the WTC “unfinished business.” Tampa FBI agents determine that he had associated with these al-Qaeda agents, but nonetheless they don't believe him. According to Arkeh, one agent responds to his “something big”warning by saying: “Is that all you have? That's old news.” The agents fail to learn more from him. On September 9, concerned that time is running out, a fellow prisoner tried to arrange a meeting, but nothing happens before 9/11. The Tampa FBI agents have a second interview with him hours after the 9/11 attacks, but even long after 9/11 they claim he cannot be believed. On January 6, 2002, the Tampa FBI issued a statement: “The information [was] vetted to FBI New York, the Acting Special Agent in Charge of the Tampa Division and the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Florida. All agreed the information provided by this individual was vague and unsubstantiated… Mr. Arkeh did not provide information that had any bearing on the FBI preventing September 11. ” [Orlando Sentinel, 1/6/02, Orlando Sentinel, 10/30/02]


August 23, 2001
According to German newspapers, the Mossad gives the CIA a list of terrorists living in the US and say that they appear to be planning to carry out an attack in the near future. It is unknown if these are the 19 9/11 hijackers or if the number is a coincidence. However, four names on the list are known and are names of the 9/11 hijackers: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, and Mohamed Atta. [Die Zeit 10/1/02; Der Spiegel 10/1/02; BBC 10/2/02; Ha'aretz 10/3/02] The Mossad appears to have learned about this through its “art student” spy ring (see for instance, March 5, 2002). Yet apparently this warning and list are not treated as particularly urgent by the CIA and also not passed on to the FBI. It's not clear if this warning influenced the adding of Alhazmi and Almihdhar to a terrorism watch list on this same day, and if so, why only those two. [Der Spiegel 10/1/02] Israel has denied that there were any Mossad agents in the US. [Ha'aretz, 10/3/02] The US has denied knowing about Atta before 9/11, despite other media reports to the contrary (see January-May 2000)


August 23-27, 2001
In the wake of the French intelligence report on Zacarias Moussaoui (see August 22, 2001), FBI agents in Minnesota are “in a frenzy” and “absolutely convinced he [is] planning to do something with a plane.” One agent writes notes speculating Moussaoui might “fly something into the World Trade Center.” [Newsweek, 5/20/02] Minnesota FBI agents become “desperate to search the computer lap top” and “conduct a more thorough search of his personal effects,” especially since Moussaoui acted as if he was hiding something important in the laptop when arrested. [Time, 5/21/02, Time, 5/27/02] FTW They decide to apply for a search warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). “FISA allows the FBI to carry out wiretaps and searches that would otherwise be unconstitutional” because “the goal is to gather intelligence, not evidence.” [Washington Post, 11/4/01] Standards to get a warrant through FISA are so low that out of 10,000 requests over more than 20 years, not a single one was turned down. When the FBI didn't have a strong enough case, it appears it simply lied to FISA. In May 2002, the FISA court complained that the FBI had lied in at least 75 warrant cases during the Clinton administration, once even by the FBI Director. [New York Times, 8/27/02] However, as FBI agent Coleen Rowley later puts it, FBI headquarters “almost inexplicably, throw[s] up roadblocks” and undermines their efforts. Headquarters personnel bring up “almost ridiculous questions in their apparent efforts to undermine the probable cause.” One Minneapolis agent's e-mail says FBI headquarters is “setting this up for failure.” That turns out to be correct (see August 28, 2001 (D)). [Time 5/21/02; Time 5/27/02]


August 23, 2001 (D)
The FBI begins a search for hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar in response to a CIA cable about them (see August 23, 2001 (C)). The FBI later claims that they responded aggressively. An internal review after 9/11 found that “everything was done that could have been done” to find them. [Los Angeles Times 10/28/01] However, even aside from a failed attempt to start a criminal investigation (see August 28, 2001), the search is halfhearted at best. As the Wall Street Journal later explains, the search “consisted of little more than entering their names in a nationwide law enforcement database that would have triggered red flags if they were taken into custody for some other reason.” [Wall Street Journal, 9/17/01] A national motor vehicle index is checked, but a speeding ticket issued to Alhazmi the previous April is not detected. [Daily Oklahoman, 1/20/02, Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] Nor is a recorded interaction between Alhazmi and local police in Fairfax, Virginia in May that could have led investigators to Alhazmi's East Coast apartment. [San Diego Union-Tribune,9/27/02] Even though the two were known to have entered the US through Los Angeles, drivers' license records in California are not checked. The FBI also fails to check national credit card or bank account databases, and car registration. All of these would had positive results. Alhazmi's name was even in the 2000-2001 San Diego phone book, listing the address where he and Almihdhar may have been living off and on until about September 9, 2001 (see Early February-Summer 2000 and Early September 2001). [Newsweek 6/2/02; South Florida Sun-Sentinel 9/28/01; Los Angeles Times 10/28/01]


August 23 or 24, 2001
CIA Director Tenet and CIA senior staff are briefed about the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui (see August 15, 2001) in a briefing entitled “Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly.” However, apparently others such as President Bush and the White House counterterrorism group are not told about Moussaoui until after the 9/11 attacks begin. Even the acting director of the FBI is not told, despite the fact that it was lower level FBI officials who made the arrest and tried to pass on the information. Tenet later maintains there was no reason to alert President Bush or to share information about Moussaoui during an early September 2001 Cabinet-level meeting on terrorism (see September 4, 2001 (C)), saying, “All I can tell you is, it wasn't the appropriate place. I just can't take you any farther than that.” [Washington Post 4/17/04]


August 24, 2001 (B)
Hijacker Khalid Almihdhar buys his 9/11 plane ticket on-line using a credit card; Nawaf Alhazmi does the same the next day. [Congressional Inquiry, 9/26/02] Both men are put on a terrorist watch list this same day (see August 23, 2001 (C)), but the watch list only means they will be stopped if trying to enter or leave the US. Procedures are in place for law enforcement agencies to share watch list information with airlines and airports and such sharing is common, but the FAA and the airlines are not notified about this case, so the purchases raise no red flags. [Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01 (C)] An official later states that had the FAA been properly warned, “they should have been picked up in the reservation process.” [Washington Post 10/2/02]


Late August 2001 (D)
French intelligence gives a general terrorist warning to the US; apparently its contents echo an Israeli warning from earlier in the month (see August 8-15, 2001). [Fox News 5/17/02]


August 28, 2001
A report is sent to the FBI's New York office recommending that an investigation be launched “to determine if [Khalid] Almihdhar is still in the United States.” The New York office tries to convince FBI headquarters to open a criminal investigation, but are immediately turned down. The reason given is a “wall” between criminal and intelligence work—Almihdhar could not be tied to the USS Cole investigation without the inclusion of sensitive intelligence information. [Congressional Inquiry, 9/20/02] So instead of a criminal case, the New York office opens an “intelligence case”, excluding all the “criminal case” investigators from the search. [FBI Agent Testimony, 9/20/02] One FBI agent expresses his frustration in an e-mail the next day, saying, “Whatever has happened to this—someday someone will die—and wall or not—the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain ‘problems.’ Let's hope the [FBI's] National Security Law Unit will stand behind their decisions then, especially since the biggest threat to us now, UBL [Usama bin Laden], is getting the most ‘protection.’ ” [New York Times 9/21/02; FBI Agent Testimony 9/20/02]

August 28, 2001 (C)
Hijacker Atta is able to buy his flight ticket, despite being wanted by police for driving without a license (see April 26, 2001) and violating visa regulations. He should have been wanted for sabotaging a stalled aircraft (see December 26, 2000) as well, [Australian Broadcasting Corp. 11/12/01]
August 28-30, 2001
Senator Bob Graham (D), Representative Porter Goss (R) and Senator John Kyl (R) travel to Pakistan and meet with President Musharraf. They reportedly discuss various security issues, including the possible extradition of bin Laden. They also meet with Abdul Salam Zaeef, the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan. Zaeef apparently tells them that the Taliban want to solve the issue of bin Laden through negotiations with the US. Pakistan says it wants to stay out of the bin Laden issue. All three are meeting with ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed in Washington at the time of the 9/11 attacks (see September 11, 2001 (H)). Mahmood gave $100,000 to hijacker Mohamed Atta (see October 7, 2001). [AFP, 8/28/01, Salon, 9/14/01]

September 4-11, 2001
ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed visits Washington for the second time (see April 4, 2000). On September 10, a Pakistani newspaper reports on his trip so far. It says his visit has “triggered speculation about the agenda of his mysterious meetings at the Pentagon and National Security Council” as well as meetings with CIA Director Tenet, unspecified officials at the White House and the Pentagon, and his “most important meeting” with Mark Grossman, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The article suggests that “of course, Osama bin Laden” could be the focus of some discussions. Prophetically, the article adds, “What added interest to his visit is the history of such visits. Last time [his] predecessor was [in Washington], the domestic [Pakistani] politics turned topsy-turvy within days.” [The News, 9/10/01] This is a reference to the Musharraf coup just after a ISI Director's visit (see October 12, 1999). Mahmood is meeting in Washington when the 9/11 attacks begin (see September 11, 2001 (H)), and extends his stay until September 16 (see September 11-16, 2001).




September 4, 2001 (B)
FBI headquarters dispatches a message to the entire US intelligence community about the Zacarias Moussaoui investigation. According to a later Congressional inquiry, the message notes “that Moussaoui was being held in custody but [it doesn't] describe any particular threat that the FBI thought he posed, for example, whether he might be connected to a larger plot. [It also does] not recommend that the addressees take any action or look for any additional indicators of a terrorist attack, nor [does] it provide any analysis of a possible hijacking threat or provide any specific warnings.” [Congressional Intelligence Committee, 9/24/02] The FAA is also given the warning, but the FAA decides not to issue a security alert to the nation's airports. An FAA spokesman says, “He was in jail and there was no evidence he was connected to other people.” [New York Post, 5/21/02] This is in sharp contrast to an internal CIA warning sent out earlier based on even less information (see August 24, 2001), which stated Moussaoui might be “involved in a larger plot to target airlines traveling from Europe to the US.” [Senate Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02] It turns out that prior to this point terrorist Ahmed Ressam (see December 14, 1999) had started cooperating with investigators. He had trained with Moussaoui in Afghanistan and willingly shared this information after 9/11. The FBI dispatch, with its notable lack of urgency and details, failed to prompt the agents in Seattle holding Ressam to ask him about Moussaoui. Had the connection between these two been learned before 9/11, presumably the search warrant for Moussaoui would have been approved and the 9/11 plot might have unraveled. [Sunday Times 2/3/02]




September 6-10, 2001
Suspicious trading occurs on American and United, the two airlines used in the 9/11 attacks. “Between 6 and 7 September, The Chicago Board Options Exchange saw purchases of 4,744 put option contracts [a speculation that the stock will go down] in UAL versus 396 call options—where a speculator bets on a price rising. Holders of the put options would have netted a profit of $5 million once the carrier's share price dived after September 11. On 10 September, more trading in Chicago saw the purchase of 4,516 put options in American Airlines, the other airline involved in the hijackings. This compares with a mere 748 call options in American purchased that day. Investigators cannot help but notice that no other airlines saw such trading in their put options.” One analyst says: “I saw put-call numbers higher than I've ever seen in 10 years of following the markets, particularly the options markets.” [Associated Press, 9/18/01, San Francisco Chronicle, 9/19/01] “To the embarrassment of investigators, it has also emerged that the firm used to buy many of the ‘put’ options … on United Airlines stock was headed until 1998 by ‘Buzzy’ Krongard, now executive director of the CIA.” Krongard was chairman of Alex Brown Inc., which was bought by Deutsche Bank. “His last post before resigning to take his senior role in the CIA was to head Bankers Trust—Alex Brown's private client business, dealing with the accounts and investments of wealthy customers around the world.” [Independent, 10/14/01]


September 6-10, 2001 (B)
The Chicago Board Options Exchange sees suspicious trading on Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley, two of the largest WTC tenants. An average of 3,053 put options in Merrill Lynch are bought between September 6-10, compared to an average of 252 in the previous week. Merrill Lynch, another WTC tenant, see 12,215 put options bought between September 7-10, when the previous days had seen averages of 252 contracts a day. [Independent, 10/14/01] Dylan Ratigan of Bloomberg Business News: “This would be one of the most extraordinary coincidences in the history of mankind if it was a coincidence.” [ABC News, 9/20/01]

September 6, 2001
Antoinette DiLorenzo, teaching English to a class of Pakistani immigrants, asks a student gazing out the window, “What are you looking at?” The student points towards the WTC, and says: “Do you see those two buildings? They won't be standing there next week.” At the time, nothing was thought of it, but on September 13 the FBI interviews all the people in the classroom and confirms the event. The FBI later places the boy's family under surveillance but apparently are unable to find a connection to the 9/11 plot. An MSNBC reporter later sets out to disprove this “urban myth,” but to his surprise finds all the details of the story are confirmed. The fact that the family are recent immigrants from Pakistan might mean the information came from Pakistan. [MSNBC, 10/12/01] Supposedly, on November 9, 2001, the same student says there will be a plane crash on November 12. On that day, American Airlines Flight 587 crashes on takeoff from New York, killing 260 people. Investigators believe it was an accident. One official at the school says many Arab-American students have come forward with their own stories about having prior knowledge before 9/11: “Kids are telling us that the attacks didn't surprise them. This was a nicely protected little secret that circulated in the community around here.” [Insight 9/10/02]




September 7, 2001 (D)
One of the first and most frequently told stories about the hijackers is their visit to Shuckums, a sports bar in Hollywood, Florida on this day. What's particularly interesting about this story is how it has changed over time. In the original story, first reported on September 12 [AP, 9/12/01 (E)], Atta, Marwan Alshehhi and an unidentified man come into the restaurant already drunk. “They were wasted,” says bartender Patricia Idrissi, who directs them to a nearby Chinese restaurant. [St. Petersburg Times, 9/27/01] Later they return and drink—Atta having five vodka and orange juices, and Alshehhi five rum and Cokes. [Time, 9/24/01] Says manager Tony Amos: “The guy Mohamed was drunk, his voice was slurred and he had a thick accent.”Idrissi says they argue about the bill, and when she asks if there was a problem, “Mohamed said he worked for American Airlines and he could pay his bill.” [AP, 9/12/01 (E)] This story was widely reported through much of September (for instance, see [New York Times, 9/13/01 (E), Sunday Herald, 9/16/01, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/15/01, Miami Herald, 9/22/01, Newsweek, 9/17/01, Time, 9/24/01]). But starting on September 15, a second story appears. [Toronto Star, 9/15/01] It's the same as the first, except Atta is playing video games and drinking cranberry juice instead of vodka, and Alshehhi is the one who argues over the bill and pays. After some coexistence, the second story seems to have become predominant in later September (for instance, see [Washington Post, 9/16/01 (C), Washington Post, 9/22/01, Los Angeles Times, 9/27/01, St. Petersburg Times, 9/27/01, Australian Broadcasting Corp., 11/12/01, Sunday Times, 2/3/02]).

September 9, 2001 (E)
Hijacker Ziad Jarrah is stopped in Maryland for speeding, ticketed and released. No red flags show up when his name is run through the computer by the state police. However, he already had been questioned in United Arab Emirates at the request of the CIA for “suspected involvement in terrorist activities”(see January 30, 2001). Baltimore's mayor has criticized the CIA for not informing them that Jarrah was on the CIA's watch list. [Chicago Tribune 12/14/01; AP 12/14/01] The CIA calls the whole story “flatly untrue.” [CNN 8/1/02]

September 9, 2001 (C)
It is later reported that on this day, bin Laden calls his stepmother and says, “In two days, you're going to hear big news and you're not going to hear from me for a while.” US officials later tell CNN that “in recent years they've been able to monitor some of bin Laden's telephone communications with his [step]mother. Bin Laden at the time was using a satellite telephone, and the signals were intercepted and sometimes recorded.” [New York Times 10/2/01] Stepmother Al-Khalifa bin Laden, who raised Osama bin Laden after his natural mother died, was apparently waiting in Damascus, Syria, to meet Osama there, so he called to cancel the meeting. [Sunday Herald, 10/7/01] They had met periodically in recent years (see Spring 1998, Spring 2000 (C) and February 26, 2001). Before 9/11, to impress important visitors, NSA analysts would occasionally play audio tapes of bin Laden talking to his stepmother. The next day government officials say about the call, “I would view those reports with skepticism.” [CNN 10/2/01]



September 10, 2001 (I)
According to CBS News, in the afternoon before the attack, “alarm bells were sounding over unusual trading in the US stock options market.”It has been documented that the CIA, the Mossad and many other intelligence agencies monitor stock trading in real time using highly advanced programs such as Promis. Both the FBI and the Justice Department have confirmed the use of such programs for US intelligence gathering through at least this summer. This would confirm that CIA should have had additional advance warning of imminent attacks against American and United Airlines planes. [CBS, 9/19/01] There are even allegations that bin Laden was able to get a copy of Promis. [Fox News, 10/16/01]


September 10, 2001 (M)
US officials later admit American agents had infiltrated al-Qaeda cells in the US, though how many and how long they had been in al-Qaeda remains a mystery. On this day, electronic intercepts connected to these undercover agents hear messages such as: “Watch the news” and “Tomorrow will be a great day for us.” As to why this didn't lead to boosted security or warnings the next day, officials call these leads “needles in a haystack.” What other leads may have come from this prior to this day are not revealed. [USA Today, 6/4/02] At least until February 2002, the official story was that the “CIA failed to penetrate al-Qaeda with a single agent.” [ABC News, 2/18/02]



September 10, 2001 (L)
At least two messages in Arabic are intercepted by the NSA. One states “The match is about to begin” (bin Laden apparently uses football metaphors in many messages) and the other states “Tomorrow is zero hour.” Later reports [Reuters, 9/9/02] translate the first message as “The match begins tomorrow.” They were sent between someone in Saudi Arabia and someone in Afghanistan. The NSA claims that they weren't translated until September 12, and that even if they were translated in time, “they gave no clues that authorities could have acted on.” [ABC News, 6/7/02, Reuters, 6/19/02] These turn out to be only two of about 30 pre-9/11 communications from suspected al-Qaeda operatives or other militants referring to an imminent event. An anonymous official says of these messages, including the “Tomorrow is zero hour” message, “You can't dismiss any of them, but it doesn't tell you tomorrow is the day.” [Reuters, 9/9/02] There is a later attempt to explain them away by suggesting they refer to the killing of Afghani opposition leader Ahmed Shah Massoud the day before (see September 9, 2001). [Reuters, 10/17/02]

Wees eens een beetje snugger de volgende keer en geef enkel de link ok!!!!!!
Dan moet niet iedereen hier uren zitten scrollen.

[illwill]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door exodus

Kijk naar mijn bovenste post, dit is geen klein wit bolletje.

Nee, inderdaad het is meer dan enkel een bolletje, lol.
Er is geen reet op te zien verdomme. Kan het nog waziger zou ik zeggen?
Maar goed, geef de link naar het volledige filmpje aub.

[exodus]

Ik heb de link gegeven enkele posts terug. Die heb jij duidelijk gemist. Zie enkele posts terug voor uitleg:

http://www.thewebfairy.com/911/letsr...een%20High.wmv

[democratsteve]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door TomB

Tot dusver Steve's reactie op een post van een aantal bladzijden.

Dit is zo oneerlijk! Het is juist jij die steeds niets meer van zich laat horen wanneer z’n uitspraken worden weerlegd.
Ten tweede, je bent een zeer slechte verliezer Tomb. Nog nooit heb ik je weten toegeven dat je ernaast zat met een bepaalde stelling.
Je verdwijnt gewoon wanneer je zonder argumentatie valt.
In deze topic is het weer van ’t zelfde. Eerst ruk je bepaalde quotes volledig uit verband en koppelt daar conclusies aan die de poster zelf niet heeft beweerd, om vervolgens de woorden van de poster in het belachelijke te trekken.
Ik herinner me een topic van een jaar geleden waarin ik uitvoerig Gore Vidal citeerde en de mantel uitveegde met Bush. Een post van meer dan 200 lijnen. Jij en je vriendje Antoon doen vervolgens 4 pagina’s niets anders dan lachen met een schrijffout in de titel en steeds terugkomen op één enkel zinnetje uit de post, (een percentage dat niet klopte). Toen ik vroeg of dat het enige was wat je op die hele post te vertellen had , antwoordde je:

Tomb:
Ik zal eens inhoudelijk reageren op uw propaganda ook, maar wel niet dezemiddag. Kijk morgen nog eens.
__________________


Dit was de laatste post op die tread en dat is ondertussen een jaar geleden.
Ik ga er dus maar vanuit dat je geen argumenten hebt gevonden op mijn propaganda.
Maar als je toch zo graag van antwoord wordt gediend, zal ik even je quotes behandelen vooraleer verder te gaan.
Btw, je vind het toch niet erg hoop ik dat ik even denigrerende taal gebruik als jij?

Citaat:
Trouwens, de 2 boeings die zich in de WTC-torens hebben geboord werden NIET door piloten bestuurd, maar door REMOTE CONTROL!!
Nu zullen er hier wel een aantal de wenkbrauwen fronzen, maar ik wil ze er graag even op wijzen dat al in 1955 de eerste boeing met remotecontrol een feit was. Jaja, die “domme” Amerikanen hé.
Alleen NORAD heeft de middelen maar het is absoluut mogelijk een boeing uit handen van de piloot te halen en over te schakelen op remotecontrol.

Tomb:
Maar volgens u leven er dus nog ergens meer als 600 Amerikaanse families, die officieel nu dood zijn, maar allemaal mee in het complot zitten. Samen uiteraard met een paar honderd man personeel van American Airlines, alle tracking organizaties voor vluchten, nog een paar honderd van de Federal Aviation Administration en verder nog een tiental andere organizaties die hierbij betrokken waren. Waterdicht!

-Onnozele stommerik! Waarom zouden die passagiers en familieleden nu in hemelsnaam mee in het complot moeten zitten? Leg me dat eens uit. Je bent niet de enige die telkens weer aanhaalt hoeveel mensen in het complot zouden moeten zitten en hoeveel personen zouden moeten omgekocht zijn. Maar mag ik jou dan vragen hoeveel personeel AlQaida zou moeten omgekocht hebben om de aanslagen te kunnen uitvoeren?? Zoals ik eerder al zei, laat ons de zaak eens omkeren en kijken naar de huidige versie van de regering.

Citaat:
Vaak hebben we gelezen over de hoge moeilijkheidsgraad van de fatale vluchten. 'Colonel Donn de Grand Pre (US Army - Rtd.)' schrijft na een marathonvergadering van 72 uur met een 'dedicated group of experienced civilian and military pilots, including combat fighter pilots and commercial airline captains': 'The extremely skillful maneuvering of the three aircraft at near mach speeds, each unerringly hitting their targets, was superb. As one Air Force officer -- a veteran of over 100 sorties over North Vietnam -- explained, "Those birds (commercial airliners) either had a crack fighter pilot in the left seat, or they were being maneuvered by remote control."
Captain Kent Hill (retd.) of the US Air Force, and friend of Chic Burlingame, the pilot of the plane that crashed into the Pentagon, stated that the US had on several occasions flown an unmanned aircraft, similar in size to a Boeing 737, across the Pacific from Edwards Air Force base in California to South Australia. According to Hill it had flown on a pre programmed flight path under the control of a pilot in an outside station. Hill also quoted Bob Ayling, former British Airways boss, in an interview given to the London Economist on September 20th, 2001. Ayling admitted that it was now possible to control an aircraft in flight from either the ground or in the air. This was confirmed by expert witnesses at the inquiry who testified that airliners could be controlled by electro-magnetic pulse or radio frequency instrumentation from command and control platforms based either in the air or at ground level.' Sterker: 'So far, the company, QinetiQ, formerly British's defence and research agency, has developed the technology that would allow a pilot to control up to five aircraft during a mission, without needing to constantly keep a check on them, the New Scientist reported.' The News haakt hierop in: 'During the press conference Captain Hill maintained that the four airliners must have been choreographed by an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). This system can engage several aircraft simultaneously by knocking out their on-board flight controls.'

Tomb:
Eh, je verwart autoland en autopilot avionics met 'remote control'. Het is idd mogelijk om vanop de grond een vliegtuig te besturen, maar dat is niet gemakkelijker dan erin te zitten, dat is een pak moeilijker. Het verhaal spreekt zichzelf tegen.

-Weeral sla je de bal compleet mis. Lees de commentaren van de Noradpiloten. Je kan als piloot nu eenmaal niet met een boeing dezelfde strapatsen uithalen, als wat met remote-control wél mogelijk is.

Citaat:
Even een terzijdse opmerking van de nederige auteur.
De video’s waarin Bin Laden zich uitlaat over de aanslagen, zijn heel de wereld rondgegaan.
Iedereen heeft ze gezien en beluisterd. Mij viel maar één zinnetje op.
Toen hij zei dat de meeste van de terroristen niet eens wisten wat te gebeuren stond.
Tuurlijk wisten ze van niks. Ze dachten op dat moment dat een “wargame” was.

Tomb:
Welke terroristen? Hierboven zeg je me dat het allemaal remote control was.

-Dit bedoel ik nou met uit verband halen. Het één heeft toch niets te maken met het ander. Ja, er waren kapers. En kan het dan niet dat nadien de toestellen alsnog overgeschakeld zijn op remote-control. Om de eenvoudige reden dat datgene wat moest uitgevoerd worden een te hoge moeilijkheidsgraad bevatte. Trouwens, het is hier al aangehaald: wie zegt dat de kapers op de hoogte waren van wat er daadwerkelijk te gebeuren te stond?

Citaat:
Ik ga er eventjes vanuit dat de geachte lezers op de hoogte zijn, dat NORAD die zelfde ochtend (zelfde tijdstip) een “drill” hield? Laat ik er meteen bijvertellen dat vice-president Cheney die ochtend Supervizer was van die “oefening”.
De ènige reden waarom NORAD niet ingreep, was omdat ze hen op dat eigenste moment vertelden dat het “deel van de oefening” was!
Opnieuw terzijde, wil ik me even richten tot diegenen die alleen maar “conspiracytheorie” roepen, zonder verder ook maar een zinvolle bijdrage te leveren.

Tomb:
De reden waarom Norad niet ingreep is omdat er 1000 passagiers in drie gekaapte vliegtuigen zaten en er geen enkel precedent was om aan te nemen dat die vliegtuigkaping niet zou kunnen behandeld worden zoals andere vliegtuigkapingen, die traditioneel ergens landen en eisen beginnen stellen.

-De reden waarom Norad niet ingreep kennen we ondertussen. Lees het 9/11 report.

Citaat:
Iedereen zou zo graag weten door w�*t het Pentagon is geraakt. Dat het geen boeing was, weten we bijna zeker. BIJNA! But hey! We KUNNEN het te weten komen.
De bewakingscamera’s hebben het op film. Alleen, we kunnen de films niet zien, want ze zijn door de FBI in beslag genomen, onmiddellijk na de crash.
Heeft de 9/11-commissie die tapes mogen zien? Nope!

Tomb:
Waarom zou het geen boeiing zijn? Omwille van dat sprookje over de vleugels die niet zouden passen in het gat? Vliegtuigvleugels moeten per designafscheuren bij impact. Misschien omwille van dat sprookje dat er geen brokstukken liggen op het gras voor het pentagon? Komkomkom, die vertelseltjes zijn gemaakt door mensen die nog niet eens een basiskennis hebben over de luchtvaart.

-Kun jij eigenlijk LEZEN, of lees je echt alleen maar wat je WIL lezen??? Hier staat toch duidelijk BIJNA zeker. Vervolgens wordt er afgevraagd waarom die beelden van de beveiligingscamera’s niet worden vrijgegeven, zodat we het WEL zeker zouden kunnen weten?? Maar daar ga je wijselijk niet op in.
Citaat:
Kijk, ik ben geen blinde gelover in “conspiracytheories”, maar zouden jullie niet allemaal graag een antwoord hebben op deze vraag?? Het ligt daar tenslotte ergens in een lade.

Tomb:
Die vragen hebben allemaal een zeer logische en voor de hand liggende uitleg, waarvoor de conspiratisten meestal geen oog hebben.

-Waarom beantwoord jij ze dan niet? Ik zal de moeite doen om in de komende posts nog eens enkele vragen naar voor te brengen. Benieuwd of je zal hier zijn om ze te beantwoorden.


Citaat:
Men hoort hier wel eens zeggen, “ Ze (Amerikanen) hebben de terroristen zelf opgeleid.
Hier interpreteert men dat als, ze hebben ze opgeleid tijdens de oorlog tegen de Russen , maar mag ik er even opwijzen dat M. Atta op de paylist stond van de CIA tot aan z’n dood.
Atta werd tijdens de weken voorafgaand aan 9/11intensief getraind IN DE VS door de CIA!

Tomb:
Ah ja? Ik denk eerder dat men als men die opmerking maakt refereert naar het feit dat de VS een traditie heeft van het opleiden en bewapenen van temporary allies van verdacht allooi die dan vroeg of laat van mening veranderen en diezelfde kennis en wapens tegen de VS gebruiken.

-Wrong again vriend. Dit refereert helemaal niet naar wat jij denkt. Nogmaals, leer lezen!! Als de CIA director himself toegeeft dat er dubbelspionnen bij AlQaida worden gerecruteerd en je leest de citaten in de twee geposte timelines, is het overduidelijk dat CIA-agenten en bepaalde AlQaida-leden samenwerken.

Citaat:
Laat me daar nog aan toevoegen dat in Juni en Juli 2001 Bin Laden en het hoofd van de CIA mekaar hebben gesproken in een Amerikaans militair hospitaal waar hij behandeld werd voor z’n nierproblemen. Weeral bestaan er officiële documenten die dit bevestigen.

Tomb:
Neen, er bestaat een onbevestigde claim van le Figaro dat een CIA operative met Bin Laden zou gesproken hebben, en niet in een militair hospitaal, en zeker niet in een Amerikaans. De mug is in vijf posts een olifant geworden. Grappig.

-Helemaal niet grappig Tomb, want je zit er voor de zoveelste keer in één post, flagrant naast. Ten eerste is de claim helemaal niet “onbevestigd”. Je moet natuurlijk ook eens naar iets anders dan Fox TV kijken hé, dan zou weten je dat zowel persagentschap Reuters, The Guardian, Radio France Int. en de Franse veiligheidsdiensten dit bevestigd hebben. The CIA onkent gewoon botweg het verhaal. Meer niet. Maar als jij verkiest de CIA-woordvoerder te geloven, dan doe je maar. Hoever je daar mee komt zie je wel in het vervolg van deze post.

Citaat:
En wij hier maar denken dat de VS al jaren jacht maakte op Bin Laden. Tot slot wil ik nog even de flagrante leugens van Bush en C. Rice aanhalen uit hun eerste persconferenties na 9/11. Tot vervelens toe was te horen, “ Ja, er waren wel aanwijzingen voor dreigende aanslagen maar wie had er ooit aan kunnen denken dat ze vliegtuigen in gebouwen zouden laten crashen!!” Wel, ik ben even aan het tellen gegaan en ik kom aan 18 radio-uitzendingen, 4 tv-uitzendingen en 23 krantenartikels waar uitgebreid wordt gediscusieerd over de mogelijkheid om vliegtuigen op gebouwen te laten neerstorten.
Daar komt nog bij dat NORAD al van in 1996 meerdere malen oefeningen hebben gehouden die van dit scenario uitgingen. Dus waar heeft Bush het in hemelsnaam over als hij zegt dat met dit scenario totaal geen rekening is gehouden!!?

Tomb:
Het is niet omdat een mogelijkheid bestaat, dat het evident is om de beslissing te nemen 1000 mensen uit de lucht te schieten. Je kan trouwens die beslissing politiek onmogelijk nemen in een pre 911 tijdsgeest. Als je dat niet begrijpt, is uw politiek inzicht nul komma nul, wat me eigenlijk niet zou verbazen na het lezen van zoveel onzin.

-Ondertussen weten we ALLEMAAL dat PRE-9/11 het WEL mogelijk was dat Norad in bepaalde omstandigheden een vliegtuig zou neerhalen.!!!! Dus wie z’n politiek inzicht is hier nu nul komma nul?


.Enfin, terug over tot de orde van de dag.
Ik wil graag de discussie over een andere boeg gooien. Er werd hier meermaals gevraagd om eens met bewijzen te komen en toen zei ik al, waarom eens niet naar de “bewijzen” van de regering kijken? .
Sinds deze zomer hebben we het rapport van de 9/11-commissie, en als je dit eens gaat vergelijken met eerdere verklaringen van de betrokkenen, kom je toch wel tot enkele rare vaststellingen. Ik heb hier o.a. gehoord dat voor elke theorie van de cospiratisten, een hele simpele verklaring is. Wel, ik heb hier een lijstje met bepaalde vragen, toevalligheden, tegenstrijdigheden, verdachte verklaringen en flagrante leugens. Ik ga er af en toe eentje uitpikken en hier plaatsen.

1. Gedurende de eerste dagen na 11 september heerst er een totale “airban”.
Geen enkel prive-vliegtuig krijgt toestemming om te vliegen en de enkelen die het toch proberen worden al na enkele minuten door fighters gedwongen om terug te landen. Vandaag weten we dat Saudi’s het land hebben verlaten gedurende die periode en de FBI heeft ondertussen ook een enigsinds plausibele verklaring gegeven voor dit feit.
Wat ondertussen wel iedereen schijnt vergeten te zijn, is de oorspronkele versie van de autoriteiten. Laat ons even terug gaan in de tijd:
Op 5 oktober 2001 verschijnt in de Tampa Tribune het bericht dat privejets met aan boord enkele Saudi’s de airban hebben geschonden. Ze vragen zich ook af hoe zoiets kan?
2 jaar aan een stuk wordt dit bericht uit de Tampa in alle toonaarden ontkent door FAA, FBI en White House!! Het bericht wordt afgedaan als een Urban legend en een journalist van Fox beledigd zelfs openlijk de schrijver van het stuk.
Het Witte Huis is formeel dat in geen enkel geval de “airban has violated in anyway”.
Wanneer er echter overduidelijk bewijsmateriaal wordt gevonden, geeft Richard Clark in 2003!! eindelijk het bestaan van de vluchten toe. Dit wordt later nog eens bevestigd door Colin Powell. De nieuwe versie van de FBI luidt dat de Saudi’s, confirm de geplogenheden, zijn ondervraagd voor hun vertrek, maar ook deze versie is ondertussen ontkracht door verschillende getuigenissen van de betrokken passagiers.

FAA, FBI én regering hebben dus twee jaar lang gelogen over dit feit.
Probleem is natuurlijk, als je eenmaal begint te liegen is het einde gauw zoek. Je moet om de haverklap je versie aanpassen en je loopt het risico dat pientere journalisten de tegenstrijdigheden in je verhalen ontdekken. En da’s nou net wat met 911 aan het gebeuren is. Van de versie van de regering blijft ondertussen geen spaander meer heel.
Dus wederom heeft dit niets te maken met geloven in conspiracytheorieën, maar een nuchtere vaststelling van welbepaalde feiten.

Dus om te besluiten:
Vaststelling: FAA, FBI en de Bushadministration hebben het publiek gedurende 2 jaar belogen.
Vraag: a) Waarom hebben ze daarover gelogen?
b) Waarom genoten deze mensen een privilege dat geen enkele andere Amerikaan(hoe belangrijk z’n functie ook was) zich op dat moment kon veroorloven?
c) Waarom zijn familieleden en kennissen van de vermoedelijke daders niet ondervraagd, terwijl zoiets standardprocedure is bij een misdaad en waarom liegt de FBI in hun nieuwe versie opnieuw?

[maddox]

Trouwens, de 2 boeings die zich in de WTC-torens hebben geboord werden NIET door piloten bestuurd, maar door REMOTE CONTROL!!
Nu zullen er hier wel een aantal de wenkbrauwen fronzen, maar ik wil ze er graag even op wijzen dat al in 1955 de eerste boeing met remotecontrol een feit was. Jaja, die “domme” Amerikanen hé.
Alleen NORAD heeft de middelen maar het is absoluut mogelijk een boeing uit handen van de piloot te halen en over te schakelen op remotecontrol.

Och ja, die omgebouwde onbemande raketlancerende holografische Ex tankvliegtuigen([size=1]met 2 motoren missende[/size]) op radiografische bediening op 3000 km afstand.
Dan kunnen ze beter de besturing van een kruisraket gebruiken. Da's gekende, redelijk betaalbare technologie.

Tomb:
Eh, je verwart autoland en autopilot avionics met 'remote control'. Het is idd mogelijk om vanop de grond een vliegtuig te besturen, maar dat is niet gemakkelijker dan erin te zitten, dat is een pak moeilijker. Het verhaal spreekt zichzelf tegen.

Demoncrat Steve-Weeral sla je de bal compleet mis. Lees de commentaren van de Noradpiloten. Je kan als piloot nu eenmaal niet met een boeing dezelfde strapatsen uithalen, als wat met remote-control wél mogelijk is.

Ok, we hebben een radioverbinding van 3000 km, dus dat wil zeggen 6000 km heen en terug. Zelfs met lichtsnelheid geeft dat een meetbaar tijdsverschil. dan de electronica die minstens een reactietijd vraagt van minstens, de door mij gekende, 0.008 seconden.([size=1]ik ben nogal veel bezig met RC spullen, en de reele waarde is meer naar de 0.04 seconden op[/size])
En als je de zekerdere, moeilijker onderschepbare, of stoorbare satelietverbinding gebruikt word het alleen maar groter, dat tijdsverschil.
En dan nog eens de vliegeigenschappen van een volgeladen 767.
Welke strapatsen ga je beter vanop afstand kunnen uithalen dan een piloot aan de knuppel, die een beter overzicht heeft, en ook een directere link voelt met het vliegtuig. Ook ga je godsonmogelijk alle info die de piloot voelt niet kunnen doorsturen naar de comfortabel gezeten RC piloot, 3000 km verderop.

Ook, en dat is wat TomB ook weet, een piloot kan ten alle tijden de electronica overriden.Soort van hetzelfde idee als de cruisecontrole op een wagen.

Och kom, de helft van die conspiracy theorieën worden toch ontkracht door logica en technische kennis. En de andere helft door idioten die ze geloven en tot in den treure volgen.
Zoals ik al zei, de US heeft de deathstar gebouwd, en gaat nu The Empire zijn.Hun eerste doel, hun economisch centrum in het midden van hun grootste stad.

[exodus]

Het is ongelooflijk welke ignorantie hier door sommige personen tentoongespreid wordt. Ze trekken het in het belachelijke, zo'n belangrijk onderwerp, omdat ze gewoonweg denken dat dit niet kan. Hun is teveel voor hun voorstellingsvermogen. Ik kan alleen maar vaststellen dat ze gecondiotneerd zijn in niet te geloven dat een regering zoeits niets kan doen tegen hun volk. Wel, lees eens uw geschiedenis.

[maddox]

Exobug, als je mij beschuldigd van onwetendheid, dan moet ik je teleurstellen. Als technieker werkende met moderne technologieën ,en bedenker van nieuwe toepassingen weet ik toch een beetje van wat mogelijk is.
Van TomB kan ik alleen zeggen dat ie veel weet van de luchtvaart.En toch zien we als mensen met een technische achtergrond veel zaken hetzelfde. Raar he.

Ik ga er alleen van uit dat de VS overheid beter weet, en meer kent dan ik.
Dus als ik al gaten, haken en ogen zie in de meeste theorieën, dan denk ik persoonlijk het mijne ervan.

Daarvoor moet ik niet gehersenspoeld of een dwangmatig US volgelingetje zijn.

Eigenlijk, ik ben tegen democratie, en de huidige vorm in de VS al helemaal. Dat hypocriet gebeuren.En eigenlijk, de Belgische versie is al even hatelijk.

[democratsteve]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door maddox

Och kom, de helft van die conspiracy theorieën worden toch ontkracht door logica en technische kennis. En de andere helft door idioten die ze geloven en tot in den treure volgen.
Zoals ik al zei, de US heeft de deathstar gebouwd, en gaat nu The Empire zijn.Hun eerste doel, hun economisch centrum in het midden van hun grootste stad.

Ik ben hier niet een cospiracytheorie aan 't verdedigen. Lees m'n post nog eens terug hierboven (niet de antwoorden op Tomb).
Ik beschuldig Bush, CIA en FBI van andere dingen! Dingen waar wél bewijzen van bestaan. Zoals hierboven een eerste voorbeeld van velen.

[straddle]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door democratsteve

je bent een zeer slechte verliezer Tomb. Nog nooit heb ik je weten toegeven dat je ernaast zat met een bepaalde stelling.
Je verdwijnt gewoon wanneer je zonder argumentatie valt.
In deze topic is het weer van ’t zelfde. Eerst ruk je bepaalde quotes volledig uit verband en koppelt daar conclusies aan die de poster zelf niet heeft beweerd, om vervolgens de woorden van de poster in het belachelijke te trekken.

Offtopic...

Tiens tiens, dat is mij met Tomb ook al overkomen ... Ik kan het niet nalaten dit ter morele ondersteuning van Democratsteve (wiens ideeën ik anders niet altijd deel) te bevestigen...

http://forum.politics.be/showthread....951#post586951

Ik vond zijn reactie toen ook uitermate belachelijk en misplaatst.

Soit, ik wil de discussie niet onderbreken...

[illwill]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door exodus

Die kwaliteit is zo laag in mijn avater omdat het een GIF animatie is, het kan niet beter. Hier kan je een beter overzicht hebben.
Vanuit verschillende hoeken:
http://www.thewebfairy.com/911/letsr...een%20High.wmv

Dit is bewijs dat zegt dat dit niet door terroristen met kartonsnijders kan komen, en geen veronderstelling.
Er zijn er nog met betere kwaliteit zoals in films over 9/11 en op dvd's van CNN over 9/11. Dit is minder omdat het voor het web is. Ik zag het op 11 september laatst ook in het nieuws van vrt. Je kon het zelfs zien aan de gewone snelheid, heel even. Dit is niet getrukeerd.

Let er ook op het onbekende object onderaan het vliegtuig, en hoe die flash perfect in het verlengde van dat object ligt.

Ook dit filetje heb ik nu gezien...ik weet niet wat jij daar van kunt uitmaken é, het enigste wat je duidelijk kunt opmaken na het zien van die beelden is dat er niets uit op te maken valt. Er is gewoonweg niets te zien kerel!

Wat is het bewijs dat dit niet door terroristen kan komen?
Was jij ook niet degene die niets van CNN geloofde?
Onbekende object? Perfect in het verlengde van dat object? Mooie uitleg overgenomen van jou sites.

[illwill]

Oorspronkelijk geplaatst door exodus

Het is ongelooflijk welke ignorantie hier door sommige personen tentoongespreid wordt. Ze trekken het in het belachelijke, zo'n belangrijk onderwerp, omdat ze gewoonweg denken dat dit niet kan. Hun is teveel voor hun voorstellingsvermogen. Ik kan alleen maar vaststellen dat ze gecondiotneerd zijn in niet te geloven dat een regering zoeits niets kan doen tegen hun volk. Wel, lees eens uw geschiedenis.

De reden hiervoor is dat er enkel een hoop beweringen zijn die gewoonweg niet ondersteund kunnen worden, daarnaast zijn nog de beweringen die zeer duidelijk leugens zijn (kernexplosie), en dan zijn er ook nog dingen zoals een wit bolletje waar men zomaar een raket van maakt. Gewoonweg belachelijk. En dan nog andere beweringen zoals die van zogezegde gevechtspiloten (wacht nog steeds op de naam). Maar dan nog het meest ongeloofwaardige van allemaal is dat men gewoonweg teveel mensen nodig heeft gehad die erbij betrokken moesten zijn op verschillende plaatsen. Zowiezo kan het niet dat al deze personen toevallig bereid waren om mee te doen. Echt belachelijk kerel.

Maar goed, je geloofd wat je wil hoor, ik heb gewoonweg een duidelijk bewijs nodig, en niet dingen zoals wazige beelden waar gewoonweg niets op te zien is, ga me niet zeggen dat je echt kunt zien dat het een raket is. Komaan é.

[Funghus]

Wat doe je met de beelden van het Pentagon? Zie je daar een vliegtuig liggen op het gazon?